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This thesis proposes to come to terms with the problem which the idea of
history poses for theology, but it does so primarily through a critical
analysis of the way epistemological dualisms have pre-determined the dis¬
cussion. Part One engages in a critical and methodological study which is
intended to show that the rise of modem philosophy, in attempting to pro¬
vide an epistemological access to reality, provided the intellectual tools
which ultimately led to the rise of modem historical criticism. Further,
it will be seen that these epistemological dualisms (e.g., the distinction
between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact)
underlie the problem which the rise of historical criticism has put to
theology—how can historically-conditioned events which are empirically
uncertain and inconclusive serve as the frame of reference for Christian
faith with its claim to universal and absolute validity? This question
which presupposes a dualistic epistemology is the fundamental and recurring
issue in this thesis. For example, modern philosophy (beginning with
Descartes) sought to establish a basis for the absolute truths of reason
in contrast to the incertitudes of historical knowledge. This quest for
absolute certainty in regard to philosophical knowledge led to such
epistemological dualisms as body-mind, thought and extension, truths of
reason and truths of fact. The consequence of these dualisms led to the
recognition history is characterized by the categories of relativity and
probability. That is, historical events are conditioned according to their
historical setting, and the knowledge of these events are characterized by
varying degrees of probability in sharp contrast to the absolute certainty
of the necessary truths of reason. Thus, the epistemological dualisms
to be considered in Part One provide the central twofold question which
historical criticism has posed to theology—how can historically-conditioned
events (i.e., historical relativity) serve as the point of departure for
Christian faith with its claim to universal and absolute truth? That is
to say, how can historical relativity be reconciled with the claim of
Christian faith that a single event can be absolutely unique? And, how
can the probabilities of historical knowledge be reconciled with the claim
of Christian faith as a historical revelation to have absolute truth?
That is, how can the certitude of faith be maintained over against the
incertitude of historical knowledge?
Part Two is concerned with dualisms in religious epistemology, which
correspond somewhat to the philosophical dualisms articulated in Part One.
That is, even as modern philosophy sought to provide a basis for the
absolute certainty of truth through such distinctions as thought and
extension, truths of reason and truths of fact, even so theology has sought
to provide a basis for the absolute certainty of religious knowledge
through such distinctions as faith and knowledge, Hlstorie and Geschichte,
inner history and outer history, nature and history. The intent of these
related dualisms in religious epistemology is to make room for the
certainty of faith which is threatened by the incertitude of historical
knowledge and the relativity (i.e., the causal nexus) of the historical
process. Thus, these two categories of historical criticism—i.e.,
historical relativity and the probability of historical knowledge—
presuppose the delineation of a dualistic epistemology. For example,
Use other side if necessary.
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with the sharp distinction between the truths of reason and truths of fact,
it was seen that history is characterized by (1) historical relativity (or
contingency) as opposed to the necessary truths of reason and (2) more or
less degrees of probability concerning historical knowledge as opposed to
the absolute certainty of the truths of reason. On the other hand, religious
epistemology developed into a dualism of its own in an attempt to cope
with these two categories of relativity and probability with the result
that the certainty of faith was made independent of the uncertainty of his¬
tory.
Part Three offers a constructive proposal to integrate the twofold aspect
of religious epistemology. It is argued that theology cannot tolerate a
divorce between Historie and Geschichte, faith and knowledge, inner history
and outer history, even as philosophy cannot endure the Kantian divorce
between noumenon and phenomenon. Also, even as theology must not divorce
inner history from outer history, i.e., historical meanings cannot be
divorced from historical facts, even so hermeneutics cannot be divorced
from historical research. Thus, it is argued that the kerygma must be
based upon temporal events which can at least be theoretically verifiable.
This is to acknowledge that the biblical texts intend to "report" events
which really happened. Thus, Part Three is an attempt to "overcome" a
dualistic epistemology. In so doing, it proposes to integrate the her-
meneutical and historical aspects of the idea of revelation, as well as
integrating faith and history, in terms of a theology of universal history.
The term, "hermeneutical," is intended to focus attention upon: (l) the
biblical texts themselves as the linguistic bearers of the interpretation
of certain events which are revelatory, (2) the distance that separates
the biblical texts from the modern age, (3) the resulting necessity for
bridging the distance between the biblical texts and the modern age, and
(4) the epistemological problem of history. The term, "historical," is
intended to focus attention upon: (l) the objective, temporal quality of
history as the bearer of revelatory events, and (2) the necessity for
ascertaining the historical reliability of the events recorded in the
biblical texts. The term, "universal history," is a more comprehensive
concept which intends to bring together both the historical and the her¬




This thesis is concerned with the relationship of theology to the
idea of history. This general theme of "faith and history" has been widely
discussed in modern times with scores of books having been written on the
subject. This interest however shows no signs of abating. Nor should it,
since Christian faith is inextricably linked in its origin with historical
events which serve as its point of departure.
This present work could be judged as another attempt to reconcile
faith with the problems which the idea of history poses. However, much
more than this is intended. What is believed to be of fundamental significance
in this thesis is the unfolding of the epistemological dualisms which serve
as the background both to the rise of the modern historical consciousness
("Der Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins," as Dilthey termed it) and
to the modern view of revelation as the self-revelation of God.
I must thank my supervisor. Professor John Mclntyre, for his generous
assistance in the writing of this thesis—especially in the way of critical
assessment and constructive suggestions. I am also indebted to Mr. D. W. D.
Shaw for the helpful suggestions he made in consultations that I had with
him on several occasions. Mr. J. V. Howard and Mr. I. G. Hope of the New
College Library have given kind assistance in securing books and articles
^Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (Stuttgart; B. G. Teubner,
1958), VII, 105.
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both from within this country and abroad. Finally, without the untiring help
of my wife (including the typing of this final copy of the manuscript) and
her encouragement this thesis would not have been possible.
So far as the style and rules for writing a thesis is concerned, Kate
L. Turabian's A Manual for Writers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1966) has been followed. The spelling of words is in conformity with American
usage. Two final comments should perhaps be made. First, no glossary of
technical words is being given at the outset of this thesis. Rather, the
necessary definition of technical words will be given within the context of
their usage. Second, all italics inside quotations are original with the







PART I. DUALISMS IN PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Chapter
I. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS .... 1J
Descartes: Methodological Skepticism
Pierre Bayle: Historical Positivism
Spinoza: Reason and History
Richard Simon: Faith vs. Historical Certainty
Vlco: A Metaphysic of the Human Race
Leibniz: The Concept of Historical Probability
Lessing: The Fallacy of Misplaced Necessity
Herder: The Categories of Individuality and Relativity
II. TRUTH: SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE? 6l
Kant: An Epistemological Dualism
Hegel: Absolute Knowledge and World History
Hegel's critique of Kant
The objectivity of truth
Hegel's philosophy of world history




IV. HISTORY AND THEOLOGY: A RECAPITULATION OF THE PROBLEM ... 134
PART II. DUALISMS IN RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY
V. THE DUALISM OF KIERKEGAARD 155
Thought and Being
Paragraph-Material and Existential Communication
Quantitative Approximation and Qualitative Dialectic
Faith and Knowledge
Eternity and Time, the Moment and the Historical
God and Man
VI. MARTIN KAHLER: DER HISTORISCHE JESUS UND DER GESCHICHTLICHE
CHRISTUS TT~ 183
VII. KARL BARTH: THE WORD OF GOD AND HISTORY 197
VIII. BULTMANN: THE DIVORCE OF HISTORIE AND GESCHICHTE 215
IX. EBELING: "PURE WORD" AND "MERE FACT" 231
PART III. RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY
X. HISTORY AS THE SEIF -REVELATION OF GOD 242
XI. THE ONTOLOGY OF HISTORY 271
XII. HIST0R7 AND HERMENEUTICS 287
Schleiermacher: The Psychological Interpretation
Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason
Bultmann: The Pre-understanding of Human Existence
Ebeling and Fuchs: Understanding THROUGH Language
Panneriberg: The Integration of History and Hermeneutics
XIII. A THEOLOGY OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY 320
Revelation and the Probabilities of Historical knowledge
History as the Totality of all Reality
An Eschatological Doctrine of Creation
History as the History-of-the-transmission-of-traditions
Universal History and the Problem of Historical Relativity
BIBLIOGRAPHY 389
SUMMARJf
This thesis proposes to come to terms with the problem which the
idea of history poses for theology, but it does so primarily through a
critical analysis of the way epistemological dualisms have pre-determined
the discussion. Part One engages in a critical and methodological study
which is intended to show that the rise of modern philosophy, in attempting
to provide an epistemological access to reality, provided the intellectual
tools which ultimately led to the rise of modern historical criticism. Further,
it will be seen that these epistemological dualisms (e.g., the distinction
between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact)
underlie the problem which the rise of historical criticism has put to
theology—how can historically-conditioned events which are empirically un¬
certain and inconclusive serve as the frame of reference for Christian faith
with its claim to universal and absolute validity? This question which
presupposes a dualistic epistemology is the fundamental and recurring issue
in this thesis. For example, modern philosophy (beginning with Descartes)
sought to establish a basis for the absolute truths of reason in contrast to
the incertitudes of historical knowledge. This quest for absolute certainty
in regard to philosophical knowledge led to such epistemological dualisms as
body-mind, thought and extension, truths of reason and truths of fact. The
consequence of these dualisms led to the recognition history is characterized
by the categories of relativity and probability. That is, historical events
are conditioned according to their historical setting, and the knowledge of
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these events are characterized by varying degrees of probability in sharp
contrast to the absolute certainty of the necessary truths of reason. Thus,
the epistemological dualisms to be considered in Part One provide the central
twofold question which historical criticism has posed to theology—how can
historically-conditioned events (i.e., historical relativity) which are
empirically uncertain and inconclusive (i.e., historical probability) serve
as the point of departure for Christian faith with its claim to universal
and absolute truth? That is to say, how can historical relativity be reconciled
with the claim of Christian faith that a single event can be absolutely unique?
And, how can the probabilities of historical knowledge be reconciled with
the claim of Christian faith as a historical revelation to have absolute truth?
That is, how can the certitude of faith be maintained over against the incer¬
titude of historical knowledge?
Part Two is concerned with dualisms in religious epistemology, which
correspond somewhat to the philosophical dualisms articulated in Part One.
That is, even as modern philosophy sought to provide a basis for the absolute
certainty of truth through such distinctions as thought and extension, truths
of reason and truths of fact, even so theology has sought to provide a basis
for the absolute certainty of religious knowledge through such distinctions
as faith and knowledge, Historie and Geschichte, inner history and outer history,
nature and history. The intent of these related dualisms in religious epis¬
temology is to make room for the certainty of faith which is threatened by
the incertitude of historical knowledge and the relativity (i.e., the causal
nexus) of the historical process. Thus, these two categories of historical
criticism—i.e., historical relativity and the probability of historical knowl¬
edge—presuppose the delineation of a dualistic epistemology. For example,
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with the sharp distinction between the truths of reason and truths of fact,
it was seen that history is characterized by (l) historical relativity (or
contingency) as opposed to the necessary truths of reason and (2) more or less
degrees of probability concerning historical knowledge as opposed to the abso¬
lute certainty of the truths of reason. On the other hand, religious epistemol-
ogy developed into a dualism of its own in an attempt to cope with these two
categories of relativity and probability with the result that the certainty of
faith was made independent of the uncertainty of history.
Part Three offers a constructive proposal to integrate the twofold
aspect of religious epistemology. It is argued that theology cannot tolerate
a divorce between Historie and G-eschichte, faith and knowledge, inner history
and outer history, even as philosophy cannot endure the Kantian divorce between
noumenon and phenomenon. Also, even as theology must not divorce inner history
from outer history, i.e., historical meanings cannot be divorced from histori¬
cal facts, even so hermeneutics cannot be divorced from historical research.
Thus, it is argued that the kerygma must be based upon temporal events which
can at least be theoretically verifiable. This is to acknowledge that the
biblical texts intend to "report" events which really happened. Thus, Part
Three is an attempt to "overcome" a dualistic epistemology. In so doing, it
proposes to integrate the hermeneutical and historical aspects of the idea
of revelation, as well as integrating faith and history, in terms of a theology
of universal history. The term, "hermeneutical," is intended to focus attention
upon: (l) the biblical texts themselves as the linguistic bearers of the
interpretation of certain events which are revelatory, (2) the distance that
separates the biblical texts from the modern age, (3) the resulting necessity
for bridging the distance between the biblical texts and the modern age, and
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(4-) the epistemological problem of history. The term, "historical," is
intended to focus attention upon: (l) the objective, temporal quality of
history as the bearer of revelatory events, and (2) the necessity for ascer¬
taining the historical reliability of the events recorded in the biblical
texts. The term, "universal history," is a more comprehensive concept which




The question of history has become the central issue in contemporary
theology. In contrast to the Barthian theology of revelation, history-
seems to have become the all-embracing category of theology. This can be
seen by Carl Michalson's statement, for example, that nothing should be
claimed for theology at all which is not also history.
The problem of history became acute for Christian theology for the
first time during the middle of the seventeenth century with the application
of historical criticism to Scripture. This rise of historical criticism is
one of the direct results of the rise of modern philosophy with its bifur¬
cation of reality into mind-body (Descartes), necessary truths of reason
and accidental truths of history (Leasing), relation of ideas and matters
of fact (Hume), the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears (Kant),
and thought and being (Hegel). This is to say that this bifurcation of
reality, e.g., into universal reason and contingent facts, provided the
crucial question that historical criticism has posed for theology—how
can historically-conditioned events which are empirically uncertain and
inconclusive serve as the point of departure for Christian faith with its
claim to universal and absolute validity? This is to say, how can the
incertitudes of historical research guarantee the certitude of faith?
This rise of the modem historical consciousness resulted in an




inevitable tension between revelation and history, and it thus challenged
the traditional linking of revelation with the Bible. This tension between
revelation and history can be seen in such distinctions as "faith and
knowledge" (Kant), the "What" and the "How" (Kierkegaard), "Historie" and
"Geschichte" (Kahler and Bultmann), "Deus dixit" and "Paulus dixit" (Barth),
"mere facts" and "pure Word" (Ebeling), "inner and outer history" (H. R.
Niebuhr), and "nature and history" (Michalson). The purpose of these termino¬
logical distinctions (which are to be dealt with in the course of this thesis)
is to protect faith from the onslaughts of historical criticism, for it was
believed that the relativity of history forbade Christian faith from making
absolute claims for such temporal and contingent events as the Christ event.
This is seen in Ernst Troeltsch's opening statement in Die Bedeutung
der Geschlchtlichkelt Jesu fur den Glauben in which he suggests that historical
criticism has brought about the "conclusive dissolution" (endgultlgen
Zersetzung)1 of the traditional historical picture of Jesus. He believes
that historical criticism makes it impossible to speak of any temporal event
as containing absolute significance for all mankind. He writes:
Christianity is not at all merely the production of Jesus, for
Plato and the Stoics and immeasurably popular religious forces
of the world of classical antiquity have had a part in it. So
then the conclusion, which the Christian layman calls as the
eternal, absolute center of salvation for the entire duration
of mankind, appears to be impossible. One cannot say this with
genuine certainty, but it is not probable. The age of mankind
on the earth comes to several hundred thousand years or more.
His future may come still to more hundreds of thousands of
years. It is difficult to bring out a single point of history
within this long time, and specifically to think of a direct
middle point of our individual religious history as the
^Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), P. !•
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exclusive center of all mankind. This looks much too severe
to absolutize our accidental individual surroundings.*
The question which Troeltsch thus poses in the very beginning of his essay
iss "is it possible, then, to speak at all of an inner, substantial meaning
of Jesus for faith?"2
It is particularly this historical relativism articulated by Troeltsch
that serves as the point of departure for existentialist theology to place
the locus of revelation in the moment of faith's decision. In this respect,
3 4
Michalson and Priedrich Gogarten both suggest that theology must begin
with Troeltsch's analysis of the relativism of history. Thus, the termino¬
logical distinctions such as "history" and "nature" (Michalson) serve to
protect faith from the uncertainty and transience of history. This is to say,
for Michalson faith is interested in historical meanings, not in historical
facts."'
David P. Strauss envisaged the rise of historical criticism to mean
that Christian faith is divested entirely of its historical foundation. As
a consequence, he suggested four options for the Christian minister who takes
seriously modern historical studies. (1) He can try the impossible feat of
persuading the church to see the untenability of its historical claim.
(2) He can appear to hold to the historical view of revelation though in
reality he does not. (3) He can leave the pulpit and become a professor.
1 2
Ibid., p. 15. Translation mine. Ibid., pp. 1-2. Translation mine.
^Worldly Theology, pp. 2-3-
\>emythologizing and History, trans. Neville H. Smith (London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1953), PP. 18-19.
"'Michalson, The Rationality of Faith (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, I963), pp. 29, 60.
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(4) He can merely Ignore the historical claims of Christian faith and simply
expound their spiritual significance.
The very one who provided the classical formulation of the J E D P
theory, Julius Wellhausen, felt the full impact what historical criticism
could have for Christian faith. In fact, he could only see em unbridgeable
gap being created between Christian faith and historical studies. It was
for this reason that he resigned from the theological faculty of Heidelberg
2
in 1882, and then transferred to Halle as professor of Semitic languages.
He explained his resignation in a letter this ways
I became a theologian because I was interested in the scientific
treatment of the Bibles it has only gradually dawned upon me
that a professor of theology likewise has the practical task
of preparing students for service in the Evangelical Church,
and that I was not fulfilling this practical task, but rather.
In spite of all reserve on my part, was incapacitating my
hearers for their office.2
Thus, historical criticism with its dualistio view of reality created
a skeptical climate of opinion concerning the hermeneutical validity of
temporal history for Christian faith. It also by implication raised the
question of meaning in history. This is to say that if historical study
rules out the objective revelational character of temporal events that are
so decisive for Christian faith, then history becomes a hermeneutical problem,
and meaningfulness in history must have recourse to a metahistorical realm.
"^David F. Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, fourth
edition, trans. George Eliot (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Company,
1906), pp. 782-784.
Alfred Jepsen, "The Scientific Study of the Old Testament," Essays
on Old Testament Interpretation, ed. Claus Westermann, trans. John Bright
iLondon: SCM Ltd., 1963), pp. 246-247.
^"Wellhausen in Greifswald," Festschrift der Universitait Greifswald,
Vol. II (1956), pp. 47ff., cited by Jepsen, p. 247.
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This is not to impugn the validity of historical criticism. Conversely, it
is to suggest that the strength of Christian faith lies in its historical
quality which is open to critical investigation. However, if this objective
historical quality of Christian faith is looked upon from the perspective of
an extreme dualistic view of reality (as if, for example, existential history
and objective history, or Geschichte and Historie were mutually exclusive
of each other), then the question of the validity of temporal history for
faith seems to be a negative foregone conclusion.
Thus, this thesis proposes to come to terms with the problem which
the idea of history poses for theology, but it will do so primarily through
a critical analysis of the way epistemological dualisms have pre-determined
the discussion. Part One engages in a critical and methodological study
which is intended to show that the rise of modern philosophy, in attempting
to provide an epistemological access to reality, provided the intellectual
tools which ultimately led to the rise of modern historical criticism.
Further, it will be seen that these epistemological dualisms (e.g., the
distinction between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths
of fact) underlie the twofold problem which the rise of historical criticism
has put to theology—how can historically-conditioned events which are
empirically uncertain and inconclusive serve as the frame of reference for
Christian faith with its claim to universal and absolute validity? This
question which thus presupposes a dualistic epistemology is the fundamental
and recurring issue in this thesis. For example, modern philosophy (beginning
with Descartes) sought to establish a basis for the absolute truths of
reason in contrast to the incertitudes of historical knowledge. This quest
for absolute certainty in regard to philosophical knowledge led to such
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episteraological dualisms as body-rnind, thought and extension, truths of reason
and truths of fact. The consequence of these dualisms led to the recognition
that historical knowledge is characterized by the categories of relativity
and probability. That is, historical events are conditioned according to
their historical setting, and the knowledge of these events are characterized
by varying degrees of probability in sharp contrast to the absolute certainty
of the necessary truths of reason. Thus, the epistemological dualisms to
be considered in Part One provide the central twofold question which histor¬
ical criticism has posed to theology—how can historically-conditioned
events (i.e., historical relativity) which are empirically uncertain and
inconclusive (i.e., historical probability) serve as the point of departure
for Christian faith with its claim to universal and absolute truth? That
is to say, how can historical relativity be reconciled with the claim of
Christian faith that a single event can be absolutely unique? And, how cam
the probabilities of historical knowledge be reconciled with the claim of
Christian faith as a historical revelation to have absolute truth? That
is, how can the certitude of faith be maintained over against the incertitude
of historical knowledge?
Part Two is concerned with dualisms in religious epistemology,
which correspond somewhat to the philosophical dualisms articulated in
Part One. That is, even as modern philosophy sought to provide a basis
for the absolute certainty of truth through such distinctions as thought and
extension, truths of reason and truths of fact, even so theology has sought
to provide a basis for the absolute certainty of religious knowledge through
such distinctions as faith and knowledge, Hlstorie and Geschlchte, inner
history and outer history, nature and history. The intent of these related
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dualisms in religious epistemology is to make room for the certainty of
faith which is threatened by the incertitude of historical knowledge and the
relativity (i.e., the causal nexus) of the historical process. Thus, these
two categories of historical criticism—i.e., historical relativity and the
probability of historical knowledge—presuppose the delineation of a
dualistic epistemology. That is, with the sharp distinction between the
truths of reason and truths of fact, it was seen that history is characterized
by (l) historical relativity (or contingency) as opposed to the necessary
truths of reason and (2) more or less degrees of probability concerning
historical knowledge as opposed to the absolute certainty of the truths of
reason. On the other hand, religious epistemology developed into a dualism
of its own in an attempt to cope with these two categories of relativity and
probability with the result that the certainty of faith was made independent
of the uncertainty of history.
Part Three offers a constructive proposal to integrate the twofold
aspects of religious epistemology. That is, it will be argued that theology
cannot tolerate a divorce between Historie and Geschichte, faith and
knowledge, inner history and outer history, even as philosophy cannot endure
the Kantian divorce between noumenon and phenomenon. Also, even as theology
must not divorce inner history from outer history, i.e., historical meanings
cannot be divorced from historical facts, even so hermeneutics cannot be
divorced from historical research. Thus, it will be argued that the kerygma
must be based upon temporal events which can at least be theoretically
verifiable. This is to acknowledge that the biblical texts intend to
"report" events which really happened. Thus, Part Three is an attempt to
"overcome" a dualistic epistemology. In so doing, it proposes to integrate
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the hermeneutical and historical aspects of the idea of revelation, as
well as integrating faith and history, in terms of a theology of universal
history. The term, "hermeneutical," is intended to focus attention upon:
(1) the biblical texts themselves as the linguistic bearers of the
interpretation of certain events whioh are revelatory, (2) the distance
that separates the biblical texts from the modern age, (3) the resulting
necessity for bridging the distance between the biblical texts and the
modern age, and (4) the epistemologlcal problem of history. The term,
"historical," is Intended to focus attention upon: (l) the objeotive,
temporal quality of history as the bearer of revelatory events, and (2)
the necessity for ascertaining the historical reliability of the events
recorded in the biblical texts. The term, "universal history," is a more
comprehensive ooncept whioh intends to bring together both the historical
and the herrneneutical aspects of revelation.
PART ONE
DUALISMS IN PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
The current debate in theology over the meaning of history for
Christian faith has its roots in the rise of modern science which Whitehead
dates in the year 1600.1 There took place then a decisive change in the
mode of thinking about the universe„ The experimental method of natural
science introduced a radical change concerning the thinking process itself,
which previously had consisted of the mere accumulation of knowledge.
Ernst Cassirer writes: "The task of medieval thought had consisted largely
in tracing the architectonics of being and. in delineating its main design.
In the religious system of the Middle Ages as it is crystallized in
scholasticism every phase of reality is assigned its unique placej- and
with its place goes a complete determination of its value, which is based
on the greater or lesser distance which separates it from the First Cause."
The new method of natural science was the discovery of universal
laws derived from experimentation with the particular and the concrete.
This movement toward the universal and at the same time this movement
toward the particular and the concrete thus influenced the rise of modern
philosophy and contributed to the distinction between sensibility and
^A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York:
Macmillan Company, 195^)* P« 5»
2The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln
and James P. Pettegrove i[Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1951), P. 39.
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intellect, between experience and thought.1
This radical change in thought during the rise of modern science
meant the rejection of the medieval distinction between reason and revelation
insofar as natural science was concerned. Nature was seen not as mere
creation, but as a part of the divine essence. This means that nature
was no longer something that was moved from without, but something that
moved from within according to the universal principle of natural law.
The Aristotelian theory had taught that the terrestrial bodies
moved toward the center of the universe, which for the medievals was at
or near the center of the earth. It was this motion of the terrestrial
bodies that required an explanation, which Aristotle ascribed to the
Prime Mover and the medievals, to the supernatural interference of God.
With the rise of the modern law of inertia, natural science ruled out the
Aristotelian theory. Herbert Butterfield put it this way: "The modern
law of inertia, the modern theory of motion, is the great factor which
in the seventeenth century helped to drive the spirits out of the world
"5
and opened the way to a universe that ran like a piece of clockwork."
This mechanistic working of nature was interpreted to mean that
nature possesses its own inner principle of motion. Giordano Bruno put
it this way: "God is not an external intelligence rolling around, and
leading around; it is more worthy for him to be the internal principle of
motion, which is his own nature, his own appearance, his own soul than
"'"Ibid., p. 38.
P
Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York:





that as many entities as live in His bosom should have motion. This
meant that natural law replaced the supernatural law of medieval theology,
in which lex naturalis had never been more than a point of departure for
2
lex divina.
William Gilbert in 1600 had published a work in which he described
gravity as a form of magnetic attraction and that the principle of the
magnet explained the workings of the Corpernican system. Galileo and
Kepler were greatly influenced by Gilbert's work and further expanded the
idea of natural law by demonstrating how it worked in individual cases,
as in the phenomena of freely falling bodies and planetary motion. By
1678, Newton had established the principle of gravitation as a universal
law."' Thus, the method of natural science was not the understanding of
nature through the assistance of revelation and the Church's doctrine of
creation. Rather, the point of departure for knowledge was to make an
exact analysis of things.
It is at this point where the influence of natural science came
to bear upon the rise of modern philosophy. In medieval theology, philosophy
had been the servant of theology. Now philosophy stood on its own feet
and forged ahead with the critical questions of the validity and objectivity
of human knowledge. Its task was to make an exact analysis of reality Just
as natural science had set out to do.
The crucial point of discussion in the rise of modern philosophy
was the relationship between empirical and intellectual knowledge. On the
one side were the rationalists (as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) with their
^Cited by Cassirer, p. 4l. ^Ibid., p. 40.
3Ibid., p. 45.
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emphasis upon a priori knowledge. On the other side were the empiricists
(Locke, Hume) with their emphasis upon experience as the source of knowledge,
thus asserting that the mind was a "blank tablet" at birth.
This tendency to bifurcate knowledge into two distinct levels—
the rational and the empirical—brings into clear focus the epistemological
question of religious certainty for Christian faith. Absolute knowledge
for the rationalists could only be found through metaphysics, i.e.,
knowledge is derived from reason and innate ideas. In some cases, this
resulted in the depreciation of historical knowledge, as with Descartes,
Spinoza, and Lessing. On the other hand, Locke's empiricism led to a
distinction between primary and secondary qualities and a corresponding
rejection of innate ideas, which resulted in metaphysical agnosticism with
Hume.
Thus, the rise of modern philosophy with its diet inction*-between
rational and empirical knowledge adumbrates the modern theological distinc¬
tion between empirical fact and existential meaning. It will thus be the
intention of this first part to show how this distinction between the
different levels of reality in the seventeenth and eighteenth century
helped to formulate an epistemology of history. Thus, Part One will
mainly consist of a historical survey of those philosophies whose ontological
and epistemological presuppositions for theology will be self-evident.
CHAPTER I
THE BEGINNINGS OP THE MODERN HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
A. Descartes: Methodological Skepticism
Rene Descartes in his "Discourse on Method" (1637) initiated a
long series of attempts to provide a valid foundation for philosophical
knowledge. In the early part of his educational training under the
\
Jesuits in La Fleche, Descartes complained of an overwhelming sense of
doubt. While he greatly respected the beliefs of the Church, he found
them to be far above the powers of human reason to ascertain. What he
thus sought to do was to establish a system which would lead to absolute
certainty within the limitations of human reason.^" This, in turn, would
2
serve to convince the unbelievers of the truths of Christian faith.
What, then, could serve as an adequate epistemology for the
discovery of absolute certainty? The answer was found in the geometric
method. Since mathematical certainty was demanded in metaphysics, this
called forth the consistent application of reason to discover the axiomatic
truths of philosophy.
In order to ascertain the axiomatic truths of philosophy, Descartes
^Rene Descartes, "Discourse on Method," Essential Works of
Descartes, trans. Lowell Blair with an intro. by Daniel J. Bronstein
(New York: Bantam Books, 1966), pp. ^-6.
Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," Essential Works
of Descartes, p. *1-8.
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employed the vise of methodological skepticism. This entailed four general
principles. (1) Never accept anything as true which is not self-evident.
This means the philosopher must renounce as false anything which is
merely plausible. This means one must avoid bias and he must not include
anything in his Judgments which does not present itself clearly and
distinctly to his mind. (2) It is necessary to divide each philosophical
difficulty into as many parts as possible in order to reach a satisfactory
solution. (3) One must conduct his thoughts in an orderly manner. He
must begin with those objects which are simplest and easiest to know, and
then he must rise little by little to knowledge of the most complex events.
(4) He must be careful not to omit any of the facts. He must carefully
scrutinize every event and make a complete enumeration and comprehensive
review in order that he may not overlook anything.1
It Is these four principles which helped to lay down a basis for
critical historical research, as it will be pointed out shortly. In terms
of philosophical truth, Descartes' methodological skepticism led him to
the following conclusions. First, there is the a priori knowledge of the
self. Man could doubt the existence of everything around him, but he
could not doubt the fact of his doubting. This could only point to the
undeniable certainty that he was a thinking self. "I think, therefore,
2
I am." He could have no misgivings about this self-evident truth.
A second distinct idea is the existence of God. He uses an argument
comparable to Anselm's ontological proof for God's existence. Since Descartes
can think of a more perfect Being than himself, it is evident to him that
lf'Dlscourse on Method," Essential Works of Descartes, p. 12.
2lbid., p. 20.
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this idea must have come from a Being who is more perfect than he is. This
argument cannot be used in regard to the sense world. The stars, the sun,
and the moon stand in a different relation to him, for he can see nothing
in them which could cause him to think that they were superior to him. In
fact, it could be deduced that their existence really depends upon his own
nature. On the other hand, this conception of a Being more perfect than
himself could not have come from nothing, for it would be contradictory to
believe that the more perfect would follow and be dependent upon the less
perfect.1 Consequently, this distinct idea of a Being greater than himself
can only be the result of this idea coming from beyond himself. Descartes
writes: "From the fact that I exist and have in me the idea of a supremely
perfect being, that is, of God, it must be concluded that the existence of
God is demonstrated in the most evident manner."
A third axiomatic truth is that the soul is entirely distinct from
the body. In fact, the soul is easier to know than the body and would be
known if there were no body."^ This is so because "intellectual nature is
distinct from corporeal nature."^ The Justification for this argument is
also found in the Cartesian skepticism concerning the empirical world.
Anything that is based on sense perception does not qualify as genuine
5
knowledge, though of course it may possess a strong degree of validity.
This means: "We ought never to let ourselves be convinced of anything
except by the evidence of our reason," and not by our imagination or
1Ibid., p. 21.
Q
"Meditations on First Philosophy," Essential Works of Descartes,
p. 81.
^"Discourse on Method," Essential Works of Descartes, p. 20.
4 5 ,
Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 24.
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our senses.1 Thus, absolute knowledge is deduced from a priori concepts,
not a posteriori.
This means that there is a bifurcation between body and mind, the
intellectual and the empirical. This can be seen when Descartes makes it
clear that the innate ideas do not need any corresponding reality in the
2
empirical world. For these innate ideas are imbedded within the mind from
birth. They are just as axiomatic and clear as any demonstration of
mathematical knowledge.
If there is such a radical distinction between mind and body, between
a priori concepts and sense perceptions, then methodological skepticism
becomes actual skepticism in regard to historical knowledge, for empirical
perception cannot be compared with the clear a priori knowledge of the mind.
This is why Gustave Lanson says that the Cartesian method is radically
hostile to history, that history as a science is in fact abolished and
becomes nothing more than a curiosity and a series of confused representations,
3
capable only of amusing the imagination.
This historical Pyrrhonism (Collingwood's term) marks the beginning,
4
in a paradoxical way, of the modern historical movement. It served as a
challenge to historians to establish a solid and sure foundation for
historical knowledge. Collingwood calls this constructive response, "Cartesian
1Ibid.
p
"Meditations on First Philosophy," Essential Works of Descartes,
P. 99.
^Gustave Lanson, "L* Influence De La Philosophie Cartdsienne Sur La





historiography," since it was based on the critical principles of Cartesian
methodological skepticism.
B. Bayle: Historical Positivism
Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) was one such historian who responded to
the challenge of Cartesian methodological skepticism. He adopted the
Cartesian ideal of the distinct idea and sought to establish certain
knowledge for historical facts, thus becoming the first "positivist." His
concern was not with any teleological interpretation of history, but with
establishing the mere facts of history in a critical fashion. In this
respect, his General Dictionary, Historical and Critical "proposes only to
collect errors with regard to fact.It intends to be of "the most
minute detail."^
His method was to examine all phenomena and to distinguish between
the certain and the uncertain, the probable and the erroneous. He writess
"Errors are the only thing that can be of any service to me, provided I am
„5
able to correct them. He thus does not use his Cartesian methodological
doubt against historical knowledge, but rather uses it to examine critically
what can be certain historically. In each of the articles of his dictionary,
he thus restricts his primary remarks in correcting historical errors of
the subject in question.^ It can thus be seen that Bayle's positivism led




•^Pierre Bayle, "A Proposal for a Critical Dictionary," A General
Dictionary, Historical and Critical, trans. J. P. Bernard, et al. (London:
James Bettenham, 1741), X, 388.
4Ibid., P. 583. 5Ibid.., p. 378. 6Ibid., p. 379.
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him to search for the facts of history for their own sake and that he was
not so much interested in their "meanings."
Bayle thus rejected the Cartesian anti-historical influence. He
asserts that historical study can lead to a greater type of certainty than
mathematical study. He writes:
It may, perhaps, be observed that those things, which seem the
most abstract and fruitless in the Mathematics, are productive,
at least, of the following advantage, that they lead us to the
discovery of truths which cannot be doubted ofj whereas,
historical enquiries, and researches into the actions of men,
leave us always in the dark, and ever furnish occasions for
fresh contests. But how imprudent is it to touch this string!
I assert that historical truths may be carried on to a more
undoubted degree of certainty, than what geometrical truths
are brought to, provide we consider these two kinds of truth .
according to the species of certainty which is peculiar to them.
What Bayle is arguing is that geometric truths may not exist outside the
mind, while historical facts can be ascertained with greater certainty
insofar as they exist externally to what the mind merely thinks. Bayle
writes: "Thus it is more certain metaphysically, that Cicero has existed
out of the understanding of any other man, than it is certain that the object
2
of the Mathematics exists out of our understanding."
From what has been pointed out concerning Bayle's critical approach
to history, it can be seen that the Cartesian criticism of history inevitably
led to historical criticism. While Descartes elevated the axiomatic truths
of reason, Bayle likewise was devoted to truth in terms of historical facts.
Bayle describes his devotion to truth this way:
All such as are acquainted with the laws of history, will own, that
an historian, who will discharge his duty with fidelity, ought to
divest himself of the spirit of flattery and of slander, and put
himself as far as he is able in the condition of a Stoic, who is
not actuated by any passion. Insensible to all other things he
IIbid., p. 386. 2Ibid., p. 387.
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ought to be attentive to nothing but the interests of the truth,
and to this he ought to sacrifice the resentment of an injury,
the remembrance of a benefit received, and even the love of his
country. He ought to forget that he is of a certain country, was
brought up in a certain communion, that he owes his fortune to
certain persons, and that certain persons are his relations or
friends. An historian, as such, is like Melchisedec, without
father, mother, or pedigree. Should he be asked, What countryman
are you? he must answer, I am neither a Frenchman, a German,
an Englishman, nor a Spaniard, etc. I am an inhabitant of the
world; I am not in the service of the Emperor, nor of the King
of France, but only in that of truth; she only is my Queen,
and to her only I took an oath to be faithful.1
It can thus be seen that Bayle's goal was to release history from
all authoritarianism and to put historical studies on an entirely independent
basis. In this respect, Cassirer points out: "Bayle accomplished scarcely
less for history than Galileo did for natural science. . . . It is he who
2
carries out the 'Copernican revolution' in the realm of historical science."
C. Spinoza: Reason and History
Another Cartesian thinker, Baruch Spinoza (16^2-1677), became the
founder of modern biblical criticism with his publication of Theologico-
Political Treatise in 1670."' For Spinoza, pure being is the source of
absolute certainty, while the temporal exists in becoming and thus is relative.
Since the philosopher must rise above the temporal world in order to ascertain
absolute certainty, this could only have negative consequences for the
biblical claim to absolute validity, for it is both subject to historical
4
development and contains historical material. This can be seen when
Spinoza differentiates sharply between what is self-evident knowledge and
what is experiential knowledge. He writes:
^""Usson," Remark F, A General Dictionary . . . , X, 69» cited also
by Cassirer with a different wording, pp. 208-209.
^Cassirer, p. 207. ^Ibld., pp. 185-186. ^Ibid., p. 185.
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If anyone wishes to persuade his fellows for or against anything
which is not self-evident, he must deduce his contention from
their admissions, and convince them either by experience or by
ratiocination? either by appealing to facts of natural experience,
or to self-evident intellectual axioms. Now unless the experience
be of such a kind as to be clearly and distinctly understood,
though it may convince a man, it will not have the same effect
on his mind and disperse the clouds of his doubt so completely
as when the doctrine taught is deduced entirely from intellectual
axioms—that is, by the mere power of the understanding and
logical order, and this is especially the case in spiritual
matters which have nothing to do with the senses.1
This leads him to say that conclusions reached through the deductions
of general truths a priori make use of extensive arguments. This means
that the intellectual effort required for such deductions causes most men
to prefer to learn through experience "rather than deduce their conclusion
2
from a few axioms, and set them out in logical order.'"7" Thus, religion
3
is for the majority of people, while philosophy is for the learned.
In this way, it can be seen that for Spinoza the eternal truths
of reason known through philosophical deduction are far superior to truths
learned through experience. But, this does not mean that the Scriptures
are irrelevant to most people. Quite the contrary, the Scriptures teach
4
what is already known through the light of reason. This is to say that
the Scriptures embody eternal truths through the use of allegories, legends,
and parables. The chief speculative doctrine of the Bible is the existence
of God and that He directs and governs the world. Though experience oannot
"explain the nature of God, nor how He directs and sustains all things, it
"A Theologico-Political Treatise", The Chief Works of Benedict
de Spinoza, translated with an introduction by R. H. M. Elwes (London:
George Bell and Sons, 188?), I, 76-77.
2Ibid., p. 77. 3Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 14. 5Ibid., p. 25.
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can nevertheless teach and enlighten men sufficiently to impress obedience
nl
and devotion on their minds. Thus, the philosopher may allow limited
validity to its teachings, yet at the same time pointing out its subordinate
position to philosophy with its axiomatic truths.
In this way, Spinoza says that the historical trustworthiness of
the Bible is of no consequence to knowledge of God. He writes:
The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give
us the knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of
God springs from knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should
be derived from general ideas, in themselves certain and known,
so that the truth of a historical narrative is very far from
being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest good.^
What Spinoza is pointing out is that philosophy and theology are
entirely separate in their procedure to knowledge."^ In this connection, he
identifies the "Word of God," not with the books of the Bible, but with the
idea of God which was impressed a priori upon the prophets and the apostles,
4
who in turn urged obedience to God. It is this obedience to God that
5
constitutes faith and piety, and it is not contrary to reason. This means
6
theology is not dogma, but precepts and rules of life. Thus, theology
exercises a necessary and practical task for the majority of people, but it
is restricted in that it does not teach philosophy, i.e., its teaching comes
from experience rather than the self-evident and distinct ideas of reason.
Nevertheless, if one will strip away the historical framework of the teachings
of the Bible, Spinoza thinks that theology and philosophy will agree. He
writes:
Now, as in the whole course of my investigation I found nothing
taught expressly by Scripture, which does not agree with our
•"•Ibid., p. 78. 2Ibld., p. 61. ^Ibld., p. 10. \bld., p. 9.
5Ibid., p. 195. 6Ibid.
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understanding, or which is repugnant thereto, and as I saw that
the prophets taught nothing, which is not very simple and easily
to be grasped by all, and further, that they clothed their
teaching in the style, and confirmed it with the reasons, which
would most deeply move the mind of the masses to devotion towards
God, I became thoroughly convinced, that the Bible leaves reason
absolutely free, that it has nothing in common with philosophy,
in fact, that Revelation and Philosophy stand on totally different
footings. 1
It follows from this divorce of revelation and philosophy, historical
knowledge and philosophical knowledge, that the Scriptures only have a
practical value. Spinoza writes: "The sphere of reason is, as we have said,
truth and wisdom; the sphere of theology is piety and obedience."
This distinction between truth and piety, wisdom and obedience, with
truth and wisdom relating to philosophy and piety and obedience relating to
theology, is not altogether unlike the modern theological distinction between
faith-knowledge, inner history—outer history, etc. (which shall be dealt
with in Part Two). This trend of modern theology seems to place emphasis
upon the decision of faith at the expense of knowing whether or not the basis
of faith is grounded in historical reality. Likewise, Spinoza's definition
of the "Word of God" as being the unraediated idea of God to the prophets
and apostles which idea prompts to obedience is not unlike the neo-orthodox
view of revelation with its emphasis upon the Word of God being the unmediated
confrontation of God and man which confrontation calls for an act of obedience.
It can thus be seen that the first one to provide a systematic and
objective foundation for biblical criticism*^ (whose method is not dissimilar
1Ibid., p. 9. 2Ibid., p. 19^. 5Cassirer, p. 184.
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to our own procedure today)1 permitted the Cartesian dualism to vitiate
the historical character of revelation.
D. Richard Simon: Faith vs. Historical Certainty
Nicole Malebranche, another Cartesian philosopher, inspired Richard
Simon, a member of the Congregation of the Oratory, to conduct a critical
2
study of the development of the books of the Bible. This was the first
time that such a study had been conducted.^ In his work, A Critical History
of the Old Testament (1678), he set forth a critical study of the original
texts along with the various translations. Simon's indirect purpose for
this critical analysis of the biblical books was to enhance the authority
of the Roman Catholic Church which had been challenged by the Protestant
Reformation. He attempted to argue that the Bible alone is no sure
protection against doubt, but needs to be supported by the tradition and
4 •
the authority of the Church. Thus, the Protestant s total reliance upon
the Bible was thought to be inadmissable.
Some of the presuppositions of this critical study are as follows.
(1) The original texts of the Bible were fully and equally inspired. He
Robert M. Grant, A Short History of the Interpretation of the
Bible (New York: The Macmillan Company, I963TT~p. 149. That Spinoza's
method is similar to ours today can be seen with the following four
principles; (l) the original language should be known; (2) an analysis
of each book should be thoroughly made according to its content, with
special attention being given to obscure or contradictory passages; (3)
a thorough historical background study of each author and book should be
made—who wrote it, how did it become a part of the canon, etc.; (4)
the interpretation must take into full account the intention of the
author, so that our study will be objective and without the interference
of our opinions. The Chief Works of Spinoza, I, 100-103.
^Cassirer, p. 184. ^Ibid. ^Ibid.
24
objects to a certain "Divine" who believed the Bible was inspired only in
matters of faith.(2) The original authors abbreviated those larger acts
of the people which were the most instructive. (3) The original authors
did not always intend to give an exact chronological order of things, for
they were not merely writing factual and chronological history. Rather,
they were writing theological history, though the matters of detail were
likewise accurate. (4) Biblical books were sometimes written by authors
of a later age who compiled the book from the public records. Nevertheless,
these authors were inspired by the Holy Spirit.^ (5) In this way, Moses
was not the author of the Pentateuch as we have it, though the original
composition was extracted from Moses* public records. (6) The original
texts have undergone serious changes with the result that our present
texts are replete with errors.^ (7) Consequently, the authority of the
Roman Catholic Church is needed to provide faith with its foundation.
Simon writes:
Instead of believing with the Protestants that the shortest and
most certain way of deciding the questions of Faith is to
consult the Holy Scriptures, we shall on the contrary find in
this Work that if we Join not Tradition with the Scripture,
we can hardly affirm any thing for certain in Religion.7
It can thus be seen from the uncertainty which Simon thinks attaches
to the Scripture (because of its historical development) that the certainty
of faith is independent of historical research. This is to say that
nothing "certain in Religion" can be established from historical study.
Rather, the certainty of faith finds its support in the authority of the
^Richard Simon, A Critical History of the Old Testament, translator
unknown (London: Walter David, 1682), p.iv.
2Ibid., p. vii. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. iv. 5Ibld.
6Ibid., p. viii. 7Ibid., p. ix.
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Church. In this way, the Cartesian methodological doubt was used to support
the authority of the Roman Catholic Church."''
E. Vico: A Metaphysie of the Human Race
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), an Italian philosopher, made a
deliberate attempt to counteract the anti-historical character of Cartesian
rationalism. He blames the Cartesian influence for the "great and sudden
revolution in literary affairs in Naples" in which the literary appreciation
for the past was neglected in favor of the sole study of metaphysics and
the natural sciences.^ He complains of Descartes' Meditations and On
Method in which Vico says that Descartes discourages "the study of languages,
orators, historians and poets, and by setting up only his metaphysics,
physics and mathematics, reduces literature to the wisdom of the Arabs,
4
who in all these three fields produced men of great learning.
Vico proposes to restore the study of history to its proper position.
In The Principles of a New Science of the Common Nature of Nations (1725)*
he sets forth a new critical method in which he says that he "discovers
new historical principles of philosophy, and first of all metaphysics of
C
the human race." Cassirer points out that this was the first systematic
6
attempt to give a theory of knowledge along these lines.
In establishing this new critical approach to the nature of the
nations, Vico contends that this new metaphysic of the human raee does not
^assirer, p. 184. 2Cassirer, p. 209.
■3
The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. Max H. Fiseh
and Thomas G. Bergin (New York: Cornell University Press, 19^» P« 137•
^Ibid., pp. 157-138. ^Ibid., p. I67. ^Cassirer, p. 209.
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repudiate the validity of Cartesian rationalism with its emphasis upon the
"clear and distinct ideas" of reason. Rather, he rejects the one-sided use
of rationalism. He distinguishes between philosophy and philology (historical
data). He writes: "Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge
of the true; philology observes that of which human choice is author,
whence comes consciousness of the certain."'1' This means that philosophy
as such is knowledge of what is true and is derived from reason a priori.
In this sense, philosophy is mediated knowledge which gives rise to reasoned
truth. Philology is knowledge of human actions. It deals with what is
immediately given in human consciousness and thus deals with what is made
certain by the choice of the will.
Vico thus distinguishes between truth and certainty, intellect and
will. This is further seen when he says: "Men who do not know what is
true of things take care to hold fast to what is certain, so that, if they
cannot satisfy their intellects by knowledge (scienza), their wills at least
p
may rest on consciousness (cosoienza)."
By pointing out this distinction, Vico intends to show that
philosophy and philology must be integrated in his new metaphysic of the
human race. This means that the New Science is to go directly to the subject
3
matter through the help of the philologians and philosophers. In this way,
truth and certainty become one. This was the failure of the previous
attempts of both the philosophers and the philologians, for they did not work
together. He writes:
Hlco, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, revised translation of
the third edition (1744) by Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch (New York:
Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 63.
2Ibid., pp. 62-63. ^Ibid., p. 100.
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Philosophers failed by half in not giving certainty to their
reasonings by appeal to the authority of the philologians, and
likewise how the latter failed by half in not taking care to
give their authority the sanction of truth by appeal to the
reasoning of the philosophers. If they had done this they would
have been more useful to their commonwealths and they would have
anticipated us in conceiving this Science.
Vico delineates seven main principles of the new science, (l) Divine
Providence is seen to be a universal belief both through the observed customs
of even the moat ancient nationo ao well as through the rational demonstration
2
of the philosophers. The development of the world begins with the first
nations and their poetic theology (mythology), continues through the natural
theology of the philosophers in their rational demonstration of the existence
of God (the Greeks), thus preparing the way for revealed theology (Christianity)
Thus, the new science is a "rational civil theology of divine providence."^
This is to say that both philology (a posteriori knowledge) and philosophy
(a priori knowledge) serve as arguments for God's existence.
(2) The new science presupposes the principle of authority. First,
there is divine authority (fear of the gods); second, there is human authority
in the philosophical sense; i.e., the free use of the will; third, there Is
5
the authority of natural law.
(3) There is the history of ideas as a further principle of the new
T
science (this foreshadows Hegel). It Is at this point that Vico draws a
sharp distinction between "the world of civil society" and "the world of
nature." The study of "the world of civil society" is the "queen of the
sciences," for its subject matter consists of the thoughts of man's first
1Ibid., p. 63. 2Ibid., pp. 97, 121, 170. "Ibid., pp. 111-112.
^Ibid., p. 121. ^Ibid., pp. 121-122. ^Ibid., p. 123.
^Infra, p. 98.
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beginnings down to the present day.1 Since history is the history of ideas,
history is one sure reality that man can know. This is to say that since
this world of civil society was created by man, and since whatever is created
by man originates in thought, then one certain truth is that man can know
history. Vico writes:
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest
antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal
and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that
the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and
that its principles are therefore to be found within the
modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this
cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all
their energies to the study of the world of nature, which,
since God made it. He alone knows; and that they should have
neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world,
which, since men had made it, men could come to know.2
He further says that when history is reported by one who also creates it
3 _
nothing can be more certain. This means that thought and deed are
indistinguishable, that a deed is what it is because of its concept, as
4
Hegel would say. This is further seen when Vico says that even as thought
and deed are the same with God, even so thought and deed are indistinguishable
in man's contemplation of history. In this respect, Vico pursues an argument
quite similar to Bayle's concerning the difference between mathematical and
historical knowledge. Vico writes:
Now, as geometry, when it constructs the world of quantity out
of its elements, or contemplates that world, is creating it
for itself, just so does our Science ^create for itself the world
of nations/, but with a reality greater by Just so much as
the institutions having to do with human affairs are more real
than points, lines, surfaces, and figures are. And this very
fact is an argument, 0 reader, that these proofs are of a
kind divine and should give thee a divine pleasure, since in
God knowledge and creation are one and the same thing.5
•4b id., p. 104. 2Ibid., p. 96. 4bid., p. 104.
4nfra, p. 8l. 4he New Science, pp. 104-105. Cf. Supra, p. 18.
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(4) The fourth principle is one of philosophical criticism in
which judgments will be made on the basis of the history of ideas.^
(5) The fifth principle is one of "an ideal eternal history traversed
ti2
in time by the histories of all nations. This means that every nation
will follow the same pattern "in its rise, development, maturity, decline,
"5
and fall. This pattern forms a triadic movement—the age of the gods,
4
the age of the heroes, and the age of men. This triadic movement is
pursued in eleven developments. This means there will be three kinds of
natures, three kinds of customs, three kinds of natural law, three kinds of
governments, three kinds of languages, three kinds of linguistic characters,
three kinds of jurisprudence, three kinds of authority, three kinds of
5
reason, three kinds of judgments, and three kinds of sects of time. For
example, there are three kinds of natural law corresponding to the three
ages of the gods, the heroes, and men. The first kind of natural law was
the divine law whereby men lived in fear of the law of the gods. The second
was a heroic law whereby men were held in control by force. The third was
"the human law dictated by fully developed human reason."
(6) Vico further lifts out the principle of natural law as one of
7
the main aspects of the new science.' This law is a natural law, for it
3
"proceeds with the greatest equality and constancy through the three ages."
This means that the eleven triadic divisions are "all embraced by one general
unity.This one general unity is a unity of a "provident divinity,"^
1Ibid., p. 123. 2Ibld., p. 124. ^Ibid., p. 79- ^Ibid., p. 355.
5Ibid., pp. 355-562. 6Ibld., p. 358. 7Ibid., pp. 124f.
8Ibid., p. 20. 'Ibid., p. 355- 1QIbid.
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who is "the unity of spirit that informs and gives life to this world of
nations.""*" Though this development of the nations is called a providential
development, it nevertheless is characterized by the naturalness of its
movement. It is "a constant and uninterrupted order of causes and effects
present in every nation." The naturalness of this providential law can be
■3
seen in the fact it corresponds to the needs and usefulness of human nature.
(7) Finally, the new science is based on the principle of universal
history. This means that divine providence as the general unity which
embraces all the eleven lesser triadic unities is working out in an orderly
and natural way the history of all nations. This means that the whole of
humanity demonstrates in its history a theodicy. Vico puts it this way:
Our new Science must therefore be a demonstration, so to speak,
of what providence has wrought in history, for it must be a
history of the institutions by which, without human discernment
or counsel, and often against the designs of men, providence has
ordered this great city of the human race. For though this world
has been created in time and particular, the Institutions established
therein by providence are universal and eternal.5
While Descartes depreciated the study of history, Vico seemed to restore
it to a rightful position with his emphasis upon the unity of thought and deed,
that a thing is what it is beoause of its concept. This is to say that history
can be known as it really is, for it is a reality created by man. However,
If Descartes depreciated history, Vico naturalized it. This can be seen
in the way that Vico defined the historic process in terms of a rational
civil theology of providence through which the world is seen to follow a
rigid prescribed course of the eleven triadic divisions. This natural provi¬
dential movement of the world toward human freedom Is not unlike Hegel's
1Ibid. 2Ibld. ^Ibid., p. 63. ^Cf. Hegel, Infra, p. 90.
^New Science, p. 102.
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Idea (Reason) which is a secularized form of providence and which is coming
to the consciousness of freedom through a dialectic movement.1 Also, Vico's
eleven triadic categories which are embraced by the one general unity of
providence is remarkably similar to Hegel's Absolute Idea which embraces all
p
the lesser categories of reality.
Croce points out that Vico's principle of the natural development of
nations, especially in regard to the rise of myths and religion, was anti-
■3
religious by implication, even though Vico himself was a devout Catholic.
In this respect, Croce points out that Vico adumbrated many of the ideas of
Hegel. He writes: "it almost seems as if the soul of the Italian Catholic
philosopher had migrated into the German thinker, reappearing in him at the
..4
distance of a century, more mature and more self-conscious.
Vico made a decisive step toward providing a valid basis tor historical
knowledge In that history can be known as it really is since history is a
reality created by man and exists In the form of thought; on the other hand,
his rational civil theology of providence so naturalized historical reality
that history seemed to be defined exclusively in anthropological terms. This
in effect eliminated the transcendent reality of God in the world, i.e.,
history became totally a human reality.
P. Leibniz: The Concept of Historical Probability
G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) brought into a more systematic formulation
the Cartesian dualism of the distinct and clear ideas of reason and the
Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead of The Philosophy
of Hegel, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited,
1915)7 pp. 72-75. cf. Infra, pp. 97f.
"Infra, p. 82. ^Croce, p. 72. ^Ibld., p. 77.
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contingent facts of experience."*" He points out that the primary function
2
of reason in metaphysics is making logical connections of truths. In this
respect, Langley points out that Leibniz speaks of reason not In terms of
the Vovs of Plato and Aristotle, i.e., as the faculty of ideas and principles.
Rather, reason for Leibniz is /Icya , the power to connect truths and draw
3
conclusions.
Leibniz distinguishes between reason and experience. Pure reason
relates to truths which are independent of sense experience. These truths
of pure reason are "called the 'Eternal Verities', which are altogether
necessary, so that the opposite implies contradiction. Such are the truths
whose necessity is logical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot
tt4
deny without being led into absurdities. However, Leibniz does not
distinguish between reason and experience in any absolute sense. In contrast
to Descartes, he does not hold the view that innate ideas of reason exist
as such, but rather they exist as potentialities which became actualities
on the basis of experience. This is to say, eternal truths of reason cannot
be read off in the soul as in a book, but rather the senses furnish the
occasion for the discovery of these innate ideas. Thus, experience is the
"*"Cf. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction" in Kierkegaard,
Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Niels Thulstrup
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. xlvi-xlvii. Cf.
Cassirer, pp. 192f.
^Leibnitz, Theodicy, ed. with an intro. by Austin Farrer, trans.
E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan, Ltd., 1951)* PP« 73f- Cf.
Theodicy, p. 74.
■^Langley's editorial note in Leibnitz, New Essays Concerning
Human Understanding, trans. Alfred Gideon Langley (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1896), p. 555n. Cited hereafter as New Essays.
^Theodicy, p. 74. ^New Essays, p. 44.
33
necessary occasion for the awakening of these ideas."1" Here it can be seen
p
that Leibniz will not allow for a body-mind dualism.
In addition to these necessary truths of reason are the truths of
fact. But, these truths are "verified" through the analysis of reason
which perceives "the fitness of things.""^ This means that sense-data are
given an objective existence outside our consciousness (i.e., what we perceive
as external objects are not dreams),, and the truths of these facts can be
known because reason perceives a priori "the connection of phenomena."^
However, the conclusions which reason draws from the analysis of things are
contingent. This is to say that the truths of experience cannot be demon¬
strated to be necessary as the truths of pure reason are as, for example,
in geometry. Leibniz is not doubting the objectivity of our experiences.
Rather, he is calling attention to the tentative conclusions which we infer
from our experiences. Thus, we conclude from our experiences of nature
that there are laws of nature. But, these laws do not contain a demonstration
of geometrical necessity. They are known "by consideration of the fitness
of things."^
This fitness of things has also its rules and reasons, but it is
the free choice of God, and not a geometrical necessity, which
causes preference for what is fitting and brings it into existence.
Thus one may say that physical necessity is founded on moral
necessity, that is, on the wise one's choice which is distinguished
from geometrical necessity.7
Leibniz shows in this way that the laws of nature are not mechanically
necessitated, but are contingent and subject to the creative act of God.
1Ibid., p. 110. 2Ibid., pp. 117-118.
•^Ibid., pp. 422; Theodicy, p. 74. ^New Essays, p. 421.
5Ibid., pp. 422, 445. ^Theodicy, p. 74. 7Ibid.
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This can be seen when he writes: "it is therefore true that God gave such
laws not without reason, for he chooses nothing from carpice and as though
by chance or in pure indifference; but the general reasons of good and of
order, which have prompted him to the choice, may be overcome in some cases
by stronger reasons of a superior order.""'"
What is a truth of pure reason is thus necessary, and its opposite
is impossible. What is a truth of fact is contingent, and its opposite is
2
possible. Both of these kinds of truths are subject to demonstration. This
means that they must be shown to be true. This is to say that they are a
reasoned .knowledge, i.e., reason perceives the connection of truths and
3
draws inferences from what is given, thus reaching a reasoned conclusion.
4
The reasoned truths of fact are governed by the law of sufficient reason,
while the necessary truths of reason are governed by the principle of
5
contradiction, e.g., a thing cannot be and be at the same time.
Leibniz has Philalethes (who represents Locke's An Essay concerning
Human Understanding) to distinguish three kinds of knowledge. First, there
is intuitive knowledge, which is knowledge of two ideas which are immediately
known by themselves so that reasoning is not needed. Leibniz calls this
6
intuitive knowledge—primitive truths of reason or fact. Second, there is
demonstrative (or, reasoned) knowledge, where the connection of ideas is
seen to exist necessarily by means of proofs, i.e., through other intervening
ideas. Each of the stages of proofs in this demonstration is intuitive
"'"Ibid. Slew Essays, p. 404. "'ibid., p. 556.
4
The Philosophical Works of Leibniz, trans, George Martin Duncan
(New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, Publishers, 1890), p. 222.
%ew Essays, pp. 404f. ^Ibid., pp. 404, 410.
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knowledge. Each of the truths of reasoned knowledge is either logical,
p
metaphysical, or geometrical, and thus they are necessary. Third, there
is sensitive knowledge. This is knowledge that things really exist outside
the mere thinking of them. While this knowledge may not be known with the
absolute certainty that adheres to intuitive and reasoned knowledge, yet
-x
its certainty stands above mere probability. It is the "connection of
phenomena" in space-time that guarantees the reality of things outside the
4
mind. To deny the certainty of sensitive knowledge is to deny the
possibility of any knowledge at all. Leibniz has Philalethes (representing
Locke) to say: "For I do not believe that any one can seriously be so
sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of things which he sees and
feels. At least, he who can carry his doubts so far will never have any
controversy with me, since he can never be certain that I say anything
5
contrary to his opinion.
In addition to intuitive knowledge, demonstrative knowledge, sensitive
knowledge, Leibniz speaks of a fourth kind of knowledge—knowledge which
relates to what is probable.^ Leibniz also calls this knowledge "opinion"
7
in the best sense of the word. Such knowledge is the truths of experience,
especially those truths derived from a study of history. These truths of
experience likewise can be called truths of reason, since the truths of
experience consist in showing the connection that exists among empirical
8
facts through reasoning. The difference between what Leibniz usually calls
1Tbid., p. 411. 2Ibid., pp. 411-414j Theodicy, p. 7^.
■x 4
New Essays, pp. 417, 4-19. Ibid., pp. 422, 5llf.
5Ibid., p. 511. 6Ibid., p. 420. 7Ibid., p. 417.
^Theodicy, p. 7^«
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truths of reason and truths of fact Is primarily the difference between what
is absolutely necessary and what is contingent. The truths of fact are
contingent, for whatever conclusions are drawn from what is observed are
tentative. This is to say that these conclusions are not necessary conclusions
as it is with the conclusions of mathematical, metaphysical, or logical
reasoning. It can be seen from this distinction between what is necessary
and what is contingent that Leibniz is not suggesting that our knowledge of
the external world is uncertain. He makes it quite clear that both "primitive
truths of reason" and "primitive truths of fact" are intuitive knowledge.
This is to say that a thing is what it is, that A is A. It needs no proof,
for It is inmiediately known for what it is."*" Such a primitive truth of
fact would be sensitive knowledge. For example, when I perceive an object,
2
I immediately know that this is an object and that I am not dreaming.
However, the conclusions which are drawn from the concatenation of
ideas derived from intuitive knowledge are either necessary or probable.
In this respect, Leibniz shows that the truths of reason are of two kinds:
(l) "Eternal Verities" and (2) "positive truths."^ The former refers to
what he usually calls the truths of reason and the latter, to truths of facts.
The truths of fact refer to the laws of nature. This is to say that we learn
that nature behaves in a certain way through experience, and we reason from
our experience that nature thus behaves in a orderly fashion by the choice
of God. We cannot say that nature behaves a certain way through geometrical
necessity. This is to say that the laws of nature are contingent upon the
choice of God, and thus any conclusions we infer from our experience of nature
"*"New Essays, p. 404-410. ^Ibid., pp. 410, 421.
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are likewise contingent. Thus, the truths of pure reason are necessary,
while the truths (conclusions) of facts are contingent. In this way, it can
be seen that Leibniz has sought to provide a valid basis for the historical
claims of Christian faith. Since the conclusions drawn concerning facts
of nature are contingent and not necessary, one cannot "disprove" the truths
of faith. Leibniz writes! "if the objection is not conclusive, it can only
form a probable argument, which has no force against faith, since it is
agreed that the Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearance.1,1
It can further be seen that degrading the validity of truths of facts
is not in any way the intention of Leibniz. Rather, he has sought to
distinguish properly among the degrees of knowledge. And, when he speaks
of the contingency of truths of facts, he is not resorting to skepticism.
Neither is he putting a higher value on the necessary truths of reason. He
shows that the necessary truths of reason, in fact, are only conditionals
"As regards eternal truths, it must be observed that at bottom they are all
n2
conditional and say in effect, such a thing posited, such another thing is.
Henry Chadwick has suggested that "truths of reason belong to a higher order
Tj
and valuation than mere truths of fact" for Leibniz. However, this hardly
seems to be the intention of Leibniz. It would be difficult to see how
Leibniz could place a higher valuation on truths which are so conditional
as the truths of pure reason.
Leibniz thus does not intend to depreciate the truths of experience
"""Ibid., p. 75.
*T?he Philosophical Works of Leibniz, p. 359- Of. New Essays,
pp. 515f.
•^Leasing's Theological Writings, translated with an introductory
essay by Henry Chadwick (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1956), p. 30.
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when he says that they are only contingent, while the truths of pure reason
are necessary. He points out that to doubt something simply because it
does not bear the necessary demonstration of mathematical proof is "madness."
What is important for truths of experience is that they be established with
sufficient reason.1 Thus, truths of experience can be considered sufficiently
based when they stand in a positive relationship to what is practical.
To doubt seriously is to doubt in relation to the practical,
and we might take certainty as a knowledge of truth which we
cannot doubt in relation to the practical without madness; and
sometimes we take it still more generally, and apply it to cases
where we could not doubt without deserving to be severely
blamed. But evidence would be a luminous certainty, i.e. where
we do not doubt because of the connection we see between ideas.
Acoording to this definition of certainty, we are certain that
Constantinople is in the world, that Constantine, Alexander
the Great, and Julius Caesar lived. It is true that some
peasant of Ardennes might Justly doubt about these, for lack
of information; but a man of letters and of the world could
not do so without great derangement of mind.^
Insofar as truths of facts are concerned, Leibniz (following Locke)
3
points out the degrees of probability that adheres to them. (1) When a
particular fact conforms with what we repeatedly and constantly observe,
and it conforms likewise with the testimony of others, then this particular
fact may be considered certain knowledge. This is a reasoned knowledge of
the highest degree of probability; e.g., that fire warms, that a rock sinks
in water. Thus, this belief prompts assurance. (2) When historians report
that an individual preferred his own selfish Interests to that of the public
interests, then these histories are met with confidence, since we observe
this to be the custom of the majority of men. (3) If a fact is reported by
those of highest integrity (that is, those whom we do not suspect), and if
1The Philosophical Works of Leibniz, p. 222. ^New Essays, p. 513.
3Ibid., pp. 537-538.
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this fact has nothing for or against its validity insofar as our observations
are concerned, then it may be received with a firm belief. For example, that
Julius Caesar lived can be firmly believed. (4) If a reported fact is
contrary to what we usually experience, or if the fact is reported with
conflicting testimonies among historians, then the degrees of probability
will vary, ranging from belief, conjecture, doubt, uncertainty, to distrust.
In this case, exactness is demanded so that a right judgment can be formed.
This means we must "proportion our assent to the degrees of probability.""'"
Leibniz further illustrates the problem of ascertaining the varying
degrees of probable knowledge in connection with the Judicial process of
law. There is "notoriety," which demands no proof. There are "complete"
proofs upon which sentences of conviction are based, but the degrees of
"complete" proofs required for a conviction will themselves be governed by
the nature of the offense, e.g., in criminal eases "complete" proofs have
to be more comprehensive than in civil cases. Thus, some proofs more than
"complete" will be demanded in severe cases of criminal trials. There are
also "presumptions" which may serve as sufficient ground for a conviction.
Thus, the jurisconsults show that proofs in regard to probable knowledge
may vary from notoreity, to more than half complete proofs to less than half
complete, presumptions which hold good unless the contrary is proved, finally
down to varying degrees of conjectures and indices. What Leibniz is thus
calling for is a "new kind of logicwhich would come to terms with the
problem of the probabilities of knowledge.
In thus delineating the varying degrees of probabilities of knowledge,
Leibniz shows a high regard for historical knowledge, especially in the way
1Ibid., p. 558. 2Ibid., pp. 558f. ?Ibld., p. 541.
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that he points out the need for "historical criticism." Not only is historical
criticism a legitimate study for Leibniz, but it is a necessary study for
lending support to the foundation of revelation. In this respect, he says
that faith finds its justification "upon the experience of those who have
seen the miracles whereon revelation is founded, and upon the trustworthy
tradition which has handed them down to us, whether through the Scriptures
or by the account of those who have preserved them.1' Just as it is the
credibility we ascribe to those accounts concerning what others have experi-
■x
enced that gives rise to assent, even so faith (as Philalethes puts it)
"is a firm assent, and assent, regulated as it should be, can only be given
upon good reasons."^ This leads Philalethes to say (with Leibniz's strongest
approval): "He who believes without any reason for believing may be in love
with his fancies." Leibniz takes further into account "the inward motion
of the Holy Spirit," insofar as the truth of Holy Scripture is concerned.
It is thus seen that Leibniz has not bifurcated the necessary truths
of reason and the contingent truths of reason (or, truths of fact) in order
to gain room for the truths of faith. He is quite emphatic that faith is
not contrary to the truths of reason. In this respect, he says that reason
cannot deceive, i.e., reason defined in terms of linking together intuitive
knowledge. On the other hand, our senses and understanding may be misled,
but not reason. Whatever is seen to be contrary to reason must be acknowl¬
edged as false.''' In this way, the truths of reason are distinguished from
the truths of facts. Truths of reason are necessary; truths of facts are
1Ibid., p. 547. ^Theodicy, p. 74. ^Ibid.
^New Essays, p. 580. ^Ibld. ^Theodicy, p. 74.
^Ibid., pp. 89, 110.
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contingent.
For I observed at the beginning that by REASON here I do not
mean the opinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit
they have formed of Judging things according to the usual
course of Nature/truths of facts^, but rather the inviolable
linking together of truths.^
Leibniz complains that many are willing "to grant that the Holy
Trinity is contrary to that great principle which states that two things
which are the same as a third are also the same as each other: that is to
say, if A is the same as B, and if C is the same as B, then A and C must
also be the same as each other." If this basic principle of logic is
rejected in favor of faith, then all basis for reasoning with certainty is
destroyed.
Thus when one says that the Father is God, that the Son is God
and that the Holy Spirit is God, and that nevertheless there is
only one God, although these three Persons differ from one
another, one must consider that this word God has not the same
sense at the beginning as at the end of this statement. Indeed
it signifies now the Divine Substance and now a Person of the
Godhead.^
Leibniz brings Pierre Bayle into sharp criticism at this point for
confusing the relationship of faith and reason. Under the influence of the
Cartesian dualism of the distinct ideas of reason and the empirical facts of
the world, Bayle failed to correlate adequately the relationship of faith
and reason. Austin Farrer points this outs
So far as he had a philosophical opinion, he was a Cartesian;
in theology he was an orthodox Calvlnlst. He could not
reconcile his theology with his Cartesianism and he did not
try to. He made a merit of the oppositions of faith to
reason and reason to itself, so that he could throw himself
upon a meritorious and voluntary faith.4
1Ibld., p. 88. 2Ibid., p. 87. 3Ibid., pp. 87-88.
^"Editor's Introduction," Theodicy, p. 55.
42
Leibniz will not have this opposition of faith and reason. He
writes:
M. Bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise: he
declares himself against reason, when he might have been content
to censure its abuse. He quotes the words of Cotta in Cicero,
where he goes so far as to say that if reason were a gift of
the gods providence would be to blame for having given it,
since it tends to our harm. M. Bayle also thinks that human
reason is a souroe of destruction and not of edification
(Historical and Critical Dictionary, p. 2026, col. 2), that
it is a runner who knows not where to stop, and who, like
another Penelope, herself destroys her own work.l
Instead of setting forth an opposition between faith and reason,
Leibniz distinguishes between what is above reason and what is contrary to
reason. "What is contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain
and inevitable truths? and what is above reason is in opposition only to
2
what one is wont to experience or to understand. Thus, the distinction
between truths of reason and truths of faith serve the purpose of pointing
out that faith is in perfect harmony with the necessary truths of reason,
while at the same time the contingent truths of facts have "no force
*2
against faith," for these truths of facts are inconclusive and probable.
This is to say that the truths of facts are contingent upon the choice of
God, and while the truths of facts substantiate the orderly working of
nature, yet these laws "may be overcome in some cases by stronger reasons of
a superior order."
Thus, the truths of faith stand on a higher level than the truths of
facts (that is, faith sees what is contrary to appearance, but not to facts
as such). Further, faith does not contradict the necessary truths of reason.
^Theodicy, p. 99. 2Ibid., p. 88. ^Ibid., p. 75-
^Ibid., p. 74.
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This leads Leibniz to point out that faith is neither contrary to the truths
of reason nor the truths of facts. However, faith cannot be fully explained,
but it can be sufficiently apprehended by the understanding so that our will
may give assent to its truth. Leibniz writes:
But one must not always demand what I call 'adequate notions',
involving nothing that is not explained, since even perceptible
qualities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us such
notions. Thus we agreed that Mysteries should receive an
explanation, but this explanation is imperfect. It suffices
for us to have some analogical understanding of a Mystery
such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, to the end that in
accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid of
meaning: but it is not necessary that the explanation go as
far as we would wish, that is, to the extent of comprehension
and to the how.l
Thus, the necessary presupposition of faith Is not the how it 1s,
but what it is. This means that faith must be substantiated by the
following: (1) The credibility of the Scriptures must be established on
the basis of historical criticism; (2) The truths of faith must be seen
to be in perfect harmony with the necessary truths of reason (that is, the
articles of faith should be as exact as the proofs of mathematics); (3)
there is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit who persuades and prompts
4
one to faith and charity.
Finally, it can be seen that Leibniz shows that the faculty of
reason is not to be disparaged, especially since It is a gift of God as well
c;
as faith.' In this respect, he finds the harmony of faith with reason to be
g
a basis for "the motives of credibility." This means that reason shows that
faith is sufficiently based and Is thus credible.
1Ibid., p. 103. 2lbid., p. 74; New Essays, p. 547.
^Theodicy, p. 87. 4Ibid., p. 74. 3Ibid., p. 91
°Ibid., pp. 76, 91; New Essays, p. 579-
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G. Leasing: The Fallacy of Misplaced Necessity
Ephraim Leasing (1729-1781), who was largely influenced through the
rationalism of Spinoza and Leibniz, transposed the philosophical distinctions
of reality (i.e., the truths of reason and the truths of facts) into a
strictly theological context. The critical question which Cartesian ratio¬
nalism had posed for theology is—how can religious certainty be attained
with the polarization of the temporal and the eternal? This polarization
is especially seen in Spinoza whose bifurcation of reality into eternal
truths and historical facts led to his rejection of the decisive significance
of history for revelation. Likewise, Lessing refused to allow history to be
of any decisive significance for eternal salvation, for history is the realm
of the mere probable and uncertain. He writes:
We all believe that an Alexander lived who in a short time
conquered almost all Asia. But who, on the basis of this belief,
would risk anything of great, permanent worth, the loss of which
would be irreparable? Who, in consequence of this belief, would
forswear for ever all knowledge that conflicted with this belief?
Certainly not I. Now I have no objection to raise against
Alexander and his victory: but it might still be possible that
the story was founded on a mere poem of Choerilus just as the
ten-year siege of Troy depends on no better authority than
Homer's poetry.2
Thus, Lessing writes: "Accidental truths of history can never become
,3
the proof of necessary truths of reason. In this way, Lessing clearly bi¬
furcates reason and history. This is to say that he refuses to believe the
most probable of all historical events, if it should go against what he knows
"^Cassirer, pp. 190-194. Cf. Thulstrup in Philosophical Fragments,
p. xlix.
^Lessing's Theological Writings, p. 54.
^Ibld., p. 53.
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can be from his own experience. If all historical evidence supports the
statement that Jesus was raised from the dead, he still cannot find this a
convincing argument against what reason says can and cannot happen according
to what he himself has experienced. Since historical truths and truths of
reason are different kinds of truth in that the former cannot be verified,"^
Lessing finds it impossible to accept historical events as possessing absolute
significance for faith.
But to Jump with that historical truth to a quite different class
of truths, and to demand of me that I should form all my metaphysical
and moral ideas accordingly; to expect me to alter all my fundamen¬
tal ideas of the nature of the Godhead because I cannot set any
credible testimony against the resurrection of Christ: if that is
not a eU aXio yeVc-s, then I do not know what Aristotle
meant by this phrase.^
It is this bifurcation of historical knowledge and reasoned knowledge
that "is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and
"X
however earnestly I have tried to make the leap." This leads him to say:
"if anyone can help me over it, let him do it, I beg him, I adjure him. He
i.4
will deserve a divine reward from me. Cassirer shows how Lessing sought
to provide his own solution.
But neither the theology nor the systematic metaphysics of the
eighteenth century contained a principle by virtue of which
Lessing's question could really be answered and his demand
truly satisfied In his Education of Humanity Lessing
created a new synthesis of the historical and the rational.
The historical is no longer opposed to the rational; it is
rather the way to the realization of the rational and the real,
indeed the only possible place of its fulfillment.5
In the Education of the Human Race, Lessing defines revelation in
terms of the growth of man's perfection. He writes: "Education is revelation
1Ibid., pp. 51, 53. 2Ibid., p. 54. ?Ibid., p. 55. ^Ibid.
^Cassirer, p. 194.
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coming to the individual man; and revelation is education which has come,
nl
and is still coming, to the human race. But, this education is nothing
which man could not get for himself from within himself. He says: "Reve¬
lation gives nothing to the human race which human reason could not arrive
2
at on its own.
The growth of this "education" is traced from the time of poly-theism,
through the Hebrews and the Greeks, up to the Christian religion. This
development is further seen as the movement from revealed truths to truths
of reason. He puts it this way: "The development of revealed truths into
truths of reason, is absolutely necessary, if the human race is to be
assisted by them. When they were revealed they were certainly not truths
of reason, but they were revealed in order to become such."'5 It cam be seen
from this "demythologizing" of revealed truths into natural religion through
the education of mankind in history that Leasing's Education of the Human
5
Race is a theodicy of history.
It can further be seen that this essay on the Education of the Human
Race shows certain similarities both to Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza
"*"Lessing's Theological Writings, p. 83. Cf. p. 96.
2Ibid., p. 8p. 3Ibid., p. 95-
^Lessing says that all revealed (or, positive) religions are equally
true and equally false. They are "equally true: insofar as it has every¬
where been necessary to come to an agreement over various things in order
to get uniformity and unity in public religion." They are "equally false:
in that the matters on which agreement is reached not only stand beside
what is essential but also weaken and supplant it." This leads him to say:
"The best revealed or positive religion is that which contains the fewest
conventional additions to natural religion, and least hinders the good




maintained: (1) "that the truth of a historical narrative is very far from
being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest good,"1 even as
Lessing says that historical facts, no matter how certain, cannot serve as the
basis for belief, for no one "would risk anything of great, permanent worth,
the loss of which would be irreparable," upon historical facts; (2) that
the essential teachings of Scripture are in perfect harmony with the eternal
3
truths of reason, even as Lessing maintains that revealed truths must be
turned into truths of reason (which establishes natural religion); (3) that
theology teaches eternal truth "in the style, . . . which would most deeply
it5
move the mind of the masses to devotion to God, which teaching is easy to
comprehend, and that philosophy reaches its conclusions through the deductions
of general truths a priori,^ while Lessing maintains that positive religions
clothed abstract truths in historical allegories, for this made it possible
7
for the education of the human race to take place sooner.
It can thus be seen that Lessing's main theological points are
8
essentially derived from Spinoza's philosophy. On the other hand, Leibniz's
• 9
philosophical categories serve as Lessing s point of departure.^ This is
seen in the Education of the Human Race in which Lessing adapted Leibniz's
Theodicy as a model for showing that man is progressing toward spiritual
maturity in the process of historical development.10
This Leibnizian influence is further seen in the way that Lessing
draws a sharp distinction between the truths of reason and the truths of
12 3
Supra, p. 21. Supra, p. 44. "Supra, pp. 21-22.
|i r
Supra, p. 46. DSupra, p. 22. Supra, p. 20.
8
Lessing's Theological Writings, pp. 83, 91* Cassirer, p. 190-
9Ibid., p. 192. 10lbid.
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history.1 However, there is a profound difference in the way that Leibniz
intends his distinctions of reality to be taken. Lessing fails to draw the
distinctions between the two kinds of reason that are so crucial for Leibniz's
philosophy. For Leibniz, there are the necessary truths of reason whose
necessity can be seen in that if opposite conclusions were drawn in the
reasoning process, then the truths (conclusions) would be contradictory and
thus false. Such are the "Eternal Verities" of geometry, logic, and meta-
physics. Furthermore, these "Eternal Verities" (truths of reason) are all
conditional, for they have no reality outside the mind. They are simply
the connection of ideas. This is to say that if such and such a thing
should exist, then it will be characterized in a certain way. For example,
the proposition that every figure which has three sides will also have three
angles says nothing more than if such a figure with three sides should exist,
3
it will also have three angles.
For Leibniz, there are also contingent truths of reason (truths of
fact). This is to say that what we observe of the experienced order of
nature suggests that there are certain laws of nature which can be said to
be the result of the choice of God. We reason to these truths (laws) of
nature through a consideration of the fitness of things. We cannot prove
these laws of nature (truths of facts) to be of a kind of geometric necessity.
Thus, whatever conclusions we may come to, they are at the most probable and
contingent. This means the arguments of critics against the miracles of faith
4
have no force. On the other hand, Leibniz insists that the truths of faith
must conform to the fundamental principles of logic and the truths of pure




reason, which truths can be seen to be absolutely necessary.1
Lessing does not draw this distinction between the necessary and
contingent truths of reason. He only distinguishes between reasoned knowledge
and historical knowledge. In this way, Lessing depreciates the significance
of history for faith. However, Leibniz holds historical knowledge of great
value, not only because of its practical value, but because it is through
historical study, along with the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, that one
2
finds supporting evidence for revelation.
Thus, Lessing's distinction between "the accidental truths of history"
and "the necessary truths of reason" is not in line with Leibniz's intention
at all. This can especially be seen when Lessing suggests that he cannot
believe in miracles because "I live in the eighteenth century, in which
„3
miracles no longer happen. Here it can be seen that Lessing is confusing
"necessary truths" and "contingent truths." That Lessing believes that
miracles cannot happen because he does not see them to happen is not a
"necessary truth of reason," but it is "contingent truth" which merely ex¬
presses a opinion. Thus, when Lessing says "accidental truths of history
can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason," Leibniz would
argue otherwise. Leibniz would showi (l) that necessary truths of reason
(e.g. geometry, logic) cannot disprove the truths of faith; (2) that pure
reason is in perfect harmony with faith, though faith stands above reason,
but not against reason; (3) that Lessing's argument against the factual
resurrection of Jesus on the basis that reason will not permit him to alter
his fundamental ideas of the laws of nature is in fact only an example of a
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 74.
^Lesslng's Theological Writings, p. 52.
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contingent truth of fact since it cannot be proved to be a necessary truth
of reason and thus this argument only expresses an opinion and yields no
force against faith; (4) that "the accidental truths of history" are not
necessarily accidental and uncertain.
This fourth point is of special importance in the discussion between
the difference of Leibniz and Lessing. Leibniz's distinction between the twu
kinds of reason is intended to show that reason is in conformity with faith,
and he does not intend to depreciate the validity of historical knowledge.
In fact, Leibniz establishes a basis for the validity of historical knowledge
1
through his distinctions among the various degrees of probability. In this
connection, Leibniz shows that "to doubt seriously is to doubt in relation
to the practical, and we might take certainty as a knowledge of truth which
o
we cannot doubt in relation to the practical without madness." He cites as
one of the examples of the certainty of historical knowledge the existence of
Alexander the Great whom one could not doubt really existed "without great
derangement of mind.In sharp contrast to Leibniz, Lessing suggests that
even a historical fact as certain as the existence of Alexander the Great
,, „4
may in fact have been derived from a mere poem of Choerilus.
Finally, it can be seen that Lessing did not distinguish correctly
between the (necessary) truths of reason and the (contingent) truths of facts
(reasoned knowledge of facts). This is to say that it would appear that
Lessing has not adequately stated the theological problem of historical
reality when he questions how "accidental truths of history" can become
"necessary truths of reason." For example, faith is wrongly categorized as
^Supra, pp. 58ff. Slew Essays, p. 513. ^Ibid.
4 • i
Lessing s Theological Writings, p. 54.
a necessary truth of reason. Furthermore, instead of holding to the Leibnizian
distinction of the two kinds of reason, it seems he exaggerated the incertitude
of historical knowledge, and at the same time it appears he has confused the
contingent truths of reason with the necessary truths of reason. This can
be seen when he suggests that since he has not seen a miracle, reason neces¬
sarily compels him to abandon belief in the resurrection of Jesus despite
whatever conclusive historical evidence may be put forward to substantiate
it.1 For Leibniz, the validity of the resurrection is to be decided on the
basis of history and the "inward motion of the Holy Spirit" and not on the
basis of arguments which merely express opinions, such as those which are
derived from a reasoned knowledge of facts. On the other hand, Lessing holds
to what may be termed—the Fallacy of Misplaced Necessity. That is, Lessing
clearly suggests that the truths of fact necessarily exclude the possibility
of the laws of nature being superseded by a higher law of divine providence.
It may be that a reasoned knowledge of contingent facts will not permit him
to accept the idea of miracles, but such a, conclusion is a conviction and
not a demonstration of necessity and thus, as Leibniz has said, has no force
against faith. Further, Lessing classifies faith as a necessary truth of
reason which cannot be damaged by the incertitude of historical knowledge.
He asks: "But who, on the basis of this /historical/ belief, would risk
anything of great, permanent worth, the loss of which would be irreparable?
Who, in consequence of this /historical/ belief, would forswear for ever all
knowledge that conflicted with this belief? Certainly not I." Instead,
the teachings of Jesus are what is significant, for they represent the
necessary truths of reason and thus qualify as a legitimate basis for faith.
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Now it may be for Lessing that faith corresponds to what are the necessary
truths of reason, but clearly this is not the distinctive feature of Christian
faith. Conversely, what is theologically necessary for Christian faith is
its historical frame of reference, though to be sure the condition of fiducial
faith has its sole basis in God himself. Thus, Lessing holds both to a
philosophical and theological Fallacy of Misplaced Necessity.
So far, this discussion on the problem of faith and history has been
restricted to the various forms of Cartesian rationalism, and it has sought
to do two things in particular: (1) to show that the bifurcation of reality
into the rational and the empirical led to a criticism of history which then
gave rise to historical criticism; (2) to show that the depreciation of
historical knowledge (because it lacked the certainty of rational knowledge)
led to a devaluation of history for Christian faith. Thus, the field of
historical studies developed with the result that, in the words of Cassirer,
"theology had recognized an ally which was to prove stronger than itself, and
which in the end was to challenge it on its own ground.""''
H. Herder: The Categories of "individuality" and "Relativity"
It is Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744-1802) concept of history (which
is representative of the Romantic view) that became especially significant
for what Collingwood calls "scientific history."" There are especially two
significant features of Herder's concept of history as it relates to the
"""Cassirer, p. 201.
O
Collingwood, pp. 86-95* Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, History and
Eschatology (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1957)* PP. 9f«# 78, 84.
Friedrich Gogarten, Demythologizing and History, pp. 27-28.
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question of theology, (l) There is the principle of the unique individuality^"
of the various phases and developments of the historical process. Instead
of forcing a modern standard of interpretation or pattern on the historical
development of the past as it had been done with the analytical thinking of
the Enlightenment, Herder sought to understand every development and phase of
2
history as possessing its own unique significance. In this respect, Herder
condemns the Enlightenment, for example, for dismissing the European Middle
3
Ages as an era of darkness and barbarity. What is thus required of histori¬
ography is to understand each era within its own context. For example, when
one writes of the history of Egypt, Herder says:
It is silly to take a single Egyptian virtue out of the context
of its country and time, out of the youth of the human spirit,
and then to appraise it with a standard of a different time!
Even if the Greek could ... be so mistaken in his Judgment
of the Egyptian, and if the Oriental could hate the Egyptian;
yet it seems to me, one's first thought should be to see him
in his proper place. Otherwise one sees, especially from the
European viewpoint, a most distorted caricature.
Tillich points out that one of the main reasons for Romanticism's
appreciation of the historical periods of the past was the belief in the
immanence of God in the world. He writes:
The infinite was also present in the past periods of history
through expressive forms of life and their great symbols. They
had their revelatory character also. This means that history,
Hjhile the idea of individuality is clearly formulated by Herder,
Troeltsch points out that it was Schleiermacher who actually "coined the
catchword 'individual.'" (Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity,
trans. David Reid (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1972), p. 76.
2
Cassirer, p. 231.
•^Herder, "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der
Menschheit," Werke, ed Suphan, V, cited by Barth, Protestant Thought,
p. 209.
T"Auch eine Philosophie der Gesohichte zur Bildung der Menschheit,
Werke, V, 489f., 50If., cited by Cassirer, p. 231.
54
the historical past, be taken seriously. Tradition could be
important for Romanticism, whereas the Enlightenment was merely
the critic of tradition.1
(2) There is the principle of historical relativity which Troeltsch
2
was subsequently to develop more fully. For Herder, history is seen to be
a continuous tradition. Barth shows this means that historical beings are
not monads, "but links in a chain, drops of water in a stream, the living
cells of a growing organism."^ Herder puts it this ways
Why should I become a mind of pure reason when my sole wish is to
be human, and when in knowledge and belief I am just what I am in
my being, drifting like a wave in the sea of history?4
Even as Lessing had sought for the reconciliation of "the accidental
truths of history" with "the necessary truths of reason," so Herder sought
to effect a reconciliation between the general and the particular, thought
5
and extension, God and the world, reason and history, noumenon and phenomenon.
It is at this point that Herder particularly breaks with Kant.^ This is seen
Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology,
edited with an introduction by Carl E. Braaten (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1967)» P. 84.
^This principle of historical relativity was to become the dominant
motif in Troeltsch's philosophy of history. For him, "the historical and
the relative are identical" (The Absoluteness of Christianity, p. 85). He
offers this concise definition of historical relativity: "Relativity simply
means that all historical phenomena are unique, individual configurations
acted on by influences from a universal context that comes to bear on them
in varying degrees of immediacy. It means, therefore, that every independent
structure leads one to a perspective that embraces broader and still broader
horizons till finally it opens out onto the whole" (Ibid., p. 89.)
^Barth, Protestant Thought, trans. Brian Cozens (New York: Harper
and Row, 1959)* P- 210.
^Briefe d. Stu. Theol. betr., Werke, ed. B. Suphan, Berlin, l&Tlff,
X, 290, cited by Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 210.
^Herder, God, Some Conversations, trans, with a critical Introduction




in the two main features of his concept of the world and man—the dynamism
of nature and the immanence of God.
Now you yourself see, Philolaus, that the Highest, or rather the
All (for God is not the Highest in a gradation of things like
Him), could reveal itself as active in nothing else than in All.
Nothing could be dormant in Him, and what He expressed was Himself,
an indivisible wisdom, goodness and omnipotence. The world of
God is thus the best, not because He selected it from among the
less good, but rather because neither good nor bad existed without
Him, and He, according to the inner necessity of His existence
could effect nothing bad. Therefore all forces exist which could
exist, all together forming an expression of the All-wise, All-
good and All-beautiful. He is active in the smallest and in the
largest, in every point of space and time, that is, in every living
force of the universe. For space and time are only phantoms of
our imagination, conditions of measurement for a limited mind
which must acquaint itself with things one after another and side
by side. For God there is neither space nor time, but all is an
eternal connection. He is before all and all exists in Him. The
whole world is an expression, an appearance of His eternally-
living, eternally-active forces.1
What Herder is maintaining is that the development of the world forms
a continuous and dynamic unfolding plan of God. This means history shows no
gaps nor leaps, but it is a steady movement toward the perfection of man's
nature and the world. Despite the great diversity of the cosmos, it is one
j " 2
continuous whole; God is One and All (<£V ka,' rr** ). This reconciliation of
spirit and matter, thought and extension, is effected through the idea of
"substantial forces. In this way, Spinoza's Substance is made dynamic,
while at the same time Leibniz's monads are no longer seen to be separate
4
entitles. This means that thought and being, spirit and matter, are no longer
isolated.
I am happy, Theophron, that you have cleared up the obscure con¬
ception of matter for me. For although I gladly accepted the
system of Leibniz which said that it could be nothing but a
phenomenon of our senses, an aggregate of substantial monads,




yet the so-called "ideal connection between such substances," in
this system remained an enigma to me. Leibniz compared matter to
a cloud which is made up of rain drops and only seems a cloud to
us, or even to a garden full of plants and trees, to a pond full
of fish, and the like. But by those means I was still unable to
explain to myself the existence of this appearance, the connection
of these forces. The raindrops in the cloud, the plants in the
garden, the fish in the water have a connecting medium, and what
could such a medium between the forces constituting matter be,
except the forces of the substances themselves, through which
they act upon one another? In this way, then, are organs formed;
for the organ itself is also a system of forces which in their
inner connection serve a single ruling one. Matter no longer
remains for me merely an appearance in my idea, or something con¬
nected only through the ideas of perceiving creatures, but exists
itself through its nature and truth, through the inherent con¬
nection of active forces. Nothing is isolated in nature, nothing
is without cause, nothing without effect. And since everything
possible exists, and exists in connection, nothing in nature
therefore is without organization. Every force is connected with
other forces which either serve or rule it. Hence, if my soul
is a substantial force and its present realm of activity is
destroyed, then it can never lack a new organ in a creation in
which there is no gap, no leap, no island. New serving forces
will come to its aid and form its sphere of activity in its new
connection with a world in which all is connected, (italics mine.)
It can thus be seen that Herder's attempt to reconcile the polar¬
ization of reality is made through his synthesis of Spinoza's Substance and
Leibniz's monad. In this respect, Herder acknowledges his dependence on
2
Lessing, who likewise sought to reconcile reason and history through a
3
synthesis of Spinoza and Leibniz in his Education of the Human Race. Barth
also points this out: "in what concerns history, too, Herder shouted what
Lessing had whispered. History, for him, is nothing else but living experience
understood in the maerocosmic and universal sense, instead of, as previously,
in the microcosmic and individual one."^
Herder, again following the lead of Lessing, exempts particular facts
1Ibid., pp. 173-174. 2Ibid., pp. 134-161, especially.
3 4
Supra, pp. 47f. Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 211.
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as possessing any decisive significance for faith in so far as their objective
truth is concerned. What is important for theology is not isolated facts,
which cannot be, for in creation there is "no gap, no leap, no island.""*"
Rather, what is important for theology is the world seen in its necessary and
inter-connecting phases.
Every true physico-theology thus exhibits nothing but divine
reason and power according to eternal necessary laws in the
structure of creatures and in their entire interrelation in
place and time. Everywhere it involves one and the same
inference, or rather one and the same Insight, in a thousand
examples and objects, from the most vanishingly minute to the
most unsurveyably great, (italics mine.)2
In this way. Herder rejects Leibniz's distinction between the necessary
truths of reason and the truths of fact. For Leibniz, the laws of nature
operated as sueh, not as a mathematical necessity, but as a "physical neces¬
sity . . . founded on moral necessity."^ This means the laws of nature are
4
contingent upon the choice of God, and are not of themselves necessary.
Herder rejects this idea of "moral necessity.""' For Herder, the laws of nature
are necessary and immutable.
Herder further considers metaphysical speculation as being irrelevant,
for what one knows he derives from experience. And, these experiences cannot
be transplanted "to the province of demonstration." To demand such demon-
g
stration would be to engage in "metaphysical hair-splitting" and "hypercrit-
itQ i
icism. Thus, the epistemological basis for Kant s noumenon and phenomenon,
or even Leibniz's truths of reason and truths of fact, appear to be without
1 2
God, Some Conversations, p. 17^. Ibid., p. 152.
^Theodicy, p. "Jb. ^Ibid. "'God, Some Conversations, p. 1^2.
6Ibid., pp. 150-152, 175. 7Ibid., p. 153. 8Ibid., p. 146.
9Ibid., p. 153.
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significance. This would clearly suggest a rejection of an objective demon¬
stration of faith. Barth puts it this way:
We must get used to the idea that with Herder and with the whole
line of theological development which began with him there is not
that burning interest in the question of truth which we might at
first expect where the establishment of a working basis for a
theology is at stake which had to come to terms with Kant of all
people. Herder's theology finds the reality of revelation so
conclusively in living experience or history, in feeling or
practical knowledge, that it thought it could dispense with the
enquiry into its legitimacy.1
Herder's attempt to overcome the philosophical disjunction of reality
in terms of the concepts of "individuality" and "Relativity" aided not only
the rise of the modern historical consciousness, but also his systematic
effort to bring theology into a constructive relationship with history fore¬
casted much of subsequent theology. The same likewise could be said of Lessing,
2
whose influence is particularly felt today through Kierkegaard. Barth points
out the pervasive influence of Herder.
The master in the art of circumventing Kant was Johann Gottfried
Herder. He has been called the 'theologian among the classical
writers'^ He was also truly a classical theologian, because he
was the first to discover in convincing manner a way of making
a theology possible which was able to bypass Kant. The possibility
which Lessing was too cautious to exploit, and which, according
to Kant, was forbidden, is to Herder a joyous event, in the course
of whioh, as I. A. Dorner has well expressed it, his mind stands
like a help-meet beside the masculine mind of Lessing. Herder's
significance for those theologians who came after him can scarcely
be rated highly enough. Without him the work of Schleiermacher
and de Wette would have been impossible, and also the peculiar
pathos of the course of theology in the nineteenth century. With¬
out Herder there would have been no Erlangen group and no school
of religious history. But for Herder there would have been no
Troeltsoh.5
While Herder is credited with having taken the first most significant
"^Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 216. ^Infra, pp. 155 et passim.
Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 200.
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step toward establishing a basis for the modern principles of historiography
with his appreciation for the historical past,1 he could not have done so
without the pioneering efforts of the eighteenth century. Cassirer shows
that, though Romanticism was superior to the Enlightenment in its historical
appreciation for the past, the basis for establishing a positive relationship
with the past is to be found in the critical epistemological considerations
of the Enlightenment. This is to say that the attempt to delineate the
relationship between the general and the particular, thought and extension,
etc., raised the central philosophical question of history.
However remote from the Enlightenment the Romantic view of the
content of history—its material "philosophy of history"—may be,
in method it remains dependent on, and most deeply indebted to,
the Enlightenment. For it was the eighteenth century which
raised the central philosophical problem in this field of knowl¬
edge. It inquires concerning the "conditions of the possibility"
of history, just as it inquires concerning the conditions of the
possibility of natural science. To be sure, the eighteenth
century seeks only to establish these conditions in preliminary
outline. It tries to grasp the meaning of history by endeavoring
to gain a clear and distinct concept of it, to ascertain the
relation between the general and the particular, between idea
and reality, and between laws and facts, and to draw the exact
boundaries between these terms.2
In this respect, Cassirer also shows that Herder could not have taken
his decisive step toward establishing a genuine basis for historical study
without "the intellectual tools ready at hand.""'* This is to say that Herder
wrestled with the already systematically-formulated problem of the relation¬
ship of reason and history, God and the world, thought and extension, spirit
and matter. Cassirer thus further indicates what has been intended in this
Part One—i.e., a methodological study of the general question of epistemology
•'■Cassirer, pp. 195, 230-233; Collingwood, pp. 86, 88-89, 113-
2Cassirer, p. 197. ^Ibid., p. 230.
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shows that the attempt to ascertain the nature of reality (thus giving rise
to the terminological distinctions such as thought and extension, truths of
reason and truths of fact) provided "the intellectual tools" for the rise of
the modem historical method.
CHAPTER II
TRUTHS SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE?
In distinguishing the subjective and objective aspects of truth,
what is being questioned is whether truth is mere subjective certainty or
objective truth? Is truth solely an anthropocentric determination? That is,
is the truth of reality merely what man determines it to be, or can he achieve
an objective knowledge of the truth of reality in terms of his human subjec¬
tivity? Stated succinctly, can man's subjective certainty be determined as
objective truth? The implications of this question for theology can be
readily seen, especially in its claim that man can have an experiential knowl¬
edge of God on the basis of his knowledge (i.e., insight) of historical
reality.
Perhaps the two most significant philosophical systems that have more
or less determined the epistemological presuppositions for modern theology
are those of Kant and Hegel. It is their attempt to resolve the problem of
subjective certainty as opposed to objective truth that will now be considered.
A. Kant: An Epistemological Dualism
Immanuel Kant's significance in regard to the problem of theology
and history can hardly be exaggerated, especially as it is seen in his
distinctions between (l) noumenon and phenomenon, and (2) theoretical reason
and practical reason. It was his intention to bring about a synthesis of
rationalism and empiricism. Following his contact with David Hume's skeptical
61
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philosophy, he was aroused from his "dogmatic slumber,and subsequently
formulated, instead, a critical philosophy. He developed two basic convictions
concerning the nature of knowledge. First, knowledge of objective reality
2
cannot be merely deduced from certain innate laws of reason (rationalism).
Second, empiricism is correct in emphasizing the priority of sense experience
over against pure speculative thought, but it is wrong in saying that first¬
hand contact with reality is in itself equivalent to knowledge. Rather, sense
experience only provides the faculty of understanding with source material,
which taken together (i.e., sense data and the concepts of the understanding)
forms synthetical a priori Judgments. This means that reality can be known
only as we have first-hand intuitive contact with it and intellectually
analyze what this empirical intuition provides.
However, what the senses perceive is only appearance (phenomenon),
not reality as it is in itself (noumenon). This means that reality which
the intellect analyzes undergoes a transformation in the process of being
received by the sense. Thus, sense data are the mere appearance of reality.
Kant writess "The only manner in which objects can be given to us is by
modification of our sensibility."' Kant even goes so far as to say that
"the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we
ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we
,,4
ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. Not only
^Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, with an introduction by
Lewis White Black (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950),
p. 8. Cited hereafter as Prolegomena.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1929), P- 32.
•at 2i
Ibid., p. 182. Ibid., p. 147.
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is appearance a modification of reality and thus it is not reality itself,
but also the connection of the appearances of reality are subjectively intro¬
duced through the activity of the mind, and it is not inherent in the reality
itself.^"
Consequently, knowledge relates only to what appears and there can
be no knowledge of reality as it is in itself. Kant writess "What objects
may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility,
2
remains completely unknown to us." Knowledge, rather, is the combination
of the concepts of the understanding (spontaneously activated by the intellect)
with the empirical intuitions of the senses.^ Thus, knowledge is a conver¬
gence of the concepts with empirical intuitions. Otherwise, there can be no
knowledge, for "thoughts without content are empty," while "intuitions without
concepts are blind.
It is this dualism of appearance and reality, noumenon and phenomenon,
that hfs had far-reaching influence in the epistemology of history.
Maurice Mandelbaum has shown that Kant's theory of knowledge became
the presupposition of much of subsequent philosophies of history—that whatever
meaning and value lie in the objects of our knowledge are the result of the
5
activity of the mind and not the inherent characteristics of reality Itself.
This aspect of historical relativism is to be found In Kant's own philosophy
of history, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht.
"^Cf. H. W. Cassirer, Kant's First Critique (London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 195^), PP. 75-76.
P "5
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 82. Ibid., p. 105.
4Ibid., p. 93-
^The Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright Publishing
Corporation, 1936),p. 203.
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Kant says that while human deeds are the results of moral laws, i.e., they
stem from freedom of the will (which has its basis in noumenon), these deeds
as seen from the perspective of the historian are considered phenomena and
are subject to natural laws. These phenomena of history say nothing of what
really is the objective basis of history (though noumena are the basis of the
phenomena of history, i.e., moral laws are the basis of human deeds). Thus,
one can only know history as it appears (in the sense of a speotator) and not
as it really is.'"
In addition to this dualism of noumenon and phenomenon is the dualism
of theoretical reason and practical reason. The task of Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason is to determine the boundary lines of human knowledge, "it is
a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely,
that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason
its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic
decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws." What
results from this critique is that "reason by all its a priori principles
never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, and even
■*
of these nothing more than can be known in experience." On the other hand,
there is nothing to "prevent reason from leading us to the objective boundary
of experience, namely, to the relation to something which is not itself an
object of experience but is the ground of all experience."^ Here is the
5
practical use of pure reason—to move beyond the limits of sensibility.
'"Kant, "idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher
Absicht," Sammtliche Werke, IV, 143. Cf. Collingwood, pp. 93ff•
o 3 4
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 9. Prolegomena, p. 110. Ibid.
e:
^Critique of Pure Reason, p. 27.
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Thus, the distinction between practical and theoretical reason corresponds to
the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon.
The critique of pure reason is thus to define the boundary of human
knowledge and limit it to appearances (i.e., representation of objects in
the mind).1 These appearances are called phenomenal reality. But, phenomenal
reality is not the whole of reality, for the practical use of pure reason
leads us "to the objective boundary of experience" to "the ground of all
experience." This "ground of all experience" (ultimate reality) is called
2
the noumenon (thing-in-itself).
Here we have a clear bifurcation of reality into the phenomenon and
the noumenon with the result that theoretical reason will not permit any
knowledge of the noumenon. This means that God, freedom, and immortality
cannot be proved on the basis of pure reason alone, but they are rather the
necessary postulates of practical reason. This suggests that speculative
reason relates to "knowledge" of phenomena, while practical reason relates
to "faith" insofar as noumenal reality is concerned. Thus, practical reason
must "surrender the language of knowledge" and employ "the quite legitimate
language of a firm faith.This distinction between theoretical and practical
reason is further illustrated in this well-known quotation of Kant:
Even the assumption—as made on behalf of the necessary practical
employment of my reason—of God, freedom, and immortality is not
permissible unless at the same time speculative reason be deprived
of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order to arrive
at suoh insight it must make use of principles which, in fact,
extend only to objects of possible experience, and which, if also
Prolegomena, p. 36. 2Ibid., p. 103. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 268.
^Critique of Pure Reason, p. 597-
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applied to what cannot be an object of experience, always really
change this into an appearance, thus rendering all practical
extension of pure reason impossible. I have therefore found it
necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.
Consequently, Kant rejected the three traditional proofs for the
existence of God because of their over-stepping the boundary of pure reason.
The ontological argument is faulty because reality cannot be postulated on
the basis of mere thinking. Whether or not something exists must be proved
2
by experience and not by mere thinking. The cosmologioal argument falsely
assumes the absolutely necessity of a Supreme Being as a sufficient oause
for all effects. The law of cause-effect is observed on the phenomenal level
of reality, but there is no proof that such a law reaches back to an ultimate
3
ground. The teleological argument deserves respect, for it is the oldest
4
argument and the most adequate to common sense. However, it cannot claim
to be an apodictic argument, for there is no way we can experiment with the
5
noumenal level of reality. Further, this argument cannot prove the idea of
a creator, but only suggests the idea of an architect. Kant writes;
The utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove is an arohiteot
of the world who is always very much hampered by the adaptability
of the material in which he works, not a creator of the world to
whose idea everything is subject. This, however, is altogether
inadequate to the lofty purpose which we have before our eyes, namely,
the proof of an all-sufficient primordial being. To prove the con¬
tingency of matter itself, we should have to resort to a transcen¬
dental argument, and this is precisely what we have here set out
to avoid."
Thus, Kant agreed with Hume that natural theology cannot be supported
by mere rational demonstration. What, then, is the basis for postulating the








idea of the finite reaching into the infinite, believes there is a basis for
belief. Having abolished knowledge, he makes room for faith by giving it a
rational basis in man's freedom, the evidence of which is found in the practi¬
cal use of pure reason. Kant puts it this way:
Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an
apodictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole
system of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts
(those of God and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain
in it unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by
it obtain consistent and objective reality; that is to say, their
possibility is proved by the fact that freedom actually exists,
for this idea is revealed by the moral law.^
This means that freedom is the only idea of speculative reason "of
which we know the possibility a priori (without, however, understanding it),
because it is the condition of the moral law which we know." Thus, without
freedom there could be no moral law and without the moral law we would not
3
know freedom. The ideas of God and immortality are not conditions of the
moral law, but are the conditions of the practical use of pure reason. These
ideas can only be assumed from a practical use of pure reason, not from any
4
necessary or theoretical reason.
Theoretical reason sees these transcendental ideas only in terms of
"a merely subjective principle of assent," while practical reason sees them
as "objectively valid ... by means of the concept of freedom," which "assures
»»5
objective reality and authority to the ideas of God and Immortality.
It is this practical use of pure reason in terms of "freedom" which
^Critique of Practical Reason and other works on the theory of
Ethics, trans. T. K. Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., Ltd., 1927)*
p. 88. Cited hereafter as Critique of Practical Reason.
2Ibid., p. 88. 5Ibid., p. 117- ^Ibid., pp. 88-89.
5Ibld., p. 89.
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makes it possible for us to make contact with the transcendent world without
encouraging theoretical reason "to run riot into the transcendent."1 Thus,
freedom has its basis in the noumena, while on the other hand causality
2
controls things on the phenomenal level.
This inter-relatedness of morality and freedom excludes the necessity
of religion, for morality is seen to be self-sufficient. It is a law within
3
itself. However, morality does inevitably lead to the idea of religion and
4
ultimately to the idea of a moral legislator. This means the moral argument
for God is a matter of faith, not knowledge. This is so because finite reason
cannot break into the infinite.
Theodore Greene in his introduction to Religion within the Limits of
Reason Alone summarizes the four characteristics of the moral law. (l) The
moral law is defined as what ought to be, in contrast to what is. (2) The
moral law is self-legislative and autonomous within each man. Man's own
conscience is the final judge in all matters of right and wrong. (j5) The
moral law is universally binding upon all men because it is the law of reason.
c
(4) The moral law has its basis in the noumena and not in the phenomena.
God's existence is postulated on the basis of a moral certainty, not
a theoretical certainty. This is to say that a moral certainty is "faith"
and that theoretical certainty is "knowledge." Thus, the bifurcation between
the phenomenon and the noumenon leads to a bifurcation between faith and knowl¬
edge. The obvious consequence of Kant's divorce between faith and knowledge
1Ibid., p. 147* 2Ibld., pp. 91* 145# 210.
^Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans, with an
introduction and notes by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (London:
The Open Court Publishing Company, 1934)# P« 3«
^Ibid., pp. 5f. 5Ibid., pp. liii-liv.
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means that man can never claim knowledge of the object of his worship.. Thus,
Kant says that Hume's criticism of natural religion really affects theism
more so than deism. Kant writes: "Hume's objections to deism are weak, and
nlaffect only the proofs and not the deistic assertion itself. Thus, Kant
reestablished deism from the practical use of pure reason; namely, through
the moral argument, while destroying (he believed) any basis for theism with
its "dogmatic anthropomorphism." However, Kant distinguished his moral
philosophy from deism in that he would allow "symbolical anthropomorphism,
3
which in fact concerns language only and not the object itself. In thus
postulating the existence of God as Supreme Will, Kant is not suggesting a
theoretical knowledge of God, for moral certainty can only speak in terms of
als ob. Neither can one say that "it is_morally certain that there is a God,"
but only, "l_ am morally certain."^
It is not within the scope of this work to offer em extensive and
critioal commentary on Kant's philosophy. Rather, I have attempted to show
that Kant brought together in a systematic way certain principles of rational¬
ism and empiricism. In doing this, Kant sought to overcome the skepticism
of Hume which, if followed, would mean the end of science as well as theology
especially since Hume denied objective validity to the connection of phenomena.
On the other hand, Kant taught that scientific knowledge is possible on the
5
basis of what he called synthetical a priori judgments. This means that the
Judgments of perception are combined with universal laws of the understanding
^Prolegomena, p. 104. ^Ibid., p. 105.
^Ibid., p. 106; Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 568.
^Critique of Pure Reason, p. 650. ^Prolegomena, pp. 42-74.
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which give rise to valid judgments of experience.^ Though these universal
laws of the understanding give our empirical judgments objective validity,
nevertheless these judgments tell us nothing of things-as-they-really-are.
Rather, our judgments of experience are objectively valid only for phenomena
(things-as-they-appear).
Here, then, is the way Kant attempted to synthesize the a priori
concepts of rationalism with empiricism. But, in so doing, he excluded any
empirical basis for knowledge of God as well as denying the a priori knowledge
of God's existence in rationalism. Rather, God's existence is a "faith"
assertion (to be sure, it is a valid assertion for Kant) derived from the
practical use of the apodictic moral law of reason.
It can be seen that Kant sought to provide a philosophical basis for
scientific knowledge with his synthetic a priori judgments, but on the other
hand, he substituted the "language of faith" for the "language of knowledge"
insofar as practical reason is concerned, thereby providing faith with a valid
foundation for belief in the existence of God, but with the result that faith
in God would serve no constitutive purpose especially since the categorical
imperative is sufficient in itself for morality.
That the Idea of God has no constitutive purpose (though it has a
regulative status) necessarily follows if "we are compelled to consider the
„3
world as if it were the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, for what¬
ever is "constitutive" obviously must be based on more than the mere suppo¬
sition of an als ob. Kant further says that the world bears a relation to
God in the same way that "the world of sense (or whatever constitutes the
substratum of this complex of appearances) does to the unknown, which I do
1Ibid., pp. 48f. 2Ibid., p. 98. ^Ibid., p. 106.
not hereby know as it is in itself but as it is for me, that is, in relation
to the world of which I am a part.""*" This analogy is not to be understood
as an imperfect comparison between two similar things. Rather, it is "a
o
perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things." In
this way, Kant maintains that "there remains a concept of the Supreme Being
sufficiently determined for us, though we have left out everything that could
determine it absolutely or in Itself."^ The theological problem that Kant
has raised here is not his clarification of the use of language in reference
to what is transcendent, but whether or not faith can be Christian faith on
the mere basis of an als ob.
It is this divorce of knowledge and faith, noumenon and phenomenon,
the Supreme Being "in itself" and the Supreme Being "for us," that has had
far-reaching influence on theology. This is particularly seen in the way
that contemporary theology, when it begins with the Kantian distinction
between "God in himself" ard "God for us," defines the certainty of faith
exclusively within the context of the unmediated presence of God, which is
devoid of any propositional content. As it will be pointed out In "Part Two,
it is this Kantian Influence that has become the point of departure for much
of contemporary theology. In this respect, Kant has been called the philoso-
pher of Protestantism.
B. Hegel: Absolute Knowledge and World History
Hegel's importance for the problem of theology and history is twofold
(l) he sought to go beyond the Kantian bifurcation of reality into phenomenon
and noumenon (which epistemological dualism more or less has served as the
1Ibid. 2Ibid. 5Ibid. ^Tillich, pp. 65-66.
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philosophical framework for the neo-orthodox dualism of faith and history);
and (2) he sought to establish an epistemological basis for history. Hegel
acknowledges that Kant serves as the point of departure for his own philosoph¬
ical system."'" He points out that philosophy had come to accept uncritically
Kant's results, "that reason can cognize no valid content, and with regard
to absolute truth rnust be referred to faith." It is this skepticism that
Hegel says has become "a pillow for intellectual sloth, which soothes itself
with the idea that everything has been already proved and done with. Those
who look for knowledge and a definite content of thought, which are not to
be found in this dry and sterile acquiescence, must turn to that proceding
exposition /Kant^.
Inasmuch as Kant is the precursor of Hegel's epistemology and philoso¬
phy of history, it would be helpful in this exposition to offer a comparison
between Hegel and Kant in order to lessen some of the complexities of Hegel's
thought and thus bring into the foreground a summary of Hegel's epistemology,
which is presupposed in his philosophy of history. In other words, Hegel
assumes in his philosophy of history that "Reason" governs world history.
But, he says that the justification for this presupposition is to be found in
his Science of Logic. This indicates that a knowledge of his metaphysics is
necessary prior to an understanding of his philosophy of history. Further,
inasmuch as Hegel follows up many of Kant's thoughts, it is fitting to begin
"Slegel, Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers,
with an introductory preface by Viscount Haldane (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1929), I, 75n. Cited hereafter as Logic.
2Ibid. ■'ibid.
^Hegel, Reason in History, trans, with an intro. Robert S. Hartman
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1953)* PP» H* 22, 51.
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with Hegel's critique of Kant's philosophy of critical idealism.
Hegel's Critique of Kant. In the preceding discussion on Kant, it
was pointed out that Kant set about to examine critically the possibilities
and validity of the knowing faculties. He distinguished the cognitive
faculties into (l) sense, (2) understanding, and (3) reason.1 The function
of the senses is to perceive phenomena. The function of the understanding
is to take these empirical intuitions and to bring them into conformity with
the a priori concepts of the understanding, which conformity is defined as
the a priori synthetical judgment of the understanding. This is to say, the
judgment of perception becomes the judgment of experience when perception is
2
united with its corresponding categories. These Judgments of experience are
synthetical a priori, not a posteriori, for these concepts do not come from
empirical intuitions and thus are not synthetical a posteriori Judgments.
Rather, these concepts are a priori and are universally binding, thus render¬
ing objective validity to the synthetical a priori Judgments. It follows
from this, then, that truth is the correspondence of the concepts of the under-
3
standing with empirical intuitions.
1 2
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 300-301. Prolegomena, p. 48.
3
Kant shows how a Judgment of perception becomes a judgment of
experience when he writes: "Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can
become a judgment of experience, it is requisite that the perception should
be subsumed under some such concept of the understanding; for instance, air
belongs under the concept of cause, which determines our judgment about it in
respect to its expansion as hypothetical. Thereby the expansion of the air
is represented, not as merely belonging to the perception of the air in my
present state or in several states of mine, or in the perceptual state of
others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, 'Air is elastio,'
becomes universally valid and a Judgment of experience only because certain
judgments precede it which subsume the intuition of air under the concept of
cause and effect; and they thereby determine the perceptions, not merely
with respect to one another in me, but with respect to the form of judging
in general (which is here hypothetical), and in this way they render the
empirical Judgment universally valid." (Prolegomena, pp. 48-49).
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Reason receives the pure concepts of the understanding for its source
material Just as the tinderstanding receives empirical intuitions from the
senses and the senses perceive objects for its material."'" Just as space-time
condition the senses, and the categories of the understanding condition judg¬
ment, even so do these three transcendental Ideas condition reason—(1) the
Idea of the Self, (2) the Idea of the Material World, and (3) the Idea of
2
God. Now Kant does not deny the reality of Self, the World, and God, but
reason cannot postulate what that reality is, for we can only know what is an
object of possible experience. We cannot know their reality, only their ideas.
Hegel charges that Kant has merely replaced an objective dogmatism
with a subjective dogmatism in that he denies knowledge of what is objective
and dogmatically asserts the possibility of knowledge of what is subjective,
3
i.e., phenomena. Hegel rejects a philosophy which limits knowledge to mere
facts of experience. His Logic goes beyond this limitation and is concerned
to know the truth of what-is, i.e., he intends to provide an epistemological
basis for absolute truth. This is to say, It is not enough for the faculty
, , 4
of reason to merely conceive of the infinite, while on the other hand
knowledge is restricted to mere empirical facts. Rather, "reason" must know
the infinite (the unconditioned) which is the truth of the finite (the con¬
ditioned).^
6
Kant calls his philosophy a transcendental or critical idealism.
"'"Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 300-301, 318, 386-389, 535* 557* 569.
2
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 323.
^Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1892), III, 427. Cited
hereafter as History of Philosophy.
^Critique of Pure Reason, p. 308. ^Logic, I, 47. ^Prolegomena, p. 4l
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By this he means that something lies at the basis of experience, that something
(i.e., thought determinations) precedes experience a priori which makes knowl¬
edge of experience possible. If these concepts (categories) overstep experience,
this would mean they are transcendent and this gives rise to illusion. Thus,
transcendental is used to point out that knowledge is limited to experience
only.1
Hegel says that Kant has the merit of pointing out that thought is
something concrete by his definition of synthetical a priori judgments. Hegel
believes this to be an advance beyond Descartes who defined thought abstractly
in terms of pure objectivity, while Kant defined thought as subjectivity.
This is also seen to be em advance beyond Hume who denied the validity of
2
universal categories except merely as relations of ideas.
However, Kant is brought into sharp criticism for his transcendental
logic. Though he posited the universality of the categories and showed they
were independent of empirical intuitions, these categories were defined merely
as subjective concepts of thought. They have no known objective reality,
though they provide the objective element In human consciousness. Thus, the
categories would be objective if they were predicated of some known object,
but this in turn would suggest that man had transcended the subjective element
in consciousness. However, since these conceptions of the understanding are
themselves subjective, Kant says that they have validity only so far as man
has existence. If man had no existence, these a priori concepts would be
3
nonexistent.
1Ibid., p. 122n. ^History of Philosophy, III, 423, 427-450.
^Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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On the other hand, Kant's ideas of Reason (the self, the world, and
God), which may have objective reality, cannot be known as such. For example,
the empirical ego (the empirical apperception) is the unity of all the repre¬
sentations of reality in consciousness. Though it is through our consciousness
that we as a thinking self (as the empirical apperception) know the objects of
our experience, we cannot know the absolute subject of our experience. Thus,
for Kant, the empirical ego is the unity of self-consciousness from which
Reason infers the idea of an absolute self (the pure ego, or the transcenden¬
tal apperception). That is, the self as the empirical unity of all thought
is the basis for Reason to form the idea of an absolute self, "yet in so doing
it has nothing in view save principles of systematic unity in the explanation
of the appearances of the soul."^ That is, Reason's idea of the self "cannot
„2 ,
be represented in concreto. Consequently, Reason s idea of the self has a
■5
regulative (and not a constitutive) value.
Hegel says this definition of the ego has an important characteristic—
it shows that thought produces unity, that thought organizes all the manifold
4
things into one. For Hegel, when this unity of all the modes of truth
converge in self-consciousness, then this is absolute knowledge, for truth
is the whole of what-is. Further, this knowledge is absolute because it is
a knowledge of the unconditioned, the infinite. It can also be seen that
what is for Kant the transcendental ego is for Hegel self-conscious spirit,
i.e., the spirit (Notion, the Idea, Reason) knowing itself as what actually
is (the Absolute Idea).'*
Hegel faults Kant because he simply adopted Hie traditional categories
1 2 3
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 557 • Ibid., p. 558. Ibid., p. 557-
^History of Philosophy, III, kJJ. 5Logic, II, 466ff.
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without subjecting them to a critical analysis, while Hegel says he should have
provided a critique of the categories instead of a critique of reason. Hegel
rejects the idea of a critique of pure reason, and he substituted instead a
critique of the categories in his Logic. To criticize the knowing faculties
before knowing is like trying to learn to swim before getting into water.1
However, Hegel commends Kant for dividing the twelve categories into
2
four triadic divisions. Hegel says that these four divisions of the categories
into triads is moving in the right direction of seeing that one universal is
the whole of all the various categories. Kant sees these four divisions as
mere titles for the categories of the understanding, but Hegel suggests these
3
titles really express the development of the categories into one universal.
Hegel thus suggests that the triadic divisions point to the Notion—the unity
of subject and object.
It betrays a great instinct for the Notion when Kant says that the
first category is positive, the second the negative of the first,
the third the synthesis of the two. The triplicity, this ancient
form of the Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists and of the Christian
religion, although it here reappears as a quite external schema
only, conceals within itself the absolute form, the Notion.^
What Hegel is saying is that Kant failed to see the inner dynamic of
this triplicity. Kant merely accepted the traditional categories and put them
in a stilted form of triplicity without introducing movement between them.
Thus, Kant lacked consistency in regard to his "rhythm of knowledge," so far
as Hegel is concerned. That is, Kant set forth a universal (the ego, the
history of Philosophy, III, 428-429-
*These four triadic divisions are—(l) as to Quantity: Unity
(Measure), Plurality (Magnitude), Totality (Whole); (2) as to Quality: Reali¬
ty, Negation, and Limitation; (j) as to Relation: Substance, Cause, Community;
and (4) as to Modality: Possibility, Existence, Necessity. (Prolegomena,
p. 51.)
^Logic, I, 91. ^History of Philosophy, III, 459-
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unity of apperception) which has difference in itself and delineated a triplicity
(thesis—antithesis—synthesis), yet this scheme lacked a dynamic quality.'1
This leads Hegel to say: "Kant has thus made an historical statement of the
moments of the whole, and has correctly determined and distinguished them."
But since Kant did not follow through with this dynamic quality of his triplicity,
Hegel charges that Kant ends up with a dualism of subjective certainty as
3
opposed to objective truth. Somewhat superficially stated, what Hegel is pro¬
posing as the dynamic structure of this triplicity can be illustrated this way.
In his Logic, the three main categories are: (l) the doctrine of Being, (2)
the doctrine of Essence, and (3) the doctrine of the Notion. Being relates to
what is immediately given (thesis); Essence relates to what is mediated as the
deeper understanding of Being, suggesting that what merely appears is contrary
to what really is (antithesis); the Notion is the self-conscious ego (synthe¬
sis), i.e., the unity of an objective entity (Being) and a subjective entity
jj.
(Essence).
From what has been said so far, the following parallels between Kant
and Hegel have been indicated, which further illuminate what Hegel has in mind
in regard to his idea of world history. (1) Hegel transformed Kant's ideas of
Reason into one universal Idea, which he variously but comparably described
simply as Reason, Idea, Absolute, thought, infinite, God, the unconditioned,
etc. (2) Kant's conceptions of the understanding become the successive defi¬
nitions of Hegel's Notion.^ (3) The totality of these definitions become the
1Ibld., p. ^77. 2Ibid., p. 478. ^Ibld., p. 476.
4Cf. Logic, I, 71; II, 217, especially pp. 479-480.
^Loglc, I, 46, 91-92. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 113.
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Notion, the Absolute Idea, which is also comparable to Kant's transcendental
ego.1 (4) While Kant's triplicity provided the definition for the moments of
the whole of reality, Hegel says he failed to see the dialectic movement in¬
volved in this triplicity. Hegel, in contrast, introduced movement into the
dialeotie, while at the same time preserving the distinct moments of the
opposites.2 (5) It will be seen that Kant's synthetic a priori judgments
become comparable to what Hegel calls his dialectic moment.' (6) Kant says
the thinking "l" knows itself, not through the categories, but knows the
categories (and through them knows all objects) in the absolute unity of apper-
n n 4
ception, and therefore the I comes to know itself through itself. Similarly,
Hegel speaks of the Notion (the Idea, the Soul, Spirit) coming to awareness
of itself through itself, i.e., in self-consciousness. Here then is the
logical (metaphysical) demonstration, so far as Hegel is concerned, that
"Reason" governs world history. Metaphorically speaking, history "is the
exhibition of spirit striving to attain knowledge of its own nature."' "World
history in general is the development of Spirit in Time." That is, even as
the self (the Notion, or Spirit) organizes its experiences of the world into
a rational and coherent whole (as Hegel has sought to show in terms of pure
thought), even so history is the progressive and the outward unfolding of this
rational activity of man, thus giving rise to his belief that reason governs
world history.
1Logic, I, 59-60} n, 218-219. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 3505,
518, 564-565.
2Infra, pp. 90ff. 'infra, p. 95.
^Critique of Pure Reason, p. 565. ^Reason in History, p. 25
6Ibld., p. 87.
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The Objectivity of Truth. In contrast to Kant (as it has already-
been pointed out), Hegel says that the most pressing need of metaphysics is
a critique, not of reason, but of the categories. That such a critique is
necessary can be seen, Hegel says, in the way that the categories originate
in the mind in an instinctive and unreflective way. Furthermore, that these
categories originate in such a spontaneous way would indicate that language
in its penetration of our inner ideas intends to externalize what is universal
and thus to speak of things as they really are."1" Thus, the study of logic is
the study of categories, which is a study of things-as-they-are. Hegel puts
it this way: "Pure Science includes Thought in so far as it_ is just as much
the Thing in itself as it is Thought, or the Thing in itself in so_ far as it
is just as much pure Thought as it is the Thing in itself."
What Hegel thus proposes to do in his Science of Logic is to evaluate
the various concepts which are used in speaking of man and the world. He does
not intend to set forth prepositional truths as such. For example, his dis-
3
cussion on the concept of judgment is not intended to make individual
judgments and statements, but it is a reflection on the concept of Judgment
in general.^ Thus, as Findlay says, Hegel offers us a series "of what are
now called 'linguistic recommendations'. Hegel recommends for our adoption
a given way of talking about the world, then discovers flaws and inadequacies
in this mode of speaking, then supersedes it by a further recommendation
which also comprehends it, until his last recommendation supersedes and
i»5
comprehends all others.
1Logie, I, 46. *Xogic, I, 60. ^Loglc, II, 258-300.
\?f. J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958)» P« 151*
5Ibld.
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These concepts used in speaking of the world are given only a subjec¬
tive significance in Kant, though they do give objective validity to the
Judgments of perception, which then become Judgments of experience. In contrast,
Hegel's logical system has objective existence, i.e., his categories are real,
not nominal. Consequently, truth is objective when an object corresponds to
its category."*" This objective truth is called a subjective Judgment.
In the subjective Judgment the attempt is made to see one and the
same object twofold,—first in its individual actuality, secondly
in its essential identity, or in its Notion: the individual raised
to its universality, or, what is the same thing, the universal
individualized into its actuality. In this manner the Judgment is
truthj for it is the agreement of Notion and reality.2
In this way, it can be seen that am object is what it is by virtue of its
concept.
Hegel divides his logic (metaphysics) into subjective logic and objec-
"X
tive logic. Objective logic coxrresponds partly to Kant's transcendental logic.
It includes not only the metaphysical ideas of the self, the world, and God,
but also a study of ontology in general. It relates to such concepts as
4
number, measure, difference, appearance, substance, cause, etc. Subjective
logic is the study of the Notion, i.e., the Notion as it pertains to the subject
himself. Whereas objective logic is directed towards objective things in the
world, subjective logic is directed toward thought itself. Whereas the former
considers thought-determinations, the latter considers the thought-determi¬
nations of thought itself. In this respect, subjective logic is both subjec¬
tive and objective at the same time. Thus, subjective logic is comparable to
Kant's transcendental ego. This can be seen when Hegel writes:
1Logic, II, 425. ^Logic, II, 266. ^Logic, I, 73.
S?indlay, p. 221.
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The Notion, in so far as it has advanced into such an existence
as is free itself, is just the Ego, or pure self-consciousness.
It is true that I have notions—that is, determinate notions;
but Ego is the pure Notion itself, which as Notion has reached
Existence.
Hegel in enunciating his own subjective logic thus considers it to be one of
the greatest contributions of Kant to see "that the unity which constitutes
the essence of the Notion is recognized to be the original and synthetic
p
unity of apperception, as unity of the 'I Think' or of self-consciousness."
It can be seen from the following discussion that the Notion Is the
Absolute which embraces all the categories evaluated in the Logic. Thus, the
doctrine of the Notion embraces both the subjective and objective aspects of
reality. Hegel writess
The Absolute Idea is the only object and content of philosophy.
As it contains every determinateness, and its essence is to
return to itself through its self-determination or particular-
ization, it has various phases. It is the business of philosophy
to recognize it in them. Nature and Spirit are different manners
of presenting its existence; art and religion, different manners
in which it comprehends itself and gives itself an adequate
existence. Philosophy has the same content and end as art and
religion; but it is the highest manner of comprehending the
Absolute Idea, because its manner is the highest—the Notion.
Consequently it comprehends within itself these phases of real
and ideal finitude, as well as infinitude and holiness, and
understands both them and itself .3
The Notion is thus variously described as the Absolute Idea, the
"Spirit's knowledge of its own pure essence,"^ the "Truth of all modes of
jr ^
Consciousness," "Absolute Knowledge," etc. Further, the Notion embraces
the whole of logic. This is to say that the two "moments" of logic—the
subjective and objective entity—are distinct and yet inseparable in self-
•^Logic, II, 217. 2Logic, II, 218. ^Loglc, II, 466-467.
^Logic, I, 62. ^Logic, I, 60. ^Ibid.
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consciousness.
Logic was there found to determine itself as the science of pure
thought, having pure knowledge as its principle, which is not
abstract, but a concrete living unity; for in it the opposition
in consciousness between a subjective entity existing for itself,
and another similar objective entity, is known to be overcome,
and existence is known as pure concept in itself, and the pure
concept known as true existence. These are then the two Moments
which are contained in Logic. But they are now known as existing
inseparably, and not as in consciousness each existing for itself;
it is only because they are known as distinct and yet not merely
self-existent that their unity is not abstract, dead, and immobile,
but concrete.•*-
It is this goal of reconciling thought and being that Hegel says is
2
the task of modern philosophy. But, so long as the Idea of God was expressed
in terms of some external reality separate from this world of existence, this
3
reconciliation of thought and being could not take place. Hegel thus contends
that the Idea (or, God) is nothing more than an expression of a universal, a
concept. He makes this quite clears
In order that we may at least envisage this we must put aside the
opinion that Truth is something tangible. Such tangibility has
for example been imported even into the Platonic Ideas, which are
in the thought of God, as though they were things existing, but
existing in a world or region outside the world of Reality, a
world other than that of those Ideas, and only having real Sub¬
stantiality in virtue of this otherness. The Platonic Idea is
nothing other than the Universal, or more precisely the Concept
of an Object of Thought; it is only in its concept that anything
has actuality; in so far as it is other than its concept, it
ceases to be actual and is a nonentity, (italics mine.)^
Hegel says that the history of the world and philosophy is the striving
5
for the reconciliation of thought and being. This is to say that the Universal
Idea (variously described as God,^ the Absolute, Reason,^ Providence,® Truth")
"'"Logic, I, 71. ^History of Philosophy, III, 160-161.
^Logic, I, 61. ^Ibid. ^History of Philosophy, III, 551-552.
g
Hegel, Reason in History, p. 21; Logic, I, 90.
^Reason in History, p. 11. ®Ibid., p. 15- ^Logic, I, 60.
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has been striving to know itself through its reconciliation with the finite
spirit. This means the Universal Ego knows itself in the particular ego.
Our standpoint now is accordingly the knowledge of this Idea as
spirit, as absolute Spirit, which in this way opposes to itself
another spirit, the finite, the principle of which is to know
absolute spirit, in order that absolute spirit may become
existent for it.1
When this unity of absolute Spirit and finite spirit are seen to be distinct
2
and yet inseparable, this unity is absolute knowledge. It can be seen from
this use of the Idea as God and absolute Spirit that Hegel's philosophy lacks
all content of any mysticism. Haldane points this out in his Introductory
preface to The Science of Logic. He writes: "He ^Jegel^ had, notwithstanding
what has been said by people who have not mastered his system, nothing of the
3
mystic in his composition.
It can thus be seen that the Notion as absolute knowledge corresponds
to Kant's transcendental ego. This is to say that just as it is the nature
of myself to organize all ny thoughts of objective reality into a single
unity, even so it is the nature of the categories to be organized into one
single universal. This means that "i" myself am given an objective existence,
for my self-consciousness "is the pure Notion itself, which as Notion has
reached Existence."^
This goal of absolute knowledge where thought and being are brought
together in the thinking self-consciousness means that what is and what is
thought coincide. This means that subjective certainty becomes objective
truth. Hegel writes:
Absolute Knowledge is the Truth of all modes of Consciousness,
■^History of Philosophy, III, 553* ^Ibld., p. 551.
•^Logic, I, 8. 4Ibld., II, 217.
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because according to the process of knowledge, it is only when
absolute knowledge has been reached that the separation of the
Object of Knowledge and Subjective Certainty is completely
resolved, and Truth equated to this Certainty, and this Cer¬
tainty equated to Truth.1
This distinction between truth and certainty leads to Hegel's logical
development of the Absolute Idea. In the beginning of this logical development,
the beginning is absolute and immediate. It is absolute, for it begins with
2
what is universally recognized as the subject matter of the mind. Further,
it is absolute, for it is an abstract beginning in that it begins with Being
3
abstractly conceived. This is to say, this beginning is immediate, but it
is mediated through existence, for Pure Being as the beginning of logical
science arises from finite consciousness. Thus, this immediate beginning
is not the last word insofar as knowledge of Being is concerned, for this
knowledge does not end with the immediate certainty that something is and can
be abstractly conceived. It is the function of logic to examine "pure knowl¬
edge in the whole extent of its development. In its result, this Idea has
determined itself to be certainty become truth? certainty which in one aspect
is no longer over against the object, but has incorporated it with itself and
knows it to be itself."^
In this way, It can be seen that subjective certainty and objective
truth correspond to immediate knowledge and mediated knowledge. Immediate
knowledge Is subjective certainty? it is what is given in the empirical con¬
sciousness and has no connection with such "explosive abruptness" as inner
revelation, faith, and intellectual intuition.^ Mediated knowledge comes as
a result of the critique of the categories. It begins with wliat is immediate,
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namely. Being, and critically examines the various categories (which are
used for talking about the world) until finally the highest stage of the
categories is reached, which in turn comprehends all that preceded. This
final stage is Absolute Spirit.1 In this way, whatever came before were more
or less adequate expressions for the various definitions of the Absolute
2
Spirit. But, this movement toward the Absolute Spirit is not to suggest
that new "truths" are being discovered. Rather, this critique which leads
to the highest category of Absolute Spirit only points out the limitations of
other categories. In this way. Absolute Spirit only becomes a fuller expression
for the truth which was lacking in the beginning.
What is one-sided in the beginning, owing to its general deter¬
mination as something abstract and immediate, is lost in this
movement: it becomes mediated, and the line of scientific
advance becomes a circle.—It also follows that the constituents
of the Beginning, since at that point they are undeveloped and
without content, are not truly understood at the Beginning;
only the Science itself fully developed is an understanding of
it, complete, significant, and based on truth.5
Hegel is thus pointing out that truth is something eternal. It does
not change, and whatever progress is made in the logical development toward
the fuller comprehension of the truth is in fact only a return to the foun¬
dation. This means truth forms a circle. This means that however one-sided
and abstract the category Being may be, the truth of what this category intends
to express is the same as that of Absolute Spirit. Hegel writes:
Thus consciousness is led back on its road from immediacy, with
which it begins, to absolute knowledge as its inmost truth; and
the first term, which entered the stage as the immediate, arises,
precisely, from this last term, the foundation.—Still further,
we see that Absolute Spirit, which is found to be the concrete,
last, and highest truth of all Being, at the end of its evolution
freely passes beyond itself and lapses into the shape of an
1Lo£ic, I, 83. 2Logic, I, 83. ^Logio, I, 83-84.
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immediate Being."*"
Consequently, Hegel says it is not so much important where the
beginning is. Rather, it is important that logical science in its totality
"forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last, and the
last first."2
It can be seen that this circle which the categories form in their
totality as the Absolute Idea corresponds to the sum-total of Kant's conceptions
3of the understanding. Hegel divides his logic into three primary categories—
Being, Essence, and Notion. We have already pointed out that Being is mediated
through existence, i.e., Being is abstractly conceived from what is given in
existence. In this way. Being is immediacy and absolute (abstract). Essence
is mediated. It is reflection. It is the truth of Being. Logic presses
"beyond the immediate and its determinations, penetrates further, assuming
that behind this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that
this background constitutes the truth of Being." Notion is subjective logic.
This is to say that the Notion is the exact correspondence of the pure concept
5
with existence. But, this correspondence is known in the subjective thinker.
Under the category of Being (which is the most elementary and abstract
of all the categories)^ Hegel discusses the categories of finite and infinite.
It turns out that this distinction between finite and infinite parallels the
distinction between pure Being and determinate being. Determinate being is
7
the finite, while indeterminate Being is the infinite.
1Logic, I, 8?. 2Ibid.
^Logic, I, 91} II, 466; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 316.
4Logic, II, 15. ^Loglc, I, 71. 6Logic, I, 83.
TLogic, I, 151f.
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Hegel distinguishes between the bad infinity of the understanding
and the true infinity of Reason.'*' The bad infinity of the understanding
makes the finite and the infinite exclusive of each other, so that any con¬
nection between them is only external. While the finite is seen to be the
existent reality, the infinite is put in opposition to the finite so that the
infinite is "the indeterminate void, the beyond of the Finite, whose Being-
o
in-Self does not depend on its Determinate Being, which is a determinate."
The result of this external connection between the finite and the infinite
is a contradiction. Hegel writes:
This contradiction is immediately found in the fact that the
finite remains opposed to the infinite as a Determinate Being;
thus there are two determinatenesses: there are two worlds,
the finite and the infinite, which being related the infinite
is but the limit of the finite, and thus Is merely an infinite
itself determinate and finite.^
On the other hand, the true infinity of reason "does not stand above
the finite as something complete in itself, the finite still permanently
remaining without or beneath it. Rather, Hegel writes: If it is asked
how the infinite becomes finite, the answer is that there is no infinite
which first Is infinite and then must become finite or pass on to finitude,
„5
but that for itself it is already finite as much as infinite. What Hegel
is saying is that the a priori does not exist independently of the a posteriori,
i.e., that "the eternal truths of reason" do not stand divorced from "the
accidental truths of history."^ The finite is the perishing object, while
the infinite is the ideal. In this way, It is evident that any category is
a one-sided abstraction unless It takes Into consideration its opposite.
"*"Logic, I, 150. 2Logic, I, 152. ^Logic, I, 152-15?.
\ogic, I, 151. 5Logic, I, 166-167. 6Loglc, I, 75.
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This is why Hegel says that Kant's thing-in-itself is an abstraction without
content. This is to say that it is an indeterminate Being, and Being is
Nothing when it is void of content. This means that Kant's thing-in-itself
is a product of thought (abstracting thought) and that thought is not the
product of the thing-in-itself.1 Whatever has content has determinacy, and
since Kant's thing-in-itself is an absolute essence without determinacy, the
A
question "what" of the thing is either impossible or self-contradictory.
What Hegel is maintaining is that what is a priori and what is a posteriori
do not stand separate from each other in any absolute sense. A thing is
what it is by virtue of the concept. To consider a thing apart from its
concept is an abstraction. Likewise, to consider one concept separate from
3
its opposite is an abstraction. Thus, a thing-in-itself and its concept
are distinct, but not bifurcated. The finite and the infinite are Juxtaposed,
but not divorced.
Likewise, Hegel distinguishes between reason and passion. Passion
refers to the particular, to the private interest and self-seeking purposes
of the individual, though this selfish goal of the individual is the unconscious
4
activity of reason actualizing itself in the attainment of freedom. Thus,
Hegel says that reason governs the world and that its goal is actualized by
the special interest of passion. It is passion that "pays the penalty and
suffers the loss,"'' while reason does not involve "itself in opposition
and combat and exposes itself to danger; it remains in the background, un-
& 7
touched and uninjured." This is the "cunning of Reason." Thus, passion
1Logic, I, V>• ^Logic, I, 155- 3Logic, I, 154.
k i i
Reason in History, pp. 22ff., 29. Ibid., p. 44.
6Ibid., p. 45- 7Ibid., p. 44.
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pertains to the finite, while reason relates to the infinite.
It is this distinction between the finite and the infinite that
helps to clarify one of the most difficult of Hegel's sayings: that "the
actual world is as it ought to be."''' In the Logic under the category of
2
finitude, he discusses two further categories—Barrier and Ought. The
finite contains a barrier within itself. This barrier is the determinateness
of a limit. But, this barrier also implies an ought. This is to say that
something contains a barrier, but if it contains a barrier then this implies
an ought. Hegel writes:
What ought to be is, and also is notj for if it were, then it
could not also be the case that it ought to be. Thus, essentially,
Ought has a Barrier.3
It can thus be seen that Hegel is not intending to absolutize the
finite when he says that the actual world is as it ought to be. He writes:
"But certainly no philosophy, nor opinion, nor Understanding in general,
will allow itself to be saddled with the point of view that the finite is
absolute.
Thus, when Hegel speaks of the "ought to be" he is referring to what
is infinite, for "the Ought is the accomplished transgression of the barrier."
This is to say that infinite reason is accomplishing its purpose in world
g
history. In this respect, Hegel says that both his Philosophy of History
7
and History of Philosophy can be viewed as a theodicy.
It remains to be pointed out that Hegel did not follow with his
dialectic method any rigorous three-step thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Walter
""Ibid., p. 47. 2Logic,I, 144. ^Logio, I, 145. ^Logic, I, l4jj.
^Logic, I, 146. ^History of Philosophy, III, 546.
^Reason in History, p. 18.
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Kaufmann has shown that Hegel never once used this rigorous three-step method
in any of his writings. He points out that there is only one place in all of
Hegel's writing where the three terms (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) appear
in combination.^" The place where Kaufmann points to is Hegel's lecture on
Kant's philosophy. He suggests that Hegel reproached Kant for having "posited
p
thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Actually, quite the contrary seems evident
to me. In fact, Hegel praised Kant for having made "an historical statement
of the moments of the whole." He says that Kant "has correctly determined
and distinguished them." Hegel's criticism of Kant at this point was that
Kant's triplicity was "unspiritual," i.e., it lacked the dynamic.4
However, it seems to me that Kaufmann has correctly pointed out that
Hegel did not make use of any rigorous three-step dialectic. He writes:
Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms.
Schelling took up this terminology; Hegel did not. He never
once used these three terms together to designate three
stages in an argument or account in any of his books.5
Kaufmann further points out that Hegel made use of triadic arrangements for
the purpose of organizing his material. The particular occasion for this
type of triadic arrangement was when Hegel had become the principal of the
Gymnasium at Nurnberg in 1808. Hegel here lectured to teenage students in
philosophy. Kaufmann writes:
^Walter Kaufmann, Hegel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965)*
p. l68n.
2Ibid., Cf. History of Philosophy, III, 477. While Kaufraann says
this is the only place where Hegel uses the three terms in combination, yet
he does use it in a similar discussion on Kant on page 449, History of
Philosophy, III. Cf. W. Kaufmann, pp. 428-431.
^History of Philosophy, III, 478. 4Ibid., p. 477-
^Walter Kaufmann, p. 168.
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He aimed at clear outlines that could be readily remembered, at
great brevity, and at definitive formulations. The organization
henceforth becomes neat to a fault—triads everywhere (but not
theses, antitheses, and syntheses).1
Hegel's use of dialectic was unique in that he sought to put it on a
different level than ever before used. It has previously been used in an
external manner, and it did not relate to the subject matter as such. It
sought to expose the inadmissibility of certain false assumptions. Hegel
writes*
Since the Dialectic was regarded merely as the art of producing
deceptions and bringing about illusions, it was straightway
assumed that it played a cheating game, and that its whole power
depended solely on concealment of the fraudj that Its results ^
were reached surreptitiously, and were a mere subjective illusion.
Kant had used the dialectic to point out the restriction of reason's
knowledge. In this respect, he eliminated its arbitrary use. He showed that
it was a necessary assumption of reason.
When Kant's dialectical exposition in the Antinomies of Pure
Reason are looked at closely ... it will be seen that they
1Ibid., p. 185. Cf. J. N. Pindlay, Hegel, p. 75. That Hegel did
not intend hiB triadic divisions to be mistaken for his dialectic is clearly
stated in his introduction to the Logic! "The procedure consists, It may
be, in grouping together what is similar, in putting what is simpler before
what is compound, and other external considerations. But as for any inner
necessary connexion, this goes no further than the list of Section, and the
transition consists merely in saying Chapter II;—or We_ now come to Judgment,
and the like" (Logic, I, 66). Kaufmann suggests that the only possible place
where such a three-step method of thesis-antithesis-synthesis could be found
is in the first chapter of the Science of Logic. "The sole possible exception
comes in the first chapter! the first triad of the book, that of being,
nothing, and becoming, seems to substantiate the myth; though even here the
further breakdown of the discussion of becoming will not fit, and even the
mere headings of Notes 2 and 5 suggest the shallowness of the traditional
misrepresentation" /p. 20^7. Kaufmann further writes: "it is tempting to
suggest that those who cling to the legend of thesis, antithesis, and syn¬
thesis have obviously never got beyond the first triad, and have not even
read the Notes that explain what it Is all about" (ibid.).
2Logic, I, 67.
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are not indeed deserving of any great praise; but the general idea
upon which he builds and which he lias vindicated, is the Objectivity
of Appearance and the Necessity of Contradiction which belong to the
very nature of thought-determinations; primarily indeed in so far as
these determinations are applied by Reason to Things in themselves;
but further, just what these determinations are in Reason and in
respect of that which is self-existent,—Just this it is which is
their own natureT*
When Hegel thus speaks of the necessity of contradictions in the
categories, he is pointing out that any one category is only a one-sided
abstraction unless its opposite category is seen to be inseparably related.
In this respect, Pindlay has shown that Hegel's use of "contradiction" is
in fact only one of ordinary usage which implies that any one thing contains
2
opposite tendencies.
It can thus be seen that Hegel's dialectic does consist of three
"moments," though it would not be accurate to speak of these moments as
thesis-antithesis-synthesis as Kaufmann and Pindlay have shown. Two of
these moments are opposites (e.g., finite and infinite). The third moment
is the dialectic moment, which forms the unity of the opposites.
This equally synthetic and. analytic moment of the Judgment, by which
the original universal determines itself out of itself,to be its
own Other, may rightly be called the dialectic moment.
It is the Notion that initiates the movement of the opposites.
Otherwise, the categories remain isolated and contradictory. Hegel makes
this clear when he writes:
Thus all opposites which are taken as fixed, like (for example)
finite and infinite or individual and universal, are contradictory
not in virtue of some external connexion, but rather are transitions
in and for themselves, as the consideration of their nature showed;
the synthesis and the subject in which they appear are the product
of the auto-Reflection of their Notion. Notionless contemplation
1Ibid. ^Pindlay, p. 193- ^Logic, II, 473-
94
halts at their external relation, isolates them and leaves them as
fixed presuppositions: the Notion scrutinizes their very selves,
is their moving soul, and stimulates their dialectic.
Thus the dialectic "method has emerged as the Notion /f.e., the ego
as the unifying principle for the whole of man's experience/ which knows
itself and has for object itself as the Absolute, both subjective and ob¬
jective, that is, as the pure correspondence between the Notion and its
Reality, as an existence which the Notion itself is." It is this correspon¬
dence between the Notion and Reality that constitutes the whole of truth,
absolute knowledge. Hegel says: "Everything else is error and gloom, opinion,
striving, caprice, and transitoriness; the Absolute Idea alone is Being,
imperishable Life, self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth." Hegel does
not seem to be suggesting that one person can grasp absolute knowledge in
the sense of omniscience. Rather, he seems to be strongly emphasizing that
what one knows of the world he really knows to be true objectively and that
this knowledge is not some postulate of faith or mere subjective certainty.
This is to say that immediate knowledge as subjective certainty can be seen
to be objective truth upon further reflection. Pindlay also points this out
in regard to Hegel's statement that the Absolute Idea is the whole of truth.
Pindlay writes:
4
Hegel may be forgiven the extreme gorgeousness of this passage:
its import is perfectly clear. To conceive things with adequacy
and truth is to see them as having no other meaning or function but
to call forth the intellectual and practical efforts of conscious
person, beings who are and must remain atomically separate in their
self-enclosed personality, but who also share an endless open horizon
of rational enterprises, for which the rest of the world provides no
more than the stepping-off place or the stimulus. There is no ref-
1Logic, II, 475. 2Logi£, II, 468. ^Logic, II, 466.
^"this passage" refers to the quotation cited in the previous footnote.
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erence here to any absolute, timeless or supra-individual experience:
the Absolute Idea is merely the categorial form of self-conscious
Spirit, something we all exemplify when we admire art, practise re¬
ligion or cultivate philosophy.
Paradoxical though it is, it can be said that Hegel's philosophy has
no place for "faith," and in this sense it is quite anti-metaphysical as well
as wholly non-religious. To introduce a world that does not have an empirical
foundation in this world would be to adopt the "bad infinite of the under¬
standing." Findlay points out this amystical and anti-metaphysical aspect
quite clearly.
Here it may first be held that, despite much opinion to the contrary,
Hegel's philosophy is one of the most anti-metaphysical of philosoph¬
ical systems, one that remains most within the pale of ordinary ex¬
perience, and which accords no place to entities or properties lying
beyond that experience, or to facts undiscoverable by ordinary methods
of investigation.2
Findlay further points out the amystical aspect of Hegel's philosophy.
"Hegel often speaks the language of a metaphysical theology, but such language,
it is plain, is a mere concession to the pictorial mode of religious ex¬
pression."^
Though Hegel eliminates faith and the transcendence of a personal
God who stands above and beyond the empirical world, his importance for this
thesis is found in his emphasis upon the objectivity of truth. This is to
say that he attempted to show that the cognitive faculties are so constituted
that they can be a reliable guide to what is objectively true. This means
that it is man's quest not to be satisfied with subjective certainty; he can
only rest content when subjective certainty is seen to be objective truth.
^Findlay, p. 265. "Tindlay, p. 348. Cf. W. Kaufmann, pp. 273-278.
"^Findlay, p. J&8.
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This appreciation for Hegel's attempt to provide a basis for objective
truth is not intended to suggest that he has conclusively resolved the problem
of epistemology. It can also be seen that no pretense has been made for
giving a comprehensive critique of Hegel's philosophy which would far exceed
the limited scope of this thesis. Neither has any attempt been made to trace
the many features of its pervasive influence. Nor has any attempt been made
to blame or justify the negative features of this influence. Rather, this
appreciation lies in the idea behind Hegel's philosophy; namely, that sub¬
jective certainty must be shown to be objective truth. What is a further
important feature of this summary discussion on Hegel's logic (metaphysics)
is found in the fact that Hegel considers his Science of Logic to be the
i
Justification for the presupposition in his philosophy of history that "Reason"
governs the course of world history. We now turn to that discussion.
Hegel's Philosophy of World History. What is of paramount signif¬
icance for the purposes of this thesis on the problem of theology and history
is Hegel's idea of history, which has been the goal toward which the previous
discussion on his logic has been directed.
Collingwood points out that "the culmination of the historical movement
which began in 1784 with Herder ^.e., with his Ideen zur Philosophie der
Menschengeschichte/ came with Hegel" in his lectures on the Philosophy of
History. Hegel's interest in the philosophy of history, as well as in the
history of philosophy, is motivated by his desire to reconcile thought and being,
2
reason and history. It is at this point that Hegel criticizes the weakness
of Locke's philosophy, which is not greatly concerned with the difficulties
"^Collingwood, p. 11?.
^Reason in History, pp. 11-67; History of Philosophy, III, 545*
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which thought presents concerning the nature of what is objectively true.
Hegel writes; "Before the need for reconciliation can be satisfied, the pain
of disunion must be excited."1 It is this "pain of disunion" between thought
and being, reason and history that prompted, in fact, all of Hegel's philosoph-
2
ical writings.
In depicting "this strife"' between reason and history, thought and
being, Hegel enunciates his own means of effecting a reconciliation. This is
seen in the closing lecture of his History of Philosophy, which also parellels
4
the intention of his Philosophy of History.
It has been ray desire that you should learn from it /history of
philosophy/ that the history of Philosophy is not a blind collection
of fanoiful ideas, nor a fortuitous progression. I have rather
sought to show the necessary development of the successive phi¬
losophies from one another, so that the one of necessity presupposes
another preceding it. The general result of the history of
Philosophy is this: in the first place, that throughout all time
there has been only one Philosophy, the contemporary differences
of which constitute the necessary aspects of the one principle?
in the second place, that the succession of philosophic systems
is not due to chance, but represents the necessary succession of
stages in the development of this science; in the third place,
that the final philosophy of a period is the result of this devel¬
opment, and is truth in the highest form which the self-conscious¬
ness of spirit affords of itself. The latest philosophy contains
therefore those which went before; it embraces in itself all the
different stages thereof; it is the product and result of those
that preceded it.5
The following principles can be seen to emerge from this, (l) Reason
governs the movement and progress of history. (2) Each stage in history is
history of Philosophy, III, 312.
2Logic, I, 59-60, 65; History of Philosophy, III, 5^5*
'History of Philosophy, III, 552. ^Reason in History, pp. 68-95•
^History of Philosophy, III, 552-553*
^Cf. Reason in History, p. 11.
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a necessary moment of the whole development of history. (3) Each successive
stage includes all the previous stages of truth. (4) History is the growth
of the self-conscious spirit toward freedom, which is the ultimate goal of
world history.'*' (5) History is thus movement toward the perfectibility of
2
man. (6) History means both G-eschehen and Geschichte; it is both events
3
and the narration of events. This means history is not merely ascertaining
4
what happened, but apprehending why the event happened. This is to say that
history can be known, for thought and being, history and reason, are not
fundamentally different spheres of reality. Being is what it is because of
thought; history is what it is because of reason.
Finally, it can be said that Hegel's principles of historiography
clearly enunciate the relativity of history. Truth (or. Reason) is progres¬
sively actualizing itself in each stage of history. Each subsequent generation
more fully embraces the various aspects of truth which have existed in the
previous stages. To be sure, Hegel said that his method was the only true
and absolute method for reconciling thought and being (history and reason),^
but he did not claim that philosophy nor history would make no further progress
beyond his own system or the present day. He insists that he can only write
g
from "the standpoint of the present day." He further points this out in his
enunciation of the relativity of history.
Thus, in dealing with the idea of Spirit only and in considering
the whole of world history as nothing but its manifestation, we
are dealing only with the present—however long the past may be
which we survey. . . . This implies that the present stage of
Spirit contains all previous stages within itself. These, to be
1Ibid., p. 70. 2Ibid., p. 68. 3Ibld., p. 75.
^Collingwood, p. 113- ^Loglc, I, 65.
^History of Philosophy, III, 552. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, p. 70.
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sure, have unfolded themselves successively and separately, but
Spirit still is what it has in itself always been. The differ¬
entiation of its stages is but the development of what it is in
itself. The life of the ever-present Spirit is a cycle of stages,
which, on the one hand, co-exist side by side, but, on the other
hand, seem to be past. The moments which Spirit seems to have
left behind, it still possesses in the depth of its present.^
This relativity of history means that no gaps nor individual absolutes can
2
be found in history. It also means that no individual stage in the historical
development of Spirit toward the actualization of freedom can be absolutely
unique, though his emphasis upon the fulfilment of universal history in the
present-day stage of the historical development has opened up his philosophy
of history to the charge that he glorifies the present and thus gives support
3
to a rigid political conservatism. The individual and the particular are
non-essential and arbitrary. Only the universal (world history seen as a
whole) and the infinite are essential. Herein lies the theological weakness
of Hegel's epistemology of history—having eliminated the concept of biblical
transcendence (which for Hegel corresponds to the spurious infinite of the
understanding), historical events cannot serve as the point of departure for
faith, e.g., the Christ event as a particular point in the process of historical
development cannot have absolute meaning for all mankind. Rather, the Idea
(Reason) is the perspective whereby world history can be surveyed. To be sure,
it is hardly fair to charge Hegel with the naive assumption that world history
mediates a total conception of world events and meaning. Rather, Hegel insists
that world history is a convergence of empirical facts and a priori judgments.
These a priori judgments make the idea of world history feasible. These
I 2
Reason in History, p. 95. Ibid., p. 66.
^Collingwood defends Hegel against this charge, p. 120.
II _
Logic, I, 150j Reason in History, p. 80.
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a priori presuppositions are the result of his Logic, namely, the Idea of
Freedom is progressively being unfolded in the development of world history.
This, then, is the ultimate purpose of world history for Hegel.
However, despite Hegel's attempt to go beyond Kant's dualism of
noumenon and phenomenon, he himself ends up with a dualism of the particular,
individual, and arbitrary aspects of reality on the one hand, and the univer¬
sal, enduring, and essential aspects of reality on the other hand. As already
noted, the difficulty of this "dualism" is that Hegel's metaphysical system
thus vitiates the concept of uniqueness in regard to historical events. What
is significant for Hegel is Reason's logically-fixed Idea of Freedom actual¬
izing itself in the development of world history by means of particular and
mere transitory events and dispensible persons. Theologically interpreted,
the Christ event can have no absolutely unique significance for all mankind.
CHAPTER III
HEIDEGGER: TRUTH AS THE SEIF-DISCLOSURE OF BEING1
Martin Heidegger has attempted to resolve the critical epistemological
problem in terms of primordial thinking. Insofar as he is concerned, Western
metaphysics represents a breakdown in thought. The ontological difference
2
between Being and beings has been obscured, especially as it is seen in
modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel. Traditional metaphysics has
established the categories of the positive sciences, while at the same time
ignoring the existenzial concepts of Dasein. The truth of Being has been
reduced to the scientific grasp of truth in terms of a known oonformity of
subject and object, thereby re-interpreting and degrading Being as beings.
Heidegger thus calls for a "destroying of the history of ontology," in order
4
that the primordial foundation of metaphysics might be retrieved.
because of the difficulties involved in the translation of Heideg¬
ger's works, I have not always followed the English translations, especially
in those places where particular words which are not used in the translations
would add consistency to the style and clarification of ideas in regard to my
discussion of Heidegger in this section. Thus, I will in all cases give
reference both to the English editions and the German editions. The German
editions will be enclosed in parentheses.
^The word "Sein" will be translated throughout this section as "Being,
while "Das Seiende" (that-which-is) will be translated as "being."
^Since"Dasein" (There-Being) has become a familiar Heideggerian word
to express the kind of Being that uniquely belongs to man, it will not be
translated or italicized in this discussion.
4
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), cited hereafter as BT, pp. 41-49 (Sein und
Zeit /Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 19535/# PP« 19-27, cited hereafter as SZ).
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In this way, Heidegger attempts to overcome the subject-object
bifurcation of reality, thus going behind the conception of truth as confor¬
mity to the primordial, significance of truth as unconcealment (ci-A^&ca-)t as
a letting-be. In placing exclusive emphasis upon truth as ontological dis¬
closure, it will be pointed out in the following discussion that Heidegger's
epistemology succumbs to a dualism which is expressed in more or less related
terms as, Vorhandenheit and Exlstenz, nature and history, language as "state¬
ment" and language as "unconcealment."
Being and Daseln. Heidegger contends that the question of Being is
the fundamental question of man. Since Being is the Being of beings, it is
not a Being among beings. It is not one category among other categories. It
is not that of a class or genus.1 Just what Being is, however, is the task
which philosophy must once again raise. It is a question that cannot be
assumed to be self-evident or negligible. It is not a new question, but
one that extends back to the very beginning of Western metaphysics in the
pre-Soeratic thinkers. It is a question that has become muddled In the course
of philosophical development, beginning with Plato's reduction of Being to
an extended sense) and the resulting distinction between idea as
what really is and sensibility as a mere copy of the idea. This distinction
was then intensified with Descartes' res cogitans and res extensa, and it
finally culminated in Hegel's theory of absolute knowledge—the Notion as the
absolute unity of subject and object, thought and being.
What is thus required of philosophy is a "backtracking" to primordial
1BT, pp. 22, 26 (SZ, pp. 3, 6).
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thinking, i.e., one must go behind beings to Being.^ The earlier Heidegger
sought to get at the truth of Being through an interrogation of beings. But,
this interrogation of beings was not Just any being, but man as he stands
related to Being. Thus, man is Dasein (There-Being). This means that man
"exists." "Existence" is a term to express man's relationship to Being.
Man "exists" in the sense that Being expresses itself in the "There.
Existence does not mean existentia as an occurrence (Vorkommen) or presence
(Vorhandenseln). "Nor does 'existence' mean, 'existentially' speaking, mam's
moral preoccupation with himself—a preoccupation arising out of his psycho¬
physical constitution. Ex-sistenoe, grounded in truth as freedom, is nothing
t»3
less than exposition into the revealed nature of what-is-as-such. '
A piece of wood has "real being," but it does not "exist," for it
does not stand in a relationship to Being. On the other hand, existence is
the determining factor of Dasein. Dasein conceives itself in terms of exis¬
tence, i.e., its possibilities to be itself and whether or not it so chooses
to be itself. In this way, inauthentic or authentic existence depends upon
Dasein's relationship to Being. Dasein in its forgetfulness of Being is
inauthentic existence, while Dasein reconciled with Being means that mam
^Heidegger, Essays in Metaphysicst Identity and Difference, trans.
Kurt P. Leidecker (New York: Philosophical Library Inc. i960), pp. 44-45#
cited hereafter as Essays in Metaphysics (Identitat und Differenz /Pfullingen
Verlag Gunther Neske, 195777 pp. 47-48,cited hereafter as Identitat).
2BT, PP. 32-33 (SZ, p. 12).
^Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," Existence and Being, trans.
R. P. C. Hull and Alan Crick, With an intro. by Werner Brock (.London: Vision
Press Ltd., 1949), p. 335, cited_hereafter as Existence and Being ("Vom
Wesen der Wahrheit," Wegmarken /Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
19677, PP. 84-85, cited hereafter as Wegmarken).
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experiences authentic existence."'"
That Dasein asks the question of Being means that man is an ontic-
ontological being. He is an ontical being because he is a being as such.
He is an ontological being because he stands in a relationship to Being.
Heidegger further clarifies the terminological distinction between ontic and
2
ontological by his use of the terms, existenzial and existenziell. "Existen-
zial" refers to the analytic of Dasein's existence. "Existenziell" refers
to the actual existence itself of Dasein. Thus, ontic and existenziell, on
the one hand, and ontological and existenzial, on the other hand, closely
correspond.^
What Heidegger is ultimately concerned with is not Dasein, but Sein
(Being). Not the "There" of Being, but the Being which effects the "There."
It is the ontological question that is most significant, not the ontic-
existenziell. This distinction between the ontic and the ontological
is intended by Heidegger to point out the inadequacy of the traditional
categories, especially as they are articulated in Kant's a priori transcen¬
dental logic. His categories related to only one aspect of the subject matter-
nature. In this respect, Kant pursued an ontical inquiry rather than an
ontological one. What Kant (following Aristotle) effected was a foundation
for the positive sciences. They provided the concepts for understanding the
subject matter of the natural sciences, which concepts are validated only
1BT, pp. 67ff. (§Z, pp. 4lff.).
because of the technical distinction that Heidegger makes of these
two terms and because of the difficulty of conveying this distinction in
English, existenzial and existenziell will be left untranslated in this
chapter.
3BT, pp. 32-53 (SZ, pp. 12-13).
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after an investigation into the beings themselves. On the other hand, Heideg¬
ger calls for an "ontological inquiry" which "is indeed more primordial, as
over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences.""'' Thus, the
ontical sciences are severely restricted until they have become ontological.
It is not enough to interrogate scientifically beings as such, but one must
"back track" to the primordial investigation of Being. It is "the domineering
nature of modern technology" that must give way to a "back track" to the
2
essence of metaphysics if the nature of Being is to be 'unfolded.
In this way, it can be seen why Heidegger claims he is an ontologist
rather than an existentialist.*^ However, that he inquires after Being through
an existenzlal analytic of Dasein would seem to justify classifying him also
as an existentialist. This is particularly pronounced in Being and Time.
It is in this work that he seeks to clarify human Dasein, which in turn would
open up the meaning of Being. The method for getting at Being Is phenomenology—
4 5
to the things themselves. In adapting the phenomenology of Husserl, Heideg¬
ger uses phenomenology as the method whereby the Being of beings is unfolded.
But, the task of encountering Being through Dasein by the means of phenomenology
✓ 6
is not "the naivete' of a haphazard, 'immediate *, and unreflective 'beholding'."
Rather, it is a phenomenological method in which Being must "be wrested from
1Hr, p. 51 (SZ. p. 11).
^Essays in Metaphysics, p. 44 (Identitat, p. 48).
^William J. Richardson, Heidegger (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff,
1962), p. 259- Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger (London; Bowes and Bowes,
195T)» P. 12. John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (London; SCM
Press Ltd., 1955)# PP- 29-50.
^BT, p. 50 (SZ, p. 27). ^P, p. 62 (SZ, p. 58).
6BT, p. 61 (SZ, p. 57).
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the objects of phenomenology."^" This "wresting" comes about through a
methodical interpretation, which is called a "hermeneutic of Dasein."
Heidegger writes:
Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological
description as a method lies in interpretation. The loyos of the
phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a itzlv t through
which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures
of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are made known to Dasein's
understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic
in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates
this business of interpreting.
Thus, the primary significance of hermeneutic is that it is "an
analytic of the existentiality of existence."'* Insofar as it unfolds the
historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of man, hermeneutical inquiry points out
the ontical basis for Hlstorie, which is the methodical study of world
history. Hermeneutic as the method of the human sciences is a derivative
it
of hermeneutic as the existenzial analytic of Dasein.
Historicity, existence, ontology, are parallel terms and are pri¬
mary. The scientific study of history (Historie), existenziell, ontic,
positive sciences are also parallel terms and are only secondarily derived
from the idea of historicity, existenzial, and ontology.
Thus, hermeneutic in its primary sense is an exposition and clari¬
fication of man's relationship to Being. What this hermeneutic explicates of
Dasein can be seen primarily in three main descriptive terms which are called
existentials (Existenzialien), i.e., concepts of existence in contrast to the
5
categories of the positive sciences. These three existentials are:
(1) existentiality, (2) facticity, and (3) Being-fallen. These existentials
"W, p. 61 (SZ, p. 36). 2BT, pp. 61-62 (SZ, p. 37).
5BT, 62 (SZ, p. 38). ^Ibid.
"*BT, p. 70 (SZ, p. 44).
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are disclosed in the phenomenon of anxiety (Angst). The ontological term
which Heidegger coins to express the unity of these existentials is "care"
(Sorge).1
These existenzial characteristics are not pieces belonging to some¬
thing composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there
is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that
totality of the structural whole which we are seeking.
Existentiality refers to "the state of Being that is constitutive
•x
for those beings that exists." It is the term which includes all the possi¬
bilities of Dasein. These "possibilities" of Dasein are not ontical cate¬
gories, for Dasein does not possess the general properties of a static ob¬
ject. Dasein is not a "what" (a mere being), but a "who" (one who exists)."^
Dasein is a "way of existing" (eine Weise zu existieren), not "a being present-
at-hand" (ein vorhandenes Seiendes). Since existentiality thus refers to
Dasein's "ownmost potentiality-for-Being,one can say: "Become what you
are."7
The second main existenzial concept disclosed in ontological anxiety
is facticity. Facticity means that Being is not a worldless and thus in¬
determinate subject. Being is Being-in-the-world. "To Being-in-the-world,
however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself—that it
Q
has in each case already been thrown into a world.But, "world" does not mean
to suggest a factum bruturn. It is not a world of objects "welded together
it9
with a subject. ' Heidegger writes:
iffl?, p. 235 (SZ, p. 191)- ?BT, pp. 235-236 (SZ, p. 191).
5BT, p. 33 (SZ^ p. 13). 4BT, pp. 70-71 (§Z, pp. 44-45).
5OT, p. 312 (SZ, p. 267). ^BT, P. 236 (SZ, p. 191).
7BT, p. 186 (SZ, pp. 145-146). 8BT, p. 236 (SZ, p. 192). 9Ibid-
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Facticlty is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something
present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being—one which
has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been
thrust aside. The "that-it-is"of facticity never becomes
something that we can come across by beholding it.l
Thus, the world is not the cosmos; not the world of a cause-effect
mechanism. The world (the "that-it-is") "which is disclosed in Dasein's
state-of-mind must rather be conceived as an existenzial attribute of the
2
being which has Being-in-the-world as its way of Being."
The third ontological term which characterizes Dasein is "Being-fallen"
(Verfallensein). This fallenness of Dasein is further described as "everyday-
ness," "publicness of the 'they'," "inauthenticity." This fallenness means
that Dasein is a "not-Being-its-self."^
Anxiety not only discloses the fallenness of Dasein, but also opens
up the possibility of authentic existence. Anxiety relates to an indefinable
1\.
threat. It is the feeling of nothingness which one gets from simply Being-
in-the-world. This sense of dread characterizes man because when he senses
the entirety of his life he knows that he is a Being-unto-death. It is this
sense of ontological anxiety that jars man from his self-forgetfulness. Thus,
anxiety (Angst) releases man from his everydayness to authentic being, a
Being-unto-Death.
This potentiality for authentic existence is further attested through
the voice of conscience. Conscience is not understood here in a theological
sense, nor as proofs of God. The ontological analysis of conscience is also
■m
"prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience."
^ p. 174 (SZ, p. 135). P. 174 (§Z, P- 155).
"^BT, pp. 220, 236, 237 (SZ, p. 175, 176, 191-192).
^BT, p. 231 (SZ, p. 186). 5BT, p. 315 (SZ, p. 269).
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Conscience calls us to authentic existence. This call of conscience "asserts
nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell."1
"'Nothing' gets called to this Self, but it has been summoned to itself—
2
that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."
"Resoluteness" is the authentic answer to the summons of conscience.
"'Resoluteness' signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness
in the 'they.'This resoluteness always happens at a particular time. It
is not open to ontico-psychical investigation. Rather, it is existenziell
indefiniteness. "Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself."^
What is to be resolved? "Only the resolution itself can give the answer."
Thus, resoluteness is "Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being, in its
existenziell attestation."
This call of Being gives rise to man's awareness of lostness in the
"they," the common everydayness of inauthentic existence. Resoluteness
restores Dasein's potentiality-for~Being-its-Self. Finally, when one comes
to an authentic and ontological understanding of the inevitability of death,
then the potentiality-for-Being becomes authentic. Heidegger writes:
When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the "they" is
revealed. Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being-its-Self. When one has an understanding Being-towards-
death—as one's ownmost possibility—one's potentiality-for-Being be¬
comes authentic and wholly transparent.
Stated succinctly, authentic existence is anticipatory resoluteness.
1m, p. 318 (SZ, p. 273). 2Ibid.
P. 3^5 (SZ, p. 298). ^Ibid.
5Ibid. 6KT, p. 349 (ffi, p. 302).
7kt, p. 554 (sz, p. 307).
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Being and Temporality. We have already pointed out the three main
characteristics which follow from an existenzial analysis of Dasein—
existentiality, facticity, and fallenness. These three characteristics are
interrelated, and they do not exist separately from each other. The compre¬
hensive term Heidegger uses for expressing the meaning of existence as a whole
is care (Sorge)
Care is defined as an ontological-temporal concept. It is ontological
because it designates man's existence as it stands inauthentically towards
2
Being. It Is temporal, for the meaning of Care is temporality (Zeitlichkeit).
Care is temporality in the sense that man exists as time, not "in
time" like a thing. Temporality is the ultimate ground of Dasein's existence
as a whole (Care). Thus, temporality In its primordial significance is
existenzial time. It is ontological, not ontical.
Existenzial time points in three directions. This is to say that
existenzial time Is "ecstatic"—I.e., it refers to "states of mind.First,
it points to the future through man's existentiality, i.e., the possibilities
5
of existence in that man projects what he can be. Heidegger also calls
this direction (ecstasls, i.e., state of mind) "ahead-of-itself." Second,
Second, existenzial time points to the past through his facticity, i.e. his
7
throwness Into the world, his has-beenness. The present is seen in his
10T, p. 237 (SZ, p. 192). ^ET, p. 370 (SZ, p. 323).
3HT, pp. 376-377 (SZ, P. 328).
V, pp. 377, 425 (SZ, pp. 328-329, 373).
5BSj pp. 378, 401, 373 (SZ, pp. 329, 350, 325-326).
6BT, p. 293 (SZ, pp. 249-250).
7HT, pp. 293, 373 (SZ, pp. 250, 325-326).
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fallenness, i.e., his lostness in everydayness."*"
It is from this existenzial phenomenon of time as it is experienced
in everydayness that gives rise to the interpretation of time in terms of
inauthentic temporality, i.e., an endless succession of "nows." This
mechanical and derived view of time stands in sharp contrast to authentic
2
and historical time—time as the structural constitution of Dasein.
This temporality of Dasein is further worked out in the concept of
historicity (Gesehichtlichkeit). Historicity is here an ontological-existenzial
concept. Just as man does not exist "in time" neither does he exist "in
history." Rather, Dasein is history as temporality.^ History is the "hap¬
pening" (Geschehen) of man; it is man's existence. It Is the "connectedness
of life", i.e. "the movement of existence."^ Heidegger writes: "The movement
(Die Bewegtheit) of existence (der Existenz) is not the motion (Bewegung) of
something present-at-hand (elnes Vorhandenen).This movement of existence
(as the connectedness of life or it may be described as Dasein stretching
itself along) Is by definition called "happening" (Geschehen). Here it can
be seen that Heidegger sharply delineates Existenz and Vorhanden, the movement
of existence and the motion of something present-at-hand, and Geschehen and
Vorhanden. Thus, the movement of existence is not a succession of nows, nor
the motion of something present-at-hand. Neither is Geschehen a making of
something to be present-at-hand. Rather, it is a "happening", a making of
history, a connectedness of life in an ontological sense. This is to say,
that man's life is "connected" ontologically from birth, through Care, to death.
1HT, pp. 236-237 (§Z, p. 192). 2BT, p. 37^ (SZ, pp. 326-327).
5ET, p. 428 (SZ, p. 376). 4BT, p. 427 (SZ, pp. 374-375).
P. 427 (SZ, pp. 37^-375). V, P. 427 (SZ, p. 375).
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Thus, the connectedness of life is the "ends" and their "between" of Dasein.
The "between" is Care. The "ends" and their "between" are.1 This unfolding
of the existenzial structure of Geschehen in its temporality (Zeitlichkeit)
is thus characterized as the ontological interpretation of Dasein's historicity
(Geschichtlichkelt)?
The "connectedness of life" means that Dasein's future, past, and
present (in that order) are united into a whole. This means that Dasein does
not live in history which is characterized by a past, present, and future.
Rather, the historicity of Dasein means that man lives in such a way that the
past, present, and future are intrinsically the very structure of Dasein.
When this ontological unity "happens" in the "moment of vision," then man's
"fate" (Schicksal) is achieved. Fate thus is authentic historicity."' Fate
further expresses in terms of history what has already been expressed as
4
anticipatory resoluteness.
Historicity is the wholeness of Dasein from its birth to its death,
including its existentiality (the future), its facticity (the past), and its
fallenness (the present). Historicity in the sense of Care is inauthentic
existence. Historicity becomes authentic existence in its fate—in authentic
temporality when Dasein becomes resolute in the anticipation of Being-unto-
Death (anticipatory resoluteness).
In pointing out the primordial significance of history (Geschichte)
as the historicity (Geschichtllchkeit) of Dasein, Heidegger plays up the
"W, p. 426 (sz, p. 374). 2BT, p. 427 (§Z, p. 375).
^BT, p. 437 (SZ, p. 385). ^William Richardson, p. 91.
5bt, pp. 438-439 (sz, pp. 386-387).
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terminological distinction between Historie and Geschichte. Historie is
the science of history.1 Geschichte is the historical reality itself. It
is what makes Historie possible. Heidegger, however, is concerned primarily
with Geschichte.
Heidegger summarizes four popular views of history. These views
speak of history as a being (that-which-is) of the past in their primary
signification. He is not here speaking of the science of history (Historie).
First, history (Geschichte) is interpreted to mean something that is past
and no longer present-at-hand. Second, history means something that is past,
but is still having an effect in the present. Here history is a becoming in
which events are related through a connection of time—the past, the present,
and the future. Third, history means the historical development of cultures.
2
Fourth, history is what is handed down by tradition.
In each of these four interpretations of history, Heidegger points
out the fact that they refer to man as the "subject" of history. This leads
Heidegger to stress the fact that history (Geschichte) is primarily the
"happening" (C-eschehen) of Dasein, i.e., history is man himself. The secondary
meaning of Geschichte is called "world-historic."^ For example, remains,
monuments, records have a historisch significance because of their world-
4
historic (welt-geschichtlich) character. A battlefield, place of worship,
a countryside are world-historic beings, for they have an "essential existent
,,5
unity with Dasein. Thus, whatever geschichtlich significance adheres in
world beings is only derived from having stood in relationship to Dasein's
1HT, p. 430 (SZ, p. 378). 2BT, pp. 430-431 (SZ, pp. 378-379).
5ET, p. 433 (§Z, p. 381). *HT, p. 446 (SZ, p. 394).
5bt, p. 440 (sz, p. 389).
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historicity.1 In this way, Heidegger stresses that Geschichte precedes and
is the basis of Historle. He writes:
World-historic beings do not first get their historic (geschlchtlich)
character, let us say, by reason of an historical (historisch)
objectification; they get it rather as those beings which they
are in themselves when they are encountered within-the-world.*
Heidegger restricts the task of the historian in making the science
of history (Historie) solely a study of what is a repeatable possibility for
authentic human existence today. The existenzial foundation of Historie is
the historian's own historicity (C-eschichtlichkeit) P This is to say, the
historian examines the "past" from the present standpoint of his own historicity.
Heidegger writes:
Our going back to 'the past' does not first get its start from
the acquisition, sifting, and securing of such material; these
activities presuppose historic (geschichtlich) Being towards
the Dasein that has-been-there—that is to say, they presuppose
the historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of the historian's (Historiker)
existence. This is the existenzial foundation for Historie as
a science, even for its most trivial and 'mechanical' procedures.^
The ultimate goal of the historian is to make a study of the possibil¬
ities of Dasein; this historical study is to reveal "by repetition the Dasein
which has-been-there" and it is to reveal Dasein "in its possibility.
Heidegger writes:
The question of whether the object of Historie is Just to put once-
1bt, pp. 432-433 (sz, pp. 380-381). 2bt, p. 433 (sz, p. 381).
^The "historicity" of the historian as the necessary presupposition
for a study of the historical past closely corresponds to Schleiermacher's
"psychological interpretation", Dilthey's "understanding of mental life"
(BT, pp. 429, 449-450, SZ, pp. 377, 397-399), and Bultmann's "pre-under-
standing." Cf. Wolfhart Pannehberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History,"
History and Hermeneutic, ed. Robert W. Funk (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1967), P. 130.
4BT, p. 446 (SZ, p. 394). 5BT, pp. 446-447 (SZ, p. 395).
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for-all 'individual' events into a series, or whether it also has
'laws' as its objects, is one that is radically mistaken. The
theme of Historle is neither that which has happened Just once
for all nor something universal that floats above it, but the
possibility which has been factically existent.1
This means that historical science studies the possibilities of authentic
existence in the past, which possibilities are seen to be repeatable as
possibilities for man today. Thus, the presuppositions of (l) the historicity
of the historian and (2) authentic repetition (i.e., "the repetition of a
2
possibility of existence that has come down to us") serve as the principles
3
of selection for Historie.
In this way, it can be seen that "facts" are important only as they
arise in connection with the question of human existence. Heidegger writes;
"Only because in each case the central theme of Historie is the possibility
of existence which has-been-there, and because the latter exists factically
in a way which is world-historic, can it demand of itself that it takes its
orientation inexorably from the 'facts'."^
Though Being and Time sought to explicate the meaning of Being through
an existenzlal analytic (hermeneutic) of Dasein, a clear and precise definition
of Being is not set forth. Rather, what has emerged in Being and Time has
been an interpretation of "the primordial whole of factical Dasein with regard
«5
to its possibilities of authentic and inauthentie existing. One might say
p. 447 (sz, p. 395). ^ p. 437 (§z, p. 385).
■^(1) Existentiality as the futural direction (ecstasis) of Dasein in
the sense that the possibilities of Dasein's authentic existence are unfolded,
and (2) "authentic repetition" as unfolding the possibilities (existentiality)
of human existence seem to correspond to what Bultmann means in his use of
"eschatological existence." Cf. John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology,
p. 166.
^HT, p. 447 (SZ, p. 395). p. 486 (SZ, p. 436).
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that the purpose of Being and Time was to serve as a prolegomenon to an inter¬
pretation of Being. This can be seen when Heidegger writes his concluding
remarks s
The conflict as to the Interpretation of Being cannot be allayed,
because it has not yet been enkindled. And in the end this is
not the kind of conflict one can 'bluster into'; it is of the
kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for
it. Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the
way.-*-
That Heidegger changed his hermeneutical approach from an existenzial
analytic of Dasein to a more direct approach to Being in terms of primordial
2
thought has frequently been pointed out. This change of method is especially
evidenced in his An Introduction to Metaphysics. Heidegger himself points
this out in his preface to the seventh edition of Being and Time. When Being
and Time was first published, it was designated as the "First Half." Now
Heidegger acknowledges that the second half which was to follow Being and Time
can no longer be added "unless the first were to be presented anew." Thus,
he suggests that one should turn to his Introduction to Metaphysics for an
"elucidation of this question" of Being.^ It is this book which represents
his methodological change.
Being and Truth. To reiterate, Heidegger wants to overcome traditional
metaphysics which basically is nothing more than an inquiry into beings as
mere entities rather than into the Being of beings. Such metaphysics is
ontical, i.e., a type of physics. What he is calling for is a meta-physlcs;
3BT, pp. 487-488 (sz, p. 4^7).




an investigation into what lies behind beings.
This investigation into Being follows from the question, "Why are
there beings rather than nothing?" "The question aims at the ground of what
m2
is insofar as it is. Thus, this question is to be taken strictly as onto-
logical independent of any particular ontical being. Heidegger writes:
Accordingly, if our question "Why are there beings rather than
nothing?" is taken in its fullest sense, we must avoid singling
out any special, particular being, including man. For what
indeed is man? Consider the earth within the endless darkness
of space in the universe. By way of comparison it is a tiny grain
of sandj between it and the next grain of its size there extends
a mile or more of emptiness; on the surface of this grain of sand
there lives a crawling, bewildered swarm of supposedly intelligent
animals, who for a moment have discovered knowledge. And what
is the temporal extension of a human life amid all the millions
of years? Scarcely a move of the second hand, a breath. Within
the being as a whole there is no legitimate ground for singling
out this being which is called mankind and to which we ourselves
happen to belong.?
Here it can be seen the decisive shift in Heidegger's focus from Dasein to
Being, which is characteristic of his later writings.
This question of Being is not a theological question and it is in no
way intended to be related to theology. Heidegger maintains this is so because
theology cannot raise the question "why" there are beings, for it already
knows the answer. Thus, to speak of a Christian philosophy is like talking
about a "round square," though this is not to imply that Christian experience
4
cannot be theologized, i.e., theology may think and raise questions. Heideg¬
ger writes:
Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim
(London: Oxford University Press, 1959)* P* 17* cited hereafter as IM.
/^Einfuhrung in Die Metaphysik (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 195377" PP-
13-14, cited hereafter as EM. J
2IM, p. 3 (EM, P. 2). ^IM, p. 4 (EM, p. 3).
Vl, p. 7 (EM, p. 6).
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Only epochs which no longer fully believe in the true greatness
of the task of theology arrive at the disastrous notion that
philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology if not a
substitute for theology, which will satisfy the needs and tastes
of the time.^ For the original Christian faith philosophy is
foolishness.
In thus posing the "why" of beings, Heidegger is not raising the
traditional metaphysical questions of God, the soul, and the world. Basically,
his question of Being is an epistemological primordial question—how can one
2
know the ground (the Being) of beings? This means that in raising the question
of Being Heidegger is raising the question of truth. To ask what is Being is
3
to ask what is truth. This correlation between Being and truth can further
be seen through the inseparable connection of language (as primordial thought)
and Being. Heidegger writes: "it Is in words and language that things first
n4 »
come into being and are. Heidegger here is enunciating the linquisticality
of reality" which is the point of departure for the so-called "New Hermeneutic"
5
of Ebeling and Fuchs."
The fact that Being is an empty word today is because man has not learned
to exist authentically, i.e., he does not stand in an adequate relationship to
Being. His conquest of beings in technology has caused him to eliminate the
question of Being. It is this "destroyed relation to Being as such" that "is
the actual reason for the general misrelation to language."^ If the possi¬
bility is to be opened up for a new relationship of man to Being, then we must
look for the meaning of Being, not in the existenzial analytic of Dasein, but
in the grammatical and etymological question of language. Heidegger writes:
1Ibid. 2IM, pp. 3, 22, 27 (EM, PP. 2, 17, 21).
^BT, p. 196 (SZ, p. 154). 4IM, p. 13 (EM,-p. 11).
5Infra, pp. J04f. 6IM, p. 51 (EM, p. 39).
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Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's relation
to Being, the question of Being will involve us deeply in the
question of language. It is more than an outward accident that
now, as we prepare to set forth, in all its implication, the
fact of the evaporation of Being, we find ourselves compelled
to take linguistic considerations as our starting point.^
This shift of emphasis from "authentic existence" (Being and Time)
to "authentic language" (An Introduction to Metaphysics) does not represent
a olefin break between the two works. Being and Time gives a considerable
2
amount of attention to the question of language, and An Introduction to
Metaphysics does not ignore Dasein. In fact, Heidegger makes it explicit
that there is no truth except as Dasein stands in a relation to Being. Thus,
there is no such thing as an "eternal truth" unless it could be proved that
3
man has and will always exist.
Just as hermeneutic, Dasein, time, and history were interpreted in the
primordial sense of Dasein's existence and only secondarily in their external
objective sense, even so truth is primarily existenzial, i.e., Being as it
discloses itself to Dasein. Heidegger points this out when he says that truth
is not in the primary sense a correspondence between res and intellectus.
Rather, truth is the appearing of Being. Heidegger writes:
Let us think of the sun. Every day it rises and sets for us.
Only a very few astronomers, physicists, philosophers—and
even then only on the basis of a specialized approach which may
be more or less widespread—experience this state of affairs
otherwise, namely as a motion of the earth around the sun.
But the appearance in which sun and earth stand, e.g. the early
morning landscape, the sea in the evening, the night, is an
appearing. This appearance is not nothing. Nor is it untrue.
Nor is it a mere appearance of conditions in nature which are
really otherwise. This appearance is historic (geschichtlich)
1IM, p. 51 (EM, P- 39). 2BT, PP. 205-214 (SZ, pp. 160-170).
3bt, pp. 269-270 (sz, p. 227).
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and it is history (Geschichte), discovered and grounded in
poetry and myth and thus an essential area of our world.1
Heidegger denies that this definition of truth as the appearance of
Being is mere subjectivism. Rather, truth as self-disclosure is the primordial
Only the tired latecomers with their supercilious wit imagine
that they can dispose of the historic power of appearance by
declaring it to be "subjective," hence very dubious. The
Greeks /i.e., the pre-Socraticig!7 experienced it differently.
They were perpetually compelled to wrest Being from appearance
and preserve it against appearance. (The essence of Being is
un-eoncealment.)2
It is this experience of Being as appearance that points to the neces¬
sity of "linguistic considerations" as the point of departure for getting at
the "why" of beings."' Language is called "the House of Being."Essence
and Being express themselves in language."Our aim, rather, is an essential
clarification of the essence of Being in respect to its essential involvement
with the essence of language."
to primordial thinking. This primordial thinking is accomplished in the pre-
Socratic thinkers, for it is here that Being comes to expression in authentic
language. This necessity of returning to the pre-Socratics can be seen in
the way that language has been corrupted (according to Heidegger), beginning
In order for language to open up Being, what is necessary is a return
with Plato's dualism of res and intellectus
8
1IM, p. 105 (EM. P. 80). 2Ibid.
■* h
IM, p. 51 (em, p. 39). William Richardson, p. 528.
5IM, p. 53 (EM* P- 4l)' 6™' P* 54 (M' P- 4l)-
7IM, p. 180 (EM, pp. 137-138).
^BT, pp. 44, 122-134 (SZ, pp. 22, 89-101); IM, p. 195 (EM, p. 149)
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Heidegger engages in a detailed grammatical and etymological study.
Whether this study is "philological fancies"'1' or not intended to be a scientific
2
philology is not of great importance for the purposes of the present discussion.
Thus, we shall not try to pursue the intricate details in his attempt to open
up the primordial and authentic language of Being in early Greek thought. Rather,
we shall make use of some of the results of these word-studies to indicate
how Heidegger in his attempts to resolve the eplstemological question of Being
delineated a dualism of language as the "happening of Being" and language as
the "statement of correctness," i.e., the primordial significance of language
as the comlng-into-expression of Being and language as propositional correc-
titude.
Being for the early Greeks was c^i/o-c-s , the emerging, arising,
enduring presence of Being. Cpv'crcs is an overpowering presence; it is not yet
3
something which has been conquered in thought. This word is translated
"nature" and comes from the Latin natura, which means to be born. Thus, the
original meaning of the word is forfeited, for tf><scrc± originally meant "self-
blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding,
that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it;
in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on."^ Thus, cj>vcrts iS the
emergence of what we today call "nature" (phenomena), but this emerging is not
the same as nature in itself. Heidegger writes: "This opening up and inward-
jutting-beyond-itself must not be taken as a process among other processes that
we observe in the realm of being. tfyvo-<s is Being itself, by virtue of which
^Marjorie Grene, p. 100. William Richardson, p. 296.
5IM, p. 61 (EM, p. 47). ^IM, p. 14 (EM, p. 11).
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beings become and remain observable.1,1 In this way, it can be seen that the
early Greeks learned what Being was, not through natural phenomena, but
through Being itself emerging into being. This is to say. Being is known
2
because it emerges from the hidden.
vcris is equal to CL—Aifleca- (un-concealment). Truth is no addition
to Being; it is not correspondence of Being and thought. It is not "proposi-
„3
tional correctitude. Rather, truth is the very essence of Being. Truth is
4
Being unveiling itself. Truth is freedom in the sense that truth is the
"letting-be" of what is.^
<f)vvrcs as emerging and lingering presence is an over-powering. In this
over-powering, is rfoAef/osRa it is seen in Heraclitus. is
the original struggle which is prior to beings. It is a struggle between
concealment and un-concealment of Being. This conflict is not a split in
Being, but is its unity, its binding-together. It is this conflict that
causes beings to emerge.^
When the conflict ceases, the beings which emerge in the conflict do
not vanish, but Being itself falls into the background. The being which
has emerged becomes a ready-made datum. consequently degenerates into
a mere object; it becomes "nature." Heidegger writes:
The being becomes an object, either to be beheld (view, image) or
to be acted upon (product and calculation). The original world-
1IM, p. 14 (EM, p. 11). 2IM, pp. 14-15 (EM, PP. 11-12).
^Being and Existence, p. 534 (Wegmarken, p. 84).
4IM, p. 102 (04, pp. 77-78).
^Belng and Existence, p. 533 (Wegmarken, p. 85).
6IM, pp. 61-62 (04, pp. 47-48).
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making power, e^vcrcs , degenerates into a prototype to be copied
and imitated. Nature becomes a special field, differentiated
from art and everything that can be fashioned according to plan.
The original emergence and standing of energies, the ,
or appearance in the great sense of a world epiphany, becomes
a visibility of things that are already-there and can be pointed
out. The eye, the vision, which originally projected the project
into potency, becomes a mere looking at or looking over or gaping
at. Vision has degenerated into mere optics (Sohopenhauer's
"world eye"—pure cognition . . . ).^
Apyys. Though At(yos lias come to mean speech, Heidegger claims
originally that it did not relate to language in its primary meaning. Rather,
its primordial meaning was to gather, to collect (in the sense of an orderly
collection), even as the primary meaning of the Latin legere and the German
lesen mean to gather, to collect. For example, "Holz lesen" means to gather
wood. Lesen in the sense "to read" is a derived meaning of lesen in the strict
sense, for reading is the Joining of one word with another word in an orderly
2
fashion, i.e., a bringing together and collecting of words.
The primordial meaning of Aoyo-s in its inner relation to inverts (as
Being) is seen in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Without trying to follow the
intricate explanations, we shall summarize briefly what Heidegger Iras to say
in regard to both early Greek philosophers.
Heidegger summarizes Heraclitus' use of /ioyos in the two following
ways, (l) Authentic speaking and authentic hearing "are directed in advance
"X
toward Being, the logos." It is only when logos as Being discloses itself
that a "phonetic sound" becomes an authentic word. Without this element of
disclosure, i.e., Being as 0-~Aifj()eia (un-concealment), there can be no authentic
hearing and speaking. (2) "Because Being as logos is basic gathering, not
1IM, p. 63 (EM, P. 48). 2IM, p. 124 (EM, p. 95).
5IM, p. 132 (EM, p. 101.
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mass and turmoil in which everything has as much or as little value as every¬
thing else, rank and domination are implicit in Being.This suggests that
truth is reserved for the strong (i.e., the poets and philosophers), not the
weak. This means that Being shows itself as it pleases; man can¬
not set himself up as the arbiter of truth. Rather, Being is the sole arbi-
2
ter of truth.
Heidegger rejects the traditional interpretation of Heraclitus1 philos
ophy in terms of "everything flows." Heidegger writes:
If these words stem from Heraclitus to begin with, they do not mean
that everything is mere continuous and evanescent change, pure im-
permanence; no, they mean that being as a whole, in its Being, is
hurled back and forth from one opposition to another; Being is the
gathering of this conflict and unrest.-^
Thus,/ioyos for Heraclitus means, according to Heidegger, an orderly gathering
gatheredness, not a "haphazard dispersion."^
Heidegger contends that Heraclitus says the same thing as Parmenides
in this regard. He rejects the view that Parmenides and Heraclitus were
opposed in their respective doctrines of Being and Becoming. In Fragment
\ V 7 \ ) / V ^
5, Parmenides says: to yap awo voai.v ecrciv re kat 6< vac . Heidegger re¬
jects "the crude translation prescribed by a long tradition" which reads:
jr
"Thinking and Being are the same. This translation leads to the definition
of v/oe?v in terms of thinking as an activity of the subject. In this way,
thinking delimits what Being is with the result that Being is only what is
thought. This means Being is nothing in itself, but is only what is thought.
In following this traditional line of interpretation, it has been said that
1IM, p. 133 (EM, p. 101). 2IM, p. 133 (EM, p. 102).
5IM, pp. 133-134 (EM, p. 102). \m, p. 134 (EM, p. 102).
5IM, p. 136 (EM, p. 104).
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Parmenides adumbrated German Idealism. Plato is said to have furthered
this idealism, while Aristotle with his realism foreshadowed medieval
philosophy.1
This popular view, Heidegger believes, distorts "the authentic truth
of the primordially Greek words spoken by Parmenides." Heidegger attempts
to explicate Parmenides' intended meaning by a lexical study of the words
in this text.
G1 j / 3(1) fLiva.*. is seen to be equivalent to Qircrcs
(2)/Vce7i/ is interpreted to mean vernehmen—to apprehend.
//ov-s means Vernehmung—apprehension. Heidegger writes:
To apprehend means to accept, to let something (namely that which
shows itself, which appears) come to one. Vernehmen means also to
hear a witness, to question him and so determine the facts, to es¬
tablish how a matter stands. To apprehend in this twofold sense
means to let something come to one, not merely accepting it, however,
but taking a receptive attitude toward that which shows itself.4
Thus, VOt(* is defined as the "receptive bringing-to-stand" of Being.^ In
this way, voetv iS seen to be intrinsically related to Being, while at the
same time they are distinct. In this sense, Being and apprehension are the
same.
a.vyo does not mean, Heidegger explains, self-sameness, nor
mere equivalence. He writes: "Unity is the belonging-together of antagonisms.
This is original oneness."^ o-vTo does not mean that thinking equals Being
in a monotonous and tautologous sense. Rather, it indicates that Being and
thinking belong together in the sense of a "nexus," i.e., "a necessary eom-
XIM, p. 137 PP- 104-105). 2IM, P. 137 (EM, P. 105).
5Ibid. 4IM, p. 138 (EM, p. 105).
5IM, p. 138 (EM, pp. 105-106). 6IM, p. 138 (EM, p. 106).
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1 ^ ^
bination of one thing with another." Heidegger's exposition of Ta is
fundamentally a further elucidation of what he has to say about >° (XV rc.
Heidegger contends that what Parmenides' maxim means is not that
"thinking and Being are the same," but that "there is a reciprocal bond be-
„2
tween apprehension and Being. Thus, apprehension does not mean mere
"thinking" for Parmenides. Nor does it intend to suggest a human activity.
Heidegger writes:
Apprehension, as Parmenides says, is not a faculty belonging to man
already defined! apprehension is rather a process (ein Geschehen)
in which man first enters (appears, i.e., in the literal sense, comes
into being) into history as being.3
Heidegger thus contends that apprehension is not an attribute of
man, but that man is an attribute of Being, thereby showing that "apprehension
is the happening that has man.In this separation of man and Being is .re¬
vealed their togetherness instead of "the pale and empty dichotomy of 'Being
,„5
and thinking. However, it is when Being emerges in this togetherness with
man (i.e., man knows himself as a historic being) that he becomes defined as
the rational animal (^ov /loyeve^'). This use of Heidegger says,
represents a departure from its primordial significance. While Parmenides'
maxim defines the essence of man in the light of Being itself. Immediately
following him Being became interpreted in the light of human thinking. For
7
Heidegger, this reversal represents a degeneration of primordial thinking.
Heidegger believes that this decline of Western metaphysics began with
^Essays in Metaphysics, p. 19 (Identitat, p. 20).
2IM, p. 145 (EM, P. 111). *^IM, p. 141 (EM, p. 108).
4Ibid. 5IM, p. 141 (EM, p. 108).
6IM, p. 142 (EM, p. 108). 7IM, p. 145 (EM, P- Hi).
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Plato. became the name for Being, replacing 4>Mr<rs. The Co/o- (Being)
became the "whatness" of beings (the visible "thatness"). Thus, Being becomes
2
an extended thing, i.e., reduced to the level of being. This reduction of
Being led to the definition of truth as "correctness of vision," as the
correlation of a "thatness" and a "whatness.The idea (Being) became
what-really-is, and being became a mere copy of the idea. Heidegger writes:
Being y^-fein/ as is exalted, it becomes true /eigentlich/ being
/Seienden7T while being /^3eiende/7 itself, previously dominant, is
degraded to what Plato calls ov, what really should not be and
really i_s not, because in the realization it always deforms ;bhe idea,
the pure appearance, by incorporating it in matter. The now be¬
comes a Tra-po-oGiyf^o-r a model. At the same time, the idea necessarily
becomes an ideal./ The copy actually^"is" not; it merely partakes of
Being, it is a fj-efieB.*-*. The yyZf>tCf*-ost the cleft, has opened between
the idea as what really is, the prototype and archetype, and what
actually is not, the copy and image.
Here Heidegger points out that the distinction between thinking and
Being became decisive. With Descartes, the distinction was intensified, so
that truth came to be determined on the basis of a known certainty, not
merely a conformity of thought and Being. Being is brought under man's
control, and it becomes a mere objective entity. Whatever value it has is
attributed to it by man as the thinking subject. For Descartes, truth is
certitude in the sense that only what can be verified analogously to the
subject's certitude of itself is true. In this way, Heidegger complains that
5
Being as the emergence into truth is forgotten. It is this emphasis upon the
human subjectivity of truth that reached its culmination in Hegel.^
1IM, p. 180 (EM, p. 137). 2IM, P. 181 (EM, p. 138).
^IM, p. 185 (EM, P. 141). J|IM, p. 184 (EM, p. 140).
^Cf. William Richardson, p. 321. BT, p. 46 (SZ, p. 24).
^Cf. William Richardson, p. 360. IM, p. 180 (EM, p. 137).
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/y\oy£>s (Being) in Aristotle underwent the same misfortune as (f>v~<?cs
(Being) in Plato. Originally, /(oyo* as Being meant a "collecting-collected-
ness."^ It is a "collecting" in the sense that Being is a process of dis¬
closing itself. It is a "collectedness" in the sense that Being (My^) is
the collectedness of beings. "Adyjs is the steady collecting, the intrinsic
2
collectedness of being, I.e., Being." "The disclosure of being happens in
the logos as collecting. -Aoyo* in the secondary sense of language meant
that speech and hearing were authentically oriented towards Being. In this
way, a "phonetic soundis an authentic word. Thus, language became "the
ii5
custodian of the disclosed being. This is to say, what comes to expression
in language is Being (as thejjDycs , the collecting-collectedness). Just as
Being as cfrv-fo f is "what-is-as-such-in-totality"^ even so Being as Abyos is
the orderly collection of being in its totality. When finally became
understood primarily in terms of language, the truth that is passed on was
not freshly appropriated by the hearers with the result that language was
corrupted in mere terms of statement rather than un-concealment ).
Heidegger writes:
What has once been said can be repeated and passed on. The truth
preserved in it ^Language/7 spreads, and in the process being orig¬
inally gathered and disclosed is not each time experienced for itself.
In the transmission the truth detaches itself as it were from being.
This can go so far that the repetition becomes a mere babbling by
rote, ayiCocrcra..'
What results from this de-volution of language is that logos becomes
1IM, p. 128 (EM, p. 98). 2D4, p. 130 (EM, p. 100).
^IM, p. 185 (EM, p. 141). ^Supra, p. 123.
^IM, p. 185 (EM, p. 141). ^Existence and Being, p. 355 (Wegmarken, p.
7IM, p. 185 (EM, p. 141-142).
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statement in which truth is defined in the sense of correctness.
Initially the logos as gathering is_ the event of unconcealment,
grounded in unconcealment and serving it. Now logos as statement
becomes the abode of truth in the sense of correctness. And this
process culminates in Aristotle's proposition to the effect that
logos as statement is that which can be true or false. Truth that
was originally unconcealment, a happening of the dominant being
itself, governed by gathering, now becomes an attribute of the
logos.1
Finally, it can be said that what Heidegger has described as "truth'7
is not intended to be only one definition among many definitions. Rather,
"truth" in this primordial signification is "the mark of 'truth' of every
2
kind," whether it be religious belief, technology, scientific research,
3
art, practical experience, or philosophical contemplation.
One could point out the many parallels in Heidegger's philosophy
to what is in a broad sense called neo-orthodoxy, (l) There is the "moment
of vision" in which one achieves authentic existence. This is comparable to
the idea of revelation as the "moment" of the encounter with God in which
man is given redemptive existence. (2) The call of conscience is an in¬
definable call in that it asserts nothing, but is simply a summons to be
oneself. This is comparable to the call (encounter) of revelation which
asserts no propositional truth, but is a summons to live obediently before
God. (3) The call of conscience is precluded from any authoritative cri¬
terion or description, but is solely attested in its actual existenziell
situation. Likewise, faith is self-authenticating and is not exposed to the
critical criteria of any scientific investigation. (4) Being is not a
category alongside other categories. Rather, Being is the essence (ground)
1m, p. 186 (EM, p. 142).
^Existence and Being, p. 319 (Wegmarken, p. 73) • ^Ibid.
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of all beings. It is not subject to the manipulation of man, but stands
beyond the confines of human experience. Being discloses itself as it pleases.
Being solely determines its truth. Man is not the arbiter of truth. The
truth of Being "has" man. Man is never in possession of primordial truth,
but rather, truth possesses man. Being conceals itself at the same time that
it discloses itself. What is here described as Being could equally be said of
the neo-orthodox emphasis upon the reality of God, though, to be sure, Being
for Heidegger is not at all intended to be a description of any religious
belief as such. (5) There are many interesting parallels particularly in
regard to Rudolf Bultmarm. Heidegger's ecstatic future (existentiality, i.e.,
the possibilities of Dasein) closely correspond to Bultmann's "eschatological
existence." This can be seen in Bultmann's exposition of the Kingdom of God.
The future of the Kingdom of God is "not really an event in the course of
time, which is due to occur sometime."1 "Rather, the Kingdom of God is
genuinely future, because it is not a metaphysical entity or condition, but
the future action of God." Thus, this future as the action of God means that
man comes to stand in the "crisis of decision," but this future is not re¬
lated to the present in the sense that "the Kingdom begins as a historical
3
fact in the present and achieves its fulfillment in the future. In this way,
Bultmann's exposition of the future of the Kingdom of God parallels Heidegger's
4
existentialist definition of time.
1Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, trans. L. P. Smith and E. Huntress
(London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1935)» PP. 52-53*
2Ibid., p. 51. ^Ibid.
^Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to His Critics," Kerygma
and Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (New York:
Harper and Row, 1961), p. 208.
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Another parallel is Heidegger's hermeneutic of Dasein which is guided
by the prior question of Being,^ whereas Bultmann's herraeneutic of the New
Testament texts is guided by the prior question of human existence.
Heidegger's ultimate goal was to move beyond the question of human existence
2
to an independent understanding of Being, whereas Bultmann never intended
to move beyond the question of human existence. For Bultmann, the question
about man and God was inseparable. (6) The later Heidegger's emphasis upon
the linguistic focus of Being serves as the basis for Ernst Fuchs' and
Gerhard Ebeling's new orientation of hermeneutics,^ as well Heinrieh Ott's
5
systematic theology which seeks to overcome the subject- object schema.
(7) What has emerged as of paramount importance for the purposes
of this present discussion can be seen in the way that Heidegger, in his
attempt to provide the primordial foundation of truth, has bifurcated nature
and history, Vorhandenheit and Geschichte.^ What is primordially significant
for Dasein is not the world as an object (Vorhandenheit), but Dasein in
the pntological sense of Being-in-the-world (historicity)j not history as mere
facts, but history as the historic (geschichtlich) structure of Dasein; not
time as the moving succession of "nows," but time as the temporal structure
of Dasein; not death as an ontical possibility, but death as the ontological
possibility which opens up Dasein's "ownmost Potentiality-of-Being" (authentic
"hsT, p. 24 (SZ, p. 5).
p ^
Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger, Being, and Truth (London: Yale University
Press, 1965), p. 189. Cf. W. Richardson, pp. 623-641.
^Infra, p. 218. ^Infra, pp. 304f.
^Heinrich Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?" The Later Heidegger
and Theology, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963)* PP« 106ff.
^Cf. Macquarrie, pp. 85ff.
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existence)j not thought as the arbiter of truth, but thought as the means of
truth coming to expression in language; not language as statement, but
language as the happening (un-concealment) of Being; and finally, not
truth as the correspondence of subject and object, but truth as the primordial
self-disclosure of Being.
The question arises whether or not the truth of Being is adequately
defined so long as Vorhandenheit and Existenz are split into two parts. To
be sure, Heidegger intends to view the struoture of Dasein in its primordial
wholeness, but this unity can hardly be achieved so long as the ontological
signification of human existence does not take into sufficient consideration
the ontical aspects as well, including what-is-present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit).
Though Heidegger cogently points out the inauthenticity of mere things, does
not his exclusive preoccupation with Being on the other hand undermine the
significance of beings (including Vorhandenheit) for Existenz?
Though Heidegger correctly stresses the necessity of one's "openness"
to Being, it does not seem to follow necessarily that to ascertain the correct¬
ness of what is disclosed is irrelevant or that it represents a devolution of
thought. It may be that the "tired latecomers with their supercilious wit"
will call our experiencing the sun in terms of a rising and a falling "subjective."1
But, does not intellectual integrity compel us to verify to the highest degree
of probability the truth of what we experience? In this respect, "objectifying
thought" is an essential tool for historical research, as well as in all the
sciences. To be sure, the critical tools of historical research are not the
same as those of the physical sciences in that history mustireat its "objects"
as human subjects, not as mere things. However, Heidegger's emphasis upon
1Supra, p. 120.
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the self-disclosure of Being does point out the fact that symbolical, poetic,
and mythical language is often necessarily employed for expressing what one does
experience of reality. In theological terms, the necessity of symbolical
language is quite evident, especially as it is seen in the biblical writers
who have expressed their experiences of the transcendent reality of God in
anthropomorphic language. In this respect, Heidegger's emphasis upon truth
as the self-disclosure of Being is highly instructive.
Laszlo Vers/nyi points out that in Heidegger's later writings his
quest for Being and a corresponding neglect of beings has led him to mystical
overtones, especially in Gelasseriheit and Nothing Is without Ground. Even
speech falls into the background, and what is significant is a passive
waiting for the disclosure of the Wholly Other, the absolute, transcendent
Being (though not In a theistic sense)."'" In this respect, Versenyi's criticism
of Heidegger seems to be just:
As such a reaction and protest, existentialism was a necessary
philosophical movement, a wholesome corrective to the shortcomings
of an all too radical and absolute rationalism. But unfortunately
existentialism remained a mere reaction and a protest, and thus
became, in its turn, just as absolute and one-sided as the movement
it opposed. Because rationalism insisted on the immutability of
truth and Being, existentialism insisted only on historicity, change,
and becoming. Because essentialism insisted on the universal, on
Law, and on the fixity of all good and value, existentialism in¬
sisted only on the unique, opposed all tradition, rule and law,
and even refused to think in terras of good and value. Essentialism
mistook nomos—the particular truths, values, goods, rules, and
laws disclosed to man at a particular moment in his historical
existence—for physis—absolute truths, values, and laws. Exis¬
tentialism, in its turn, eliminated physis and even turned against
nomos, thus leaving man altogether without guidance, rule, principle,
and law.2
'"Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger, Being, and Truth, pp. 159-198.
2Ibid., pp. 196-197'
CHAPTER IV
HISTORY AND THEOLOGY: A RECAPITULATION OF THE PROBLEM
It has been pointed out that the rise of modern philosophy with its
terminological distinctions between the intellect and sensibility brought
into clear focus the question of history for theology. Though Descartes
himself depreciated the field of historical study,^ his clear and distinct
ideas of reason became the epistemological ideal for the new historiography.
In this way, his criticism of history led to historical criticism, which in
turn raised the theological question of the relationship between history and
reason. Though Descartes insisted that his methodological procedure of
2
systematic skepticism had no effect on the independent field of theology,
in fact its influence was quite revolutionary in regard to the significance
of history for theology.
This is seen in Richard Simon who sought to enhance the authority
of the Catholic Church against the growing Protestant influence through his
critical analysis of the biblical books, thereby pointing out the unreliability
of the present texts of the Bible for belief. Thus, an attempt was made to
3
make faith independent of the results of historical criticism.
"Ssupra, pp. 15ff. Cf. Collingwood, p. 59-
2_
Essential Works of Descartes, p. 48.
^Supra, pp. 23 ff. Cf. Cassirer, p. 184.
1^4
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Spinoza became the founder of modern biblical criticism with his
publication of the Theologico-Political Treatise. The immediate occasion for
his interest in the Bible was that the ultimate authority ascribed to it by
the Church was in direct conflict with his own metaphysical presupposition
that the basis of absolute certainty was rational, not empirical. We have
pointed out that Spinoza located the source of certainty in pure being, not
in becoming. This means the temporal elements have no significance for philo¬
sophical knowledge; history and reason lie on totally different levels. Thus
if the Bible is accorded such a place of prominence by the Church, then reason
is sacrificed, for how can the absolute certainty of metaphysical truth in any
way depend on the historically-conditioned elements of the Bible? Cassirer
puts it this way:
And yet Spinoza was the originator of the idea of the historicity
of the Bible, and the first to develop it with sober precision
and clarity. If we pursue this idea to its place in Spinoza's
system as a whole, we find that it arose from no immediate his¬
torical tendency, from no interest in historical method as such,
but that it represents an indirect conclusion from the logical
premises of the system. Spinoza's monism is offended by the
special position of the Bible, indeed by the special place of
thought in general. Extension and thought, nature and mind, the
order of things and the order of ideas, are not two fundamentally
different spheres; they are identical orders of being depending
on the same basic law. Hence contemplation of historical being
is not to be separated from contemplation of natural being; ^
both orders of being are to be treated from the sarnie standpoint.
Thus, it can be said that in following the line of Cartesian rational¬
ism with its distinction of reality into Intellect and sensibility Spinoza
was led to a depreciation of historical events as possessing any real signif¬
icance for truth. Since truth is eternally the same, it cannot be made
dependent on derived being, but rather on the contemplation of pure being.
"'"Cassirer, p. 185.
1^6
Leibniz further sought to resolve the question of religious certainty
that had been raised by the delineation of reason and history. He sought to
reconcile the truths of faith with the truths of reason and the truths of
fact. In contrast to Spinoza, Leibniz did not drive a wedge between the
temporal elements and the eternal elements of religious and philosophical
certainty. Neither did he divorce the truths of reason from the truths of
fact. The necessary truths of reason possess absolute certainty, while the
truths of fact are contingent. However, this is not to suggest a depreciation
of the empirical truths or historical knowledge. The purpose of this dis¬
tinction is to delineate the two kinds of reasoning. The "Eternal Verities"
(necessary truths of reason) can be demonstrated with absolute certainty to
be necessary. Such truths are logical, mathematical, and metaphysical. The
truths of fact are truths of reasoning which cannot be demonstrated to be
absolutely necessary. That the sun must rise tomorrow cannot be demonstrated
with absolute certainty, and thus it is not a necessary truth of reason.
Rather, it is a contingent truth of reasoning. The truths of fact stand
superior to the truths of reason In that the necessary truths of reason are
only conditional. For example, that a triangle with three sides has three
angles says nothing more than that if a triangle should exist, such would be
Its necessary truth. On the other hand, the truths of reason stand superior
to the truths of fact only in that the former can be shown to be absolutely
necessary.
The truths of faith relate to the truths of experience, for faith is
dependent upon both the witness of those who saw the miracles of revelation
and the historical reliability of that tradition. In this way, it can be
clearly seen that Leibniz did not depreciate the contingent truths of fact;
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neither did he depreciate history. Rather, he sought to establish a valid
basis for historical knowledge through his careful delineation of the degrees
of probable knowledge.1 Thus, Leibniz, as a result of his distinction
between the truths of reason and truths of fact, set forth the concept of
probability as a basic category of historical knowledge.
Following the lead of Spinoza, Lessing rejected the decisive importance
of historical events for faith. He formulated a natural religion of reason
through which he sought to reconcile "the accidental truths of history" with
"the necessary truths of reason." This he attempts to accomplish in the
Education of the Human Race in which he traces the progressive development
of the human race in terms of a religious education. This interaction of
the universal and the particular, the eternal and the temporal, stands in
sharp contrast to Spinoza's divorce of thought and extension. In this respect,
Lessing follows the idea of Leibniz's monad which expresses the nature of the
universe in terms of "unity in multiplicity." This means that what Leibniz's
monad sought to do for the cosmos, Lessing's natural religion sought to do
for the human race. Cassirer puts it this way:
Just as Leibniz had defined the monad as the "expression of
multiplicity in unity," so Lessing could have defined it as the
expression of the temporal in the immutable. For the monad is
only in so far as it is constantly evolving, and no phase of
this evolution is absolutely dispensable for the whole. The
form of temporality as such is not incompatible with being; for
only in such form can being appear and reveal itself in its
purest essence. In applying this fundamental concept to
religion Lessing encounters a new problem. For the historic¬
ity of the sources of religion is no longer utilized merely
for the purpose of criticizing, or of refuting, religious
doctrine; it now becomes a fundamental element of the deepest
sense of religious teachings. If Spinoza seeks to dispute the
^upra, pp, jj8ff.
2
Cassirer, pp. 31-32, 191.
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absolute truth of religious revelation by an investigation of
its history, Lessing attempts by the same procedure to accomplish
the opposite end, namely, the restitution of religion. The
authentic, the only absolute religion is simply the religion
which comprehends within itself the totality of the historical
manifestations of the religious spirit.^-
In attempting this synthesis of the "accidental truths of history"
with the "necessary truths of reason," Lessing fails to make the precise
distinction between the truths of reason and the truths of fact. Lessing
includes as part of the truths of reason those which Leibniz maintains are
merely contingent. This can be seen In the way that Lessing suggests that
the laws of nature are necessary truths of reason. Thus, he refused to
believe in miracles since they are contrary to nature. He insists regardless
how reliable a historical testimony may be, he cannot believe what experience
teaches him cannot happen. In this respect, Lessing merely assumes that the
laws of nature are necessary, when he in fact cannot demonstrate them to be
such. From Leibniz's standpoint, Lessing has thus confused the two kinds of
reason with the result that faith does not depend upon any particular histor¬
ical point of departure, and thus religion is not affected by the incertitude
of historical knowledge.
It can thus be seen that the rise of the modern historical conscious¬
ness had its beginnings "in the sphere of theology" which Cassirer shows
"spread from there until it pervades progressively all the fields of knowl-
2
edge." It has been pointed out that both Bayle and VIco were inspired to
make their own critical study of history on the basis of the Cartesian model
of the clear and distinct ideas of reason, thus putting historical studies on
3
an independent footing from theology and philosophy. This development of
1Ibid., pp. 191-192. 2Ibid., p. 199- 3Ibid., pp. 207-209.
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historical studies into other fields of knowledge (polities, sociology, science,
philosophy) can be further traced in the Enlightenment era to Voltaire,
Montesquieu, Turgot, Condorcet, Hume, Gibbon, Robertson, d'Alembert, Lagrange,
the Encyclopaedists, Kant, and Herder.1
It was with Herder and Romanticism that history entered into the
2"threshold of scientific history." There are two categories which were
especially significant—"individuality" and "relativity." The category of
individuality emphasizes that each age possesses its own uniqueness and must
be interpreted within the context of its own environment. The category of
relativity stands in tension with the category of individuality, for the
relativity of history means that the historical process is a continuous and
dynamic development so that each historical period is only a link in the whole
chain of history.
Herder's emphasis upon the relativity of history follows as a result
of his deliberate rejection of Leibniz's distinction between the necessary
truths of reason and the contingent truths of reason, as well as a rejection
of Kant's dualism of noumenon and phenomenon. For Herder, the relativity of
history means the necessary linking together of all events so that the whole
of history forms a continuous development. Furthermore, the laws of nature
are necessary and immutable in contrast to Leibniz's emphasis upon the
3
contingent truths of fact.
Kant's epistemological dualism is presupposed by his idea of history
in that while historical phenomena have their origin in noumena (i.e., human
deeds originate in freedom of the will), nevertheless the historian can only
1 2




know history as phenomena as opposed to noumena. This suggests that the
historian can never know history as it really is, but only as it appears.
Hegel's Logic intended to be a rational demonstration that "Reason"
governs world history, that history is moving toward the ultimate goal of
human perfectibility and the full realization of human freedom. What is
called in ontology the tension between thought and being, noumenon and
phenomenon, the infinite and the finite is called in Hegel's philosophy of
history the tension between God and history. Reason and Passion. This is to
say, God (as the metaphorical expression of Reason, or the Idea of Freedom)
is actualizing himself in history. History thus is the ongoing process of
the dialectical unity of the infinite and the finite, thought and being, the
absolute spirit and the finite spirit. There are three important concepts
of history that Hegel thus enunciated. First, there is the concept of thought.
This means that history can be known as it really is, for history as the
record of events is the record of what man has thought. For Hegel, thought
is the ultimate (the "infinite") side of human experience, while finite being
only exists for the sake of this ultimate aspect. Thus, when one studies
history, he studies not the history of mere facts, but the history of thought,
which is to know history as it really is. Second, there is the concept of
relativity, which means that the historical process has no gaps or breaks in
it, but is the progressive movement of each historical period, so that each
subsequent period is the necessary development of what went before. This
means, to speak of the relativity of history is to speak of the relativity of
truth itself, for truth is the comprehensive whole of reality. Third, there
is the concept of individuality, which means that each period is to be appre¬
ciated in terms of its own realization of Freedom. This further suggests that
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the historian's task is restricted to the present day, which "implies that
the present stage of Spirit contains all previous stages within itself."1
This means the historian cannot speak of the future, but only the present.
Truth is thus mediated in terms of the present stage of world history only.
With Heidegger, history takes on a different orientation. What is
significant about history is not an objective course of world events, but the
historicity of each individual person, i.e., not man in history, but man as
history.
Thus far, the following concepts of history have been enumerated—
probability, individuality, thought, relativity, and historicity. Finally,
the problem which history poses for theology can be summarized in the thought
of Ernst Troeltsch whose principles of historiography represent the systematic
formulation of the modern historical-critical method. Troeltsoh acknowledges
that his own method follows in the general line of Leasing, Kant, Herder,
2
Schleiermacher, de Wette, and Hegel.
Troeltsch articulates three basic principles of his historical-
critical method. First, there is the principle of historical criticism itself,
which means that the critic has to cope with judgments of varying degrees of
3
probability in regard to what is contained in the tradition. This means
4
that all historical knowledge is characterized by relative uncertainty.
Second, there is the application of the principle of analogy to tradition.
This principle serves as the very basis of criticism concerning the Judgments
1Reason in History, p. 95.
'"TSrnst Troeltsch, "Historische und dogmatische Methode in der
Theologie," Gesammelte Schriften (Tubingbn: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915)* II» 758.
^Ibid., p. 751- Sib id., p. 7?8.
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of varying degrees of probability. Through the agreement of what is reported
in the tradition to what we observe in daily life as the normal and the
usual, we are led to render the judgments of probability concerning the events
in the tradition. Troeltsch writes: "On the analogy of events known to us
^italics mine7 we seek by conjecture and sympathetic understanding to explain
and reconstruct the past."1 This means that there is an underlying similarity
of all events, though this does not imply that there is an equality among all
2
historical events. Third, there is the principle of correlation, which
means that there is a reciprocal action among all events. No changes can
occur at any point without preliminary and subsequent alterations in the his¬
torical process, so that all events stand necessarily in an unending correlative
relationship.^ He writes: "The sole task of history in its specifically
theoretical aspect is to explain every movement, process, state, and nexus
of things by reference to the web of its causal relations. That is, in a
„4
word, the whole function of purely scientific investigation.
Troeltsch thinks that these basic principles of a historical method
do not need to be supported by some philosophic theory, for he finds them to
possess an irresistible necessity in the human mind. The Hegelian thought
expressed by David Strauss, that the Idea is not so inclined to exhaust its
5 6
fulness on a single individual, is for Troeltsch self-evident. However,
^rnst Troeltsch, "Historiography," Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, ed. James Hastings, VI (1914), 718.
2 "5
Gesammelte Schriften, II, 7352. Ibid., p. 733*
^Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, VI, 718.
^David Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, p. 780.
£
Gesammelte Sohriften, II, 7354.
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these self-evident principles of criticism, analogy, and correlation, Troeltsch
contends, only affected theology at first reservedly, then more energetically,
then ultimately it completely uprooted the historical claims of traditional
theology.^" This means that when the historical-critical method is followed
through in theology to its full and unprejudiced consequences, (1) every
single historical fact will be seen to be at best uncertain and (2) all his¬
torical events will be seen to be inseparably connected according to the law
2
of cause and effect, so that no facts are isolated and absolute. In this
way, Troeltsch believes that this "new scientific mode of representing man
and his development . . . shows at all points an absolute contrast to the
Biblico-theological views of late antiquity."'' This is to say that the
historical method is like leven which bursts the hitherto existing form of
theological methods, and thus produces a radical transformation both in theology
4
and Church history.
That a radical transformation has taken place in contemporary theology
is particularly evidenced in the way that the idea of revelation has been
5
inflated. The tendency to accept categorically the relativity of history
has prompted theology to exempt faith from any necessity of historical proof,
with the result that faith and history tend to be bifurcated, thereby sub¬
suming all Christian doctrines under the idea of revelation. In this way,
the relativity of history is interpreted to mean that the historical process
as such reveals no ultimate purpose and meaning.^ Rather, the truths of
1Ibid., p. 735f. 2Ibid., pp. 736, 738.
•'Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, VI, 718.
^Gesammelte Schriften, II, 730. ^Infra, P- 242.
Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 120.
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faith are "eschatological phenomena" which are immune from the necessity of
proof.To be sure, Troeltsch did not so interpret the consequence of
historical relativity, for in his "history-of-religion theology" he esteemed
highly the historical tradition, which tradition in no way suggested to him
2
historical chaos and meaninglessness. Nevertheless, the radical transfor¬
mation which he envisaged the application of historical criticism to effect
was carried out along different lines than which he himself projected.
Finally, it can be said that the Cartesian disjunction of reality
into res cogitans and res extensa and his negative criticism of history not
only led to the rise of historical studies, but also posed the crucial question
of history for theology—how can historically conditioned events serve as the
point of departure for theology with its claim of the absoluteness of the
Christ event? This is to say, what is the relationship of history and reve¬
lation, of the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ?
Even as in the rise of modern philosophy an attempt was made to provide
an epistemologlcal access to reality through delineating the terminological
distinctions of thought and extension, truths of reason and truths of fact,
relation of ideas and matters of fact, noumenon and phenomenon, thought and
being, even so modern theology has attempted to come to terms with the epis-
temolcgical question of revelation through such distinctions as "the What"
and "the How," "Deus dixit" and "Paulus dixit," Historie and Geschichte, "mere
fact" and "pure Word, "inner history" and "outer history," and "nature" and
"history." These latter distinctions may be considered theological reactions
to the general problem of spistemology. Thus, these latter distinctions
^Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," Kerygma and Myth, p. 44.
^Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schrlften, II, 738, 7^7* 7^8.
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somewhat parallel the former philosophical distinctions of reality.
Each of these theological distinctions, which will be discussed
in Part Two, has been formulated on the basis that Christian faith is not
destroyed or even vitiated by the rise of historical criticism. Indeed,
the function of these distinctions has been to preserve Christian faith from
what seem to be the negative results of the rise of the modern historical
understanding, which in Troeltsch's words, "assail the traditional Christian
view of the world from the most diverse quarters and with the most manifold
1
results. In preserving the character of Christian faith from the relativity
of history and the uncertainty of historical knowledge, the question arises—
is it possible to maintain "peaceful coexistence" (Gerhard Ebeling's terms)
between faith and history? It is this question that serves as the focus of
a critique of the theological reactions now to be discussed.
"^Encyc loped la of Religion and Ethics, VI, J16.
o
Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith, trans. J. W. Leitch (London:
SCM Press Ltd., i960), p. 292.
PART TWO
DUALISMS IN RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY
Karl Barth has delineated three possible theological options, par¬
ticularly in response to the implications of Kant's philosophy for theology.1
First, he suggests that theology can pursue Kant's philosophy, assuming the
validity of its presuppositions. This approach is especially seen in the
rationalistic theologians at the end of the eighteenth century and the first
half of the nineteenth century. Their attempt was to provide a naturalistic
2
interpretation of biblical history. This attempt presupposed the uniting
of historical criticism with the theological restrictions imposed by Kant's
philosophy, which ultimately reduced Christian faith to the status of a mere
3
ethical religion. This can especially be seen in Eichhorn and Paulus.
There was also the "Back to Kant" movement in the second half of
the nineteenth century as it is seen in Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm
Herrmann. Tillich points out that this movement led to Troeltsch in Germany
and to Rauschehbusch and the "liberal theology" in America.^ Tillich describes
it this way:
The Ritschlians said that Kant is the philosopher of Protestantism.
Protestantism does not aspire to climb up to the divine, but keeps
itself within the limits of finitude. The attempt of the great
synthesis is ultimately a product of mysticism, of the principle of
identity between the divine and the human. Therefore, this "back to
Kant" movement was extremely hostile to all forms of mysticism,
"^Protestant Thought, pp. I9O-I96.
2Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, pp. 47ff.
^Ibid. Villich, p. 215.
146
147
including the theologies of experience, because there is a mystical
element present in Schleiermacher's idea of religious consciousness
and the other forms of experiential theology. Experience means having
the divine within ourselves, not necessarily by nature, but yet
given and felt within our own being. But this was not admitted by
the neo-Kantian school. They protested not only against genuine
mysticism, but also against every theology of experience. What
then was left? Only two things. The one is historical research.
This is the greatness and at the same time the shortcoming of
liberal theology. It is the greatness insofar as it dares to apply
the historical method to the biblical literature; it is the short¬
coming insofar as it tries to base faith on the results of historical
research. . . .
But there must be a second factor, for how can there be religious
certainty? According to the Ritschlians, Kant has left but one
window out of our finitude, and this is the moral imperative. The
real basis of certainty is the moral point of view. We are certain
of ourselves as moral personalities. This is not the experience of
something mystical outside of ourselves; this is the immediate per¬
sonal experience, or more exactly, the experience of being a person
as such.1
It is obvious that such a reduction of Christian faith to a moral
ethical religion is hardly satisfying, for the message of the New Testament
is that the same power that raised Jesus from the dead is the power that
effects an inner transformation in the life of a man (Ephesians 1:19-20).
Tillich points out that the result of the "back to Kant" movement was the
reduction of the message of Jesus to love and forgiveness, while at the same
time rejecting the idea of transformation, that the Spirit is present in man
2
and transforms him. Tillich says that this in effect was denying the power
of God and thus was the weakest point in the Ritschlian theology.^
In addition to the first option of merely pursuing theology within
the bounds prescribed by Kant, Barth suggests that one can adapt and modify
the basic Kantian premise by pointing out that there is an additional a
priori capacity which is a part of human reason, though distinct from the
1Ibid., pp. 216-217. 2Ibid., p. 230. ^Ibid., p. 219.
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theoretical and practical—the capacity of "feeling" in Schleiermacher's
terms and "presentiment" in de Wette's terms.1 Tillich defines Schleier¬
macher's procedure this way: "The methodologically decisive thing is that
theological propositions about God or the world or man are derived from
man's existential participation in the ultimate, that is, from man's re-
2
ligious consciousness." This is likewise the procedure of Tillich who
substitutes "ultimate concern" for "feeling."^ This is not altogether unlike
what Kant himself has suggested can be the basis of theology when he says
that the matters of faith are based "on a certain (to be sure, not a de¬
monstrable or explicable) feeling of divinity."^
We now come to the third method that Barth suggests that one may
choose as an option to Kant's philosophy. There is the possibility of theology
insisting to stand on its own feet in relation to philosophy. This would
mean that theology would take as its point of departure the method of revelation
just as philosophy takes reason as its point of departure. This would mean
that theology would be "a dialogue with philosophy, and not, wrapping itself
„5
up in the mantle of philosophy, a quasi-philosophical monologue. This
third option Barth points out is characteristic of the Hegelian school of
theology (Marheineke and I. A. Dorner), as well as certain conservative schools
of thought.
This third option is likewise characteristic of Barth's method—that
7
theology finds its justification solely within the context of the Bible.
^Protestant Thought, p. 190. ^Tillich, p. 111. ^Ibid., p. 98.
^Immanuel Kant, "Der Streit der Pacultaten in drei Abschnitten,"
Sammtliche Werke, ed. G. Hartenstein (Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1868), VII,
359-340. Translation Mine.
^Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 191. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., pp. I9I-I96.
149
This means that theology will not intrude into the philosopher's domain
of deriving truth through reason. Nor will the theologian concern himself
with the philosopher's speculations. Barth writes:
Philosophy, however, is in itself a strict study concerning a vast
field, and it is not for the theologian to conduct himself as if he
were in a position to propound a philosophy, as if this were some
subsidiary part of his office, and to pull a philosopher's work to
pieces, especially if that philosopher happens to be Kant.1
Rather, the theologian must be content solely with the Bible as the
2
source of truth insofar as religious knowledge is concerned.
Barth, in maintaining the separation of theology and philosophy, finds
support for this position in Kant, who likewise maintains the separation
of theology and philosophy. Kant contends that philosophy and theology form
two distinct kinds of professions. Since each possesses its own unique
characteristics, it should not invade the other's restricted domain which
3
in turn possesses its own unique features. This is to say that since
theology takes its teaching from the Bible and not from the faculty of reason,
it should not attempt to refute philosophy, but neither should philosophy
4
infringe on the rights of theology. Further, since there is no one who is
authorized of God to interpret Scripture, the theologian must rely on his
understanding by means of the Spirit who guides into all truth. This means
5
the faculty of reason cannot be the source of biblical theology.
However, Kant does not mean to suggest that the biblical theologian
can dispense with reason. He writes:
1Ibid., p. 192. 2Ibid., p. 196.
^Sammtliche Werke, VII, 340. Cf. Protestant Thought, pp. 191-196.
4
Ibid., p. 359- Cf. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,
p. 8. ~ ~~ —
^Sammtliche Werke, VII, 340.
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Were Biblical theology to determine, wherever possible, to have
nothing to do with reason in things religious, we can easily foresee
on which side would be the loss; for a religion which rashly de¬
clares war on reason will not be able to hold out in the long run
against it.1
Nevertheless, Kant maintains that the biblical theologian can prove
that God exists only because He has spoken in the Bible. This means that
the biblical theologian establishes God's existence as a fact of faith
2
based "on a certain . . . feeling" (auf ein gewisses Gefiihl). While "this
certain feeling of divinity" may be valid, it cannot be objectively dem¬
onstrated, for the biblical theologian as such cannot prove that God has spoken
through the Bible as a historical fact. Neither can the theologian prove
that the Bible itself contains historical facts as such, for it is the sole
3
prerogative of the philosopher to deal with such matters as objective proof.
Kant thus renounces any attempt of the biblical theologian to validate the
authority of the Bible through historical or philosophical proofs. Rather,
the reliability of the historical faith of the Church must come from the
Bible itself as a fact of faith. Kant puts it this way:
It /theology/ does not, however, speak according to the laws of
the pure and. a priori knowable religion of reason (for this would
humiliate it and reduce it to the level of philosophy), but it speaks
according to statutory precepts of faith contained in a book,
which is preferably called the Bible; that is, it /the Bible/ is a
codex of the revelation of an Old and New Covenant of men with God
composed many hundred years ago, whose authentication as a historical
faith (quite certainly not as a moral faith, for that could also be
extracted from philosophy) may indeed be expected more from the
effect, which the residing of the Bible is inclined to make on the
heart of men, than from the proofs established by mepis of a critical
examination of its inclusive teachings and accounts/
Barth suggests that in this segregation of theology and philosophy "an
insight lies hidden, which had, and still has, a right to be heard, an insight
^Religion within . . ♦ , p. 9« ^Sammtliche Werke, VII, 539-2^0.
3 4 _
Ibid. Ibid., p. 578. Translation mine.
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which, it is true, was of no direct usefulness within the framework of Kant's
undertaking, but one in which that determination of the place of theology
might well have its deep and justified reason.""*"
Barth points out that some of Kant's apparent concessions to theology
may have been made in view of the Wttllner edict, which was issued on July 9$
1788, and which threatened with civil punishment and dismissal from all
offices under King Frederick William II's Jurisdiction those who failed to
2
adhere to biblical teachings. In spite of whether or not these concessions
were made in the light of this edict, Barth asks: "is it not the case that
the philosopher of pure reason has said something very significant to the
theologian in telling him in all succinctness that 'The biblical theologian
proves that God exists by means of the fact that he has spoken in the Bible
It can be seen from this third option that Barth's own theological
method (that the only proper prolegomenon to theology is the doctrine of the
Word of God) is not uninfluenced by the restriction which Kant placed upon
reason with the result that faith cannot look for support in either philos¬
ophy or objective critical study. Rather, as Kant says, faith Is effected
through "the reading of the Bible," or, as Barth says, faith comes from the
Word of God, the truth of which is self-authenticating. Barth puts it this way:
We found that the possibility of knowing God was literally founded,
raised, and bound up in the very event of its realisation, and our
Yea to this possibility became a particular Indication of this event.
We cannot bring this event upon the stage and so we cannot prove
"*Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 196.
^arth, Protestant Thought, p. 195. Cf. Religion within the Limits
of Reason Alone, p. xxxii; S&mmtliche Werke, VII, j524ff.
•^Protestant Thought, p. 196.
1
152
our indication; we could only prove it by bringing the event it in¬
dicates on to the stage and letting it speak for itself.^-
Thus, following the lead of Kant, Barth has renounced any objective proofs
Q
of faith, for the truth of the Word of God "is based purely upon itself."
This means theology precedes anthropology, God-certainty precedes self-
certainty. This means no historical or philosophical question enter, for
men can know the Word of God because and so far as God wills that
they should know it, because and so far as over against the will of
God there is only the weakness of disobedience, and because and so
far as there is a revelation of the will of God-in His Word, in
which this weakness of disobedience is removed.
While Kant in principle has segregated theology and philosophy, in
practice he shows that at least theology must come to terms with the questions
raised by philosophy. In this connection, he suggests that it would be
beneficial for a candidate of biblical theology to include in his curriculum
a course in the philosophical theory of religion. After having taken this
course, the theological candidate should either adopt the theories of the
4
philosopher, or else he must refute the philosopher. At this point, Barth
would disagree, for it is not within the theologian's concern whatever may be
C
the theories of the philosopher. Theology's sole responsibility is to examine
the language of the Church in the light of the Bible.^ There is here no
^"Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G. T.
Thomson (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 19657", I, 1, 260-261.
2
Ibid., p. 225. Paul Althaus has pointed out that this attempt to
place revelation beyond the necessity of historical proof is the direct result
of Kant's critical philosophy, which thus led to the inflation of the idea of
revelation ("Die Inflation des Begriffs der Offeribarung in der gegenwartigen
Theologie," Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie, 18 t 134-135# l48f.).
^Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 223-224. ^Religion within . . . , p. 10.
^Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 223; Protestant Thought, p. 192.
6
Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 11.
question of any objective demonstration of faith, for the certainty of faith
comes from the unmediated self-revelation of God. "Faith as faith in God
stands on its own feet, and is the basis of knowledge."''' "Truth of revelation
2
is the freely acting God, Himself and quite alone."
In delineating these three possible options, Barth has shown the
way that theology lias "re-acted" to the philosophical distinctions which have
been drawn between truth and certainty, faith and knowledge, which follow
from the delineation of thought and being, thought and extension, relation of
ideas and matters of fact, noumenon and phenomenon, etc. This is to re¬
iterate what has been said, that the sharp philosophical distinctions of
reality into intellect and sensibility marked the rise of modern philosophy
and brought to light with a high degree of intensity the general problem of
epistemology which in turn came to serve as the epistemological presupposition
of our modern idea of revelation.
Attention shall now be focused on selected theologians who have
especially dealt with this relationship of faith and knowledge, history and
reason, truth and certainty, and a critique will be offered of each of their
methods. However, this section is not intended to make a critique of theologians
who could be used as "whipping-boys" in order to bolster an alternative
position. However, it may give the appearance of one-sidedness in restricting
Part Two to theological "re-actions," but on the other hand, the strength
of this approach is to be found in that it facilitates in lifting out the
general nature of the problem of history and faith, particularly as it has
led to dualisms in religious epistemology. Thus, Part Two self-consciously
does not intend to consider in any comprehensive way the many positive and
1Ibid., p. 15. 2Ibid., p. 16.
154
constructive aspects of the theological positions under consideration here,
though each of these theological positions is appreciated. Finally, the
choice which has led to the selection of these particular theologians should
be self-evident on the basis of their contribution to the discussion on the
problem of faith and history.
CHAPTER V
THE DUALISM OF KIERKEGAARD
One scarcely needs to point out the imposing influence of JEJ^ren
Kierkegaard (l8l?-l855) on contemporary theology. His influence was restricted
in his own day"1" (partly because his thought was not in step with the Hegelian
philosophy on the one hand and the complacent orthodoxy on the other hand,
and partly because his writings were not in one of the major world languages);
yet since World World I his influence has not been without great magnitude as
it is especially seen in modern existentialist philosophy and in what is
broadly termed as neo-orthodoxy. Paul Tillich speaks of Kierkegaard's
influence upon his own thought during his days as a student in theology at
Halle. He happened across Kierkegaard's writings through a translation made
by an isolated individual in Wurttemberg. Tillich found that Kierkegaard
provided for him the initiative for a constructive alternative to the theology
of repristination which Tillich said had failed to take into serious account
the results of historical criticism. On the other hand, Tillioh says he could
not be satisfied with the Ritschlian alternative with its amystieal theology
3
and empty moralism. He writes:
^"Commentator1s Introduction" to S/ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical
Fragments, translated by David F. Swenson with an introduction and Howard
V. Hong with a new introduction and commentary by Niels Thulstrup (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962), p. XCV. Cited hereafter as Fragments.
^Tillich, p. 164. 'ibid., pp. 162-16?.
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So we were extremely happy when we encountered Kierkegaard.
It was this combination of intense piety which went into
the depths of human existence and the philosophical greatness
which he had received from Hegel that made him so important
for us. The real critical point would be the denial that
Hegel's idea of reconciliation is a genuine reconciliation.
Man is not reconciled by the reconciliation in the philoso¬
pher's head.l
For the purposes of this paper, it will be my restricted intention
to point out that Kierkegaard radicalized the Kantian bifurcation of reality
and that this in turn tended toward a negative alliance of faith with reason
2
and history. In this respect, Kierkegaard transposed the philosophical
distinctions of reality (which have been variously but comparably described
as truths of reason and truths of experience, relation of Ideas and matters
of fact, thought and being) into theological usage. It is likewise a
comparable distinction that underlies much of contemporary theological
formulations, as It has already been suggested and will be further indicated
subsequently.
Thought and Being. Thought and being cannot be brought together
into any self-identity except in some abstract way. Kierkegaard says that
thought abstracts from what is concrete being, and in this abstraction thought
and being are Identical. In this abstract sense, truth may be so defined as
to be complete and final since thought and being have an exact correspondence.
This correspondence is a mere abstraction since it is only an abstract self-
identity. Thus, to say that thought is being is tauto logovis. On the other
hand, whenever being becomes empirically based in existence, truth (which is
''"Ibid., p. 163.
^This section deals primarily with the two writings of Kierkegaard
which present the question of history for faith—Philosophical Fragments
and Concluding Unscientific Postscript /trans. David F. Swenson and
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^1), cited
hereafter as Postscript 7»
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the conformity of thought with being) is put into a process of becoming.
This means that truth—the conformity of thought with being—is only realized
for God, but it cannot be so realized for man who is the process of becoming.'*"
Since man is an existing spirit and thus in process of becoming, he
can never attain objective certainty. He can never know an object as-it-
really-is. Truth for man is not an objective certainty, but an objective
uncertainty held fast in passionate subjectivity. Any talk of the identity
of subject and object, thought and being, is a pure abstraction. This is to
say that whenever being is an empirical entity, knowledge of this being is
essential knowledge when it relates to the individual and is only accidental
knowledge when it is unrelated to the individual. Kierkegaard writes:
That essential knowledge is essentially related to existence does
not mean the above-mentioned identity which abstract thought
postulates between thought and being; nor does it signify,
objectively, that knowledge corresponds to something existent
as its object. But it means that knowledge has a relationship
to the knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and
that for this reason all essential knowledge is essentially
related to existence. Only ethical and ethieo-religious knowl- ^
edge has an essential relationship to the existence of the knower.
Kierkegaard is not denying the reality of objective knowledge as the
conformity of thought and being—i.e., truth as the identity of thing-as-it-
is and thing-as-it-appears. This is to say that he is not denying the category
of substance as Hume did when he said that all knowledge is knowledge of
isolated impressions and not knowledge of things-as-they-really-are in the
form of extramental reality. Rather, Kierkegaard is saying that truth for
the individual exists only as it appears to the individual and that only God
knows a thing-as-it-really-is. Kierkegaard writes:
Not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject is an
1 2
Postscript, pp. 169-170. Postscript, p. I77.
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existing individual, and that existence is a process of
becoming, and that therefore the notion of the truth as identity
of thought and being is a chimera of abstraction, in its truth
only an expectation of the creature; not because the truth is
not such an identity, but because the knower is an existing
individual for whom the truth cannot be such an identity as
long as he lives in time" (italics mine.7^
This means if man were to achieve truth as an objective certainty, he
would have to be capable of standing outside time completely. But, since man
is a synthesis of finite and infinite, it is impossible for him to completely
transcend the temporal order, "it is only momentarily that the particular
individual is able to realize existentially a unity of the infinite and the
finite which transcends existence," for "existence exercises its restraining
influence.1,2
What then is truth for man, since he cannot completely transcend
existence? Kierkegaard answers: "An objective uncertainty held fast in an
appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth" (italics
Kierkegaard's).^ It can thus be seen that truth is the will's decision to
believe what is objectively uncertain.
Kierkegaard works this dualism of thought and being out in terms of
the "what" and the "how." Truth as subjectivity is not concerned with the
objective "what," but with the subjective "how" of human existence.^ He
writes: "The thing of being a Christian is not determined by the what of
Christianity but by the how of the Christian. This how can only correspond
with one thing, the absolute paradox."^ The "what" is a thing-in-itself
unrelated to existence. The "how" is a mode of existence; it is truth as
subjectivity; it is the thing-as-it-appears which is held fast in passionate




It can be seen that Kierkegaard's disjunction between thought and
being stands in sharp contrast to Hegel's philosophy. As it has already been
pointed out, Hegel rejected the absolute Kantian disjunction of subject and
object. Hegelian logic is the study of thought-determinations, which is a
study of things-as-they-really-are. This is to say that what is thought and
thought itself coincide. Thus, Hegel attempted to resolve the question of
epistemology by showing that truth resided in the thinking subject. While
Kierkegaard accepted this subjectivity of truth, he rejected the logic of
Hegel which in its dialectical method pointed out the difference between
what is and what is conceived and then resolved this distinction (or, dia¬
lectic) in such a way that the object as it is_ for us is seen to be the same
as the object as it is in itself. This means that the reconciliation of
subject and object takes place in the concrete thought of the human spirit
(ego). Thus, Hegel explains, through his critique of the categories, that
logic is the pure concept known as true existence."'"
It is this unity of "pure concept" and "true existence" that Kier¬
kegaard attacks. Kierkegaard recognizes the validity of abstract thought.
But, abstract thought concerns itself only with possibility, not reality.
He writes: "A valid thought is a possibility, and every further question
2
.as to whether it is real or not should be dismissed as irrelevant." This
is to say that thought and being are bifurcated in existence, whereas in
abstract thought the question of reality does not emerge. When Hegel intro¬
duces the dialectic moment into his logic, that the opposition of subject
and object is overcome in the concrete concept, Kierkegaard repudiates it.
1 2
Supra, p. 82. Postscript, p. 292.
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Kierkegaard writes: "To answer Kant within the fantastic shadow-place of
pure thought is precisely not to answer him."'*' Kierkegaard says the only
way to overcome skepticism is simply to break: with it, i.e., risk a decision
2
by postulating what you believe the truth is. This is to say that subjective
certainty cannot be objective truth.
This means movement from possibility to actuality cannot take place
in the realm of the abstract. Rather, this movement takes place in the realm
■5
of existence. This movement is a leap, an act of the will. Thus, Kierke¬
gaard says that Hegel's "pure thought is a phantom."** Hegel cannot show how
subject and object are united. Kierkegaard writes:
Instead of conceding the contention of Idealism, but in such a
manner as to dismiss as a temptation the entire problem of a
reality in the sense of a thing-in-itself eluding thought,
which like other temptations cannot be vanquished by giving
way to it; instead of putting an end to Kant's misleading
reflection which brings reality into connection with thought;
instead of relegating reality to the ethical—Hegel scored a
veritable advance; for he became fantastic and vanquished
idealistic scepticism by means of pure thought, which is
merely an hypothesis, and even if it does not so declare it¬
self, a fantastic hypothesis.5
What Kierkegaard is pointing out is that there is a breach between
thought and being. Kant made the mistake of relating reality to thought
instead of being. This is to say that being has priority over abstract
thought. This means what man thinks is merely abstract (it does not relate
to existence); what man is is existence. Here it can be seen that Kierkegaard
radicalized Kant. Kierkegaard is not really concerned with knowing either
Kant's noumenon or phenomenon. While Kant said that the conceptions of the
understanding provided an objective basis for knowing a thing-as-it-appears,




Kierkegaard is not interested in this objective knowledge of phenomena. He
is concerned only with postulating what a thing might be.
On the other hand, to assert the priority of thought is Gnosticism.1
Thus, reality for man is subjective; it is existence; it is action. Thought
is possibility; reality is "an internal decision in which the individual puts
an end to the mere possibility and identifies himself with the content of his
2
thought in order to exist in it."
When an individual thinks, he does not think existence: "The only
thing-in-itself which cannot be thought is existence, and this does not come
3
within the province of thought to think. What does an individual think,
then, when he thinks? He thinks abstractly, i.e., he abstracts from existence,
"it signifies that he thinks intermittently, that he thinks before and after.
His thought cannot attain to absolute continuity. It is only in a fantastic
sense that existing individual can be constantly sub specie aeterni.
The result of this absolute discontinuity between thought and being
is that there can be no such thing as an existential system. The reason for
this is obvious enough since man is in a state of process as an existing
individual, which means all attempts to finalize truth and reality must be
rejected. Only in the realm of thought is there finality. But, thought in
the existing individual is abstract thought and to say that thought and being
are the same is a tautology because in abstract thought there is no actuality,
only possibility. But, the identity of thought and being from the standpoint
of eternity is both actual and final, for what is eternal does not exist,
but always is. The eternal is thus defined as timeless.
1Ibid., p. 305. 2Ibid., p. 302. ^Postscript, p. 292.
\bid., p. 293.
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In this way, Kierkegaard rejected Hegel's attempt to convert the
empirical self into the Absolute Spirit by the use of pure thinking. This
cannot be done because of the bifurcation of being and thought in existence,
for whatever exists cannot be thought and what is pure thought does not exist.
Kierkegaard writes: "God does not think, he creates; God does not exist, He
is eternal. Man thinks and exists, and existence separates thought and being,
holding them apart from one another in succession.""*"
Kierkegaard introduces the will as the category through which man
achieves the unity of the infinite and the finite instead of Hegel's concrete
2
concept. This unity is the moment of passion, the leap of faith. This is
to say that the unity of being and thought is the passionate appropriation
of the will of that which is objectively uncertain. This means that Kier¬
kegaard rejected Hegel's reconciliation of subject and object by means of
his dialectical movement in logic, for reconciliation cannot be achieved in
the mind of the philosopher. Only in the divine mind can there be reconcil¬
iation, while alienation is the lot of human existence. Hegel thus confused
essence and existence, for his logic was in fact only one relation of ideas,
3
not real movement in time.
We have thus far delineated the way Kierkegaard's dualism has been
worked out in terms of thought and being, essential knowledge and accidental
knowledge, the "what" and the "how." We have pointed out that Kierkegaard
revived the Kantian dualism of thing-as-it-is and the thing-as-it-appears in
terms of existence rather than thought. In this way, Kierkegaard radicalized
the Kantian bifurcation so that truth is not what is known through thought,
but what is believed in existence.
Postscript, p. 296. 2Ibid., p. 176. Pbid.
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Paragraph-Material and Existential Communication. Christianity is
a res in facto poslta from an objective viewpoint. As such, it comes under
the investigation of critical study.^ But, to view Christianity objectively
as doctrine (paragraph-material) is in fact to eliminate Christianity. Kier¬
kegaard says that Christianity is not a doctrine (a series of propositions to
be understood), but is an existential communication. He writes: "To assume
that this denial that Christianity is a doctrine should imply that Christianity
is contentless, is merely a chicane. When the believer exists in faith his
existence acquires tremendous content, but not in the sense of paragraph-
material." He further says that Christianity understood as a doctrine of
the Incarnation or of the Atonement is a misunderstanding, for this would
■3
reduce Christianity to the level of speculative philosophy. What he is
pointing out is that Christianity is not a speculative doctrine, but an exis¬
tential doctrine. This is to say that Christianity may be defined as a
4
doctrine in a restricted sense when it is meant to be realized in existence.
This means the question of the truth of Christianity can be raised only as an
5
existential problem, not as an objective problem.
This distinction between paragraph-material and existential communi¬
cation is helpful so long as the two are not bifurcated. Yet, this tends to
happen when Kierkegaard draws such a sharp contrast between what is objective
and what is subjective. For example, that "Christ died for our sins" is
paragraph-material (is objectively true) whether it is existentially appro¬
priated or not. This is to say that the doctrine of the Atonement is a truth
of Christianity and can be intellectually received even though it may never
1Ibid., p. 23. 2Ibid., pp. 339-340. "ibid., p. 340.
4Ibid., p. 339n. 5Ibid., p. 331.
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be existentlally appropriated. But, Kierkegaard will not allow Christianity
any such speculative status. For example, the Bible as a historical document
cannot be the basis of religious authority.1 Christianity is not to be
discussed; it is not to be intellectually grasped; it is to be received; it
is to be believed. The only presupposition to be allowed for a "Christian
philosophy" is:
that Christianity is the precise opposite of speculation, that
it is the miraculous, the absurd, a challenge to the individual
to exist in it, and not to waste his time by trying to under¬
stand it speculatively.^
It is at this point that Kierkegaard invites a misunderstanding when
he restricts the validity of trying to understarxl Christianity and when he
denies the Bible to be an objective standard of religious authority. He says
3
that one must believe against the understanding. What is important for him
is to believe, to take the leap of faith. The only objective content neces¬
sary is "the historical fact that the God has been in human form"^ He further
writes:
If the contemporary generation had left nothing behind them but
these words: 'We have believed that in such and such a year
the God appeared among us in the humble figure of a servant,
that he lived and taught in our community, and finally died,'
it would be more than enough. The contemporary generation would
have done all that was necessary; for this little advertisement,
this nota bene on a page of universal history, would be suf¬
ficient to afford an occasion for a successor, and the most
voluminous account in all eternity do nothing more.5
The question arises whether this is enough paragraph-material for one
to take a leap of faith. It seems to me that Paul Tillich has correctly
pointed out faith needs more content than the mere fact that Christ came.
1Ibid., p. 4, 38. 2Ibid., p. 338. ^Ibid., p. 504.
4 5
Fragments, p. 130. Ibid., pp. 130-131-
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Tillich criticizes Kierkegaard thus:
Can we solve the problem which historical criticism has opened
up by a theology of the leap? I do not believe it is possible.
Philosophically the question is this: In which direction am I
to leap? You can leap In all directions, but if you have a
direction in mind, you already have some knowledge, so it is
not a pure leap anymore. If you are in complete darkness and
jump without knowing in what direction you are jumping, then
you can land anywhere, maybe even on the place from which you
jumped. The danger in this concept is asking someone to jump
without showing him the direction. Then we have more than
subjectivity and paradox; we have willfulness and arbitrariness;
we have complete contingency. But if you already know in which
direction to Jump, in the direction of Christ, for example,
then you must have a reason for this. This reason may be some
experience with him, some historical knowledge, some image of
him from church tradition, etc., but in any case, you have
some content. The mere name alone does not say anything.
This distinction between paragraph-material and existential commu¬
nication parallels yet another distinction—quantitative approximation and
qualitative dialect.
Quantitative approximation and Qualitative Dialectic. A qualitative
dialectic presupposes the disjunction between subject and object, thought
and being. It presupposes movement. It presupposes existence. It presup¬
poses the impossibility of direct communication, for direct communication
implies certainty and certainty is an impossibility for one who is in process
p
of becoming. Thus, an existential system cannot be formulated. Reality is
3
a system only for God, but it cannot be a system for an existing spirit.
Thus, whatever man has of the truth of reality is made available
through dialectics. This is to say dialectics lead one to the place "where
the resistance of an objective uncertainty tortures forth the passionate
„2i
certainty of faith. Dialectics lead one to take the leap of faith—to make
'lTiHich, p. 175- ^Postscript, p. 68n. ^Ibid., p. 107.
4Ibid., p. 438.
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a decision concerning the truth of what is objectively uncertain. It is
this decision that the Greek skeptics refused to make. Thus, by abstaining
from Judgment on issues they sought to avoid mental insecurity. Diogenes
Laertius expresses this suspension of judgment this way:
We recognize that it is day and that we are alive, and many
other apparent facts in life; but with regard to the things
about which our opponents argue so positively, claiming to
have definitely apprehended them, we suspend our judgment
because they are not certain, and confine knowledge to our
impressions. For we admit that we see, and we recognize
that we think this or that, but how we see or how we think
we know not.l
Kierkegaard thus points out that truth does not exist objectively
for the individual. In this respect, he does not differentiate between truth
and faith. Subjective truth (faith) is one thing; objective knowledge is
something else. Subjective truth is the certainty of faith, while objective
knowledge is only a quantitative approximation. Faith is a venture, an
uncertainty of knowledge. This venture is madness (passion). It is a risk.
"To ask for certainty is on the other hand prudence, for it is an excuse to
evade the venture and its strenuousity, and to transfer the problem into the
realm of knowledge and of prattle."
In contrast to dialectics which lead to faith, critical study leads
to quantitative approximation. This latter is so, for whatever comes into
existence is in process of becoming and uncertain, and whatever is uncertain
cannot be the basis for eternal happiness. This uncertainty is attached to
what has come into existence, and it points to the inadequacy of any objective
scientific investigation of the Bible when such an attempt intends to provide
"^Diogenes Laertius (IX, 103; Loeb Classics, II, 515), cited by




faith with an objective basis and thus intends to secure faith against the
doubt that it may not have a basis beyond itself. This is to say that the
certainty of faith does not rely upon the dependability of the Bible as a
historical document."*" He makes it quite explicit that faith is independent
of the incertitudes of historical research. Thus, he rejects the idea of the
Bible as the final authority of Christian truth when it is viewed from the
historical point of view. In this respect, he says that all philological and
2
critical scholarship is of no concern for faith. This is so, for all that
scientific inquiry can produce is an approximation, which is insufficient as
a basis for faith. This leads Kierkegaard to say that whenever faith seeks
"X
a demonstration, then it ceases to be faith. He writes: "Anyone who posits
inspiration, as a believer does, must consistently consider every critical
deliberation, whether for or against, as a misdirection, a temptation for the
spirit."2*
The question arises whether or not Kierkegaard's disjunction between
qualitative dialectics and the quantitative approximation-process fails to do
justice to the historical frame of reference of Christian faith. This is to
suggest that he does not draw a proper distinction between the certainty of
faith and the certainty of historical knowledge. The two certainties lie on
different levels, but are not antithetical. In fact, it seems to me impossible
to escape the realization that If historical study could historically demon¬
strate that revelation has not taken place in the world (a fact which Christian
faith must at least theoretically allow), then it would show that faith is an
illusion. Of course, it Is Just this dependence of faith upon historical
1Ibid., pp. 25-26. 2Ibid., p. 29. ^Ibid., p. 31
^Ibid., p. 27.
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research that Is looked upon as highly problematic in contemporary thought.
Faith and Knowledge. The dualism of Kierkegaard can further be seen
in the rather sharp distinction that he draws between faith and knowledge.
He defines reality in terms of truth as known and truth as believed.
Faith and doubt are passions and have nothing to do with certainty.
Certainty relates to knowledge (metaphysical truth), while faith relates to
passion."'" This is to say that one does not believe what one knows. To relate
2
critical inquiry to faith, Kierkegaard says, is to confuse knowledge with faith.
It is this separation of faith and the certainty of objective knowledge that
intensifies the passion of faith. The less objective knowledge is seen to be,
the greater the passion of faith. The more objective knowledge one has, the
less is the passion of faith. He writes:
Thus the subject merely has, objectively, the uncertainty; but
it is this which precisely increases the tension of that infi¬
nite passion which constitutes his inwardness. The truth is
precisely the venture which chooses an objective uncertainty
with the passion of the infinite. I contemplate the order of
nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omnipotence and
wisdom; but I also see much else that disturbs my mind and
excites anxiety. The sum of all this is an objective uncer¬
tainty. But it is for this very reason that the inwardness
becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective
uncertainty with the entire passion of the infinite.3
Kierkegaard differentiates between two levels of faith—faith in the
general sense and Faith in the eminent sense. Faith in the general sense is
not a form of knowledge, but a free act of the will. Faith is the will to
believe what is objectively uncertain. It is this refusal to will belief that
characterized the Greek skeptics. They suspended Judgment in order to avoid
mental insecurity. Belief is the daring to overcome uncertainty. Belief is
without error, for belief does not draw logical conclusions, but makes
1Ibid., p. 30. 2Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 182.
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resolutions. Further, it is the will that creates belief, not immediate
sense impression, nor the testimony of some contemporary to a past event.
Kierkegaard explains it this way:
A successor believes, to be sure, on account of the testimony
of some contemporary; but only in the same sense as a contemporary
believes on account of his immediate sensation and immediate
cognition. But no contemporary can believe by virtue of this
immediacy alone, and neither can any successor believe solely by
virtue of the testimony to which he has access.^
Kierkegaard further explains the difference between faith and knowledge
in relation to the law of cause and effect. That an effect is the consequent
of some cause cannot be known, but believed by an act of the will. In this
way, doubt is excluded. He writes:
The conclusion of belief is not so much a conclusion as a
resolution, and it is for this reason that belief excludes
doubt. When belief concludes: this exists, ergo, it must have
come into existence, it might appear to be making an inference
from effect to cause. However, this is not quite the case;
and even if it were so it must be remembered that the cognitive
inference is from cause to effect, or rather, from ground to
consequent (Jacobi). But it is not accurate to say that the
conclusion of belief is an inference from effect to cause; I
cannot sense or know immediately that what I sense or know
immediately is an effect, since for the immediate apprehension
it merely is. I believe that it is an effect, for in order to
bring it under this category I must already have made it doubt¬
ful with the uncertainty implicit in coming into existence.
When belief resolves to do this, doubt has been overcome; in
that very instant the indifference of doubt has been dispelled
and its equilibrium overthrown, not by knowledge but by will.
Thus it will be seen that belief is the most disputable of
things while in process of approximation; for the uncertainty
of doubt, strong and invincible in making things ambiguous, dis-
putare, is brought into subjection within it. But it is the
least disputable when once constituted, by virtue of its new
quality.
For Hume, only isolated facts as mental impressions could be known
and all connections between matters of fact were not real connections, only
^Fragments, p. 106. 2Ibid., pp. 104-105.
170
relations of ideas. Thus, the law of cause and effect was not a metaphysical
truth, but merely a relation of ideas. For Kant, the law of cause and effect
was a synthetical a priori knowledge. For Kierkegaard, the law of cause and
effect was neither a mere relation of ideas nor synthetical a priori knowledge.
Rather, it is a belief—a free act of the will. But, it is not known as such
except to God.
Further, one does not know what is historically true, for whatever
comes into existence is only an approximation from the objective standpoint,
and approximation is not knowledge. Thus, the objective truth of the past is
"a matter of cognition and concerns not existence but essence.This is to
say that the objective truth of the past cannot be known in historical exis¬
tence. When an event takes place before the eyes of a contemporary, its
2
actual perception is immediate and can be said to be non-deceiving. But,
when this event has happened and thus comes into existence, then its truth
becomes uncertain even for the contemporary who may have Just witnessed the
actual event. It can be said that this contemporary who just witnessed this
event does not know the past, but believes it. It likewise follows that a
successor believes on account of the testimony of the contemporary in the
same way that the contemporary believes on account of his immediate perception
of the event. But, it is the will that does the believing, not knowledge nor
immediate perception. Thus, it cannot be said that the historical can be
3
known.
So far we have defined faith in the general sense, but now we turn
to the definition of Faith In the eminent sense. First, it can be said that
this Faith in the eminent sense includes the definition of faith in the general
1Ibid., p. 106. 2Ibid., p. 100. ^Ibid., p. 106.
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sense, i.e., the relationship of the mind to something historical. But, this
Faith is eminent for the fact that God came into existence. This means that
Faith is a paradox, that the eternal and the historical were united at a
definite point of time. But, this Faith is not knowledge. It does not raise
the question of content, but rather raises the question of assent. Kierkegaard
writes:
Mo one can become immediately contemporary with this historical
fact, as has been shown in the preceding; it is the object of
Faith, since it concerns coming to existence. No question is
here raised as to the true content of this; the question is if
one will give assent to the God's having come into existence, by
which the God's eternal essence is inflected in the dialectical
determinations of coming into existence.■*-
What Kierkegaard is pointing to is the distinction between the eternal
and the historical. Faith does not exist from an eternal standpoint, but
rather, faith relates only to what is historical. Thus, one does not say
that he has Faith in God from the eternal perspective. One can only speak of
Faith in God from a historical perspective. Thus, to say that Socrates had
Faith in God is a misunderstanding.
Socrates did not have faith that the God existed. What he knew
about the God he arrived at by way of Recollection; the God's
existence was for him by no means historical existence . . . ;
for Faith does not have to do with essence, but with being, and
the assumption that the God is determines him eternally and not
historically.^
Kierkegaard does not at all suggest that Faith is a mere act of the
will (as it is the case of faith in the general sense). Rather, Faith receives
its condition by God Himself. This means that Faith is not based on historical
knowledge, but it is based upon the condition created by God Himself in the
Moment. While this Faith is not based on historical knowledge, yet it has a
1Ibid., p. 109- 2Ibid., p. 108.
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historical frame of reference. Kierkegaard writes:
How does the learner then become a believer or disciple? When
the Reason is set aside and he receives the condition. When
does he receive the condition? In the Moment. What does this
condition condition? The understanding of the Eternal. But
such a condition must be an eternal condition.—He receives
accordingly the eternal condition in the Moment, and is aware
that he has so received it; for otherwise he merely comes to
himself in the consciousness that he had it from eternity. It
is in the Moment that he receives it, and from the Teacher
himself.1
This disjunction between faith and knowledge corresponds to the
disjunction between certainty and passion. Knowledge is objective and certain
and relates to the realm of essence. Faith is subjective and passionate and
relates to the realm of existence. Thus, faith is existential truth, a truth
which is objectively uncertain, but believed through a passionate intensity
of the will. This is to say that faith is a risk. Kierkegaard writes:
Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contra¬
diction between the infinite passion of the individual's inward¬
ness and the objective uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping
God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot
do this I must believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith I
must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncer¬
tainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand
fathoms of water, still preserving ny faith.2
Kierkegaard's disjunction between faith and knowledge tends to be
injurious to the reality of Christian Faith. In this respect, Karl Jaspers
has said: "One cannot theologize Kierkegaard and affirm the Church."''' Does
the disallowance of historical knowledge in regard to faith (in the general
sense) and Faith (in the eminent sense) solve the problem which historical
criticism has raised in regard to the Bible? To be sure, Christian faith is
1 2
Ibid., p. 79. Postscript, p. 182.
*^Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans. E. B.
Ashton (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 3^9-
17?
more than historical knowledge—it is a relationship to God. But, to depre¬
ciate the objectivity of knowledge and to define truth solely in terms of
faith does not seem to me to be in the interest of Faith when such Faith has
a historical frame of reference. This is to say that if Faith claims a his¬
torical point of reference, and yet this Faith refuses to allow this historical
point of reference to be examined, then it could suggest that Faith is dis¬
honest .
On the other hand, his emphasis upon the priority of Faith helps to
show that Faith receives its condition from God himself. Paul writes: "So
faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of
Christ" (Romans 10:17). It is God coming to man that creates the condition
of Faith. Kierkegaard's discussion of the contemporary disciple is helpful at
this point. Being a contemporary of Jesus did not guarantee Faith. This is
to say that immediacy in the time of Jesus did not of itself create Faith.
There were many who saw the historical Jesus, but did not have Faith. Thus,
the statement of Jesus in response to Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ:
"For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in
heaven" (Matthew 16:17). This means that the fact that God became man exists
through Faith. This content exists for Faith as color exists for sight and
sound for hearing."'" Thus, this fact must really exist if Faith is to have
content. This means it is imperative that the first disciples really saw
the historical Jesus if Faith is to exist just as it is imperative that this
fact be preached today if men are to have Faith. Kierkegaard writes:
The successor believes by means of (this expresses the occasional)
the testimony of the contemporary, and in virtue of the condition
he himself receives from the God.2
^Fragments, p. 128. ^Ibid., p. 131.
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Eternity and Time, the Moment and the Historical. Kierkegaard
distinguishes between the moment and the historical. The moment is decisive;
it is filled with the Sternal; it is the "fulness of time"; it is brief; it
passes away."*" The moment is immediate perception and immediate cognition.
The moment does not deceive so long as it is this moment. But, when the
moment comes into existence, then it ceases to be the moment and becomes his¬
torical. He writes:
Immediate sensation and immediate cognition cannot deceive. This
is by itself enough to show that the historical cannot be the
object of either, because the historical has the elusiveness
which is implicit in all coming into existence. As compared with
the immediate, coming into existence has an elusiveness by which
even the most dependable fact is rendered doubtful.2
The moment is dependable so long as it is this moment, but when it is
a past moment it becomes uncertain. Thus, immediate sensation and immediate
cognition cannot deceive, for it is this moment. Immediacy does not have
the suspicion of uncertainty which attaches to the following moment."' What¬
ever has come into existence is historical. "But the historical is past
(for the present pressing upon the confines of the future has not yet become
historical)."^ On the other hand, the eternal has no history, but neither
5
does the moment. Eternity is timeless. But, time is characterized by a
g
duality, for what is present becomes past.
Kierkegaard points out this disjunction between the eternal and the
historical with reference to Lessing's statement that the accidental truths
7
of history cannot serve as the necessary truths of reason. It is this breach
1Ibid., p. 22. 2Ibid., p. 100. "'ibid., p. 101.




between the historical and the eternal that is united paradoxically through
the leap of faith in the moment. This decision of Faith happens in the moment
and is not something historical. Thus, one cam speak of the certainty of
Faith, for it is the moment and what is present as this moment is immediate
and thus certain. This means that Faith happens every moment, for whenever
Faith becomes historical it ceases to be Faith.
The moment is similar to the eternal in that the moment and the eternal
are without any history and thus certain. The difference between the moment
and the eternal is that the moment takes place in time and thus passes away,
whereas, the eternal is timeless and never passes away."'" Yet, the absolute
paradox is that the eternal did enter time and became historical.
It is this paradoxical relationship of eternal happiness and its
historical point of departure that Kierkegaard intended to show was incompatible
not only with Hegelianism, but all idealistic philosophy. This Kierkegaard
2
shows by going back to the beginnings of idealistic philosophy with Socrates.
It is a presupposition of Socratic thought that truth inheres in man. Man
cannot be taught truth, but can only be reminded of what he already knows.
This is the doctrine of recollection, that man existed priori to birth and
thus has the truth within himself. Socrates, as a dialectical teacher, only
serves as the accidental occasion whereby the learner can come to an under¬
standing of himself, and thus this provides Socrates himself an accidental
occasion for coming to an understanding of himself. It can be seen from this
that the truth is eternal and has nothing to do with the accidental truths
of experience. This means that reconciliation is a matter of being reconciled
with the truth which already inheres in his being.
"'"Fragments, p. 97. 2Ibid., pp. 11-45.
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This means that the historical cannot have any decisive significance
for the existing individual, for truth is already immanent in the mind of
man. It is this Socratic doctrine of recollection and presupposition of
idealism that universal truth inheres in man that most characteristically
differentiates Christianity from all philosophy and paganism. The teacher
and the pupil in Socratie thought exist in a state of error, and the teacher
can only serve as an accidental occasion for both the teacher and the learner
to remember what he already knows. For Christianity, the historical takes on
decisive significance, for man is not in a mere state of error, but exists
in a state of sin. Truth does not inhere in the individual, but the Teacher
brings the learner to the Truth. But this is no mere teacher; he is God.
The Teacher prompts the learner to recall that he is error, due to his own
guilt, which is sin. Thus, the doctrine of recollection in this regard does
not bring pleasure but anguish. Man becomes aware of the break that separates
God and man. But, God is not responsible for this breach, nor is it due to
an accident. Rather, it is due to man's sin. This Teacher, through a self-
imposed bondage, becomes Saviour, Redeemer, Reconciler, Judge. This means
that the Teacher brings to the learner not only truth (which the learner does
not already possess), but also makes the learner aware of his own sin. In
this respect, Socrates did not have the consciousness of sin."*" Thus it can
be seen the historical becomes of decisive importance. Kierkegaard writes:
It is well known that Christianity is the only historical phe¬
nomenon which in spite of the historical, nay precisely by means
of the historical, has intended itself to be for the single
individual the point of departure for his eternal consciousness,
has intended to interest him otherwise than merely historically,
has intended to base his eternal happiness on his relation to
something historical. No system of philosophy, addressing
1Ibid., p. 58.
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itself only to thought, no mythology, addressing itself to the
imagination, no historical knowledge, addressing itself to the
memory, has ever had this idea: of whieh it may be said with
all possible ambiguity in this connection, that it did not
arise in the heart of any man.1
Kierkegaard points out that this historical aspect of Christianity
is the sharpest contrast to paganism and to eliminate the historical is to
2
resort back to paganism. Thus, he says when modern philosophy believes it
has moved beyond Christianity it has in fact only moved back to paganism
3
and to Socratic thought. What Kierkegaard is saying is that if one rejects
the historical point of departure of faith by rejecting the Incarnation he
is thereby denying that which makes Christianity Christian. It is thus an
illusion to think that one finds this absolutely distinguishing feature
dispensible or easy to believe.
It Is this paradoxical relationship of Faith to something eternal
which is at the same time historically conditioned that distinguishes Chris¬
tianity from all philosophy and pagan religions. It is at this point that
the absolute paradox can be seen. For Socratic thought, the historical can
4
only have an accidental significance. For Christianity, the historical takes
on decisive significance for Truth. The absolute paradox is the moment when
the eternal and the historical are united. This is the supreme paradox in
that faith is the moment where something happens which thought cannot think.
But, paradox is characteristic of thought. One cannot think without it. It
is this paradoxical passion of reason—for thought to reach out beyond it¬
self to the Unknown—that unsettles man's knowledge of himself. How is man
to know this Unknown? Socrates believes man could have ontological truth




through recollection. For Christianity, this truth could be known only
through the absolute paradox—that God entered time and that Faith which
receives its condition from God appropriates this revelation of truth which
has a decisive historical frame of reference."'" It is an absolute paradox,
for it cannot be thought, only encountered in the moment of Faith.
Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the historical frame of reference for
Christian faith in contrast to idealistic philosophy is extremely helpful,
but his sharp disjunction between the eternal and time, the moment and this
historical seems to be more Platonic than Christian.
Jurgen Moltmann points out that Kierkegaard's definition of the
moment and the eternal as timeless is directly joined to Greek thinking and
2
basically cannot be harmonized with the Christian knowledge of God. To
bifurcate reality into the eternal and time is to emphasize the moment of
Faith at the expense of the historical. Moltmann writes:
This itysticism of being, with its emphasis on the living of the
present moment, presupposes an immediacy to God which the faith
that believes in God on the ground of Christ cannot adopt with¬
out putting an end to the historic mediation and reconciliation
of God and man in the Christ event, and so also, as a result of
this, putting an end to the observation of history under the
category of hope.5
He further points out that the biblical God is not one who "never was nor
will be, because he now Is all at once as a whole," but one "who maketh the
dead alive and calleth into being the things that are not.
God and Man. The bifurcation between eternity and time is further
1Ibid., p. 18.
Sfoltmann, Theology of Hope, trans. James W. Leitch (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967),P» 29-
"5 4
Ibid., p. JO. Ibid., p. 31.
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worked out in terms of an absolute difference between God and man. This
absolute difference seems to be the result of man's finitude and creaturehood.
This seems to be due to man's particularity in time while God is eternal. He
writes:
But the absolute difference between God and man consists pre¬
cisely in this, that man is a particular existing being (which
is Just as much true of the most gifted human being as it is of
the most stupid), whose essential task cannot be to think sub
specie aeterni, since as long as he exists he is, though eter¬
nal, essentially an existii individual, whose essential task
it is to concentrate upon inwardness in existing; while God is
infinite and eternal.!
It is this absolute difference between God and man that leads Kierke¬
gaard to term the Incarnation as an absolute paradox. He writes:
That God has existed in human form has been born, grown up,
and so forth, is surely the paradox sensu strictisslmo, the
absolute paradox. As such it cannot relate itself to a relative
difference between men. A relative paradox relates itself to
the relative difference between more or less cleverness and
brains; but the absolute paradox, just because it is absolute,
can be relevant only to the absolute difference that distin¬
guishes man from God, and has nothing to do with the relative
wrangling between man and man with respect to the fact that one
man has a little more brains than another.^
Since there is this absolute difference between God and man, reason
cannot attain to knowledge of God. Neither can the absolute paradox be com¬
prehended by the mind. To explain the paradox would be to explain it away.
That the understanding cannot grasp the paradox is to say that it is the
absurd, to believe what one cannot think. Yet, Kierkegaard is precise in
pointing out that this absurdity is not nonsense. He recognizes the awkward¬
ness of this term "absurd."*^ He thus speaks of the absurd as a higher
understanding, but this does not mean that one can "defend oneself against
every accusation by remarking that it is a higher understanding."^ He
"^Postscript, p. 195. ^Ibid., pp. 194-195* ^Ibid., p. 504n.
4Ibid., p. 504.
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further points out the understanding is not completely sacrificed, but that
understanding itself becomes the principle for understanding that something
cannot be fully understood. He puts it this way:
So the believing Christian not only possesses but uses his under¬
standing, respects the universal-human, does not put it down to
lack of understanding if somebody is not a Christian; but in
relation to Christianity he believes against the understanding
and in this case also uses understanding ... to make sure
that he believes against the understanding. Nonsense therefore
he cannot believe against the understanding, for precisely the
understanding will discern that it is nonsense and will prevent
him from believing it; but he makes so much use of the under¬
standing that he becomes aware of the incomprehensible, and
then he holds to this, believing against the understanding.1
In a theological way, Kierkegaard is thus providing a critique of
reason—reason coming to an understanding of its limitation—in an analogous
way to the Kantian philosophical critique of reason. By limiting the scope
of reason's possibilities, Kierkegaard is making room for revelation.
While it is admitted "the thinker without a paradox is like a lover
without feeling," it does not seem necessarily to follow that one needs to
speak of the Incarnation as the absurd or as an absolute paradox when such
terms are used to stress the absolute difference between God and man ( even if
these terms are not intended to suggest nonsense). Is it justifiable to speak
of an absolute difference between God and man? To be sure, there is a qual¬
itative difference in so far as God is holy and man is sinful. In Philosophi¬
cal Fragments, Kierkegaard speaks of the absolute difference between God and
■*
man in terms of man's sin. But, even man can hardly be absolutely sinful,
for if such were the case there would not be any good in the world and the
human race would hardly have survived to this date! Thus, the doctrine of
prevenient grace (Wesley) or common grace (Calvin) means that there is not an
"'"Ibid. ^Fragments, p. 46. ^Ibid., p. 58.
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absolute difference between God and man even in a qualitative sense, for
there is a measure of grace inherent in man as an unconditional benefit of the
Atonement.
We have pointed out that Kierkegaard radicalized the Kantian dualism
of reality. This is seen in his multiple use of sharp distinctions—Thought
and Being, Paragraph-material and Existential Communication, Quantitative
Approximation and Qualitative Dialect, Faith and Knowledge, Eternity and Time,
the Moment and the Historical, God and Man, etc. While these distinctions
have relative validity, to bifurcate them results in a negative alliance of
faith with history, for this reduces all knowledge to belief—that one can
never know anything, but only believes. This would then leave Faith open to
the charge that it is mere arbitrariness and that the will merely compels
belief in spite of what reason says the facts really are.
For example, Kierkegaard says that in the immediate moment of seeing
a star one is not deceived. But when one remembers this moment of seeing this
star, it is not known with objective certainty, even if it is the next moment.
This is to say that when the moment of seeing a star has come into existence
one does not know with certainty that he saw a star; he only believes it."*"
The obvious implication of such a bifurcation of reality forbids one
from pursuing any systematic construction of theology, especially when such
a construction would purport to assist Faith. Kierkegaard makes it quite
clear that any existential system is impossible and that all critical inquiry
is of no concern to Faith. Faith is a risk. It takes its point of departure
from an "if." To reduce the risk is to weaken Faith. To be sure, Kierkegaard
1Ibid., p. 100.
2
Journals of S/ren Kierkegaard, edited and translated by Alexander
Dru (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. J68.
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was concerned with how to become a Christian, and he was intent on making it
as difficult as possible, especially since it had become quite an easy thing
to call oneself a Christian without realizing what it really meant to be a
Christian. He further acknowledged that his approach was one-sided, hoping
that an exaggeration would draw attention to the truth of what it means to be
a Christian.1 In this respect, his importance can be seen in his emphasis
upon the priority of Faith, the otherness of God, the historical point of
departure for faith, and the significance of the individual.
1Ibid., pp. 467-468; Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard, trans. David Green
(Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 123.
CHAPTER VI
MARTIN KAHLER: DER HISTORISCHE JESUS UND DER GESCHICHTLICHE CHRISTUS
Martin Kahler was born in 1835, and he lived during the time of the
old quest for the historical Jesus. These "questers" attempted to write a
biography of the historical Jesus on the basis of a positlvistic historiography
which precluded the possibility of an absolutely unique occurrence.1' Albert
Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus (New York: The Macmillan Com¬
pany, 195*0 provides a detailed research into this "life of Jesus" movement.
It is this work that brought the movement to a close. Carl Braaten writes:
"in retrospect we can see that Albert Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical
Jesus, 1906, served as an impressive scientific obituary to a movement which
j 2
fourteen years earlier had been mortally wounded by Kahler's prophetic pen."
Earth has pointed out the following basic presuppositions of the ratio¬
nalistic biographies of Jesus which were composed mainly under the Kantian
•x
influence. (1) Just as faith comes from man s inner consciousness, so it
developed in Christ in the same way as it had in any other historical person¬
ality. (2) The gospels are the only existing sources for our knowledge of
^Cf. Collingwood, p. 1J6.
2Carl Braaten, "Martin Kahler on the Historic Biblical Christ," The
Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ (New York: Abingdon Press, 1964),
selected essays trans, and ed. Carl Braaten and Roy Harrisville, p. 79* I
am indebted to this essay for introducing Kahler's work to me.
^Protestant Thought, pp. JJ8-379•
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Christ, and they must be used in the same way as any other source material
for historical study. (3) The historical Jesus is the object of our source
material. It is both possible and necessary to discover his true personality
behind the sources. (4) Jesus was immersed in the relativities of history
as much as any other historical personality. Thus, the miracles ascribed to
him can be explained away by interpreting them as misunderstandings, hidden
forces of nature, or myth. In any case, Jesus can be seen to be a religious
genius who had a spectacular form of God-consciousness. (5) Insofar as we
are able to comprehend Jesus historically, the nineteenth century biographers
believed that he was the chief revealer of God.
KShler pointed out that the Jesus presented by these "modern biog¬
raphies" (by such writers as Reimarus, Eichhorn, Paulus, Strauss, Renan,
etc.)"'" only hid the real Christ from the believers. Their production was no
better than the dogmatic Christ of Byzantine Christology. He writes: "in
this respect historicism is Just as arbitrary, just as humanly arrogant, just
as impertinent and 'faithlessly gnostic' as that dogmatism which in its day
2
was also considered modern."
Thus, he draws a sharp distinction between "der sogenannte historische
Jesus" and "der geschichtliche, biblische Christus." In this way, he "mortally
wounds" (as Braaten puts it) the "life of Jesus"movement and provides a theo¬
logical alternative to the problem of faith and history, i.e., with his emphasis
upon the historic, biblical Christ as opposed to the so-called historical
"*"Cf. David Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, pp. 45ff.
Cf. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus.
^Martin Kfthler, The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic,
Biblical Christ, trans, with an Introduction by Carl Braaten (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1964), p. 43.
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Jesus. It is this theological alternative to the "life of Jesus" movement
that makes him so important for contemporary theology. Heinrich Ott writes,
in this respect, that KMhler's So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic,
Biblical Christ "still speaks with astonishing pertinence."1 Paul Tillich
also points this out when he says that K&hler "was a prophetic forerunner of
what developed more fully only in the twentieth century. The heritage of
Martin K&hler has been rediscovered only in the present-day discussion in
2
view of the radical criticism."
His terminological distinction between historisch and geschichtlich
seems to be the origin of the modern theological and technical distinction
between Historie and Geschichte which is particularly characteristic in
Bultmann's usage.^ This is not to suggest that K&hler intended to bifur¬
cate faith and history, though he did lend a helping hand in that direction.
This can be seen when Tillich writes: "One emphasis in KShler's answer is
decisive for our present situation, namely, the necessity to make the certainty
of faith independent of the unavoidable incertitudes of historical research."^
KEhler's first concern in his work, The So-called Historical Jesus and
the Historic Biblical Christ, is "to criticize and reject the wrong aspects" of
1Heirtrich Ott, "The Historical Jesus and the Ontology of History,"
The Historical Jesus and the Kerygma' 1c Christ, p. 148.
o
Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant
Theology, p. 215-
^Cf. Julius Schniewind, "A Reply to Bultmann," Kerygma and Myth, p. 82
(all references to Kerygma and Myth wiil be to volume one unless specifically
designated as volume two); Braaten's introduction in K&hler, The So-called
Historical Jesus . . ., p. 20; Ott, The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic
Christ, p. I43ff.; Bartsch, "The Present State of the Debate," kerygma and
Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. R. H. Fuller (London: S.P.C.K., 1962),
II, 51i Michalson, Worldly Theology, p. 9.
^Tillich, "Foreward," The So-called Historical Jesus..., p. xii.
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the approach of the "life of Jesus" movement."'" His negative Judgment against
this approach was not. its placing the Bible over against an abstract dogmatism.
Rather, he rejected its failure to understand the nature of Scripture. He
writes: "We have no sources for a biography of Jesus of Nazareth which
2
measure up to the standards of contemporary historical science." This is
why K&hler charged the "modern biographers" for heading up a blind alley.
That is, their cul-de-sac can be seen in the fact that they did not understand
the nature of their source material. Kthler points out quite concisely the
justification for this charge. He writes:
Our sources, that is, the Gospels exist in such isolation that
without them we would know nothing at all about Jesus, although
the time and setting of his life are otherwise entirely clear to
historians. He could be taken for a product of the church's
fantasy around the year A.D. 100. Furthermore, these sources
cannot be traced with certainty to eyewitnesses. In addition
to this, they tell us only about the shortest and last period
of his life. And finally, these sources appear in two basic
forms whose variation must—In view of the proximity of the
alleged or probable time of origin of these forms—awaken serious
doubts about the faithfulness of the recollections. Consequently
the "unbiased" critic finds himself confronted by a vast field
strewn with the fragments of various traditions.5
Though K&hler was quite skeptical about the possibility of writing
a scientific biography of Jesus, he is quick to point out the reliability
of the kerygma's presentation of Jesus as the Saviour.^ Furthermore, he points
out that the nature of the Bible Is perfectio respectu finis. Thus, he shows
that the purpose of the gospels was not to present a "scientifically recon¬
structed biography of Jesus." Rather, the gospels have a theological intention
"To awaken faith in Jesus through a clear proclamation of his saving activity."
"SiHhler, The So-called Historical Jesus . . ., p. 45.
2Ibid., p. 48. ^Ibid., pp. 48-49. ^Ibid., p. 48.
5Ibid., p. 127.
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Thus, the perfection of the Bible is a theological one. It contains
recollections which are also confessional. This means the gospels witness to
a reality which is beyond any mere historical fact. The Scriptures "have a
reliability which lies completely beyond proof and which would preclude the
necessity of submitting them to a scientific test."'''
Since the "life of Jesus" biographers were concerned with the discovery
of the real historical Jesus through the means of a positivistlc historiography
(as though facts were independent of meanings), it was necessary for them to
discard all confessional statements. However, for K&hler, to do this was to
destroy Christian faith. "Portrayals like those of a Renan or a Strauss, . . .
2
are for believers in Christ an offense which cuts to the quick." Further,
if their portrayals are correct, then the generations who have humbled them¬
selves before the Christ of the Bible are in immediate conflict with the First
Commandment. He writes:
All of us who want to remain—and out of innermost conviction
must remain—within the churchly tradition of the Reformers
and thus in continuity with the theologians who have held to
the divinity of Christ are united in our concern for the
"biblical" Christ. For the divinity of Christ, however it
may be more precisely defined in theology, means for us: that
by virtue of which he may become the object of faith, without
this faith's coming into conflict with the First Commandment
and without its leading to deification of the creature.2
Thus, the failure of the "modern biographer's" was due to their mis¬
understanding of the person of the biblical Christ. They seemed to think
that he was only a man who possessed larger dimensions than our own nature.
But, the truth of the matter for K&hler is this: "The distinction between
Jesus Christ and ourselves is not one of degree but of klnd."^
"*Tbid., p. 126. 2Ibid., p. 45n. ^Ibid., pp. 103-104.
4Ibld., p. 53.
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If this historical assertion (i.e., the Incarnation) can be made,
then any attempt to write a biography of Jesus is not permitted. This is
so, for the principle of analogy would have to be used. Kfihler asks: "is
this method Justified in writing about Jesus? Will anyone who has had the
impression of being encountered by that unique sinless person . . . still
venture to use the principle of analogy?""*" If he is the incarnate God, does
this not rule out the principle of analogy? The meaning of history for Chris¬
tian faith is brought into clear focus at this point. If it is historically
impossible to assert that God came into the world at a definite moment in
time, then K&hler is correctly pointing out that the historical continuity
within the churchly tradition is broken. This means that the problem of
history is twofold—the historical claims of Scripture and. the historical
continuity within the entire churchly tradition.
Consequently, K&hler out of theological necessity rejected the "life
of Jesus" movement. He writes: "The historical approach is no longer con¬
cerned with safeguarding and interpreting a solid core of the content of
faith. Only an extremely fluctuating picture of Jesus' personality is approx-
2
imately certain." Therefore, faith cannot afford to put itself at the mercy
of the "modern biographers."
On the other hand, faith is only concerned with the biblical presentation
of Jesus. K&hler puts it this way:
It is clear that the historical Jesus, as we see him in his
earthly ministry, did not win from his disciples a faith with
power to witness to him, but only a very shaky loyalty suscep¬
tible to panic and betrayal. It is clear that they were all
reborn, with Peter, unto a living hope only through the resur¬
rection of Jesus from the dead (I Pet. 1:3) and that they needed
the gift of the Spirit to "bring to their remembrance" what
Jesus had said, before they were able to understand what he had
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 103.
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already given them and to grasp what they had been unable to
bear (John 14:26; 16:12, 13).1
What KRhler is arguing is that it is illegitimate to try to go behind the
New Testament picture of Jesus in order to get at a "historical Jesus" without
taking into account the reality of the resurrection.
K&hler further points out that the disciples did not think of Jesus
as the founder of some new school of religious belief. Nor did they envisage
their task of merely spreading his teachings. Rather, they went forth into
the world to witness to his person. They went forth to call men everywhere
to faith in Christ.2
If all this clear and certain, it is equally certain that Jesus'
followers were capable of understanding his person and mission,
his deeds and his word as the offer of God's grace and faithful¬
ness only after he appeared to them in his state of fulfillment—
in which he was himself the fruit and the eternal bearer of his
own work of universal and lasting significance, a word (to be
exact) whose most difficult and decisive part was the end of the
historical Jesus. Even though we once knew the Messiah according
to the flesh, now we regard him thus no longer (II Cor. 5*16).3
This means that the real Christ is the Christ who is preached. This
further means that the real Christ was not seen for what he really was until
after the resurrection. This is to say that any picture of Jesus that leaves
out his resurrection, that seeks to bypass the resurrection kerygma, is not
a true picture of Jesus Christ. This, in fact, is the same point that Pan-
nenberg has made over against Ebeling and Fuchs who seek the real historical
Jesus apart from the factual reality of the resurrection event. However, this
anticipates what is to follow later.
Further, in contrast to the rationalistic theologians, K&hler points
out that faith in Christ does not mean "an assent of our conscience to Jesus'
religious ethic.Neither is this historic Christ an "ideal to be realized
1Ibid., pp. 65-66. 2Ibid., p. 66. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 121.
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in the remote future by scientific investigation.1,1 Rather, this faith is
"directly accessible" through the biblical tradition which "possesses the
inherent power to convince us of its divine authenticity. . . . That makes
it impossible for me even to differentiate the 'historic' from the 'biblical'
Christ."2
It can be seen from this that Kthler did not accept the historical
approach of a positivistic historiography whose concern was with a scientif¬
ically-reconstructed biography of Jesus based on the presupposition that "Jesus"
could be had apart from what he meant to the primitive church. Rather, he
shows that any historical knowledge of Jesus can be had only from the perspec¬
tive of the biblical "picture." The epistemological implication of K&hler's
thesis is to be found in that history is not merely scientifically-reconstructed
"bare" facts, but rather, historical facts speak their own language by means
of "pictures," i.e., historical reality imposes its own meaning by creating a
mental picture of what is meaningfully experienced.
K&hler is not suggesting, thus, any bifurcation between faith and
history. Rather, he is calling into question the validity of positivistic
historiography for establishing a basis for faith. In this respect, he asks:
"How can Jesus Christ be the authentic object of the faith of all Christians
if the questions what and who he really was can be established only by ingenious
investigation and if it is solely the scholarship of our time which proves it¬
self equal to this task?"'' It should also be pointed out that KHhler was not
rejecting historical studies. Neither was he suggesting that the New Testament
could not be read historically as other documents. He says, however: "For me
the more important question is whether we can do justice to the Bible when we
1Ibid., pp. 121-122. 2Ibid., p. 122. ^Kflhler, p. 102.
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view it from the historical perspective alone."1
What K&hler is correctly pointing out is that dogmatics and historical
studies must converge in Jesus. He is quick to point out that dogmatics is
not arbitrariness. Rather, dogmatics is the mediator between the past and
the present. It takes what is a past reality and puts it at the service of
2
the present. He writes:
This task of mediation, then, belongs to dogmatics, after it has
made a thorough and serious study of what historical study can
accomplish and has learned from history what is important enough
to warrant consideration by dogmatics. The task of dogmatics Is
to provide an inventory of our assets.3
The convergence of dogmatics and historical study shows that faith is
interested only in the Jesus who is at the same time the risen Christ and this
picture of the whole biblical Christ is the true basis for understanding the
"real" Jesus. This means faith cannot endure a bifurcation between the "Christ
of faith" and the "Jesus of history," for the Christ of faith is "a tangible
m4
human life.
What is further significant for K&hler is the christological authority
of the Bible. He is not willing, on theological grounds, to surrender the
authority of the Bible and replace it with the authority of the alleged results
of a scientific investigation which prides itself with a presuppositionless
approach in its historical treatment of the Bible. To be sure, the Bible
contains "historical accounts," but they do not "have the value of historical
documents in the strict sense of the term. Nor do they themselves make such
a claim.Neither is the Bible primarily a book of doctrinal propositions
or a book of devotion and edification.^ Rather, the Bible as kerygma is what
IIbid., p. 124. 2Ibid., p. 67 3Ibid., pp. 67-68.
^Ibid., p. 95. 5Ibid., pp. 125-126. 6Ibld., p. 129-
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Is decisive. Since the central theme of the Bible is the proclamation of
Jesus as the Christ, the authority of the Bible is derived from the authority
of Christ, i.e., "the passionately held dogma about the Savior vouches for
the reliability of the picture transmitted to us by the biblical proclamation
„1
of Jesus as the Christ. Thus, whatever view one holds of Jesus as the Christ
2
predetermines his view of the authority of the Bible.
It would be wrong to conclude from this that KEhler depreciates the
historical quality of faith. To be sure, historical research cannot establish
any basis for "a life of Jesus," for "from the sources we know his personality
for a period of only about thirty months, at the most, of his public ministry."^
Yet, we know enough of the historical facts as such that are "sufficient for
4
preaching and dogmatics.
If the authority and truth of the Bible (including historical events)
is authenticated in faith, is there then any necessity for a historical vali¬
dation of faith? The answer seems to be YES and NO. The answer is NO, insofar
as the necessity of historical science is concerned. The picture of Jesus as
the Christ in the Bible is as easily accessible to the layman as to the trained
historian. "For in relation to the Christ in whom we may and should believe
the most learned theologian must be in no better or worse a position than the
simplest Christian."^ On the other hand, the historical "validation" of faith
may have an apologetic use. For example, those who are predisposed against
the idea of revelation and the authority of the Bible should be encouraged to
abandon their prejudices against the Bible, despite the so-called assured
negative results of biblical criticism. Then, "we must go to the content of
1Ibid., P. 95. 2Ibid., pp. 95# 104, 112, 119, 123, 148.
3Ibid., P. 92. 4Ibid., p. 95. 5Ibld., p. 73.
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the earliest preaching and, starting with a 'minimum' of what can be histor¬
ically ascertained, introduce them to problems which serious research cannot
t
easily dismiss." In this way, one may be led to faith in Jesus as the Christ
and ultimately be led to belief in the authority of the Bible. However,
KUhler is not advocating in any way a verbally-dictated view of inspiration.
However, or the basis of what can be historically ascertained, one may be
persuaded to lay aside his bias and to listen to the preaching of Christ. But,
in the final analysis, it is not this historically-ascertained "minimum" that
brings one to faith in Christ, though it may be the apologetic occasion for
causing one to listen with openness to the message of Christ. Rather, faith
2
comes from the preaching of the Word of Christ.
Wolfliar t Panxienberg lias maintained lliat K&iler' a idea of "auprahistory"
does not do Justice to the meaning of revelation. This is to suggest that the
"X
content of faith is thoroughly historical, not suprahistorical as Klliler says.
To use terminology such as suprahistory assumes that the historical-critical
method with its emphasis upon a scientific verification leaves no room for
redemptive event.^ Whether or not Pannenberg's assessment is justified will
be considered in Part Three. However, the question must be raised at this
point whether K&hler in fact does not make too much of a concession when he
makes faith independent of the probabilities of historical knowledge.
Despite this, Klhler did not intend to divorce Historic and Geschlohte.
This is to say, he did not intend to divorce der geschlchtliche Christus der
Bibel from der historische Jesus, except in the sense that der historische
1Ibid., p. 144. 2Ibid., pp. 104-105. ^Ibid., pp. 47, 65, 95.
^"Redemptive Event and History," Essays on Old Testament Interpre¬
tation, trans. Shirley Guthrie, pp. 3l4f.
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Jesus exists only as der geschichtliche Christus der Bibel. However, K&hler
did contribute to the present-day divorce between hlstorisch and geschichtlich
that has come into technical usage for differentiating the Jesus of history
and the Christ of faith, though KRhler did not carry out this divorce himself.
In this respect, Braaten shows that Stauffer misrepresents K&hler:
When Ethelbert Stauffer interprets Kthler as being interested
merely in "the theological truth of the Gospels" and not in "the
historical reality of Jesus Christ" or in "the pneumatic historic
(geschichtlichen) Christ" and not in "the sarkic historical
(historischen) Jesus," KShler is definitely being misrepresented.
Such a sequence of theses and countertheses does not exist in
Klhler's mind at all. The impression is given that K&hler was
not interested in the earthly reality of Jesus Christ and therefore
presumably not in the incarnation. Cf. Ethelbert Stauffer,
"Entmythologisierung oder Realtheologie?" Kerygma und Mythos, ,
edited by H. W. Bartseh (Hamburg: Herbert Reich, 1952), II, j50.
K&hler's contribution to the discussion on the problem of history and
faith can be summarized as follows: (1) the gospels have primarily a theolog¬
ical intention and only secondarily are they to be used as scientific histori¬
cal sources. (2) Thus, the gospels were written by authors, not by objective
reporters.^ (3) The "life of Jesus" historians, despite their claim of
neutrality and objectivity, were motivated by preconceived views with the
result that the true image of Jesus was distorted. K&hler writes of this
distortion: "What is usually happening is that the image of Jesus is being
refracted through the spirit of these gentlemen themselves." (4) Faith has
its sole condition in the preaching of the Word of God, though this preaching
^"KMhler, Der sogenannte hlstorische Jesus und der geschichtliche,
biblische Christus (Leipzig: A. Deichert, I896), pp. 65-60I
^Supra, p. 385- ^Braaten, The Historical Jesus . . . ., p. 96n.
StMhler, The so-called Historical Jesus . . . ., p. 44.
"'ibid., p. 57.
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has a historical frame of reference. Thus, the trained historian does not
have any "corner" on the truth of faith. (5) The Christ of faith is not
divorced from the Jesus of history, but he is "a tangible human life."1 (6)
What Jesus did and who Jesus was cannot be separated, for Jesus' "work is
O
his person in its historic-suprahistoric effect." (7) The authority of the
Bible has its validation in the authority of Jesus whom the primitive church
proclaimed as the living Christ. Thus, even as the principle of analogy is
without force in considering Jesus as the Christ, even so the Bible cannot be
merely treated as one book among books, despite Lessing's advice that "if you
simply place the Bible alongside of all other books, it will prove itself to
be a very reliable and excellent book." KEhler replies to Lessing this way:
"Yes, indeed—but it will no longer be the Book of books.KEhler thus argues
for the christological authority of the Bible. (8) Finally, the real Jesus is
none other than der geschichtliche Christus der Bibel, and not der historische
Jesus of the "life of Jesus" movement. But, this biblical, historic Christ
is not an importation of the primitive community, but rather, the primitive
community proclaimed Jesus as the living Christ because "Christ himself is the
originator of the biblical picture of the Christ."^ In whatever way KEhler may
have been the forerunner of form criticism in New Testament studies, he did
not share the skeptical conclusion, for example, of Bultmann who maintains
that there is no continuity between the Jesus of history arc! the Christ of
faith.^ Nor did KEhler contend that the preaching of the primitive church was
mere confession as opposed to what is historically factual. Rather, the
1Ibid., p. 95. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., pp. 117-118.
k R
Ibid., p. 87. Infra, p.224.
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kerygmatic Christ is none other than the Jesus who died and rose again and
whom the churoh confesses as Saviour.
CHAPTER VII
KARL BARTH: THE WORD OF GOD AND HISTORY
James Smart points out that Barth had realized his disillusionment
with the theology of neo-protestantism even before the outbreak of World War I
at which time the message of liberalism failed to measure up to what was
required of it as the sinfulness of man in all his depravity was unveiled."''
This is to say, Barth had already come to realize the inadequacy of the
liberal message which sought to "lay hold on the inner life of the Jesus of
history" and which did not take seriously enough man's sin and his need for
transformation. This awareness of the difference between what he had learned
from Herrmann and what he discovered was the actual message of the Bible came
as the result of the practical need of communicating Christian faith to modem
man with his desperate condition. It had been with this practical task of
2
preaching that occupied his time since the second year following his graduation.
Since Barth's practical concern with preaching lies at the basis of his theology
of the Word of God, it will be helpful to indicate some events in his early
life as a preacher and theologian which helped to shape his theology.
Two years after Barth had begun his pastorate in Safenwil, Switzerland
(1911-1921), he became intimately acquainted with Eduard Thurneysen, who had
"'"James Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology (Philadelphia:




come to serve a pastorate in a neighboring valley, Leutwil. They frequently
met together to discuss their sermons, theological studies, and the problems
of the church and the world at large." It was through Thurneysen that Barth
was introduced to new points of view. They were the Blumhardts (father and
son) whose emphasis upon the sovereignty of God revealed to Barth how man-
2
centered his own sermons had been. There was also the influence of Dostoev-
sky whose writing exposed the contradictions between Christianity and Western
3
culture.
The greatest influence upon Barth was his own intensive study of the
Bible. Thurneysen writes of Barth's taking seriously the task of the preacher:
He sat down before the Bible each day of the week and in his own
new way ploughed it like a farmer who goes out into his fields in
the early morning and makes furrow after furrow. . . . Karl Barth
stands before us already in this early period as a reader and
expositor of Scripture. The tablets of Holy Scripture are erected
before him and the books of the expositors from Calvin through the
biblicists and all the way to the modern critical biblical inter¬
pretation lie open in his hands. Both then and now this has been
the source from which his theology has come .... That the
springs of the Bible should flow afresh in our time is the great
concern that here is central, and indeed the sole concern.
Then on September 4, 1914, the decisive change in Barth's theology
became quite evident. On this day he had written a letter to Thurneysen
expressing his regret and amazement at the manifesto that appeared in Rade's
Die christliche Welt in which many German theologians (including some of Barth's
£T
most respected teachers) had given approval of the Kaiser's war.' This
manifesto indicated to Barth the bankruptcy in theology. Smart writes:
^Tbid., p. 58. ^Ibid., p. 60. Ibid., p. 65.
4
Revolutionary Theology in the Making, Barth-Thurneysen correspondence,
1914-1925, trans. James D. Smart~T"Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964), pp. 12-13»
cited by Smart, The Divided Man . . . ., p. 66.
^Ibid., p. 67.
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"A failure in ethics revealed to him a bankruptcy in theology. But he was
able to see it only because already for him forces had been at work shaking
the theological structure in which he had been living and laying bare ominous
cracks in its foundations.""''
Then in 1919* Barth published his commentary on Romans, which he
subsequently revised in 1921. In Barth's preface to the English translation,
he points out that his only purpose for producing the commentary was to inter¬
pret the Scripture. He writes: "I felt myself bound to the actual words of
the text, and did not in any way propose to engage myself in free theologizing.
He further points out his purpose when he says:
The purpose of this book neither was nor is to delight or to annoy
its readers by setting out a New Theology. The purpose was and
is to direct them to Holy Scripture, to the Epistle of Paul to
the Romans, In order that, whether they be delighted or annoyed,
whether they are 'accepted' or 'rejected', they may at least be^
brought face to face with the subject-matter of the Scriptures.
It is this priority of Scripture which from then on characterizes all
of Barth's writings. This means that he completely rejected liberalism at
this point in the line of Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann "because in any
thinkable continuation of this line I can only see the plain destruction of
„5
Protestant theology and the Protestant church. Thus, in his Church Dog¬
matics the first volume is entitled "The Doctrine of the Word of God." He
believes the "Word of God" in Holy Scripture is the only valid prolegomenon
to dogmatics, that there is no other approach to dogmatics apart from God's
1Ibid.
2
Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans, from the sixth edition
by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Humphrey Milford, 1932), p. vi.
3 4
Ibid., p. ix. Ibid., p. x.
^Barth, Church Dogmatics, I, 1, x.
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self-revelation.1 In his Epistle to the Romans (the preface to the English
translation), Barth writes: "Theology Is rninisterium verbl divini. It is
2
nothing more nor less."
It is this priority of Scripture that Barth believed was subordinated
to an interest in historical criticism in theological liberalism. It was
this preoccupation with historical criticism over against an exegesis of
Scripture that Barth felt was totally incompatible with the preacher's task.
He puts it this way in the preface to the second edition of Romans:
I myself know what it means year in year out to mount the steps
of the pulpit, conscious of the responsibility to understand and
to interpret, and longing to fulfil it; and yet, utterly incapable,
because at the University I had never been brought beyond that
well-known 'Awe in the presence of History' which means in the end
no more than that all hope of engaging in the dignity of under¬
standing and Interpretation has been surrendered.3
What Barth is rightly suggesting is that historical criticism must be integrated
with dogmatics. Otherwise, there can be no "Protestant theology" or "Protes-
„4 , ,
tant church. Surely this is the greatness of Barth s contribution to
theology—the Word of God in Scripture. However, this emphasis upon the Word
of God in Scripture points to what seems to me his greatest weakness—the
relationship of revelation and history.
Barth's bifurcation of God and history can be readily seen in his
commentary, The Epistle to the Romans. In this respect, Barth cites Kierke¬
gaard's influence as of paramount importance in this work, along with Dostoy-
5
esky, the Blumhardts, Overbeck, and even Plato. He writes of Kierkegaard:
Church Dogmatics, I, 1, JOk. "IThe Epistle to the Romans, p. x.
3 4
Ibid., p. 9. Church Dogmatics, I, 1, x.
"'Karl Barth, "A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard.'s Reveille,"
Canadian Journal of Theology, trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt, XI, (January,
1965), 5.
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What attracted us particularly to him, what we rejoiced in, and
what we learned, was the criticism, so unrelenting in its incisive-
ness, with which he attached so much: all the speculation which
blurred the infinite qualitative difference between God and man,
all the aesthetic forgetfulness of the absolute claims of the
Gospel and the necessity to do it Justice by personal decision;
in short, all the attempts to make the scriptural message innoc¬
uous, all the too pretentious and at the same time too cheap
christianism and churchiness of prevalent theology, from which
we ourselves were not as yet quite free.1
Barth further shows the Kierkegaardian influence, not only in his
commentary on Romans, but also its lasting influence on his thought, which
was later to take a less significant role in Barth's works after the appearance
of the commentary. Barth points this out in two separate passages:
The second edition of my Commentary on Romans is the very telling
document of my participation in what has been named "the Kierkegaard
Renaissance." There were to be for all of us, and indeed also for
me, new dawns with new questions and answers, and yet I believe
that I have remained faithful to Kierkegaard's reveille, as we
heard it then, throughout my theological life, and that I am so
today still. To go back to Hegel or even Bishop Mynster has been
out of the question ever since.2
I consider him to be a teacher into whose school every theologian
must go once. Woe to him who has missed it! So long as he does
not remain in or return to it! His teaching is, as he himself
once said, "a pinch of spice" for the food, not the food itself,
which it is the task of right theology to offer to the church
and thus to men. The Gospel is firstly the glad news of God's
Yes to man. It is secondly, the news which the congregation must
pass on to the whole world. It is thirdly the news from on high.
These are three aspects, in relation to which I had to do further
study, after my meeting Kierkegaard, in the school of other teachers.
This Kierkegaardian influence on the Epistle to the Romans can be seen
in the way that God and history are absolutely contrasted. History is under¬
stood to be the relative, the profane, the materialistic. History under the
judgment of God means the end of history, not a new beginning nor a second
epoch. It is "separated absolutely" from God.^ This means that God cannot be
"'"Ibid. 2Ibid. "^Ibid., p. 7. ^Epistle to the Romans, p. 77*
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"concreted and humanized in a particular department of history," for He would
then cease to be God."'' Thus, God cannot share in any aspect the relativities
of history. Further, this means the promises and faithfulness of God "is a
matter neither of historical nor of psychological experience, and because it
is neither a cosmic happening within the x atural order, nor even the most
supreme event of our imaginings." The only point of contact between God and
man is faith in Jesus Christ. But this means faith is a miracle. It is the
establishing of a relationship with God which takes place freely of God's
"X
grace alone. But, this salvation is not a part of history, nor of man's
spiritual experience as such. Rather, it comes solely from the mercy of God;
it is a "miracle—'vertical from above.'"' Salvation is the possibility
"where the history of the relation between God and man begins; where there
is no history to record, because it only occurs, and occurs eternally . . . .
,,5
And this occurrence IS—in Jesus Christ.
This "occurrence" is not to be understood thus as a recordable fact
of past history, for it has no structural relationship to history as such.
This is so because God cannot be domesticated within the historical process.
This is the fallacy of all religions, for they look for the evidences of God
in history or in themselves.
So all religions assume either that God will act or that He has
acted; making the assumption quite apart from a consideration of
the 'Moment' when men stand naked before God and are clothed upon
by Him. They do not consider before and after to be before and
after the 'Moment' when men are moved by God; or they suppose
either that the 'Moment' depends upon some previous behaviour or
that it carries with it some subsequent behaviour: that is to
say, they conceive of the 'Moment' as in some way comparable and
1Ibid., p. 79. 2Ibid., p. 98. ^Ibid., p. 102. ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 76.
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commensurable with human behaviour. Consequently, all religions
admit the possibility of boasting of what men are and do and have,
as though they were divine. In all religions it is therefore
possible to disregard or to escape from the paradox of faith.1
On the other hand, faith is the "occurrence" of Jesus Christ, the
"Moment" which has no past or future. It is the point of eternity inserted
vertically from above, but without any history in the past nor in the future.
Barth writes:
In Jesus everything that occurs in the world is bent under the
judgement of God and awaits His affirmation. The words apart
from cover everything both before and after the 'Moment' when
men stand before God and are moved by Hlmj for no comparison
between the 'Moment' and works which are done either before or
after it is possible.2
Therefore, it is the moment that is decisive for faith. It is "the eternal
'Moment' when before God we are unrighteous and humiliated, in order that by
Him we may be justified and exalted."^
Even the "life of Jesus" is a non-historical event. Paul says that
"Jesus is declared to be the Son of God with power" (Romans 1:4). Barth
understands this "declaration" not to mean some kind of historical assertion.
4
The years A.D. 1-30 in the life of Jesus are not historical. Barth explains
this when he says:
The effulgence, or, rather, the crater made at the percussion
point of an exploding shell, the void by which the point on the
line of intersection makes itself known in the concrete world of
history, is not—even though it be named the Life of Jesus—
that other world which touches our world in Him. In so far as
our world is touched in Jesus by the other world, it ceases to
be capable of direct observation as history, time, or thing.5
What Barth is doing is to bifurcate the Jesus of history from the
Christ of faith. He writes: "Within history, Jesus as the Christ can be
1Ibid., p. 111. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 440. 4Ibid., p. 29-
5Ibid.
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understood only as Problem or Myth. As the Christ, He brings the world of
the Father.""''
It seems that Barth was trying to do at least two things in his
Epistle to the Romans. First, he was seeking to overcome Neo-Protestantism
v/hich emphasized the immanence of God over against His transcendence. Second,
he was re-asserting the priority of Scripture. That he over-reacted against
liberalism with his bifurcation of revelation and history by affirming the
absolute transcendence of God can be partly explained on the basis of his
acceptance of the presuppositions of a historical-critical method which left
no room for redemptive events which could be scientifically reconstructed.
This is to say that rather than challenging the positivistic presuppositions
as being valid he accepted without question Troeltsch's historiographical
principle of causality which ruled out the possibility of anything absolutely
unique occurring in history. This is clearly seen when Barth writes:
There is under this heaven and this earth no existence or occurrence,
no transformation, be it never so striking, no experience, be it
never so unique, no miracle, be it never so unheard of, which is
not caught up by a relativity in which great and small are inex¬
tricably woven together. Therefore, if the Resurrection be brought
within the context of history, it must share in its obscurity and
error and essential questionableness. Against the influence which
the Resurrection has exerted upon individual souls must then be
set the far more obvious distortions and disfigurements of which
it has been the cause; against the social benefits it has conferred
must be set the far more manifest impotence of Christians and their
fraudulent behaviour; with its purest and most brilliant rays must
be compared the rays which have emanated from other and even greater
lights and powers (Overbeck!) Think of those 150,000 years of
human history and of 'the ebb and flow of great civilizations; con¬
sider the ice-ages which are past and which will presumably return,
and remember that they are caused by the tiniest movement of the
pole' (Troeltsch).2
To be sure, Barth revised his position toward history considerably in
1Ibid., p. 30. 2Ibid., p. 204.
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his Church Dogmatics. In it he calls attention to his over-reaction to a
liberalism which had placed God and man practically on the same level. He
writes:
I should like at this stage to utter an express warning against
certain passages and contexts in my commentary on Romans, where
play was made and even work occasionally done with the idea of a
revelation permanently transcending time, merely bounding time
and determining it from without. Then, in face of the prevailing
historism and psychologisra which had ceased to be aware at all of
any revelation other than an inner mundane one within common time,
the book had a definite, antiseptic task and significance.1
Revelation is thus no longer understood as permanently transcending
time. Neither is God merely the Wholly Other. Revelation is now given an
objective basis in temporal reality. "God's freedom for us men is a fact in
Jesus Christ, according to the witness of Holy Scripture. The first and the
last thing to be said about the bearer of this name is that He is very God and
p
very Man." This means the life of Jesus is no longer understood as a non-
historical occurrence. Rather, Jesus Christ, as very God and very Man, is the
objective reality of divine revelation.
Though Barth does ground the basis for revelation within history, yet
revelation is never history. The Word of God is God's act. Revelation is
attested in the Bible; it proceeds from the Father; it is objectively fulfilled
3
in the Son; and subjectively made possible by the Holy Spirit. But in a
direct way, revelation "has nothing to do with the general problem of histori¬
cal understanding."^
This means that revelation is not a part of the relative sphere of
"^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 50.
2 3
Church Dogmatics, I, 2, p. 25- Ibid., p. 1.
^Church Dogmatics, I, 1, p. 168.
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history as we know it. This is crucial to Barth's theology of the Word of
God, for he wants to guard against the idea of revelation being something
one could "have." Revelation is always a matter of God's free grace.
To say "the Word of God" is to say the work of God. It is
not to contemplate a state or fact but to watch an event, and
an event which is relevant to us, an event which is an act
of God, an act of God which rests on a free decision. That
God's Word is from eternity to eternity does not allow us to
evade it ... . But it happens, and happens as nothing else
happens.1
The Word of God is thus never subjected to the relativities of history.
It Is always dynamic, never static. Revelation is the same whether it "comes"
through (1) the revealed Word of God, (2) the written Word of God, or (3) the
2
proclaimed Word of God. These three forms of the Word of God do not mean
three different words of God. For example, there Is a distinction between
Deus dixit and Paulus dixit. Yet, when the Word of God becomes an event, they
are one and the same.^ This means that revelation i£ the Word of God. "God's
4
Word is God Himself in His revelation.'' This means that revelation is dis¬
tinct from Scripture and the Church's proclamation.^ Finally, revelation
(l) is not relative, (2) does not differ from the Person of Jesus Christ, and
6
(3) does not differ from the reconciliation that took place in Him.
It can thus be seen that Barth still defines revelation as the "Moment"
of the pure presence of God as he did in his commentary on Romans. This is
why Barth can say that revelation is not concerned with the general under-
7
standing of history as such. What Barth seems to be doing is to divorce
revelation and history. To be sure, revelation has an objective basis In
^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, p. 527- *Tbid., I, 1, 136.
3 4
Ibid., p. 127. Ibid., p. 339.
5Ibid., p. 350. 6Ibid., p. 134. 7Ibld., p. 168.
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historical reality, but revelation itself is non-relative and non-historical.
This means that the question on the knowability of the Word of God is answered
by the Word of God itself. It is totally self-authenticating."*"
Barth sees the modern discussion on the problem of revelation and
2
history to be "a portentous failure to appreciate the nature of revelation."
He delineates what he considers to be three persistent errors in this connection.
First, the question of revelation cannot be answered from the standpoint of
history, for "it may well be said it is the historical as such in its univer-
"X
sality and relativity which is the necessary 'offence' to revelation." This
"questionableness and uncertainty of history"** stands in sharp distinction
to revelation. Barth writes:
There has been a failure to see that in answering this question we
cannot start with the general phenomenon of time, or, as it is
preferably called, history. We cannot assume that we know its
normal structure on the basis of comparative observation, and
then go on to ask whether and how far the phenomenon of revelation
discloses itself, perhaps, to the said comparative observation
at a specific point. On this it is to be said that the general
phenomenon of time or history in its manifold state is certainly
not the text in perusing which we will ever come directly or
indirectly upon the phenomenon of revelation.5
Second, revelation can be "seen" only when it has been "found." This
6
means that "there are no problems in the axiomatic Deus dixit." Revelation
is self-authenticating; it does not depend on an empirical verification.
Barth writes:
There has been failure to see that the event of Jesus Christ as
God's revelation cam be found only when sought as such, i.e.,
when we are seeking what we have already found. This rule which
apparently—but really only apparently—grossly contradicts all
honest investigation of truth, is the inevitable result of the
nature of the question before us here. God's revelation in
~*"Ibid., p. 350- ^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 56. ^Ibld., p. 57•
**Ibid. 5Ibid., p. 56. 6Ibid., p. 57-
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Christ, in the way in which Holy Scripture declares that it has
taken place, is not something problematic.
Third, revelation precedes history. Revelation is always the subject
and history is the predicate. Revelation becomes history, but history never
becomes revelation. "Revelation is not a predicate of history, but history
is a predicate of revelation." This means that revelation cannot be dis¬
covered by human means. Barth writes:
There has been a failure to see that if revelation is revelation,
we cannot speak of it as though it can be discovered, dug up,
worked out as worked out as the deeper ground and content of
human history. If the sentence "God reveals Himself" has any¬
thing even remotely in common with interpretation, hypothesis,
assertion, with appraising and valuing, with an arbitrary fixing,
extracting, or excising of a definite bit of human history out
of its context, if anything like "absolutising" a reality
relative to itself is even remotely the meaning of the sentence
in question, then it will be better omitted altogether, espe¬
cially if it Is perhaps to be general, as expressing a very
profound and congenial historical intuition.3
This leads Barth to say that if one attempts to determine historically
the reality of revelation (i.e., if one seeks to locate revelation through
historical investigation), then he shows in this human endeavor that he is
in fact not obedient to revelation.
But we may not first of all speak of history in order subsequently
or by epithet to speak with force and emphasis about revelation.
When the latter happens, we betray the fact that we have gone
our own way in Interpreting, valuing, absolutising. We have not
gone the only possible way, the way of obedience.^
Barth is not denying the temporal and historical aspects of revelation, but
he is denying the human attempt to locate and find revelation, for revelation
is God Himself coming to man.
Barth further says that revelation is qualitatively different from
ordinary time and general history, for revelation creates a "third time."
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 58. ^Ibid. ^Ibid.
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This "third time" .is so named, for in God's revelation a new situation is
created in temporality. It distinguishes itself from the time before the
Fall (the first time) and the time after the Fall (the second, or fallen
time). This third time, as the time of God's revelation, is real time, but
it is distinct from general time as such. It is not subject to the relativ¬
ities of fallen time. In so far as ordinary history and general time are
concerned, God cannot be known nor expressed.1 Barth points this out in dia¬
logue with Karl Heim.
K. Heim writes . . . ^"Zeit und Ewigkeit", Glauben und Leber.,
1928, p. 560_7: "if God is the highest reality upon which all
existence rests, then this fact carries with it a negative
judgment upon the time form. For in the latter God is invisible.
The highest reality can only be expressed indirectly in the time
form by denying temporality. God cannot be objectified in time."
These statements may be approved only with the reservation that
from our standpoint God is invisible in the time form, cannot
be directly "expressed" in it by us, cannot be objectified in it
by us—but that it has pleased Him to make Himself visible in
the time form, to express, to objectify Himself and thereby to
create a "time form" not liable to a negative judgment. What
would have been the meaning of "revelation," how could it have
become an event in Jesus Christ, if He had not done so?^
While this emphasis upon a "third time" with its reality and tempo¬
rality is moving in the right direction toward establishing a positive con¬
nection between revelation and history, it does not seem to me to follow that
one can exempt revelation entirely from the relativity of history; nor does
historical-critical study seem to be irrelevant. Does not the fact that Jesus
is the God-man mean that he was immersed in the relativities of our history,
thereby redeeming fallen time? Further, if revelation became history (as
Barth clearly states), then why should not theology be constructed from the
1Ibid., pp. 45-50. 2Ibid., p. 49-
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standpoint of salvation history with Christology being the guiding-principle?"'"
Further, if revelation is non-relative and is identical with the
unmediated presence of God, does this do Justice to the Scriptures where the
Word of God is identified with the words of God which words have definite
content? (Mark IJuJl; Luke 11:28; John 6:63; John 14:23-24; Rev. 1:1-2). This
is the question that Pannenberg has addressed to the Barthian theology of the
Word of God.^
Jttrgen Moltmann says that Barth derived his definition of revelation
as "self-revelation" from Wilhelm Herrmann. For Herrmann, the "self" of the
"self-revelation" of God means man's self. Barth replaces the subjectivity
of man with the transcendental subjectivity of God.'* Herrmann had accepted
the Kantian premise that revelation cannot be objectively grounded. Thus, we
4
cannot say what God is, only what effect He has on us. Barth transforms the
"self" in Herrmann's anthropological sense to a theological form. God proves
Himself, not in the depths of human existence, nor from history; rather, God
proves Himself through Himself. Moltmann puts it this way:
Where the knowledge of God stood in Herrmann as the 'defenceless
expression of religious experience', there we now have the self-
revelation of God in the proclamation of the Deus dixit in the
same defencelessness-namely, non-groundable and therefore inde¬
structible, unprovable and therefore irrefutable, grounding and
proving itself.5
Thus, revelation, while becoming history, never is preceded by history. This
"'"Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time, trans. F. V. Filson (London:
SCM Press, Ltd., 1951)» p. 26n.
2
Revelation as History, p. 12.
^Moltmann, p. 52. (Pannenberg points out that Barth's idea of self-
revelation ultimately goes back to Hegel. Cf. Infra, p. a¥x.
4 R
Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., p. 55-
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permitted him to take history seriously without putting revelation at the
mercy of historical criticism. In this connection, he points out that in his
commentary on Romans he failed to do Justice to Romans 13:12, in which he did
not see "the teleology which it ascribes to time as it moves towards a real
end . . . The one thing that remained as the only tangible result was precisely
that one-sided supra-temporal understanding of God which I had set out to
combat."1 Moltmann shows that this "supra-temporal understanding of God"
meant that the truth of God was contained in the eternal "Moment" without a
past or future. Thus, if Earth found it necessary to revise his understanding
of eschatology, why should he not have found it necessary to revise his under-
2
standing of revelation as well? For example, Barth says that the Easter
story "does not speak eschatologically.""'5 Rather, it was the self-revelation
of God, "the pure presence of God." "The Easter story . . . actually speaks
n5
of a present without any future, of an eternal presence of God in time.
Moltmann shows that if this is so, then the event of the resurrection
of Christ would in itself be the eschatological fulfillment. It "would not
point beyond itself to something still outstanding that is to be hoped for
n6
and awaited. Moltraann points out:
If the idea of self-revelation is not to change tacitly into an
expression for the God of Parmenides, then it must have an open
eye for the statements of promise in the third article of the
Creed. Yet this must not happen in such a way that the future
redemption which is promised in the revelation of Christ would
become only a supplement, only a noetic unveiling of the re¬
cited by Moltmann, p. 57. Cf. Church Dogmatics, II, 1, 635 with a
slightly altered translation.
2Moltmann, p. 57- "^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 114.
^Ibid. ^Ibid. Referred to by Moltmann, pp. 57-58.
^Moltmann, p. 58.
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conciliation effected in Christ, but in such a way that it gives
promise of the real goal and true intention of that reconciliation,
and therefore of its future as really outstanding, not yet at¬
tained and not yet realized. Then the Word of God—Deus dixit—
would not be the naked self-proof of the eternal present, but a
promise which as such discloses and guarantees an outstanding
future.1
Finally, it seems to me that if Barth separates history and revelation
this tends to depreciate the decisive events in the life of Jesus, such as the
cross and the resurrection, with the result they lose their soteriological
and esehatological meaning. We have just pointed this out in regard to the
resurrection. But it seems to be likewise true of his cross. For example,
2
Barth equates reconciliation and revelation. Does not reconciliation speak
of man's offense and sin against God? Does not reconciliation refer to the
enmity between God and man? Paul writes: "And you, who once were estranged
and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled" (Col. 1:21-22).
But, Paul makes it quite clear in verse twenty-three that this reconciliation
is made possible because of Christ's death on the cross. In this instance,
it would seem that reconciliation is the predicate of a historical event.
This means that Christ's death on the cross effected something entirely new
for man and all of creation (Romans 8:22). This means a revelation of something
new, not something that had been hidden. Thus, if Barth contends that reve¬
lation and reconciliation are the same and if he says that revelation is not
the predicate of history, then what meaning does the historical event of
Christ's death have for Christian faith? In the final analysis, Barth himself
does not seem to have gotten beyond the Kantian premise that there can be no
verification of God in objective temporal history. This is in itself a tacit
acceptance of the bifurcation of God and history. This leads me to say that
1 2
Ibid. Supra, p. 206.
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Barth's emphasis upon the Word of God is a definite advantage over the "irra-
tionalist" trend in liberal theology which precluded the possibility of God
speaking. Barth especially cites Paul Tillich who wants to make "God speaks"
into a symbol."'' Barth writes:
Nor are we bound to envelope certain anthropological centres
with so fundamental a distrust and suspicion as has frequently
been the case in the history of theology. Here I am thinking
chiefly of the extraordinary polemic which it has been the
fashion in recent years to wage against the so-called "intellect"
of man, his powers of comprehension and thought, as a centre of
possible religious experience of the Word of God.2
Barth further argues in a cogent manner the priority of God speaking.
He puts it this way:
We might very well be of the private opinion that it would be
better and nicer if God had not spoken and did not speak with
such deliberate "intellectualism" and that it would be more
appropriate to God if "God's Word" meant all sorts of dif¬
ferent things, apart from the meaning "God speaks." But is
this private opinion of ovrs so important, resting as it does
upon some sort of philosophy?^
However, it seems to me that the Word of God must not be seen merely
as the moment of the pure presence of God. Neither does it seem necessary
to limit revelation to Jesus Christ. To be sure, He is the final revelation
4
and the only redeemer, but not the only revelation. This is why Pannenberg
writes that "history is the most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology."
This is to say that revelation is history whether it be the inspired word of
1 2
Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 150. Ibid., p. 231.
5Ibid., p. 150.
\)f. Carl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1966), p. 14.
^Pannenberg, Essays on Old Testament Interpretation, p. 31^•
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man or a revelatory historical event.1 This "revised" concept of revelation
will be discussed in Part Three.
^"Pannenberg, "Response," Theology as History, ed. James M.
Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967)» P. 259.
CHARTER VIII
BUITMANN: THE DIVORCE OF HISTORIE AND GESCHICHTE
"No single work which has appeared in the field of New Testament
scholarship during the war years has evoked such a lively discussion as
Bultmann's original manifesto, New Testament and Mythology," writes Hans
Werner Bartsch.1 In 1941, when this essay was first published, it produced
an explosion in theological circles and opened up again the historical
2
question which Barth had silenced with his theology of the Word of God.
Tillich writes: "Bultmann saved the historical question from being banished
from theology."^
We pointed out in the chapter on Barth that he had refused in his
commentary on Romans to ground revelation in history. In so doing we said
that he was over-reacting against the historicism of his background. For
Barth, God proves Himself through Himself, not through history. We also
pointed out that Barth added objectifying elements to his later theology,
though he still held to revelation as a non-historical event and thus it is
not concerned with the general understanding of history as such.
On the other hand, Bultmann took seriously the question of history in
biblical criticism and worked in that direction as it is seen in his History
of the Synoptic Tradition. This work summarizes his research in form criticism.
"'""Foreword," Kerygma and Myth, p. vii. ^Tillich, p. 242.
3 4
Ibid. Smart, p. 91•
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Through form criticism, Bultmarm sought to establish the New Testament as
the viewpoint of the primitive church rather than that of Jesus of Nazareth.
He further believes that to accept the thinking of the New Testament world
view is to call for a sacrifice of the intellect, for modern science has made
it impossible to revive an obsolete world view.1 Thus, what is called for in
2
the interpretation of the New Testament is a demythologizing. This is to be
accomplished through the use of existentialist philosophy. This is to say
that the "only solution" to the problem of New Testament interpretation is
"an existentialist interpretation."^ He sees the categories of Heidegger's
philosophy of existence to be "saying the same thing as the New Testament and
„4
saying it quite independently. This suggests the existentialist philosophers
have transposed Christian concepts into philosophical usage. He writes:
"Heidegger's existentialist analysis of the ontological structure of being
would seem to be no more than a secularized, philosophical version of the New
,,5
Testament view of human life.
While Barth did not systematically engage in historical criticism,
Bultmann did. He believes that his existentialist approach deals consistently
with the problem of historical criticism and provides a nonmiraculous inter¬
pretation of Christian faith which modern science demands. In this respect,
Tillich believes that Bultmann's importance can be seen—he forged again to
^Kerygma and Myth, p. J>. 2lb id., p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 15- ^Ibid., p. 25.
^Ibid., p. 2k. Cullmann shows Bultmann's demythologizing in exis¬
tentialist categories is not really a demythologizing, but a dehistorizing
and thus a re-mythologizing, for the NT writers have already demythologized
by historicizing "myth." ("Die Verbindung von Ur- und Endgeschehen mit der
neutestamentlichen Heilsgeschichte," Vortr&ge und Aufsitze 1925-1962
^^Ftibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 19667, p. 16571
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the surface the question of history.-*-
Barth could only see the existentialist takeover in theology as the
destruction of theology. He writes: "To the best of my ability I have cut
out in this second issue of the book /~Church Dogmatics/ everything that in
the first issue might give the slightest appearance of giving to theology a
basis, support, or even a mere justification in the way of existential phi-
2
losophy." While it seems to me that Barth rightly insists upon the priority
of the Word of God over against any other criterion, it seems that he tacitly
accepts a bifurcation of history and theology by making revelation something
else than history, thus "overcoming" the problem of history.
Like Barth, Bultmann does not want to make faith insecure by equating
revelation and history. So they both speak of revelation as an "event."
However, there is a profound difference between thern. While Barth interpreted
self-revelation to mean the transcendental subjectivity of God rather than a
hidden correspondence between God and man's self, Bultmann remains closer to
Herrmann. Moltmann puts it this way:
Whereas Barth broke away from Herrmann by separating, as we have
seen, the non-objectifiable subjectivity of God in the act of
the Deus dixit from the subjectivity of man, that is, God's 'self'
from 'man's self', Bultmann remains under the spell of the hidden
correlation of God and self. Hence for him the self-revelation
of God finds its measure and development not in a doctrine of the
Trinity, but in place of that we find the disclosing of the
authenticity or selfhood of man.3
This leads then to the basic thesis of Bultmann, that revelation is
the here and now of revelation, of encounter. This is to say that faith is
man's response to the Word of God. But, this does not mean that the Word of
^Tillich, p. 242. ^Barth, Church Dogmatics, I, 1, ix.
3 4
Moltmann, p. 61. Kerygma and Myth, p. 201.
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God, that Scripture, is a set of doctrines or objective facts. Rather, faith
is simply an encounter with God in this specific here and now.1
But, this means that faith cannot be proved in any way—"True faith
2
is not demonstrable in relation to its object." Bultmann says this is where
the strength of faith lies, as Herrmann had taught, for to try to prove God
would be placing God on the level of tangible reality and proving God apart
3from faith. Thus, revelation of God comes in the moment of faith and cannot
be understood prior to its relation to faith. This leads him to say: "To
speak of the act of God means to speak at the same time of rr?y existence.
This is reiterating what Herrmann had said, that we only know what God is in
5
relation to us, not what God is per se.
This likewise presupposes the Kantian disjunction between faith and
knowledge, noumenon and phenomenon. "Faith" for Kant relates to noumenal
reality, i.e., to the transcendent. Knowledge relates to phenomenal reality,
i.e. to reality as it merely appears. Translated into theological terms, Kant
says we can only speak of God in terms of what He is "for vis," but not as he
really is.^ This, for Kant, simply means we cannot "know" God. But on the
other hand, the transcendental idea of God is a regulative idea, especially
7
in regard to its implication for ethical behavior.
Bultmann denies that he is making the reality of God merely an
experience in man when he says that to speak of God means to speak of man's
existence. Man's encounter with God is no mere psychic phenomenon just as
1Ibid. 2Ibid. "'ibid. Void., p. 196. 5Ibld., p. 202.
^Supra, p. 71*
Cf. Heinrich Ott, Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte in der Theologie
Rudolf Bultmann3 (Tttbingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1955)* P» 6. Cf. also Moltmann,
p. 61.
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to experience the love of another is no mere psychic phenomenon.^ Thus,
Bultmann contends that the proof for God does not lie in some historical
verification, but rather, the proof for God's existence lies in man's exis¬
tential experience of God, i.e., it is only in the "moment" of faith's
decision that God is known to be at all. Bultmann writes: "Real belief in
God always grows out of the realization that being is an unknown quantity,
which cannot be learned and retained in the form of a proposition, but of
2
which one is always becoming conscious in the 'moment* of living."
This "moment" of faith's decision which brings man to a new and authen-
3
tic understanding of himself is made possible by the act of God in Christ.
However, this act of God in Christ is not an historical (historisch) act,
which happened in some datable event of the past. Rather, it is an historic
(geschichtlich) occurrence which happens, but happens now and happens only
through the proclamation of Christ as the word, but not in the proclamation
of Jesus as an historical man. Christ is the word of proclamation in contrast
to Jesus as a man whom tradition designates as the "bearer" of the word.^
Thus, the kerygmatic Christ is identical to the word of proclamation. Bult¬
mann writes: "it is clear that Christ is revelation and that revelation is
5
the word; for these two are one and the same. Further, what the word of
"^Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, pp. 199-200*
^Essays, Philosophical and Theological, trans. James C. G. Greig
(London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955)»P* 7«
3
Kerygma and Myth, p. 202.
ii
Essays, Philosophical and Theological, p. 18; Bultmann, Jesus and
the Word, pp. 14, 215-219.
^Existence and Faith, shorter writings of Rudolf Bultmann, selected,
translated, and introduced by Schubert M. Ogden (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1961), p. 87.
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proclamation reveals is not doctrines or objective propositional content.
What is revealed also is not the reality of God as such, but the reality of
my own self-understanding. Bultmann writes:
What, then, has been revealed? Nothing at all, so far as the
question concerning revelation asks for doctrines—doctrines, say,
that no man could have discovered for himself—or for mysteries
that become known once and for all as soon as they are communicated.
On the other hand, however, everything has been revealed, insofar
as man's eyes are opened concerning his own existence and he is
once again able to understand himself.1
It is this anthropocentric definition of faith (i.e., theology must
begin with what is a determination of man's being and all theological questions
must be answered accordingly) that places Bultmann fundamentally in the line
2
of nineteenth century liberalism, as Barth has pointed out. On the other
hand, his existentialist definition of faith distinguishes him from liberalism.
For the liberals, as Harnack, "the great truths of religion and ethics are
timeless and eternal, though it is only within human history that they are
realized, and only in concrete historical processes that they are given clear
expression." For Bultmann, what is important is not the way these timeless
truths are historically portrayed. He says that "history may be of academic
interest, but never of paramount importance for religion."^ Rather, what is
important for Christian faith is to see the way the understanding of human
existence comes to expression in New Testament mythology. This is to say the
5
New Testament must be interpreted existentially.
This leads to Bultmann's divorce between the "Jesus of history" and
the "Christ of faith." That this divorce is intended to be carried out
1rbid., p. 85. 2Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 39«
"5 4
Kerygma and Myth, p. ljj. Ibid., p. 13-
5Ibid., p. 16.
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theologically can be clearly seen in Bultmann's "Reply to the Theses of
J. Schniewind." Schniewind suggests that Bultmann has not done justice to
the relationship between Historie and Geschichte, for Bultmann tends to drive
a sharp wedge between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith by distin¬
guishing between the geschichtlich fact and the historisch event.1 In this
respect, Schniewind writes:
It is impossible to run away from Historie to Geschichte. We
cannot reject Historie because it is not vitally present for
us and accept Geschichte because it is. It is impossible to
escape from the relativity of past history.2
Bultmann replies that he is "not running away from Historie and taking
refuge in Geschichte." Rather, he says: "I am deliberately renouncing
^italics mine7 any form of encounter with a phenomenon of past history, in¬
cluding an encounter with the Christ after the flesh, in order to encounter
the Christ proclaimed in the kerygma, which confronts me in my historic
situation.""' He further says "that God has acted in Jesus Christ is, however,
not a fact of past history open to historical verification."^
This divorce between the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ
is adumbrated as Bultmann shows in Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutic. Dilthey
writes:
All dogmas need to be translated so as to bring out their
universal validity for all human life. They are cramped by
their connection with the situation in the past in which they
arose. Once they have been freed from this limitation they
become . . . the consciousness of the supra-sensual and supra-
intelligible nature of historicity pure and simple .... Hence
the principal Christian dogmas, which include such symbols as
"Son of God", "satisfaction", "sacrifice", and the like, are,
in so far as they are limited to the facts of the Christian
story, untenable. But once they are re-interpreted as statements
1Kerygma and Myth, pp. 37# 82-85, 117• ^Ibid., p. 83.
•'ibid., p. 117. ^Ibid., p. 207.
222
of universal validity they express the highest living form of all
history. They thus lose their rigid and exclusive reference to
the person of Jesus /italics mine/t which deliberately excludes
all other referencesT^
Bultmann thus distinguishes between a geschichtlich fact and a his-
2
torisch event. We have already pointed out the way modern philosophy since
Descartes has distinguished between intellectual and empirical truths, such
as, body-mind, truths of reason and truths of fact, noumenon and phenomenon,
etc. We pointed out that Kierkegaard radicalized this distinction of reality
in terms of faith and knowledge. We have also pointed out the way that Klhler
adumbrated later theology with his distinction between the historical Jesus
and the kerygmatic Christ, i.e., der hlstorische Jesus und der geschichtliche
Christus. Now Bultmann seems to make a decisive terminological break between
geschichtlich and historisch. Hi3torie, in Bultmann's usage, refers to the
datable past, i.e., to the actual event of past history. Geschichte refers
3
to what is significant and meaningful.
These two words as termini technici have their most immediate source
4
in Heidegger. As it has been shown, Heidegger distinguishes sharply between
Historie as the science of history and Geschichte as the essence of man. That
is, man exists as history rather than in history. The meaning of Geschichte
^Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck
von Wartehburgh, 1877-1897 (Halle; Niemeyer, 1923)# p. 158, cited by
Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, pp. 23-24.
^Kerygma and Myth, p. 37 • Cf. Worldly Theology, p. 9J Ott, The
Historical Jesus" and the Kerygmatic Christ, p. 143. Also cf. Ott, Geschichte
und Heilsgeschichte, p. 10.
^Kerygma and Myth, p. 37. Cf. Carl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics,
p. 38. Cf. Gisbert Greshake, Historie Wird Geschichte (Essen; Ludgerus-
Verlag Hubert Wingen KG., 1963)# especially pp. If., 36-42. Macquarrie, An




leads to the derived idea of history as world-historic (welt-geschichtlich),
which means that certain events are significant because they stand in a
fundamental relationship to man's existence. Because of the derived meaning
of Geschichte as welt-geschichtlich, the science of history (Historie) is
possible. Nevertheless, what is basic to Heidegger's philosophy is man defined
as history (Ceschichte). History (Geschichte) is the happening (Geschehen)
of man, i.e., history is man's existence. Thus, Heidegger not only sharply
differentiates Historie and Geschichte, but he also makes a decisive break
between existence (Existenz) and something present-at-hand (Vorhanden). It
is this existentialist definition of history that is presupposed by Bultmarm
when he sets off the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith.
Bultmann thus makes use of this distinction to show that faith is
concerned only with Geschichte (i.e., history as man's existence), not Historie
(i.e., history as the scientific study of objective facts of the datable past).
This is to say that "the Jesus of history is not kerygma .... For in the
kerygma Jesus encounters us as the Christ—that is, as the eschatological
phenomenon par excellence.""*" Thus, the divorce of the historical Jesus from
the kerygmatic Christ puts faith beyond the onslaughts of historical criticism.
Bultmann writes: "i still deny that historical research can ever encounter
2
any traces of the epiphany of God in Christ."
However, Bultmann points out that the kerygmatic tradition must not
be questioned, for this would make the eschatological event insecure and
3
would make it a part of the relativity of all historical knowledge. While
the kerygma cannot be objectively validated, this is no problem for the man
1Kerygma and Myth, p. 117. 2Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 116.
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who has come to exist esehatologically. This is to say that esehatological
existence is a possibility only in response to the Word of God, "which pro¬
claims the manifestation of the grace of God in Jesus Christ. Since he is the
Word of God, Christ is ante et extra me, not, however, as a fact open to
objective verification and chronologically datable before me, but as the
2
Christus pro me, who encounters me as the Word." This means the kerygma is
self-authenticating. This means that eschatological existence comes only with
the message of the kerygma. This can be seen when Bultmann says:
The question is not whether the nature of man can be discovered
apart; from the New Testament. As a matter of fact it has not
been discovered without the aid of the New Testament, for modern
philosophy is Indebted both to it and to Luther and to Kierke¬
gaard.^
This brings us to the question—does Bultmann preserve faith from the
results of historical research? First, it should be pointed out that Bultmann
make3 it quite clear that the historical Jesus has no continuity with the Christ
4
of faith. However, the kerygma requires two necessary events in the Jesus of
history. Bultmann writes: "His /Paul's/ kerygma requires only the 'that' of
the life of Jesus and the fact of his crucifixion." It can thus be seen that
there is no historical continuity between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of
History. However, the kerygma necessarily assumes the "that" of Jesus and
his cross. Bultmann explains that these two facts are necessary in order to
protect the kerygmatic Christ from a reduction to a mythological Christ.^ If
1Ibid., p. 208. 2Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 26.
^Bultmann, "The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical
Jesus," The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, p. 18.
5
Ibid., p. 20.
^Bultmann, "Reply," The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, trans.
H. C. Kee, ed. C. W. Kegley (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 260.
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"the cross of Christ is no mere mythical event, but a historic (geschichtllch)
fact originating in the historical (historisch) event which is the crucifixion
of Jesus"1 then it does not appear that faith can be independent of the results
of historical research, which seems to be what Bultmann implies when he says
that historical research cannot establish any "traces" of the revelation of
God in Christ. Ebeling points out that to have a Christology without the
2
historical Jesus is a mere illusion. This is to say that the Christ of faith
has a "life or death" interest in the historical Jesus. Historie and C-eschichte
cannot endure a bifurcation; otherwise, it seems to me that Christianity would
collapse if faith lost reason's knowledge of history.
Heinrich Ott has pointed out that Bultmann's historiography is still
positivistic in the sense that it seeks to overcome bare facts with existen-
3
tial meanings. In this respect, Ott succinctly describes the task of coming
to terms with Bultmann. He writes:
One must seek in connection with Bultmann (l) a concept of
reality of a historic type that overcomes the Bultmannian cleav¬
age with a synthesis embracing both 'significance' and 'corpore¬
ality,' 'history' and 'nature'; (2) a comprehensive interpretation
of understanding as the actualizing of historic being that goes
beyond the limits of Bultmann's hermeneutic; (5) a synthetic
concept of time that takes into account both the eminent signif¬
icance of the historic Now and the reality of past and future
as such; (4) the primal essence of language.^
That his historiography is governed by the presuppositions of positivism
can be seen by his acceptance of a scientific world view which sees all events
as the result of cause and effect. He writes:
1Kerygma and Myth, p. yj. ^Word and Faith, p. 292.
^The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, p. 151.
^Geschichte und Hellsgeschichte in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns,
p. 210f., cited by James Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later
Heidegger," The Later Heidegger and Theology, p. 31-
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The only way to preserve the unworldly, transcendental character
of the divine activity is to regard it not as an interference in
worldly happenings, but something accomplished in them in such
a way that the closed weft of history as it presents itself to
objective observation is left undisturbed.-1-
So long as this presupposition is allowed to remain, then it seems
2
to be impossible to speak "christianly" of faith and history. In this con¬
nection, John Macquarrie writes:
The truth is that at this point we perceive in Bultmann's thought
not the influence of existentialism but the hangover of a some¬
what old-fashioned liberal modernism. He is still obsessed with
the pseudo-scientific view of a closed universe that was popular
half a century ago, and anything which does not fit into that
tacitly assumed world-picture is. In his view, not acceptable to
the modern mind and assigned to the realm of myth.3
As a result of his positivistic presuppositions, Bultmann connects
the kerygma with the historical Jesus only in a minimal way; it is not done
so in any constitutive way. This is seen when Bultmann writes: "We must
frankly confess that the character of Jesus as a human personality cannot be
recovered, by us.Furthermore, whatever the Bible may have to say to us,
its truth-content as it relates to the possibility of a critical evaluation
is of no consequence for faith. Bultmann writes: "For what God says to us
through the Bible Is in the form of address. It can only be listened to, not
ii5
examined.
While Bultmann insists that we cannot know the personality of Jesus,
we can know something of the preaching of Jesus, for "we know enough of his
message to make for ourselves a consistent picture."^ We further know that
"'"Kerygma and Myth, p. 197. ^Moltmann, p. 180.
^John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 168.
Existence and Faith, p. 52. Ibid., p. 166.
^Jesus and the Word, p. 12.
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he appeared as a teacher of wisdom, a lawgiver, and as a prophet."*" However,
he says: "i do indeed think we can now know almost nothing concerning the
2
life and personality of Jesus" /italics mine/.
Ebeling complains that Bultmann's connection of the kerygma with the
historical Jesus is so minimal that its importance amounts to nothing more
3
than a meaningless cipher. It does seem quite clearly indicated that Bult¬
mann's bifurcation between Historle and Geschichte leads to theological
agnosticism, at least so far as one cannot have an objective knowledge of the
basis of his faith.
In this regard, the theological implication of Bultmann's divorce
between Historie and Geschichte is not altogether unlike the implication of
Hume's philosophical distinction between "matters of fact" and "relation of
ideas." For Hume, what we experience of phenomena (matters of fact) is
nothing but ideas. These ideas, though they are derived from experience, give
rise to beliefs concerning phenomena, but they explain "nothing but a peculiar
sentiment or lively conception."^ Likewise, what we know of a historical
5
phenomenon is nothing but a belief, a sentiment. In this respect, he is
contending that whatever meanings we attach to phenomena are meanings which
we experience of phenomena, but this says nothing of phenomena per se. Rather,
these meanings (ideas) are all existential; they say nothing of extra mental
reality.
^Existence and Faith, pp. 52-52» ^Jesus and the Word, p. 8.
3
Gerhard Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, trans. John Riches
(London: Collins, 1966), p. 64.
^An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1955)»pp. 195-194.
"'ibid., p. 194.
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Hume acknowledged the danger of his metaphysical agnosticism. He
puts it this way, in describing his own philosophy:
Our author insists upon several other skeptical topics; and
upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties and
employ our reason only because we cannot help it. Philosophy
would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too
strong for it.^-
Likewise, it would appear that if faith "believed" in spite of the
fact that it had no sure knowledge of an external basis in reality, then the
ensuing result would be theological Pyrrhonism. This is to say that Just as
what we perceive and what is cannot be bifurcated without leading us to
Pyrrhonism, even so a divorce between faith and history cannot be allowed
without bringing faith into suspect. Bultmann seeks to avoid this by making
the kerygma dependent solely upon the mere "that" of Jesus and the fact of his
2
Cross. Whether or not faith is strong enough to resist a thorough-going
Pyrrhonism (Hume suggests that we are by nature restrained from adopting it
in philosophy) is the crucial question, if we cannot have a more adequate
basis for faith. H. P. Van Dusen suggests that if one must divorce the Jesus
of history and the Christ of faith, the result is such a theological Pyrrhonism,
Consequently, he writes: "Both intellectual honesty and ethical integrity
would compel me not merely to renounce the Christian ministry and resign from
„3
membership in the Church, but to surrender adherence to Christian Faith.
The right-wing Bultmannians who have initiated "the new quest for the
historical Jesus" are not content with Buitmann's divorce between the historical
1Ibid.
2,,The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus," The
Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, p. 20.
^Henry P. Van Dusen, The Vindication of Liberal Theology (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 19^3)>P- 128.
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Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ. Ebeling suggests that to construct a Chris-
tology upon the mere "that" is an illusion.1 He thus has sought to establish
2
a Christology directly upon the basis of the historical Jesus. He has seen
that the divorce between the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ is
to put an end to Christology.
In somewhat of a philosophical parallel, Kant sought to go beyond
Hume's metaphysical skepticism. Kant says that when Hume denies the objective
validity of our concepts, then "in plain language, this means that there is
not and cannot be any such thing as metaphysics at all.This philosophical
parallel serves to point out that Just as metaphysics cannot survive without
a knowledge of reality which has an objective validity other than a mere isolated
mental impression, even so a Christology cannot survive without a knowledge of
the kerygmatic Christ whose objective validity is the historical Jesus and
who is not merely the kerygmatic confession of the primitive Christian com¬
munity.
Finally, Bultmann's existentialist interpretation of eschatology
which restricts meaning only to the present moment and sees no goal in the
4 .
process of history itself disallows man s existential need for hope. In this
respect, Bultmann's "eschatological existence" is an adaptation of Heidegger's
category of existentiality, i.e., the future is spoken of in terms of the
existential possibilities of Dasein without any reference to an objectively
"real" future. It has been said that an eschatology without a future goal
Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith, trans. R. G. Smith (Londons
Collins, 1961), p. 292.
2 3
Ibid., p. 289. Kant, Prolegomena, p. 6.
4
Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 155.
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is an "eschatology without hope."^ Such a view, it would appear, means that
man finds himself in an existential hopeless abyss so far as any "real" future
is concerned. Paul put it this way: "if for this life only we have hoped in
Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied" (Romans 15:19)-
^H. Grass, "Das eschatologische Problem in der Gegenwart", Dank an
P. Althaus, 1958, p. 64, cited by Oscar Cullmann, Salvation in History,
trans. Sidney G. Sowers (London: SCM Press Ltd., 19^7)» P- 179•
CHAPTER IX
EBELING: "PURE WORD" AND "MERE FACT"
Gerhard Ebeling has called into question the validity of Bultraann's
exclusive preoccupation with the kerygma as opening up a new self-under¬
standing. He points out that the kerygma is not merely concerned with man's
existence, but that also it is "a testimony to that whioh has happened."1
This is to say that if Jesus has no material relationship with the kerygma
in any intelligible way, then the kerygma is nothing more "than abstract
mythologumenon."2
Ebeling points out that kerygmatic statements such as "Jesus is risen"
and "Jesus is Christ" cannot be interpreted on the basis of their predicates,
3
but they must take into full consideration the person of Jesus. It is this
indissolvable relation of Jesus and the kerygma that Ebeling says rightly
4
calls for theology to renew its quest for the historical Jesus. The basis
for this new quest is not the discovery of new source materials, but rather
the necessity for finding a "hermeneutic key to Christology."^ But, this does
not mean that we must get behind the kerygma in order to legitimate it; rather,
it means that the historical Jesus is the criterion of the kerygma and thus
g
he is necessary for interpreting the kerygma.
Gerhard Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, p. 38.
2Ibid., p. 39- 3Ibid., pp. 51-52. 4lbid., p. 55.
5Ibid. 6Ibid., p. 57.
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Ebeling further points out that he is not interested in establishing
a basis for faith "behind" the Word. This is to say that faith comes only
in response to the Word, and not to some fact anterior to the Word. If this
were the case, then this "fact" anterior to the Word "would thus sully the
purity of faith."1
In this respect, Ebeling finds Bultmann's emphasis upon the existen¬
tial interpretation of the kerygma as moving in the right direction for over¬
coming a positivistic idea of history. This is to say that Bultmann rightly
saw the kerygma was not interesting in mere objective facts of the past. In
fact, the use of the historical-critical method has often assumed that its
2
purpose was to lay bare the facts. However, Ebeling calls for the use of
the historical-critical method to do more than merely ascertain the facts.
He wants to use it as tool for ascertaining what came to expression in Jesus.
He writes!
If one only has objective facts in mind when one talks about
getting back behind the kerygma, then one will hardly do Justice
to the questions we are dealing with here. For if one has to do
with Jesus, one has to do not with mere facts /italics mine^ but
with pure Word. If we carry out our attempts to get back behind
the primitive christian kerygma in a proper manner, then we shall
not be looking for facts which confirm the Word, but we shall be
looking beyond a word which needs interpretation for the word-
event which is presupposed within it.^
This means that the emphasis should be upon the linguisticality of
reality, not upon the concept of objective facts, i.e., reality expresses
itself in words, not in mere facts. He writes: "Hence the proper question
regarding the past is not! What happened? What were the facts? How are
they to be explained? or something of that kind, but! What came to expres
sion?"^
1Ibid., p. 39. 2Ibid., p. 58. "'ibid. \ord and Faith, p. 295.
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Thus, the significance of the historical Jesus for faith is to see
him as the word-event (i.e., faith came to expression in Jesus). Ebeling
writes: "The quest of the historical Jesus is the quest of this linguistic
event which is the ground of the event of faith.But, what is faith? Is
2
it not a relationship with God? In answer to this Ebeling would say Yes.
If then faith is entering into a relationship with God and if Jesus is the
"Son of God," does this not mean that Jesus is the "object" of faith? Ebeling
says No. Rather, Jesus is the "witness of faith." He writes:
This unity of Jesus with faith comes properly to expression
not really in what Jesus says of his own faith, but as a
witness to faith in existing for others—in a word, in the
communication of faith.3
In this way, the Easter event is the rise of faith. This is not to
say that Jesus was not the occasion of faith prior to the Easter event. Rather,
« „4
it is to say that after the Easter event faith became proclaimable. This
leads Ebeling to say: "The faith of the days after Easter knows itself to be
nothing else but the right understanding of Jesus of the days before Easter.
h5
For now Jesus appeared as what he really was, as the witness to faith. This
is to say that the appearance of Jesus and the rise of faith are the same
g
thing. This means that all who saw the "appearances" were believers, for to
see the appearance of Jesus was to experience the rise of faith.
It can thus be seen that it is Jesus who gives the kerygma its legit¬
imation. But, this is not to say that the kerygma is proved by ascertaining
the facts of Jesus' life. Rather, this means that Jesus is the hermeneutical
key (as a word-event) for Christology. This is to say that Jesus is consti-
1Ibid., p. 304. 2Ibid., p. 302. 5Ibid., p. 297-
4Ibid., p. 301. 5Ibid., p. 302. 6Ibid., p. 301.
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tutive for Christology in so far as what came to expression in his person
is the occasion of faith for others.
This means that Ebeling sees the importance of putting faith into a
proper relationship with history, that the two cannot be divorced in so far
as Bultmann does by saying that the historical Jesus has no historical conti¬
nuity with the kerygrnatic Christ."'" It can thus be seen that Ebeling is
interested in the historical Jesus because he is the key to a proper under¬
standing of the linguistic elements of the kerygma. Bultmann is interested
in the Christ of the kerygma because it is "faith in Christ" in the existen¬
tial moment of encounter which makes eschatological existence possible.
Ebeling sees Jesus as the witness of faith, as the word-event, but he is not
the object of faith. Bultmann sees Jesus as a historical person as of no
consequence for faith, except that he really existed and served as the basis
for the kerygma. Thus, "faith in Christ" is not faith in Jesus as a histor¬
ical person.
Both Bultmann and Ebeling are interested solely in the linguistic
elements of the kerygma. Ebeling writes} "Now of course we would agree
completely with Bultmann's resolution to confine speech about God's action
2
strictly within the relationship between Word and faith."
If Ebeling says that the kerygma is testimony to something that
3
happened, why must he limit that happening merely to linquistics? We pointed
out that Ebeling faults Bultmann for not making the necessary connection be¬
tween Jesus and the Christ of faith. He appreciates Bultmann's attempt to
overcome the positivistic idea of history, but he says that Bultmann has net




fully understood the historical problem.''' This seems to be a tacit suggestion
that Bultmann has over-reacted against positivism with the result that an
existential interpretation does not need the historical-critical method in
so far as faith in Christ is concerned. But, if this be true of Bultmann,
it seems evident to me that Ebeling has not gotten beyond the influence of
a
positivism himself. This is true for two reasons. First, Ebeling, like
Bultmann, has over-reacted against positivism with its search for demonstrable
facts of the past. This can be seen through Ebeling's exclusive interest in
"pure word" over against "mere facts." This is to say that Ebeling can see
the act of God only in the existential situation which is given a linguistic
expression in the kerygma. Thus, existentialism is set over against positivism
for the interpretation of the kerygma.
In the second place, it seems that Ebeling has not gotten beyond
positivism because of the way in which he permits a scientific world view to
determine what can and cannot be. For example, he speaks of the self-evident
presuppositions which must guide the historian in his investigation of the
past. He says that modern man can no longer accept the idea of a historia
sacra which is ontologically different from ordinary history. Nor can he sub-
scribe to the idea of a scriptura sacra. Ebeling writes: "The fact that for
the modern age all that is metaphysical and metahistorical has entered the
dimension of the problematical is also a thing the modern historian cannot
simply put out of his mind when reading sources which presuppose the self-
evident character of the metaphysical and metahistorical." He further writes:
4
"The modern historian Is rightly convinced that he knows certain things better.




The question arises—what is the "modern age"? Is Ebeling suggesting
that only today has it become "self-evident" that God does not act in history?
Cullmann has pointed out that the scandal of a historical divine revelation
is no "modern" dilemma, for it was a problem for antiquity as well. He writes8
But is it not immediately suspicious when the very elements in the
thinking of the Bible which is foreign to modern thought is excluded
from the definition of its essence? Should we not instead consider
whether perhaps the 'offensive' element, the skandalon, does not
constitute the essence and centre of the New Testament proclamation,
so that it simply cannot be removed from it? This is all the more
likely when we find that the assertion that salvation is a history
has not become offensive only in modern times, and has nothing to
do with a changed world view (as Bultmann thinks), but was felt to
be Just as offensive in the ancient world.-'-
This can be seen when the Greeks mocked when they heard the resurrection
kerygma on Mars Hill (Acts 17:52). Further, the disciples knew as well as we
do in the modern age that dead men do not rise from the dead. Thus, Thomas
would not believe in the risen Lord without first an empirical verification
(John 20:24-29).
Perhaps what Ebeling is rather suggesting is that the modern Christian
community as opposed to the primitive Christian community must accept the
"self-evident" assumption of pagan antiquity. In this respect, Cullmann writes:
"The metaphysics of antiquity and modern existentialist philosophy, which is
2
so different, both share a hostility to salvation history."
Thus, it seems that these "self-evident" assumptions prevent Ebeling
from dealing with the events in the life of Jesus which hold great significance
for the believer. This is to say that in order to accommodate the kerygma to
modern secular man Ebeling seems to be making the kerygma say something that
"""Salvation in History, p. 22. Cf. Karl Jaspers, "Myth and




in fact it does not seem to say; namely, that Jesus is the witness to faith.
It seems to me that one cannot gloss over the death and resurrection of Jesus
merely with an existential interpretation and do them Justice. This means
that His death and resurrection hold soteriological and eschatological signif¬
icance for the believer in an existential and historical sense because Jesus
in fact enacted in history the ground of salvation and hope. Can this histor¬
ical sense be compromised? This is to suggest that if we insist on absolut¬
izing a world view which legislates what can and cannot be then any interpre¬
tation of Scripture could only appear to be a forced one in regard to the
person of Jesus. For example, Paul writes:
Now if Christ is preached as raised from the dead, how can some
of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if
there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been
raised; if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is
in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be
misrepresenting God, because we testified of God that he raised
Christ .... For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has
not been raised. If Christ has not been raised, your faith is
futile and you are still in your sins (I Cor. 15:12-17).
Now it can hardly be doubted within this context that the kerygma
(at least the Pauline kerygma) took the resurrection of Jesus as a historical
reality. Now if it is not a historical fact as Ebeling contends, how can he
maintain its significance for Christian faith by means of an existential
interpretation1 without producing a forced interpretation? Pannenberg puts
it this way:
Jesus' claim to authority by itself cannot be made the basis of
a Christology, as though this only involved the "decision" in
relation to him. Such Christology—and the preaching based
upon it—would remain an empty assertion. Rather, everything
depends upon the connection between Jesus' claim and its con¬
firmation by God.2
2
and Proclamation, p. 56. Jesus—God and Man, p. 66.
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It would also appear that Ebeling's interpretation of Jesus as the
word-event, i.e., what came to expression in Jesus was faith, can hardly be
justified on the basis of exegesis.
David F. Strauss pointed this out long ago in his criticism of the
Christology of rationalism. The rationalistic theologians saw Christ as the
greatest man who ever lived and endowed by God with such natural capacities
that he became the perfect moral example of mankind. His death serves as a
motivation for the reformation of the sinner, for in it is revealed the for¬
giving love of God. Strauss argues that this Christ is not the Christ of the
Scriptures. Since the Christ of rationalism is not a Christ who is the object
of worship, but the one who is the example of pure obedience to God, this
means that he is not the Christ whom the church proclaims as its Lord."'"
Bultmann has also criticized the idea that the historical Jesus is
the witness of faith. He especially cites Ebeling in this criticism when he
says the kerygma does not speak of Jesus' own faith. Bultmann writes: "in
Heb. 12:2, Jesus is described as the 'pioneer and perfecter of our faith.'
But this is not a description of Jesus as a believer, as Ebeling would
2 -x
suppose, for he does not appear in the 'cloud of witnesses' in Heb. 11.
This brings me to say that the linguistic elements of the kerygma
must not be set over against empirical events if faith is to remain Christian.
In this respect, Ebeling has not moved beyond an existentialist bifurcation
between Historie and Geschichte.
While Ebeling has sought to integrate faith and history through his
"'David Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, p. 768-
^Word and Faith, p. 304.
■^Bultmann, The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, p. 34.
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interpretation of Jesus as the word-event (thus, he believed he could avoid
the charge of Docetisrn)1, it would seem this is accomplished through a radical
transformation of what the kerygma means by "faith in Christ," as Bultmann
2
has pointed out. On the other hand, Bultmann has retained the "myth," "faith
in Christ," as the essence of Christian faith, but he does so in view of the
danger of Docetism because faith in Christ is divorced from Jesus.
This brings me to say an exclusive existentialist theology does not
secure Christian faith from the charges of illusion and sacrifledum intellectus,
for it is difficult to see how linguistics and history can be bifurcated with¬
out bringing into suspect the character of Christian faith.
^Theology and Proclamation, p. 35-
2
Paul Tillich has charged that Bultmann does not understand the
meaning of myth. Tillich says that all religious language is mythological,
even "faith in Christ." Tillich says that Bultmann should more properly
call his methodology deliteralization, not demythologizing, (Perspectives
on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 228). Cf. Supra, p. 2l6n.
PART THREE
RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY
Up to this point, we have delineated dualisms in philosophical and
religious epistemology. It has been pointed out that the function of these
dualisms in religious epistemology was to protect theology from the onslaughts
of historical criticism which exposed faith to the incertitude of historical
knowledge. That is, faith claims to have a historical point of departure
which serves as the absolute center of all mankind. However, the modern
historical consciousness of man is offended by such a claim since all events
are supposed to be governed by a cause-effect relationship and since all his¬
torical knowledge is characterized by varying degrees of probability. Conse¬
quently, it has been assumed by much of modern theology that faith must free
itself from any alliance with scientific objectivity. It thus sought to make
the kerygma independent of Historie. It is this divorce between faith and
history that has been critically evaluated in Part Two. An attempt now shall
be made to offer a constructive proposal for integrating faith and history in
terms of a theology of universal history. First, the idea of history as it
relates to the self-revelation of God will be discussed. In this way, it is
to be argued that revelation is not to be defined in terms of Geschichte as
opposed to Historie. Nor is revelation to be defined as a "word event" as
opposed to a propositional statement. Rather, revelation will be defined in
terms of what has been called history as the indirect self-revelation of God.
Second, the nature of historical reality itself will be considered.
An attempt will thus be made to provide an ontological basis for historical
240
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and theological knowledge. Third, the relationship of hermeneutics and
history will be pointed out. In this way, it is to be argued that the his¬
torical and hermeneutical aspects of revelation are inseparably connected.
Finally, the Pannenbergian idea of universal history will be considered as a
possible option for integrating faith and history, thus bridging the gap
between such comparable dualisms as Geschichte and Historie, "mere fact" and
"pure word," Paulus dixit and Deus dixit, faith and knowledge.
CHAPTER X
HISTORY AS THE SELF -REVELATION OF GOD
The concept of revelation today has become so all-inclusive in its
meaning that it tends to become a synonymous term for theology. This can be
seen above all in Barth's Church Dogmatics in which redemption, reconciliation,
resurrection, etc., are all categorized under the one concept of revelation.
It is in this connection that Paul Althaus has spoken of the inflation of the
idea of revelation."1"
The concept of revelation in modern times as "self-revelation" (i.e.,
what is revealed is God Himself) finds its most immediate source in German
idealism, especially in the Hegelian monistic metaphysical concept of the
Spirit which reveals itself to itself through the human consciousness(i.e.,
the Spirit, or Idea, comes to the full awareness of its essence through the
2
human spirit). In his Science of Logic, Hegel calls this fully-developed
3
consciousness of the Idea, the Absolute Idea, or the Notion. This connection
"'"P. Althaus, "Die Inflation des Begriffs der Offenbarung in der
gegenw&rtigen Theologie," Zeitschrift fttr Systematische Theologie, 18 (1941),
134-135.
2
Cf. Wolfart Pannenberg, "introduction," Revelation as History, ed.
W. Pannenberg, trans. David Granskou and Edward Quinn (London: Sheed and
Ward, 1969)* PP. 4-5. Jesus—God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane
A. Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), p. 127. Pannenberg's
frequent reference to Hegel creates the strong impression that he interprets
Hegel to be a biblical theist. At any rate, Panneriberg has not made himself
clear at this point insofar as I have been able to determine. In thus appro¬
priating any aspect of Hegel's thought, it seems to me that one should clearly
keep in mind the distinction between biblical monotheism and Hegel's meta¬
physical monism.
^Supra, p . •
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between Hegel's concept of the Notion and the neo-orthodox view of revelation
can be seen in Barth's qualified appreciation for the Hegelian Philipp
Marheineke's concept of self-revelation. Marheineke writes:
In the human spirit God is manifest to Himself not through it but
through Himself, and in that way is manifest to the human spirit
also. The latter, as reason, is annulled in Him. The hardest
thing science requires in all its devotees is that pure Substance
itself should show itself as subject, man with his spirit to be
subject to the divine spirit and be patient under it. His true
knowledge of the absolute is itself an absolute knowledge.1
In thus defining revelation as self-revelation, it can be understood
why Barth has restricted the use of this word exclusively to the person of
Jesus Christ. If revelation means "self-revelation," i.e., what God reveals
is nothing else than Himself, then Barth properly draws the logical deduction
that only in one event can God be revealed, namely, in the Christ event. If
God should be revealed elsewhere, then it would be obvious that God had not
really revealed Himself in Jesus. The idea of several revelations would show
a logical inconsistency. Thus, Barth concludes that revelation as the self-
revelation of God occurred objectively only in Jesus Christ. When one thus
speaks of revelations, he is not employing the use of this word in Barth's
3
strict sense.
For Barth, the subject of revelation and the object of revelation
are one essence, i.e., subject and object are identical. Barth has thus
emphasized the unity of God with Jesus, for if God is revealed in Jesus, then
Jesus must be God. Barth asks: "But who can reveal God but God Himself?"
^Grundlehren der Dogmatik als Wissenschaft, 1827# Paragraph 113,
cited by Barth, Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 280. Cf.Pannenberg, Revelation as
History, p. 5.
*T3arth, Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 489.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 6.
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Thus, he argues that if Jesus reveals God, then "he must himself be God."1
In this way, Barth says that the revealer, the means of revelation, and what
is revealed are the same. He writes:
God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He
reveals Himself. If we wish really to regard the revelation
from the side of its subject, God, then above all we must
understand that this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical
with His act in revelation, identical also with Its effect.^
Here it can be seen that Barth's Idea of self-revelation is somewhat
of a theological parallel to Hegel's metaphysical concept of the Notion, i.e.,
the full-developed awareness of the Idea in the human consciousness. Revelation
for Barth is known only through the Holy Spirit and cannot be comprehended on
the basis of man's intellectual achievement. Insofar as God unveils Himself
through the human spirit. He is "His own double in His Revelation."^
Pannenberg, however, has pointed out that if Barth speaks of a veiling
of revelation so that the form of revelation is both a manifestation and a
4
veiling, then the unity of form and essence is endangered because this
implies that they are as many manifestations as veiled forms. But if revelation
means self-revelation, then the form is itself the revelation. Pannehberg
writes: "Only If the form of revelation reveals God and—rightly understood—
does not veil him, only then is Barth's thesis of the unity of revelation
tenable."^
The significant factor to be considered in any definition of revelation
is whether or not it can be exegetically supported from Scripture. To be sure,
there is no systematic use of the word, "revelation," in the Bible. Neither
"^Barth, Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 465.
2Ibid., p. 540. ^Ibid., p. 565- 4Cf. Ibid., PP. l89ff, 369.
^Revelation as History, p. 8.
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is there any "concept" of revelation in the Bible,"'" just as there is no concept
of history, ethics, ecclesiology, eschatology, etc. Rather, the Scriptures
talk history and revelation, but do not talk about them, e.g., John's gospel
says "the Word became flesh" (which is talking history), but he does not
theoretically reflect on this event in the sense of a philosophical abstraction
(which would be to talk about history). However, when a concept of revelation
is used for purposes of systematic theology, it must appeal to Scripture for
its support. This is to say, if revelation as self-revelation is to be
theologically valid, then it must be shown exegetically to be in accord with
the "given" of the biblical witness. This is not intended to be an arbitrary
Judgment, but rather is an acknowledgement that the Scriptures are the only
records we have which "report" those events that specifically concern the
Christian believer.
In what follows the thesis to be defended is that revelation only
indirectly reveals who God is in His essence. In contrast to Barth's state-
2
ment that "God's Word is God Himself in His Revelation," it will be argued
here that revelation is the communication of content which is to be differ¬
entiated from God's essential presence. For example, in the Bible, the phrase,
"the Word of God," is equated with the apostolic kerygma, thus indicating that
revelation as the Word of God is linked to tradition (I Thess. 2:13? I Peter
1:25; Romans 10:8). Also, the appearances of Jahweh in the earliest Israelite
traditions are not the unveiling of the essence of God, but the imparting of
certain information and thus may be called manifestations of God, but not
\?f. John Mclntyre, The Christian Doctrine of History (Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd, 1957), p. 2. F. Gerald Downing, Has Christianity a
Revelation? (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1964), pp. 238-239-
^Church Dogmatics, I, 1, 339.
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self-revelation. For example, in Exodus 3» God appears to Moses to inform
him that he is to lead His people out of Egyptian bondage, and thus only
indirectly reveals Himself to Moses.
To be sure, Barth emphasizes the verbal character of the Word of God.
However, since "God's Word is God's Son," it is impossible to control and
systematize the Word of God in the sense in which high orthodoxy sought to do,
for it viewed the Holy Scriptures as "a fixed total of revealed propositions
1
to be systematised like the sections of a corpus of laws. On the other
hand, Barth states that God makes Himself known "in propositions by means of
language, and human language at that, to the effect that from time to time
such and such a word, spoken by the prophets and apostles and proclaimed in
the Church, becomes His Word." Barth thus differentiates between the form
and the content. The content is the Word of God, i.e., God Himself. The
form is the language of the Bible. The form becomes the content in an in-
3
direct identity when God so chooses to unveil Himself through the form.
Thus, Paulus dixit and Deus dixit are indirectly united in the moment of
revelation. The fact that the words of the Bible and the Word of God form
an indirect (and not a direct) identity is to point out that the identity is
an assumed identity, which is brought about by the choice of God and thus is
4
not an intrinsic identity.
Barth, in this respect, likewise points out that "in the Acts and
Epistles the preaching of the apostles is often regarded as equivalent to
the Word of God itself."^ For example, Barth shows this to be true of Paul,
who writes: "Christ is speaking in me" (II Cor. Ij5:3)» However, Barth does
1Ibid., p. 136. 2lbid. "^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 499.
^Ibid. 5Ibid., p. 491.
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not allow the Word of God to be historical, except in the objective reality
of Jesus Christ, because revelation always means self-revelation, i.e., the
revealer and what is revealed are identical. Thus, the propositional truth
of Holy Scripture is not revelation, but only attests revelation and becomes
revelation when God in His freedom so chooses it to be revelation. If one
should equate the words of the Bible as being inherently the Word of God (as
the post-Reformation Orthodoxy did), then this would be to reduce the Living
God to a dead book."''
If the biblical propositions contained in language are the words of
man which though can become the Word of God through God's initiative, is there
any necessity for ascertaining their authenticity and historical reliability?
Further, if Jesus Christ is the objective reality of revelation, does this
not necessitate the use of the historical-critical method for ascertaining
who he really was? Barth's answer is a decisive NO. Rather, God reveals
Himself whenever He so chooses and in no way is it a determination of man's
initiative. One might ask, why put such heavy emphasis upon the Bible as a
necessary medium through which God reveals Himself? Could He not reveal
Himself thorough some other form than the Scriptures? Barth makes it unmis¬
takably clear that Scripture is linked to the Word of God: "Preaching and
the sacrament of the Church do indeed need the basis and authority and authen-
o
ticity of the original Word of God in Scripture to be the Word of God." The
theological uniqueness of Holy Scripture rests in the fact that the prophets
and the apostles were witnesses of the one revelation which took place in
Jesus Christ, who is the objective fact of revelation, i.e., He is very God
and very Man."^ The prophets witnessed to Jesus Christ in "expectation,"
1Ibid., p. 522. 2Ibid., p. 501. ^Ibid., p. 490.
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while the apostles witnessed in "recollection."''"
Because of their unique position in relation to Jesus Christ, their
witness is essential. Thus, Scripture in its witness to the original reve¬
lation in Jesus Christ is the Word of God when God so chooses it to become
His Word. Barth illustrates this unity of form (Scripture) and content
2(revelation) in connection with the Incarnation of Jesus as both God and man.
Even as in the Incarnation, God in His free act chose to reveal Himself in
Jesus Christ, even so God chooses to reveal Himself in Holy Scripture. In
revealing Himself in Jesus, Jesus himself was identical with God. This unity
of Jesus with God is an assumed identity, i.e., the man Jesus was not inher¬
ently God, but God willed and created this unity, thus effecting an indirect
identity. Likewise, the Holy Scriptures become the revelation of God when
God so creates and wills the indirect identity between the Scriptures and God.
To be sure, there are inherent differences between the incarnate Word and the
Word of God in Holy Scripture. That Jesus became the Word of God in his
humanity needs no repetition or confirmation, for he is the eternal presence
of God.
On the other hand, the Scriptures as the witness to the revelation of
God in Jesus are signs through which Jesus is revealed to man on earth. Thus,
these signs must ever and again become the Word of God to us. This means that
the Church stands in constant need of the ministry of the Holy Spirit to effect
■5
the Word of God through the Bible.
Barth further draws the distinction between a "verbal inspiration"
and "verbal inspireclness." By the former he suggests that God verbally spoke
through the prophets and apostles by means of the inspiration of the Holy
1Ibid., PP. 487ff. 2Ibid., pp. 499ff. ^Ibid., p. 513.
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Spirit. By verbal inspiredness, Barth suggests that this is the attempt to
freeze the Word of God in the Words of the Bible, thus bringing God under
the control of man by reducing Him to the level of a mere book.'*" To be sure,
the words of the Bible contain propositions, but these propositions are not
revelation, though they can become revelation when God so chooses. Because of
this dialectical relationship between the Word of God and Holy Scripture,
2
Barth frequently refers to the Scriptures as the Word of God.
However, if one should merely equate the words of the Bible with the
Word of God, i.e., if the words of the Bible in themselves are defined as
revelation, then this is to speak of verbal inspiredness. Barth does not see
the Reformers saying anything materially different from what he says in this
regard: "For them /"especially Calvin_7 the literally Inspired Bible was not
at all a revealed book of oracles, but a witness to revelation, to be interpre¬
ted from the standpoint of and with a view to its theme, and in conformity
with that theme.""' The shift from the perspective of "inspiration" to
4
inspiredness occurred in high orthodoxy about 1700. Barth writes:
This new understanding of biblical inspiration meant simply that
the statement that the Bible is the Word of God was now trans¬
formed . . . from a statement about the free grace of God into
a statement about the nature of the Bible as exposed to human
inquiry brought under human control. The Bible as the Word of
God surreptitiously became a part of natural knowledge of God,
i.e., of that knowledge of God which man can have without the
free grace of God, by his own power, and with direct insight
and assurance.5
The result of the freezing up of the Word of God into the words of the Bible
in effect reduced saving faith to fides hlstorica. Barth writes:
The Bible was row grounded upon itself apart from the mystery
1Ibid., p. 518. 2Ibid., pp. 473-537. ''ibid., p. 521.
4lbid., p. 522. 5Ibid., pp. 522-523-
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of Christ and the Holy Ghost. It became a "paper Pope," and
unlike the living Pope in Rome it was wholly given up into
the hands of its interpreters. It was no longer a free and
spiritual force, but an instrument of human power.^
This reduction of the Word, of God to the words of the Bible was followed
by the Enlightenment, which treated the Bible solely as a historical book,
2
thus following high orthodoxy.
Barth points out the aim of the post-Reformation interpretation of
Holy Scripture in affirming its inerrancy and infallibility even to the
minutest details was an attempt to set forth the Bible as "a codex of axioms
which can be seen as such with the same formal dignity as those of philosophy
and mathematics."*^
However, if high orthodoxy attempted to guarantee the Bible to be the
Word of God by means of its rigid doctrine of "inspiredness," Barth on the
other hand completely eliminates the necessity of any natural proof of the
Word of God in Holy Scripture. To be sure, Barth has only one intention—
to let the Bible speak on its own terms. Only in this way can the Word of
God be found in Holy Scripture. But in no sense can man "find" the Word of
God in Scripture.
This rejection of any natural proof for revelation necessarily follows
from Barth's concept of self-revelation. If revelation is the direct self-
disclosure of God, then obviously it is in no way dependent upon man. Reve-
5
lation is totally a matter of faith. It is a miracle. It cannot be proved,
g
only believed. For this reason, Barth is willing to concede that the Bible
as the words of man is fallible, errant, and even contradictory. He says
1Ibid., p. 525. 2Ibid., p. 525- ^Ibid., p. 525.
^Supra, p. 199. 5Ibid., p. 502 . 6Ibid., p. 484.
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the Bible can also be read historically for it is "human speech uttered by
specific men at specific times in a specific situation, in a specific language
and with a specific intention.1,1
However, for Barth historical investigation into the Bible in no way
can damage the concept of God's self-revelation through the Bible. Revelation
in no way is dependent upon the results of historical research. Bultmann
has raised against Barth the question concerning what his "principle of
selection" is insofar as he seeks to interpret the Bible for modern man.
Bultmann asks:
The purpose of my existential interpretation of myth is precisely
to inquire into the possibility of a valid meaning for the
mythical picture of the world, and in this I am trying to proceed
methodically, while in the case of Barth I can perceive only
arbitrary assertions. What, then, is his principle of selection?^
Bultmann's question misses the mark altogether insofar as Barth's
doctrine of Holy Scripture is concerned. Barth makes it quite clear that the
proof of Holy Scripture lies in God's self-authentication of it. That the
Canon is Holy Scripture is the result of the Church confirming and establishing
that which was already formed and given. The Church did not arbitrarily com¬
pose the Canon, but the Canon was formed because it imposed itself upon the
3
Church. Likewise today, Scripture as the Word of God needs no external
authority for its support. This means the believer is "absolved from differ¬
entiating the Word of God in the Bible from other contents, infallible portions
and expressions from the erroneous ones, the infallible from the fallible, and
from imagining that by means of such discoveries we can create for ourselves
1Ibid., p. 464.
^Essays: Philosophical and Theological, p. 261.
•^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 475*
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encounters with the genuine Word of God in the Bible."1 This clearly means
that the believer is not concerned with any "principle of selection." The
question of the Bible as the Word of God is not a historical but a theological
question. This is to say, it is exclusively a question whether or not God
so chooses to reveal Himself through the biblical "form."
However, if Barth asserts that revelation became historical in Jesus
Christ and if the apostles are given a unique position in the Church because
2
they were "eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses" of God's revelation in time,
then must it not follow that man's faith can stand the test of critical
rationality and historical examination? This is to say, if in fact this
revelation did occur in time and space and was witnessed by certain men, must
not the biblical texts then be treated as historical "sources" as well as
kerygma? Paul Althaus shows that while in K&hler's time it was necessary
"to emphasize the fact that the gospels are not primarily sources, but testi¬
monies of faith, today the emphasis must be placed elsewhere? the gospels
are also narratives and sources." Althaus thus points out that the historical
question of the gospel is not only "theologically legitimate," but "by the
character of the gospels, the New Testament itself invites us to such
1Ibid., p. 531* Herein lies the significance of Tillich's statement
that Bultmann saved the question of history for theology (Supra, pp. 2l6f.).
Over against Barth who rejects the significance of historical-critical studies
for faith, Bultmann has rightly re-instated the problem of historical under¬
standing for faith. Whatever opinion one may take concerning Bultmann's
existentialist exegesis, it must be admitted that he has shown that one must
at least come to terms with the problem of historical understanding. Cf.





To be sure, Barth's emphasis upon the priority of faith over critical
rationality is well taken, i.e., faith is a way of knowing as well as trust.
But what faith believes should not have to be sheltered from critical inves¬
tigation. Paul in defending the resurrection kerygma before King Agrippa
appeals to the possibility of its public investigation. Paul says: "This
was not done in a corner" (Acts 26:26). Paul further makes it clear that the
Word of God does not consist of gnostic secrets, but is open to all who can
see, and if the gospel is veiled, it is because "the god of this world has
blinded the minds of the unbelievers" (II Cor. 4:2-4).
Without intending to surrender the freedom of God or to make faith
the work of man, it will be argued that Jesus Christ is not the only objective
reality of revelation, nor is revelation a direct self-revelation of God. To
be sure, this presupposes a revised concept of self-revelation. It has already
been suggested that the thesis to be defended in this chapter is the concept
of an indirect self-revelation of God. In order to pursue this thesis, it
has been necessary to follow Barth's proposal of a direct self-revelation of
God, for it is he who has so cogently defined what is meant by self-revelation.
This proposal for an indirect self-revelation of God in history is
consciously dependent upon certain presuppositions of Wolfhart Pannenberg,
for it is he who has purposively sought to restore a proper balance between
reason and faith, revelation and history, in contemporary theology.
"'"Paul Althaus, The So-called Kerygma and the Historical Jesus, trans.
David Cairns (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959)» P* 25. The necessary
change of emphasis today from "kerygma" to the "historical" is illustrated
in Althaus' title. The So-called Kerygma and the Historical Jesus, in contrast
to K&hler's The So-called Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ.
254
Crucial to this revised concept of revelation is thus the terminolog¬
ical distinction between direct and indirect self-revelation. Pannenberg
clarifies this distinction in connection with the difference between direct
and indirect communication. Direct communication means an exact identity
between the content to be communicated and what is actually communicated."''
Thus, in Barth's terminology, there is no difference between the Word of God
and God Himself, for what is revealed is the revealer—thus a direct self-
revelation of God. An indirect communication means that what is communicated
is not identical with what was intended to be communicated. Pannenberg
writes:
Direct communication transmits content without a break from the
sender to the receiver. In indirect communication, the path is
broken: the content first reveals its actual meaning by being
considered from another perspective. Indirect communication is
on a higher level: it always has direct communication as its
basis, but takes this into a new perspective.2
It is insignificant whether or not such an indirect or direct com¬
munication is received immediately or mediated by a messenger. For example,
the various Protestant Orthodox theories of inspiration presupposed direct
communication which was immediately given to the prophets and apostles, but
this direct communication was passed on to us as a mediated revelation. This
is to say, the direct communication which immediately was given to the prophets
and apostles through inspiration is revelation for us today because of their
words as the Word of God. Such a view of direct communication, however, was
formulated before revelation came to be re-defined as self-revelation. Pan¬
nenberg does not at all associate his view of revelation with any of the
theories of inspiration. Rather, revelation for him is comparable to indirect
"'"Revelation as History, p. 14. ^Ibid., p. 14.
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communication rather than a supernaturally-inspired direct communication.
At any rate, for the purposes of clarifying the difference between direct
and indirect communication, Pannenberg shows that a direct communication can
be received directly, i.e., without a third party being involved. Or, it can
be received indirectly by means of a third-party messenger. The same can be
said of an indirect communication. What is significant, however, is not the
act of communicating, but the content that is actually received in the act
of communicating. Does this content reflect directly or only indirectly what
was intended in the communication?
Thus, direct communication would have God himself—without
mediation—as its content, analogous to divine epiphanies in
the sense of a complete self-revelation, and communication of
the divine name would be a direct revelation if it involved a
direct disclosure of the being of God himself.^
Likewise, the Law would be a direct self-revelation if its content was
identical with the will of God, for the will of God (in a comprehensive
2
sense) is the essence of God. The Word of God would be a direct self-
revelation if its content was identical with God, either in Barth's sense of
God's self-presentation through the medium of the Bible or in high orthodoxy's
rigid doctrine of "inspiredness" in which the written Word was substituted
3
for Christ, the Living Word. However, Pannenberg contends both in regard
to the giving of the Law and in regard to the dogmatic concept of the Word
of God that what is involved is an indirect (and not a direct) self-revelation.
Likewise, the giving of Jahweh's name to Moses is not intended in the first
4
place to be a self-disclosure of God.
On the other hand, "indirect communication is distinguished by not
1Ibid., p. 15. 2Ibid. ^Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 522-5235.
4
Revelation as History, pp. 9-10.
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having God as the content in any direct manner."" Though God is the origi¬
nator of the revelatory events and thus intends to disclose Himself, never¬
theless, his essence is only known indirectly, i.e., by reflecting on the
event which he originated.
One of the many christological models critically analyzed in Professor
2
John Mclntyre's book, The Shape of Christology, is the "revelation model."
What he proposes as an adequate concept of revelation closely corresponds to
what Pannenberg means by an indirect self-revelation. Professor Mclntyre
points out that the paradigm of revelation in the Old Testament is triadic,
i.e., the revealer (represented by A), what is revealed (represented by B),
and the recipient of the revelation (represented by C) constitute the three-
term relation of the revelation model. The three terms in the concept of
revelation are thus related in this way: A reveals B to C. For example, in
the exodus event, the drying up of the Red Sea is the revealer. A; what is
3
revealed is God, B; and the recipient of the revelation, C, is Moses.
The three terms of this basic revelation model (A reveals B to C)
are further qualified. A is qualified by x, so that A (i.e., any empirical
event, object, or situation) which reveals God, B, is not revelatory in itself,
but requires a supernatural frame of reference, x. Thus, A(x) represents an
occurrence in the space-time spectrum which possesses at the same time an
ontological difference from everything else that naturally occurs, i.e., this
4
occurrence is a supernatural event; otherwise, it would not be revelatory.
1Ibid., p. 15.
0
John Mclntyre, The Shape of Christology (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1966), pp. 145-171-
^Ibid., p. 146. 4lbid., pp. l4?f.
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B is qualified by y, so that B (God who is revealed) is not the
pure essence of God, but is some aspect of his essence, y. Thus, A(x) reveals
B(y). For example, the drying up of the Red Sea as an act of God, A(x), re¬
veals God's saving activity, B(y), but not God's pure essence, B(E). The
second term of this model, B(y), is precisely what is meant by an indirect
self-revelation. What is revealed is not God's essence, but some aspect of
X
his being which indirectly reveals his essence.
The third term, C, is qualified by the Holy Spirit. The recipient,
C, is not a passive agent in the revelation event. He is active either in
rejecting or accepting the revelation. However, the recipient cannot truly
understand the revelation event apart from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.
2
Thus, A(x) reveals B(y) to C(Holy Spirit). Pannenberg would dispute the
validity of this third term, C(Holy Spirit). Instead, his third term would
be C(Historical Reason), i.e., what is revealed is open to anyone who prop¬
erly exercises his powers of reason. This is to say, the Holy Spirit is
not needed in order to ascertain the proper interpretation of revelatory
events. Rather, events speak their own language, "the language of facts."
This hard objective emphasis upon the self-clarity of historical events, which
can hardly be maintained except purely as a polemical device, will be the
4
subject of a critique below.
In the New Testament, Professor Mclntyre shows that the Old Testament
model, A(x) reveals B(y) to C(Holy Spirit) undergoes a further modification.
A represents Jesus of Nazareth as he appeared to his contemporaries as any
other man would have. The x represents the transcendent reality of A, which
1Ibid., p. 149. 2Ibid., pp. 149-150.
3 4
Revelation as History, p. 157• Infra, pp. yjiff.
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means that A can only be properly seen from the perspective of faith. B(y)
is altered to become B(A), for what is revealed is not some aspect of God's
essence, but his essence itself. Thus, B(A) refers to "God in Jesus Christ."
The second form of the revelation model is thus: A(x) reveals B(A) to
C(Holy Spirit).
Since A(x) is not just any event, but God as he is in Christ, then
A(x) becomes B(A). And since what B(A) reveals is not some attribute of God's
being, but God's being per se—which is given the term, B(E)—then the second
form of the revelation model is altered to a third forms B(A) reveals B(E)
to C(Holy Spirit). That is, the God-man reveals God as he is essentially in
himself to believers through the illumination of the Holy Spirit.1
According to the third form of the revelation model, B(A) reveals
B(E) to C(Holy Spirit), the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is absolutely
unique. That is, while there may be many instances of the Old Testament
revelation model, A(x) reveals B(y) to C(Holy Spirit), there can logically
be only one instance of the New Testament model, B(A) reveals B(E) to
C(Holy Spirit).2
But even in this third form of the revelation model, it is not a
matter of a complete direct self-revelation, though Professor Mclntyre does
not speak in these terms of a direct self-revelation. However, as he points
out, what we do have in Jesus Christ is a revelation of God's self regardless
how incomplete it may now be. He writes:
On the one hand, we want to do justice to the claim made by
theologians who use this model that in Jesus God reveals not
Just one of his attributes, or some aspect of his nature or
~4?he Shape of Christology, pp. 150-152.
2Ibid., p. 152.
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even his whole purpose for mankind, but his very self;....
At the same time, on the other hand, it is obvious that in
Jesus the naked glory of God's majesty is not beheld, and that
we have to do, in the first instance, with the Word made flesh,
God in Christ Jesus, God as a man among men.
P. Gerald Downing has given an extensive critical analysis of the
biblical terms for revelation in which he concludes that the word "revelation"
2
very often refers to the future appearance of Jesus Christ. Likewise, Profes¬
sor Mclntyre has indicated that only in the end-time will God's self-revelation
be complete. Professor Mclntyre further speaks of the incarnation as "the
„ 4
anticipation of the end, i.e., the eschaton. This suggests that what is
given in the Christ event as God's self-revelation is the pre-actualization
1Ibid., pp. 150-151.
^Downing has sought to provide an exegetical and lexical demon¬
stration that "the documents of the 'New Testament' do not, by and large,
give a very large place to 'revelation' in any sense as a metaphor, concept
or category to express their understanding of the purpose of Jesus or of
God 'in' Jesus" (Has Christianity A Revelation?, p. 126). Particularly
Downing points out the concept of revelation as an unveiling of the selfhood
of God to mam in an "i-Thou" confrontation is not a biblical idea (ibid.,
pp. I97-I99). On the other hand, he points out that "revelation" means
the revelation of Christ irj glory. He writes? "The Corinthians are waiting
for the 'revealing' (b.rtcKU-Avifrts) of our Lord, Jesus Christ (I Cor. 1.7).
The Thessalonians will receive rest 'at the revealing (same word) of
the Lord Jesus from heaven' (II Thess. 1.7). The Colossians will be mani¬
fested in glory, when Christ is manifested (<j>avepu;P-f) ) (Col. 3.4). This
is the same event as Paul earlier wrote about to Rome; 'The glory that
shall be revealed', and 'the earnest expectation of the creation' that
'waits for the revealing of the sons of God (clttok<x/[zrcj^7jvac, cutav-xjw )'
(Rom. 8.l8ff.). This is 'revelation* in its technical sense in the New
Testament. It is a future hope; other elements of the end-time may make
their presence felt now; but 'revealing' refers to those aspects of the end
that are still very much in the future." (pp. 75-7*5).
"^The Shape of Christology, p. 164. Cf. Mclntyre, Christian Doctrine
of History, p. 83.
4
The Shape of Christology, pp. 80-81.
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of the end at which time God's self will be fully revealed.1
In a way not altogether unlike Professor Mclntyre's "revelation
model," Pannenberg contends that "there are as many revelations as there
p
are divine acts and occurrences in nature and history," i.e., A(x) reveals
B(y) to C(Historical Reason). Admittedly, this eliminates the idea of a
direct self-revelation except in a qualified sense so far as the Christ event
is concerned.
What Pannenberg is asserting, in contrast to a direct self-revelation,
is the idea of an indirect self-revelation of God which becomes a direct self-
revelation only as the totality of reality is known, namely, at the end of
history. However, this direct self-revelation has already been partially
unveiled in Jesus Christ—thus Panneriberg's concept of the New Testament
revelation model becomes: B(A) reveals B(some E) to C(Historical Reason).
Only in the eschaton can it be said that B(A) reveals B(all E).
Pannenberg seeks to expound this fundamental idea of the New Testament
(i.e., that God's indirect self-revelation has progressively unfolded in the
"'"John Baillie likewise points out that the revelation in Jesus
Christ is a partial pre-actualization of the revelation which is to be com¬
pleted at the end-time. He writes: "indeed as time went on, this word
apocalypse, which is the most general word for revelation in New Testament
Greek, tended to be used exclusively for that which still waits to be revealed.
Yet the point needs clearly to be made that this is not an independent or
extra revelation, over and above that which is given in the Gospel history
itself. The revelation of what is still to be is contained in the revelation
of what has already been, and is nothing else than an elicitation of its
inherent promise. Our assurance of the full inheritance derives from the
earnest of it which we have already received. Or, in another metaphor, our
assurance of the final harvest rests on our having already reaped the first
fruits of it in the resurrection of Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit
/"The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (London: Oxford University
Press, 1956)7 P. 57 /•
2
Revelation as History, p. 16.
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world but will be consummated in a complete direct self-revelation only at
the end-time) in terms of universal history. Pannenberg acknowledges that this
idea of a universal history goes back to German idealism, especially to Hegel,
even as Barth's idea of self-revelation has it roots there. For Pannenberg,
this recognition does not invalidate its use in systematic theology.^" Rather,
what is significant is whether or not the idea of universal history can artic¬
ulate properly the idea of God's self-revelation. What follows is intended
only to point out that the idea of an indirect self-revelation of God in
terms of a universal history can be exegetically supported in Scripture.
First, it can be said that knowledge of God is derived on the basis
of His historical activity which includes both word and event. This can be
seen in the exodus event. Before the exodus, Jabweh tells Moses what He is
going to do so that after the event the people will look upon it as the
confirmation of the prophetic word. "And Israel saw the great work which
the Lord did against the Egyptians, and the people feared the Lord; and they
believed in the Lord and in his servant Moses" (Exodus 14:31). In Elijah's
contest with the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel, it was God's action in
consuming Elijah's sacrifice with fire that proved His divinity. "And when
all the people saw it, they fell on their faces; and they said, 'The Lord,
he is God; the Lord, he is God'"(I Kings 18:39)- Jethro (Exodus l8ill) and
Naaman (II Kings 5'15) likewise both acknowledged the sovereignty and deity
2
of Jahweh on the basis of what they saw and experienced.
The basis for Israel's belief in the divinity of God is thus found in
"*Tbid., p. 5.
Q
Rolf Rendtorff, "The Concept of Revelation in Ancient Israel,"
Revelation as History, p. 42.
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the testimony of their history. They have not arrived at this fundamental
oonviction through philosophical speculation, but rather, it is derived from
their experience of history. Yehezkel Kaufmann points this out succinctly.
The religion of the Bible is not set forth philosophically.
It is urged on Israel on the basis of historyj the basic
attributes of Israel 's God are historical. The first of the
Ten Commandments grounds YHWH'b claim to be recognized as
sole God on the fact that he brought Israel out of the land
of Egypt. Israel believed in YHWH and Moses after the miracle
of the Red Sea (Exod. 14:31). Israel will have lasting faith
in YHWH and Moses because of the Sinaitio theophany (19:9).
"Knowledge of God" derives from historical experience: "To
you it was shown that you might know that YHWH is God, there
is none else beside him" (Deut. 4:35). The Exodus, the
theophany at Sinai, the miraculous conquest of Canaan are
repeatedly put forth as proofs that "YHWH is God, there is
none else' (e.g., Josh. 23i 24; Judg. 2:1-2, 7; 10:11 ff.j
I Sam. 12:6 ff.; I Kings 8:16, 53)• It is the basis of
prophetic arguments as well (Amos 2:9 ff.J Hos. 13:4; Mic.
6:1 ff.j Ezek. 16; 20j and elsewhere). The eschatological
events that will proclaim the glory of YHWH to all men are 1
also portrayed in images drawn from the legends of the Exodus.
Likewise in the New Testament the decisive factor of revelation is
its historical character. For example, the mere claims of Jesus to authority
in themselves did not verify his unity with God. Rather, the function of the
miracle stories was to demonstrate this unity. Ulrieh Wilkens points this
out:
The answer of Jesus to the direct question: "Are you he who
is to come, or shall we look for another?" receives the
direct reply: "The blind receive their sight and the lame walk,
lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised
up, and the poor have the good news preached to them." All
of this was expected in the course of events on the Judgment
day and was also taken as a sign of salvation in the new age.
If these miracles were done by Jesus, then they point to Jesus
as "the one who is to come." This is the rationale for the
answer of Jesus: "Blessed is he who takes no offense at roe."
Thus, these miracles are understood as the rule of God which
1Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, trans, and abridged by Mosche
Greenberg (Chicago: The University of Chicago PreBS, 1963)# P. 132.
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is imminent in the company of his person, and they are there¬
fore to be taken seriously.1
What is being argued here is that revelation is not a direct self-
revelation, but is indirect in the sense that God is known on the basis of
his historical activity, which means that the God who reveals Himself is
not to be directly identified with what is actually revealed. To be store,
the purpose of God's revelation is to make Himself known, but in so doing
He actually communicates a content other than His pure presence. It is by
reflecting on this "other content" that indirectly reveals who God is. What
is to be further contended is that this indirect self-revelation of God is
progressively expanded in the course of historical development until it
reached its proleptic culmination in the Christ event. By "proleptic" is
meant the self-revelation of God has reached its climax in the course of the
historical process and will not be overtaken by any other event until the
eschaton at which time the direct self-revelation of God will occur. In
other words, "prolepsis" means the provisional fulfillment of what is to be
expected in the future.
Thus, revelation, as Pannenberg describes it, is related to a "chain
of tradition, which runs from the Old Testament through the apocalyptic
literature and on to the proclamation of Jesus found in the first community
2
and in Paul." Finally, it is the resurrection of Jesus from the dead that
is the self-vindication of the God of Israel to be the God of all men, for
Jesus' substantial unity with God and his claim to divine authority can be
*U. Wilkens, "The Understanding of Revelation within the History
of Primitive Christianity," Revelation as History, p. 77«
^Revelation as History, p. 131.
264
seen to be true from the perspective of the resurrection event. This em¬
phasis upon the continuity of historical events reaching back into the
earliest beginnings of Israel's history stands in conscious opposition to
the "new quest" for the historical Jesus which constructs its Christology
on the pre-Easter Jesus and his claim to authority. Jesus' claim to divine
authority can only rightly be understood both in the light of Israel's
historical development and the divine confirmation of Jesus' unity with God
by his resurrection. Paul succinctly points out this continuous chain of
tradition in which the revelation of God reaches its climax in Jesus of Naz¬
areth. In this respect, he speaks of (1) the historical continuity between
Israel and Jesus, (2) his resurrection as confirmation of his deity, and
(3) the universal goal of history in bringing salvation to all nations.
Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, set
apart for the gospel of God which he promised beforehand
through his prophets in the holy scriptures, the gospel con¬
cerning his Son, who was descended from David according to
the flesh and designated Son of God in power according to the
Spirit of holiness by his resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ
our Lord, through whom we have received grace and apostleship
to bring about the obedience of faith for the sake of his name
among all the nations, including yourselves who are called to
belong to Jesus Christ (Romans lil-6).
Thus, it is not just single historical occurrences that completely
reveal the essence of God, but rather, it is a complex of events which points
to the revelation of God, culminating in Jesus Christ. "But when the time
had fully come ( brre &e -rjiOcv to rrX^p^j^- TcO S/cO ), God
sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who
were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons" (Galatians
4:4-5).
This understanding of revelation as being the result of a complex
of events is clearly expressed by the Deuteronomist: "And because he loved
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your fathers and chose their descendants after them, and brought you out of
Egypt with his own presence, by his great power, driving out before you
nations greater and mightier than yourselves, to bring you in, to give you
their land for an inheritance, as at this day; know therefore this day, and
lay it to your heart, that the Lord is God in heaven above ami on the earth
beneath; there is no other" (Deuteronomy 4:57-59)• That God's plan for his
people had been revealed to their "fathers," and the fact that they now
were to live in the promised land constituted for them the revelation of God:
"know therefore this day . . . that the Lord is God." Thus, the purpose of
history was to make Jahweh known to the people of Israel.1
It can be said that the self-vindication of the deity of Jahweh was
2
considered to be complete after the occupation of the promised land, but
the events of the fall of Judah and the exile brought about a revision in
Israel's understanding of revelation. Revelation was now moved to a future
expectation. While the exile itself came as the result of disobedience on
the part of Israel, as the prophets proclaimed, the present tribulation was
only transitory, for in the end of their distress would come the salvation
of Jahweh. Edmond Jacob shows that the apocalyptic expectation of the
prophets is a new understanding of revelation in connection with the exodus
and conquest. "The Exodus thetar.e with its accent on deliverance had a new
flowering when the events of the exile were considered as the final point of
"5
Yahweh's judgments." This is especially seen in Ezekiel and Isaiah who take
1Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament, trans. Arthur W.
Heathcote and Philip T. Allcock {New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1958),
p. 190.
2




up the theme of the Exodus and the occupation of the promised land. Jacob
writes:
By emphasizing the wilderness theme and by introducing into it
the idea of punishment, they reconcile Judgment with the promise:
Yahweh will once more lead Israel into the wilderness of the
peoples and will perform a Judgment there (Ez. 20.35)» for,
through the dangers that it presented, the wilderness was a
place of temptation rather than an idyllic setting. Ezekiel
sees his own role in the light of that of Moses: as a sentinel
with the duty of warning the people, he will proclaim the
coming of a new shepherd, a new David, who will take up on a
vaster scale the work of Joshua. The people will be restored:
Just as in former times they had crossed the Red Sea and the
Jordan, which in each case had been a passage through death—
think of the lasting association of the sea with chaos—they
will again pass from death to life (Ez. 36-37) and the Temple
rebuilt in the centre of the country will be the guarantee of
the dependability of this promise. So Ezekiel proclaims no¬
thing which is not to be found already in the ancient credo, so
convinced is he that the faithlessness of the people does not
cancel the faithfulness of God.^
Isaiah also speaks of the future deliverance of Israel as being a
g
new Exodus which then will be followed with a new Covenant (Isaiah 5*0 •
What the prophetic expectation thus conceives as decisive is the
future revelation of God. It will be the inauguaration of a new aeon which
will also reveal the meaning of the present. History thus progresses toward
this end according to the plan of God. Jacob shows that, though the belief
that God is the initiator of events is not uniquely a biblical teaching, the
idea "that God binds himself to historical events to make them the vehiele
of the manifestation of his purpose" is a characteristic feature of revelation.
Jacob writes:
While the powers of the gods of the nations cease at the frontiers
of their territory, Yahweh directs universal history, and a dec¬
laration like that of Amos that Yahweh directs not only the des¬
tinies of Israel, but also that of the Philistines and of the
Ethiopians, provides a good illustration of the specific power
IIbid., p. 193- 2Ibid.
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of Israel's God, all of whose potentialities were developed by
the prophets. Yahweh is not only a powerful God but a wise
sovereign who leaves no place either for dualism or for chance;
all is initiated and willed by him (Amos j5.6; Is. 47.7; Ijam.
2»37)» which does not mean that history is only the unfolding
of a plan fixed in advance, for Yahweh holds the destinies of
men in his hands, not in the way of a marionette operator,
but by leaving them with the freedom of decision; and so his¬
tory always appears to be a drama in which the two protagonists,
God and men, call one another, flee from one another and
finally become reconciled.^
The ultimate purpose of God's historical activity Is to make himself
known to all peoples (Isaiah 45:9-10)» to all "flesh" (Isaiah 49:26). "i
gird you /~Israel_7. . . that men may know . . . that there is none besides
me" (Isaiah 45:5-6). "And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all
o
flesh shall see it together" (Isaiah 40:5).
What is thus especially emphasized in the prophetic expectation is
the extending of Heilsgeschichte into universal history. Thus, it is at the
end of the present aeon that the essence of God shall be revealed, for then
he shall come to Inaugurate his kingship on earth so that it can be said
that "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters
cover the sea" (Isaiah 11:9; Hab. 2:14).
It is this eschatological inauguration of the Kingdom of God on earth
which can be said to be identical with the full knowledge of God. Pannenberg
writes:
Placing the manifestation of God at the end of history means
that the biblical God has, so to speak, his own history. That
is, the historical event of revelation cannot be thought of in
an outward way as revealing the essence of God. It Is not so
much the course of history as it is the end of history that is
at one with the essence of God. But insofar as the end pre¬
supposes the course of history, because it is the perfection
1Ibid., pp. 188-189.
O
Rolf Rendtorff, Revelation as History, pp. 45-46.
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of it, then also the course of history belongs in essence to
the revelation of God, for history receives its unity from its
goal. Although the essence of God is from everlasting to ever¬
lasting the same, it does have a history in time. Thus it is
that Jahweh first becomes the God of all mankind in the course
of the history that he has brought to be.*
The significance of the resurrection of Jesus can be seen in the fact
that the eschatological expectation of God's coming Kingdom on earth has al¬
ready been pre-actualized in Jesus of Nazareth. This indicates that neither
"the realized eschatology" of Dodd or "the consistent esehatology" of Albert
Schweitzer can be seen to be the exclusive interpretation of Jesus' escha-
tological preaching. Rather, eschatology includes an "already" and "not-yet."
In the kerygma of Jesus is proclaimed the "already" of the Kingdom of God.
The central proclamation of Jesus' kerygma was the imminent Kingdom of God:
"But seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall
be yours as well" (Matthew 6:33)- Thus, the eschatological message of God's
imminent reign formed the encompassing thrust of Jesus' preaching. Whatever
attitude his hearers took toward his message and his claim to divine authority
would ultimately determine their destiny. But, this "already" of the Kingdom
of God stands in tension with the "not yet" aspect. The apocalyptic expec¬
tation had pointed to the earthly rule of the Kingdom of God, but such a
political development did not happen. For this reason, Pannenberg points out
that "without the resurrection of Jesus, his message would have turned out to
be a fanatical audacity."^ It was, in fact, because of his resurrection that
Jesus' message concerning the expectation of the near end was vindicated, for
"Stevelation as History, pp. 153-154.
2,"Cf. Cullmann, Salvation as History, p. 202.
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this end was proleptically fulfilled in his own person. In this way it can
be seen that the "not yet" of the Kingdom of God still remains to be fulfilled
in the eschaton, when "the kingdom of the world has become the kingdom of our
Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever" (Revelation 11:
15).
We shall now summarize what has been said or implied concerning the
relationship between revelation and history, (l) The concept of revelation
is here defined as the self-disclosure of God, i.e., man's knowledge of God
has its origin in God's disclosure of Himself. (2) Revelation as history is
an indirect disclosure of God, i.e., the content of revelation in history does
not directly coincide with the essence of God. This means that the Revealer
and what is revealed do not have an exact correspondence. Rather, the content
of revelation tells us something about God, and only indirectly who God is.
(3) There are as many revelations of God as there are divine events. (4) Heils-
geschichte takes on a universal character, for all history is seen to be
moving toward the eschaton at which time the full direct revelation of God
shall be visible. (5) Insofar as Jesus' substantial unity with God can be
seen on the basis of Jesus' claim to divine authority and his resurrection
from the dead, he is the pre-actualization of the eschatological future. Thus,
those who respond to his message and abandon their own self-sufficiency in
favor of his lordship have a share in the coming Kingdom of God In the present.
(6) Insofar as the eschaton has been anticipated in Jesus' person, i.e.,
insofar as Jesus is God, he possesses absolute significance for all mankind.
This means no further revelation can overtake the Christ event so long as
history is moving toward the eschaton. This suggests that all history is to
be judged in the light of the Christ event. (7) It is the end of history
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that can be said to be one with the essence of God, i.e., God will be fully-
known in a direct self-disclosure in the eschaton. This points out that the
course of history constitutes an indirect self-revelation, while the end of
history is a direct self-revelation.
That the Scriptures conceive of God as having acted concretely in
history as a course of events is generally recognized. That this historical
activity is the central focus of Christian faith has in more recent times
appeared to be problematic. To argue as it has been done in this chapter
that history is a primary medium of God's self-revelation thus indicates a
different set of ontological and epistemological presuppositions from those
theologies which pursue the Kantian dictum that there can be no degree of
proof of God's divinity on the basis of His historical activity. This dif¬
ferent set of metaphysical presuppositions, it is believed, is in accord
both with the idea of a historical revelation and with the nature of reality
itself. The subsequent chapters will thus address themselves to these onto¬
logical and epistemological considerations with the final chapter projecting
the idea of a theology of universal history, which will then further develop
the concept of an indirect self-revelation.
CHAPTER XI
THE ONTOLOGY OP HISTORY
The central epistemological problem is this question—what is the
basis of knowledge? To ask this question presupposes that there is "something"
to be known, and thus it shows that the epistemological problem cannot be
divorced from the question of ontology. What is the nature of this "something"
to be known? What is its truth? Is its truth metaphysical or empirical? The
attempt to reckon with this question accounts for the repeated controversy in
philosophical reflection over the relation between appearance and reality. In
a previous section, it was pointed out that in the rise of modern science and
modern philosophy truth was defined in terms of human subjectivity, i.e.,
truth was reduced to the control of man. The result of this anthropological
narrowing down of the criterion of truth ultimately pushed the question of
ontology into the background. In the natural sciences, A. N. Whitehead has
sought to re-instate the ontological question. He charges that the scientific
movement which began In 1600 has been anti-intellectual, for "it was a return
to the contemplation of brute fact, and it was based on a recoil from the
inflexible rationality of medieval thought."^" He further writes: "it has
remained predominantly an anti-rationalistic movement, based upon a naive
faith." Whitehead thus says that science "has never cared to Justify its




faith or to explain its meaning.""'' This elimination of the ontological
question from science resulted in "scientific materialism." Whitehead writes:
There persists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed
scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an
irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space
in a flux of configurations. In itself such a material is sense¬
less, valueless, purposeless. It Just does what It does do,
following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which
do not spring from the nature of its being. It is this assump¬
tion that I call "scientific materialism.
Likewise, Heidegger has protested against the idea of brutum factum
that dominates technology and the positive sciences. He shows that the onti-
cal sciences have severely restricted the nature of truth because they are
not ontologically oriented. It is not enough to interrogate scientifically
beings as such, but what is required is to "back track" to the primordial
investigation of Being, and thus overcome "the domineering nature of modern
•2
technology.
In the rise of modern philosophy with Descartes, the classical dis¬
tinction between appearance and reality was intensified into res extensa and
res cogitans. This dualistic definition of reality resulted in a dualistic
epistemology, i.e., the dualism of the absolute certainty of metaphysical
truth and the relative validity of empirical knowledge. Thus, truth came to
be defined in terms of not only the conformity of what-is and what-is-thought,
but a known conformity. Being (reality) was brought under man's control and
whatever truth of reality could be ascertained resulted from what man as a
thinking subject knows according to the criteriological ideal of his self-
certainty.
This elimination of the priority of ontology is further carried out
12 3
Ibid. Ibid., p. 25. -Bupra, p# 105.
273
in British empiricism. Whereas Cartesian rationalism polarized metaphysical
certainty over against the incertitude of empirical knowledge, British empir¬
icism located the nature of truth in the sensible world and denied the exis¬
tence of innate ideas. It asserted that all our ideas come from sense
perception. Empiricism also embraced a metaphysical agnosticism by denying
that our ideas of primary qualities correspond to the primary qualities
themselves.
Both rationalism and empiricism presuppose a dualistic epistemology
with rationalism embracing a skepticism concerning empirical knowledge and
empiricism being agnostic toward the knowledge of what underlies sense
experience. This dualism thus subordinates the ontological priority of truth
to an anthropocentric determination of truth, i.e., man becomes the arbiter
of truth. Hume not only eliminated the ontological priority of truth, but
denied ontology itself. Nothing exists except isolated impressions of the
mind. He thus distinguished between relations of the mind (i.e., ideas which
the mind connects together, though this connection has no "real" basis) and
matters of fact.
Kant sought to synthesize rationalism and empiricism in his philosophy
of critical idealism. He asserted that rationalism correctly acknowledged
the ontological basis of knowledge, but it wrongly attempted to deduce knowl¬
edge from metaphysical speculation. In this respect, empiricism correctly
asserted the priority of sense experience over against metaphysical speculation,
but it wrongly called this first-hand contact with the sensible world knowl¬
edge. Rather, knowledge, for Kant, is the correspondence of our empirical
intuitions and the a priori conceptions of the understanding. Thus, Kant
distinguished between noumenal and phenomenal reality, the thing-in-itself
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and the thing-as-it-appears. For man, truth is limited to phenomenal reality.
This is to say, truth is human subjectivity in the sense that what one knows
is only reality as it "seems" to man, not what reality is in itself. Kant
thus also makes man the arbiter of truth by his insisting that knowledge is
what man subjectively conceives it to be and not what it is objectively. To
be sure, Kant asserts the objective validity of our subjective knowledge, but
it still remains merely subjective truth. However, Kant's insight that the
conceptions of the understanding are related to the appearance (phenomenon)
!
of reality (noumenon) "could lead to thinking of appearanceness as the fun¬
damental characteristic of being /"realityJ itself," as Pannenberg has
pointed out.''" This suggests that access to reality lies in its appearance.
This logical priority of appearance over reality is not to advocate a super¬
ficial empiricism which accepts "bare facts" as the epistemological access
to reality. Rather, it is to say that the essence of reality is its appearance.
Hegel intended to move beyond Kant's critical idealism by showing
that the knowledge of appearance is knowledge of reality. In this respect,
he rejected the idea of the opposition between idealism and realism. Knowledge
of appearance is only pseudo-knowledge unless it is likewise knowledge of
reality. Both idealism and realism are correct. Whatever is exists. It is
the essence of reality to exist. In affirming the objectivity of knowledge,
he is not speaking of an identity of subject and object, but a reciprocity.
He is not saying that A is A, but rather he is saying that A is B, while at
the same time A is more than B. It is in this respect that Hegel speaks of
the "dialectic moment," i.e., that knowledge is the synthesis of subject and
1Panneriberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1969)# P* 1)50.
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object. But he does not mean that this synthesis (or dialectic moment) is
a "coincidence of opposites."1 Rather, he is saying that there is a recip¬
rocal relationship between appearance and reality. Not only does appearance
refer to the essence of reality appearing in it, but it is also the essence
of reality to appear. Hegel writes:
Essence must appear. Seeming (das Scheinen) is the definiteness,
through which essence is not mere being, but essence, and fully
developed seeming is appearance. Essence is thus not behind or
beyond appearance, but existence is appearance by virtue of the
fact that it is essence which exists.
Pannenberg has pointed out that though Hegel was able to show the
reciprocity of appearance and reality, he nevertheless conceived of the
logical precedence of reality over appearance, despite his insight that the
3
essence only comes into view for the first time in its appearance. Thus,
it can be seen that for Hegel appearance was a copy of reality, for appearance
was seen to be the self-alienation of essence. In this way, Hegel's logic
(metaphysics) succumbs to the Parmenidian concept of the timelessness of
Being. Pannenberg writes:
Since the Hegelian idea is thought of as timeless, logical
structure—being therein similar to the timeless being of
Parmenides—appearance in Hegel's philosophy (contrary to his
insight into the reciprocity of the relation of essence and
appearance) is again reduced to the status of the nonessential.
Instead of—as Hegel asserted—the idea existing only in the
appearances, it in fact finds in the appearances of religion
or history merely subsequent illustrations of its fixed, logi¬
cal structure.^
^Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy
of Hegel, p. 21.
^EnzyklopEdie, p. 151, cited by Pannenberg, Theology and the
Kingdom of God, p. 129.
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Heidegger's central philosophical aim has been to "back track" to
the primordial foundation of truth. In this respect, he has intended to
emphasize the ontological priority of truth, i.e., truth as the self-disclo¬
sure of Being. This means for Heidegger that truth is determined on the
basis of the appearing of Being, not according to a human grasping of truth
in terms of a known conformity of Being and beings. This is to say, reality
impresses and imposes its own truth upon man, and not vice versa.
As far as Heidegger is concerned, truth as the self-disclosure of
Being is a universal definition, i.e., it applies to all branches of knowledge
whether it be religion, art, science, or philosophy. Thus, Heidegger overcomes
in principle the one-sided existentialism of his Being and Time.As it has
been pointed out in connection with Kant and Hegel, this emphasis upon truth
as the appearing of Being is a move in the right direction toward overcoming
a dualistic epistemology. It points out that Being (the essence of what is)
has a reciprocal relationship to beings (existent entities). Beings (entities)
are what they are because Being has made its appearance. On the other hand,
beings as the appearance of Being are not mere semblances, but are in fact
Being coming into existence. Though there is this reciprocity between Being
and beings, beings are not in themselves the same as Being, for Being cannot
be fully expressed in its appearance. Thus, Heidegger speaks of Being con¬
cealing itself while at the same time disclosing itself. The significance
of what Heidegger is affirming is that the knowledge of appearance is not
merely a subjective certainty, but is an objective knowledge, based on the
appearance of reality. Thus, appearance and reality are not fundamentally
different, though they are not identical.
1Supra, p. 129.
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If reality really expresses itself in appearance, then the appli¬
cation of this insight to the epistemology of history can be seen in the fact
that it is the nature of historical reality to be known as appearance in the
human consciousness. This means what one knows of historical reality is
objective, i.e., its truth is disclosed to the mind instead of the mind arbi¬
trarily making a value judgment on what it experiences. This is a clear
rejection of the neo-Kantian distinction between value and fact. Such a
juxtaposition of fact and value results in a splitting up of human conscious¬
ness and is intolerable as a basis for historical knowledge. Even as Whitehead
has rejected "scientific materialism" because it dissects time into "simple
location" without due regard to the prehensive character of space-time (thus
resulting in the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness"), even so a positivistic
historiography which would dissect historical time into sections of bare facts
misunderstands the real nature of historical reality. Historical reality is
not something that can be divorced from its appearance, i.e., events which
are seen in their total context give rise to their own interpretation. In
this way, it can be said that "value" constitutes the very Being of historical
reality. This further means that the idea of a brute fact does not exist
except as a mere abstraction, for the significance (or value) of an event is
its historical reality.
Collingwood's distinction between the inner and outer aspects of
historical events illustrates what is being contended here. The outside of
an event relates to "bodies and their movements," as, for example, Caesar's
crossing the Rubicon or the spilling of his blood on the floor of the senate
chamber. The inside of an event relates to thought, as, for example, Caesar's
"^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 7^*
278
defiance of Republican law or the conflict with his political opponents con¬
cerning coxistitutional policy. The historian is not merely concerned with
either aspect. Rather, "he is investigating not mere events . . . but actions,
and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event."1 Thus,
the task of the historian, after having discovered the outside of an event, is
"to think himself into this action, to discover the thought of its agent,"
for ultimately "all history is the history of thought.In this way of dif¬
ferentiating between the inside and outside of historical events, it can be
seen that Collingwood defines historical knowledge as inferential, i.e.,
history is imaginatively re-enacting the past by means of data given at hand.
History, thus, is not partly knowledge of facts and partly knowledge of eternal
truths, but it "is wholly a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and con¬
crete."^
Henrich Ott in his essay, "The Historical Jesus and the Ontology of
„5
History, has pointed out the inadequacy of a positivistic historiography
which fails to acknowledge this inseparable connection of the inside and the
outside of events. By positivism, Ott means the attempt to interpret "his¬
torical reality as a complex of 'naked facts' which a person possessing
historical knowledge can control by securing them as facts on the basis of
sources." Such was the presupposition of the life-of-Jesus theologians in
the nineteenth century, even though this presupposition may not have functioned
1 2
Collingwood, p. 213- Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 215. ^Ibld., p. 254.
~^The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, ed. Carl Braaten
and Roy Harrisville, pp. 142-171.
6Ibid., p. 152.
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as a conscious axiom."''
Ott shows that such an axiom lies in the background of Bultmann's
Jesus and the Word, though his primary interest was in the question of his¬
torical knowledge and not historical being as such. Bultmann's historiography
presupposed a dualism of objectively verifiable historical data (ascertained
by the neutral observer) and the significance of this data. This can be seen
when Bultmann says that the neutral historian who objectifies the past misses
2
the real nature of history. Bultmann thus allows the possibility of history
being "objectified" in terms of isolated and detached data as though facts
of history could be determined independently of their significance, while at
the same time he calls for an understanding of history in terms of its sig¬
nificance. In this respect, Bultmann says his historiography is not governed
by "what happened," but by what the "purpose" of history is and the "demand on
us" it makes.
Ott has put this question to Bultmann: "How does it happen that one
„4
part of historical reality eludes objective observation and the other not?
Ott points out the inadequacy of the thesis that historical reality is in
part open to objective verification and part to existential encounter. He
wants to overcome this aspect of Bultmann's dualistie definition of historical
g
reality. To be sure, Ott does not charge Bultmann with pursuing a positivis-
tic investigation of history, but "certain remnants of the view that Bultmann
g
wants to overcome still persist in his thinking."
1Ibid., pp. 150, 152, 168.
'Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, p. 5. ^Ibid., pp. 7-8.
\>tt, The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatio Christ, p. 146.
5Ibid., p. 150. 6Ibid., p. 151.
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Instead of setting up a dualistic epistemology, Ott argues for the
original unity of event and significance. He writes: "Every being which
exists historically, perhaps any being which exists at all, is as such sig¬
nificant. It is significant as such; that Is, its significance is not only
one of its many attributes, but its significance constitutes its very being."1
In thus showing that the significance of reality is its very being, Ott means
reality itself impresses and imposes itself upon the human consciousness.
This means that one cannot attach whatever meaning he likes to an event, but
that the essence of the event exists in its significance. "This does not
happen, however, in the sense that as the knower I can depotentiate, register,
or put the real at my disposal: rather it happens in such a way that in
becoming significant what exists overwhelmingly forces and impresses itself
ti2
upon me.
In thus rejecting a dualistic definition of reality as it is found
in Bultmann who "allows the validity of both types of historical knowledge to
stand side by side—the establishing of facts and encounters with history,"^
Ott shows that positivistic historiography reduces historical time to time-
lessness. "According to the positivistic view of reality time is understood
as a line which can be surveyed. The individual points of time have their
fixed place but have no extension. Like every past event, their being is
something that is settled and finished. The facts, the bruta facta, can be
established in this isolation.On the other hand, Ott holds to the view
of reality that nothing in the past is finalized. "Nothing historical is
finished and settled; rather everything historical extends its being—that is.
1Ibid., p. 157- 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 159-
^Ibid., pp. 158-159.
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its significance—into time, into the future and into the present time of
every knower."^
Wolfhart Pannenberg has shown that this historical character of truth
has its source in the Old Testament itself, which stands in fundamental dis-
2
agreement with the classical Greek idea of truth. Truth for the Greek was
timeless in contrast to the Israelite view of the historicality of truth.
The Hebrew word for truth is emeth. It means a "standing firm, establishing,
supporting, bearing.""^ It does not refer to timelessness, but rather it is
a recurring event, thereby indicating its reliability. A man's word is true,
for example, if it shows itself to be reliable. Thus, futurity is a funda¬
mental feature of the Hebrew meaning of emeth. Hans von Soden shows that
truth for the Israelite was a "reality (which) is regarded as history . . .
not something that in some way or another lies under or behind things, and
is discovered by penetrating into their interior depths; rather, truth is
that which will show itself in the future."^
The Greek idea of truth is 0-~, unconcealment, i.e., a
letting-be-seen. Since the senses prevent the genuine "unconcealment" of
what is, logos as rational thought must reach behind the appearance to the
unchanging reality. Just as Being is unchanging, so is truth. This unchange¬
able unity of truth and what-is (Being) is distinguished from the changing
1Ibid., p. 159.
2
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, trans. G. H. Kehm (London:




Was ist Wahrheit? Vom geschlchtlichen Begriff der Wahrheit,
Marburger akademische Reden 46 (Marburg, 1927)» cited in Basic
Questions . . ♦ p. J>.
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multiplicity of appearances. This timelessness of truth and Being is thus
opposed to the Israelite emeth, which emphasizes the historical manifestation
of faithfulness and constancy. Thus, the happenedness of truth, i.e., the
event which constitutes the revelation of what-is, is of no material importance
for the Greek. On the contrary, truth is the enduring, unchanging, timeless
attribute of what-is. Truth is the knowledge of what-is, and what-is is in
no way different from truth.
For the Israelite, the essence of truth likewise was a knowledge of
the enduring and constant, but it was knowledge based upon the continuing
experience of the faithfulness of God in his historical manifestation. It is
this historical aspect of truth that stands over against the Greek concept of
logos (as rational thought) through which the truth of Being was uncovered.
For the Israelite, one could attain stability in the midst of the flux of
change through entrusting himself to God. Here faith (heemln) and truth
(emeth) are closely related, as it is suggested by their having the same stem.
That one attains stability through trust points out that truth will be seen
to be reliable from the future. However,' this future verification of truth
does not eliminate the present knowledge of truth. That the truth of Jahweh
is the unchanging and constant reality is not axiomatic, however. It is not
a logical necessity from the standpoint of thought. That-which-is, is not
an abstract identity for the Israelite, but rather the constancy of God Is
known on the basis of his historical activity. "He has shown his people the
power of his works, in giving them the heritage of the nations. The works of
his hands are faithful and just; all his precepts are trustworthy, they are
established for ever and ever, to be performed with faithfulness and upright¬
ness" (Psalm 111:6-8). Even the created order has its unity in the truth of
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Gods "Thy faithfulness endures to all generations; thou hast established
the earth, and it stands fast" (Psalm 119:90). Pannenberg writes: "All
constancy, whether it be in the orders of nature, in the life of nations,
or in the individual, is embraced by the truth of God and is grounded in it."1
What this indicates is that truth is historically mediated insofar
as man's knowledge is concerned. In contrast to the Greek quest for the
timeless unity of truth and true Being stands the Old Testament insistence
upon the historicality of truth, i.e., that the truth of what-is is mediated
historically. However, the Greek idea of truth with its emphasis upon what-is
is not excluded in the biblically-derived meaning of reality, but is absorbed
and modified. In fact, that the Greek defined Being (what-is) as the constant
and enduring reality explains why Hellenistic Judaism and early Christianity
linked the God of the Bible with the Greek idea of true Being.
However, the Greek dualism of true Being and changing sense-appearance
is overcome in the biblical meaning of truth. Instead of God as true Being
described in terms of timelessness, he reveals his truth historically, which
truth is not exhausted in the present but always points to the future. This
means the biblical God is distinct from his creation as one who acts freely
and contingently upon it in contrast to the Greek understanding of true Being
in terms of timeless cosmos. In this way, the Israelite view holds to the
permanency of truth (namely, God) while at the same including those aspects
which are rejected in the Greek view (as in Parmenides and Plato)—i.e.
changing sense-appearance. However, since thought is distinguished from
sense-experience, the problem arises how the gap between the two aspects are
bridged. This question again raises the problem whether truth is something
"Shid., p. 9.
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that comes under man's control or whether truth is the passive reception
of what presents itself to the senses. Perhaps the question is not properly
framed in this way, for in either case one may fall either into a dualistic
definition of reality in which one can only know what merely appeal's in con¬
trast to what really is, or else one may fall into the abyss of Hume's meta¬
physical agnosticism.
The Old Testament idea of the Imago Dei suggests an answer. As Nicolas
of Cusa pointed out, man creates ideas while God In His thought creates things.
But since man is created in the imfege of God who created the world of things,
then human ideas must be like the things God created. It follows from this
then that God is the necessary presupposition for guaranteeing the unity of
what is and what is thought.'1' In this respect, truth is neither the passive
receptivity of sense experience or the anthropocentric control of truth. Rather,
it must be said that truth is the work of man's creative rationality (i.e.,
he creates Ideas) which conforms with extramental reality which is the work
of God's creative rationality.
Ott has spoken of this interconnection between thought and being by
pointing out that it is the nature of historical reality to create a picture¬
like character. He writes:
We must state that our experience of reality always has to do with
"pictures" and never with "facts" (we use the term "facts" con¬
sistently in the sense of bruta facta). Reality always impresses
itself upon us through pictures, perhaps in different ways to
different people at different times. As it impresses itself upon
us it creates within us an exposition, an interpretation, an
explanation, a point of view in the widest sense; this does not
even need to be conscious. When we receive an impression of re¬
ality we create for ourselves a picture of it. In this sense
Nietzsche's dictum against positivism is justified: "There are
1Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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no such things as facts, but only interpretations.
Ott, however, points out that this picture-like character of historical
reality is not a mere subjective picture. It is not a picture that "we
create . . . for ourselves. Instead, reality itself is the first to impress
2
itself upon us in the form of pictures." These pictures are created simul¬
taneously when reality is experienced. In this respect, "the pictures are
primary; the facts are a secondary abstraction."^
Ott is not suggesting that knowledge is a naive apprehension of what
imposes itself upon the human consciousness. He shows that "there are levels
of phenomenality or of picture reality."^ Thus, it is necessary to get back
to the original event to what really happened. But in so doing, one still
gets a picture, not a "brute fact." "Thus we remain within the horizon of
,,5
pictures and manifestations and cannot escape it.
Ott does not intend to suggest that picture-reality is a mere copy
of reality, but that the picture of reality is reality itself. Or, in terms
previously suggested, appearance is reality itself coming into appearance.
Ott illustrates this in connection with K&hler's thesis that the picture of
the biblical Christ is the real Jesus over against the so-called historical
Jesus of the life-of-Jesus biographers of the nineteenth century. For K&hler,
knowledge of the biblical Christ was both theological knowledge and historical
knowledge. Ott writes:
For K&hler the concept of the "picture" does not mean a copy or
a duplicate. Instead, by the "picture of Jesus Christ" Klhler
means nothing but Jesus himself in the act of his self-manifes¬
tation. The picture of Jesus in the apostolic witness is the
unique impression which Jesus' appearance made upon the minds of
"*The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, pp. 160-161.
2Ibid., p. 161. ^Ibid. 4lbid., p. 166. 5Ibid.
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his disciples. This picture is Jesus himself as he influenced
his disciples, as he influences us also through their witness,
and as he has appeared and still appears to the church in every
age through the mediation of the Word—but really Jesus himself
then and not only some opinion about him!-*-
Ott, recognizing that there are levels of picture reality, attempts
to overcome the problem of endless relativism by resorting back to Kant's
Ding an sioh as a limiting concept. In this way, he reckons with the multiple
2
and inconclusive pictures created by encounters with reality. Instead of
falling back on Kant's dualistic definition of reality (which Ott so dili¬
gently attempts to escape), would it not be better to distinguish between
the eternal truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact as Leibniz
has done. While the eternal truths of reason are logically necessary but
at the same time are only conditional (i.e., they only say a thing is true
on the condition that it exists), the contingent truths of fact refer to
knowledge which reason has inferred on the basis of repeated experiences of
reality. This is to say, pure reason is governed by the principle of con¬
tradiction (i.e., something cannot be true and false at the same time), while
3
contingent truths of fact are governed by the law of sufficient reason. In
thus speaking of the latter truths, Leibniz speaks of degrees of probability
and contingency without splitting reality into the Kantian subjective and
objective level. Thus, to speak of the contingent truths of fact is more in
line with what has been discussed above in regard to the inseparable connection
of appearance and reality.
1Ibid., pp. 159-160. 2Ibid., p. 167.
■^Reason as defined by Leibniz does not refer to a faculty of innate




In the previous chapter, the ontology of history (i.e., historical
being itself) was the subject of consideration. Attention shall now be
focused on the general theme of history and hermeneutics, which also includes
the subject of epistemology as well. That hermeneutics itself has come to
include the question of epistemology dates back to Schleiermacher, as it
will be pointed out. Traditionally history and hermeneutics formed separate
studies. Hermeneutics was related to biblical exegesis, while historical-
critical study confined itself to ascertaining the nature of the events lying
behind the texts, as well as the historical development of the texts. This
distinction between history and hermeneutics corresponds to the twofold
problem which historical relativity raises for Christian faith—how can an
historically conditioned event of the past which cannot be ascertained with
absolute certainty be the point of departure for Christian faith?
The hermeneutieal task of bridging the distance between the past text
and the present age, on the one hand, and the historical-critical task of
evaluating the probabilities of the events lying behind the text, on the
other hand, will be seen in this chapter to form a single and not a separate
theme.
A. Schleiermacher: The Psychological Interpretation
Wilhelm Dilthey has defined hermeneutics as the "art of understanding"
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which "lias its centre in the exegesis or interpretation of the remains of
human existence which are contained in writings.Prior to Schleiermacher,
hermeneutics had been restricted to exegesis and a critical reconstruction
of literary documents. It was first systematically formulated with the
Sophists and especially with Aristotle in his Rhetoric and Poetics. It
consisted of formal rules of literary interpretation which the early Greeks
called grammar and rhetoric, and in the course of its development hermeneutics
came to include various aspects—grammatical, historical, aesthetic-rhetorical,
2
and impartial interpretation. It was not until Schleiermacher that it was
fully seen that the goal of philology in its interpretation of literary
documents could not be successfully achieved until these formal and logical
3
rules included the general question of epistemology. This epistemological
inquiry requisite for hermeneutics Schleiermacher called an "art" of inter¬
pretation.
Sehleiermacher's interest in hermeneutics came about as a result of
his attempt to replace the theory of biblical inspiration which he believed
4
had ignored philological study. His hermeneutics also developed in connection
"4)ilthey, "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften
(Stuttgart: B. C-. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961), V, j519» trans.
H. A. Hodges, "Selected Passages from Wilhelm Dilthey," Wilhelm Dilthey:
An Introduction (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 19^9), P- 127*
^Dilthey, "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften,
V, 321, 327. Cf. Hodges, p. 25.
^"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 327-328.
^Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Problem of Language in Schleiermacher's
Hermeneutic," Schleiermacher as Contemporary, ed. Robert W. Punk (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1970), pp.1)9, 83-84. Cf. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik,
ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Unlversit&tsverlag, 1959)#
PP. 55. 93.
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with his work of critically reconstructing and ascertaining the authenticity
of historical documents, e.g., in regard to the Platonic and pseudo-Platonic
dialogues. He came to see in the course of this work that criticism must be
supplemented with the art of understanding, that the true understanding of
historical documents demands more than a mere following of certain rigid
rules of grammar and philology.^" Thus, Schleiermacher stresses that her-
meneutics and criticism are inseparably related so that the practice of one
2
presupposes the practice of the other.
To be sure, Sehleiermacher did not intend to vitiate the significance
of the grammatical and philological presuppositions. In this respect, he
stresses the following conditions as the basic rules of hermeneuticss
(1) a knowledge of languages, (2) a knowledge of the subject matter,
(3) a knowledge of the historical conditioning of the language and the
author,^ (4) a knowledge of the author's style of writing and linguistic
6
usage, (5) a knowledge of the individual parts in the light of their whole
7 8
context, and (6) a special talent for discerning the nature of man.
In addition to these basic rules of philological study, his "analysis
of understanding" points to the need of a psychological interpretation in
Q
accomplishing the goal of philology. This psychological interpretation
^Dilthey, "Einleitung in Die Geisteswissenschaften," Gesammelte
Schriften, VII, 95- Cf. R. R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and
Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 77-78.
^Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, p. 79. ^Ibld., pp. 82, 103, 107•
4Ibid., p. 79- 5Ibid., pp. 90ff. 6Ibid., p. 108.
7Ibid., pp. 89, 91. 95ff. 8Ibid., p. 82.
^"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 327*
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means that one must re-enact the selfhood of the author.'*" Schleiermacher
O "X
speaks of this re-enactment as a divination, "a right feeling. It is this
psychological interpretation that makes hermeneutics an art rather than a
4
mere scientific study. The underlying presupposition of the psychological
interpretation is that what is peculiar to any one individual is capable of
being subjectively appropriated by another because of their common receptive-
ness to the same peculiarity. In this way, it can be seen that one can
transform himself into a corresponding subjective feeling of another, thus
5
re-enacting in the present what was the selfhood of another.
When all these various aspects of the hermeneutical task are accom¬
plished (i.e., the grammatical-historical, the psychological, etc.), then
it is possible for the interpreter to understand the author even better
than the author understood himself. Schleiermacher claims the interpreter
has this advantage, for he brings to conscious awareness much of what was
not consciously known by the author himself.^
B. Diltheys The Critique of Historical Reason
Wilhelm Dilthey further pursued Schleiermacher's hermeneuties and
extended it to fields of inquiry other than literary documents. For example,
he pointed out that there was an archaeological hermeneutics, or a hermeneutics
"*"R. R. Niebuhr, p. 79.
2
Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, pp. 8j, 109.
^Ibid., p. 91.
4
Ibid., p. 82. Cf. R. R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and
Religion, p. 85.
5
Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, p. 109•
6Ibid., pp. 87, 91.
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whose objects were paintings, statues, etc.1
Dilthey points out that it was Schleiermacher who first extended
hermeneutics beyond mere "philological virtuosity" to a "philosophical
t»2
possibility. He thus acknowledges his indebtedness to Schleiermacher and
points out that all subsequent development in the art of interpretation
depends on Schleiermaeher's re-orientation of philology toward epistemology."^
Dilthey likewise shows that exegesis involves more than the logical
processes of a grammatical-historical interpretation. But neither does the
epistemological foundation of the natural sciences which has developed in
modern times successfully broach the problem of literary interpretation. The
method of the natural sciences relates to what one perceives of natural objects.
It delineates between reality and appearance, the thing-as-it-is and the thing-
as-it-appears. What we know of phenomenon is "a mere reflection in conscious¬
ness of something real.Dilthey further writes: "The whole natural world
turns out to be a mere shadow cast by a reality hidden from us."
On the other hand, Dilthey says the human sciences are concerned with
what is distinctly human, not mere physical objects. Their epistemological
inquiry is concerned with the reality as-it-really-is, not as-it-appears.
Dilthey writes:
^"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 319,
trans. Hodges, 127-
p
"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 329-
3 4
Ibid. Ibid., p. 327.
''"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 317
trans. Hodges, p. 125-
^"Einleitung in Die Geisteswissenschaften," Gesammelte Schriften,
I, xviii, trans. Hodges, p. 113.
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For we wish to contemplate reality, and the course of our
epistemological enquiry will show that reality as it is, in
its actual being, unaltered by an medium, exists for us
only in this world of the mind.-*-
Thus, the specific task of historiography according to Dilthey is to ascer¬
tain what is objective knowledge in the strictest sense of the word (i.e., a
knowledge of what really is insofar as the world of the mind is concerned),
while the natural sciences (according to Kant's epistemology) only attain a
subjective knowledge (i.e., a knowledge of what merely appears, not what
really is).
The basis for objective knowledge in historiography lies in the fact
that man in the primary sense of the word is history, i.e., a historic being.
Dilthey writes: "So now appears the first significant moment for the solution
of the epistemology of history: the first condition for the possibility of
the historical sciences lies in the fact I myself am a historic being, that
the one who investigates history is the same one who makes history." He
further writes: "We are first historic beings before we are observers of
history, and only because we are the former do we become the latter.""^ Since
the mind can understand what it has created, man can thus know history as-it-
4
really-is. It is this objectivity of knowledge that points out the advantage
"'""Einleitung in Die Geisteswissenschaften," Gesamelte Schriften,
I, 91, trans. Hodges, p. 137-
2 "Der Aufbau Der Geschichtlichen Welt in Den Geisteswissenschaften,"




Ibid., p. 148. This emphasis upon the objectivity of historical
knowledge (i.e., history is what man creates and what he creates he can know
as it really is) very closely corresponds to the ideas of Bayle (supra,
p. 18), Vico (supra, p. 28), and Hegel (supra, 98).
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of the human sciences over the natural sciences.1
Both the natural and human sciences are concerned with natural objects.
However, there is one great divergence between them. The natural sciences
are concerned with objects which are produced independently of the activity
of the mind, whereas, the human sciences are concerned with natural objects
2
only insofar as they relate to the human consciousness. The natural sciences
distinguish between reality and appearance, while the human sciences distin-
3
guish between inner and outer. This inner and outer aspect of the human
sciences points to the inseparable connection between man and the physical
world. This is to say that insofar as the human sciences are concerned man
does not exist as an independent subject over against the world as an inde¬
pendent object. Dilthey is thus rejecting the subject-object schema of the
natural sciences as being inappropriate for the human sciences. This can be
seen when he writes:
The historical world is always there, and the individual observes
it not only from the outside, but he is interwoven with it. . . .
It is not possible to isolate these relationships.^"
That man in the primary sense of the word is history delimits the
task of the historian—to unfold what are the possibilities of human existence.
In this respect, herraeneutics plays a vital role, for man's happiness depends
in a large measure upon his understanding of himself in the light of what
others are and have been. Without this historical understanding, man's
""""Die Entstehung Der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 317*
trans. Hodges, p. 125.
p ..
"Der Aufbau Der Geschichtlichen Welt in Den Geisteswissenschaften,
Gesammelte Schriften, VII, 148, 277-278.
■^Ibid., p. 148. Cf. Hodges, p. 55.
4
Ibid., VII, 277. Translation mine.
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understanding of himself and his possibilities are severely restricted.
Dilthey writes:
The mind-body unit of life is known to itself through the same
double relationship of lived experience and understanding, it
is aware of itself in the present, it rediscovers itself in
memory as something that once was; but when it tries to hold
fast and to apprehend its states, when it turns its attention
upon itself, the narrow limits of such an introspective method
of self-knowledge make themselves felt. Only from his actions,
his fixed utterances, his effects upon others, can man learn
about himself;thus he learns to know himself only by the round¬
about way of understanding. What we once were, how we developed
and became what we are, we learn from the way in which we acted,
the plans which we once adopted, the way in which we made our¬
selves felt in our vocation, from old dead letters, from judg¬
ments on us which were spoken long ago. In short, it is through
the process of understanding that life in its depths is made
clear to itself, and on the other hand we understand ourselves
and others only when we transfer our own lived experience into
every kind of expression of our own and other people's life.^
This need for exploring the possibilities of human existence leads
to Dilthey's "critique of historical reason," which would do for historical
2
science what Kant's Critique of Pure Reason did for the natural sciences.
Dilthey wants to lift the historical studies out of bondage to the natural
sciences. He complains that history has adopted the method of the natural
sciences. In contrast, he calls for an epistemologieal re-orientation in
which inner experience (i.e., the facts of consciousness) becomes the point
3
of departure for historical study.
Though Kant's critique of reason established the epistemological
"Der Aufbau Der Geschichtlichen Welt in Den Geisteswissenschaften,"
Gesammelte Schrlften, VII, 86-87, trans. Hodges, p. 142. Cf. "Die
Entstehung Der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 317•
O II"Der Aufbau Der Geschichtlichen Welt in Den Geisteswissenschaften,
Gesammelte Schriften, VII, 278.
^"Einleitung in Die Geisteswissenschaften," Gesammelte Schriften,
I, xviii, trans. Hodges, p. 113.
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basis for natural science, it failed to provide an epistemology of history.
Likewise, the philological rules of traditional hermeneutics failed to pro¬
vide the epistemological basis of history. Dilthey points out that Schleier-
macher was the first to accomplish an adequate basis for hermeneutics as a
result of his "analysis of understanding" in which he indicated the necessity
2
of a psychological interpretation for the exegesis of literary texts. It
was this new hermeneutical approach that helped to lay the foundation for
Dilthey's epistemology of history. In this respect, Dilthey intended to
further Schleiermacher's "analysis of understanding" in terms of "a critique
of historical reason," thereby correcting the epistemological shortcoming of
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.^
It will be recalled in the discussion of Kant that it was pointed
out that he distinguished: (1) senses, (2) understanding, and (3) reason.
For Kant, the function of the senses is to perceive phenomena. The function
of the understanding is to take these empirical intuitions and to bring them
into conformity with the twelve a priori categories. This conformity of the
concepts of the understanding with the objects of sense perception is called
knowledge. Reason in turn takes the concepts of the understanding and infers
from them the Ideas of the self, God, and the world. However, reason tells
us nothing of the reality of these Ideas, but rather they are postulated on
4
the basis of the practical use of pure reason.
"'■"Der Aufbau Der Geschichtlichen Welt in Den Geisteswissenschaften,"
Gesammelte Schrlften, VII, 192, trans. Hodges, p. 115.
^"Die Entstehung Der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, j527-329•
^"Der Aufbau Der Geschichtlichen Welt in Den Geisteswissenschaften,"




In contrast to Kant's establishing the philosophical basis of the
natural sciences, Dilthey seeks to establish the philosophical basis of the
human sciences. This can be seen in the way that he gives the (l) senses,
(2) understanding, and (3) reason an existential interpretation. The objects
of the senses are not the phenomena of Kant's philosophy as opposed to the
noumena. Rather, they are the objectifications of mental life. Dilthey
writes: "But the existence of others is in the first instance given to us
only from without, in facts of sensation, in gestures, sounds, and actions."1
Neither does "understanding" have anything to do with the categories of Kant's
transcendental logic. Dilthey says that one does not understand nature, but
2
rather explains it.
Understanding is effected when the inner reality behind the external
signs are known. Dilthey writes: "We call the process in which, from signs
given outwardly to the senses, we know an inner reality, by the name of
understanding."We mean, then, by understanding, the process in which
from signs given to the senses we come to know a psychic reality whose mani¬
festation they are."^ Thus, historical knowledge comes about as a result of
understanding in the proper sense of the word. This is to say that historical
knowledge is the identity of subject and object, "a rediscovery of the I in
1"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 318,
trans. Hodges, pp. 125-126.
O
Ibid, "ideen {Jber eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie,
Gesammelte Schriften, V, 172, trans. Hodges, pp. 135-136.





the Thou.""1" "The knowing subject is here one with its object, and this
2
object is the same on all levels of objectification. Thus, it can be
seen that the object of historical knowledge, for Dilthey, is not a mere
physical object to be perceived by the senses, but rather, it is an external
sign of an inner reality.
Understanding for Dilthey thus always means that we come to know an
inner reality by means of signs which are given externally through the senses.
It does not mean the analysis of texts pure and simple. It Is not the appli¬
cation of a list of formal and logical rules of grammar and philology. Nei¬
ther is it mere explanation (ErklRrung) which is the method of natural science.
Rather, understanding is a re-enactment, a reliving, a reproduction of the
3
inner life of another. This art of imaginatively projecting oneself into
4
another Is likewise called by Dilthey as with Schleiermacher a divinization.
It is this reliving, the "inner affinity and sympathy,""' that makes possible
the objectivity of knowledge insofar as the task of hermeneutics Is concerned,
while the objectivity of knowledge for the natural sciences depends upon the
g
testing of hypotheses with mathematical exactitude. In this way, It can be
1,,Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften,"
Gesammelte Schrlften, VII, 191, trans. Hodges, p. 114.
2Ibid.
•^Ibid., pp. 213-214, trans. Hodges, pp. 121-126.
^"Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften,"
Gesammelte Schriften, VII, 226.
^"BeitrSge zum Studium der Individualit&t," Gesammelte Schrlften,
V, 278, trans. Hodges, p. 128.
^"Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt In den Geisteswissenschaften,"
Gesammelte Schriften, VII, 275» 191-192. "ideen uber eine Beschreibende
und Zergliedernde Psychologie," Gesammelte Schriften, 169-170, trans. Hodges,
pp. 133-134.
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seen that hermeneutics does for history what mathematics does for the nat¬
ural sciences.
If the function of reason in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was to
teach us only what are the objects of possible experience, thereby limiting
our knowledge to the mere appearance of reality, the function of reason in
Dilthey's "critique of historical reason" was to point out what reason can
understand insofar as the human sciences are concerned, thereby showing that
one can understand what-really-is. In this respect, Dilthey contends that
historical knowledge is understanding, not in the sense of "rational compre-
hension" (rationales Begreifen), but as the art of imaginatively projecting
oneself into the life work of another person. This means that the most sub-
3
jective approach is the proper epistemological basis of the human sciences.
He thus defines the science of hermeneutics as "the technique (Kunstlehre)
4
of the exegesis of written records.
C. Bultmann: The Pre-Understanding of Human Existence
In line with Schleiermaeher and Dilthey, Bultmann points out that
5
the central problem of hermeneutics is historical knowledge. Schleiermacher
sought to resolve this epistemological problem in terms of a psychological
interpretation whereby hermeneutics becomes an art of divining the intention
"Stodges, p. 84.
2
"Beitr&ge zum Studium der IndividualitEt," Gesammelte Schriften,
V, 278, trans. Hodges, p. 129.
^Ibld.
^"Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," Gesammelte Schriften, V, 320*
trans. Hodges, p. 128.
^Bultmarm, History and Eschatology, p. 110.
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of the author instead of being simply an exegesis of literary texts according
to standardized rules of philology. Dilthey further formulated the task of
hermeneutics in close connection with his epistemology of history. Since
man's essence is history and since what he creates is history, man can know
history as-it-really-is. Thus, the hermeneutical task is for the interpreter
to project himself into the author, thereby gaining an understanding of a
historical text by re-thinking what the author himself thought. Heidegger
likewise founded the science of hermeneutics on the basis of man's historicity,
which is to say that the historian can properly interpret historical texts
because he himself shares in the existentiality of existence, i.e., the
possibilities of human existence. For Dilthey, the purpose of historical
study is to furnish examples of what man has been in the past in order to
deepen his understanding of himself."'" For Heidegger, the function of his-
2
torical science is to unfold what is authentic repeatable history. In this
way, it can be seen that the hermeneutical task is always guided by a prior
interest in human existence. It is this "pre-understanding" of historical
study that Bultmann more fully articulated in connection with his existential
exegesis of the New Testament. Further, Dilthey's "critique of historical
reason" and Heidegger's hermeneutie of Dasein in which the historical nature
of human existence is set forth (thus effecting an epistemology of history),
is likewise a presupposition of Bultmann's existentialist exegesis of the New
3
Testament.
Though Bultmann agrees with Schleierrnacher and Dilthey that there must
be a corresponding relationship between an interpreter of a text and its
1 2
Supra, pp. 2935f. Supra, pp. Il4f.
•^Bultmann, Essays, Philosophical and Theological, pp. 251-252.
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author, Bultmann chooses to stress the life relation to the subject matter
of the text that the interpreter shares with the author instead of trying
to effect a psychological reproduction of the selfhood of the author. He
writes:
Instead of reflection on the individuality of author and ex¬
positor, on their psychical processes and on the spiritual
make-up or intellectual consanguinity of the expositor, it
requires consideration of the simple fact, that the presup¬
position for understanding is the interpreter's relationship
in his life to the subject which is directly or Indirectly
expressed in the text.1 ~
This common relationship of author and interpreter to the same subject
matter underscores for Bultmann "that every interpretation is guided by a
2
particular purpose." This particular purpose Bultmann calls a "pre-under¬
standing. However, he intends to overcome the one-sided "pre-understanding"
of Schleiermacher and Dilthey with their heavy emphasis upon the psychological
aspect of hermeneutics. Rather, Bultraann points out that what is important
as a pre-understanding of hermeneutics is "the putting of the question,"
4
i.e., what is to be understood. For example, when one seeks to understand
mathematical, medical, musical, political, military, astronomical texts, etc.,
it is not necessary to reproduce imaginatively the selfhood of an author.
Rather, what is important is a prior knowledge of mathematics, astronomy,
5
politics, military strategy, music, medicine, etc. Likewise, if the putting
of the question relates to "history as the sphere of life in which human
1Ibid., p. 241. 2Ibld.
^History and Eschatology, p. 113-
^Ibid., p. 112. Cf. Essays, Philosophical and Theological, pp. 238-
239.
history and Eschatology, p. 112. Cf. Essays, Philosophical and
Theological, pp. 252ff.
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existence moves, in which it attains its possibilities and develops them,
and in reflection upon which it attains understanding of itself and of its
own particular possibilities," then what is necessary is a prior understanding
of human existence."''
Bultmann does not think that a "prior understanding" suggests that
historical knowledge is mere subjectivism. To be sure, historical knowledge
cannot achieve objectivity in the sense that natural science can, for human
existence is a different kind of reality than the mere physical objects of
2
natural science. On the other hand, the interpreter can achieve objectivity
of knowledge when he properly frames the question to be asked of a text, and
then methodically pursues this question. Bultmann writes:
Knowledge gained methodically is an 'objective1 knowledge, and
that can only mean a knowledge appropriate to the subject,
when this has found its way into a particular formulation of
the inquiry. To call the formulation itself 'subjective' is
absurd.
Thus, Bultmann points out that it is impossible for one to eliminate
his own subjective standpoint in order to achieve objectivity of knowledge,
for it is only through subjectivity (in the proper sense of the word) that
objectivity of knowledge can ever be attained, i.e. "only those who are
stirred by the question of their own existence can hear the claim which the
text makes.What must, however, be eliminated in the subjectivity of the
interpreter is his own personal prejudices insofar as he tries to force on the
texts an alien interpretation, thereby coercing the text arbitrarily to fit
5
his own preconceived ideas. Furthermore, since historical texts can be
^Essays, Philosophical and Theological, p. 253«
2lbid., p. 254. ^Tbid., p. 255- ^Ibid., p. 256.
5Ibid., p. 255.
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methodically questioned from many different perspectives of interest, one
must guard against making any individual "putting of the question" absolute,
Bultmann's reflection on the task of New Testament exegesis, however,
leads him back to Schleiermacher's and Dilthey's existential narrowing down
of hermeneutics. The goal of his hermeneutical theory is to make a scientific
exegesis of the New Testament in the light of his prior understanding of human
existence as it is unfolded in the existential analytic of man's being. One
does not obtain this existential knowledge from the New Testament, which is
solely concerned with an existenziell understanding of man. Rather, it comes
2
about through philosophical reflection. Without this prior understanding
of human existence, then the exegete would have "to read the biblical writings
as a compendium of dogmatic pronouncements, or as 'sources' for the recon¬
struction of a section of past history," thus reducing the significance of
the Scriptures by forbidding it to "speak as a power which has something to
say to the present, to present-day existence."
Though Heidegger defined the science of hermeneutics in terms of
investigating the possibilities of existence even as Bultmann defined the
task of biblical exegesis in terms of explicating the possibilities of human
existence, Heidegger's hermeneutics intended ultimately to move beyond the
mere human level to Being itself. In this respect, Heidegger offers a contrast
to Bultmann. Heidegger's hermeneutic of Dasein in Being and Time seeks to
make an existential analytic of Dasein in order to lay the ground work for
for this would distort the objectivity of historical knowledge
1
^Essays, Philosophical and Theological, p. 258.
"'ibid., pp. 258-259.
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understanding the meaning of Being. Thus, he also speaks of a prior under¬
standing. Heidegger writes: "inquiry, as a kind of seeking must be guided
1
beforehand by what is sought. But what is sought, for Heidegger, is not
in the first place, authentic existence, nor the question of Dasein as such.
Rather, what is sought is the Being of Dasein. In order to accomplish this
goal, Heidegger believed it was necessary first of all to unfold and clarify
the meaning of human existence through an existential analytic of Dasein.
That he never followed through with the second half of Being and Time suggests
that such an existential analytic did not serve as an adequate prolegomenon
2
to the explication of Being. Conversely, Bultmann is not concerned with
the question of God as he is in himself, only as he is pro nobis. While
Heidegger's ultimate goal has been to explicate the meaning of Being, Bultmann's
ultimate goal has been to explicate the meaning of authentic existence in the
light of Christian faith. While the earlier Heidegger sought to explicate
the meaning of Being through an existential analytic of Dasein and the later
Heidegger sought to accomplish this goal through an understanding of the pri¬
mordial significance of language, Bultmann has consistently sought to achieve
an understanding of man's relationship to God in terms of an existential
exegesis of the New Testament. Stated succinctly, Heidegger's "putting of
the question" is related to the nature of Being, not human existence, while
Bultmann's "putting of the question" has consistently been concerned with
human existence, not God per se.
D. Ebeling and Puchs: Understanding Through Words
3
Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Puchs have Jointly worked out what
"^Being and Time, p. 25. ^Supra,p. 116.
•^Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith, p. 305n.
Cf. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 71-
304
J. Robinson calls "The New Hermeneutic."'*' Robinson contends "the New Her-
2meneutic" is a new theology in the sense that Ritschlian theology was new.
Carl Braaten, however, has discounted this interpretation of Robinson's. He
further has pointed out the questionable distinction that Robinson draws
between "hermeneutics" and "hermeneutic." For Robinson, traditional "herme-
neutics" is to be distinguished from the new "hermeneutic," a distinction
3
Braaten points out that cannot be made in the German language.
Ebeling and Fuehs have intended to move beyond their teacher, Rudolf
Bultmann, insofar as his existential exegesis (demythologizing) is concerned.**
While Bultmann pursued the early Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutic of
Dasein in theological terms of going behind the objectifying language of the
New Testament to discover the primordial thinking (i.e., existential intention)
of the biblical writers and thus showing that the primary intention of the New
Testament is to express an understanding of authentic existence, Ebeling and
Fuchs have pursued the later Heidegger's ontological investigation of authentic
language which discloses Being, i.e., language lets Being be. This change of
emphasis from "existence" to "language" can be seen when Ebeling writes:
The real rub in the hermeneutic problem, as it presents itself
for theology, consists in the connexion between exposition of
the text as proclamation that has taken place and execution
of the text in proclamation in the present. The concept of
existentialist interpretation has been employed to characterize
^The New Hermeneutic, edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr.
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers).
2
"Hermeneutic Since Barth," The New Hermeneutic, p. 67.
^Carl E. Braaten, "How New Is the New Hermeneutic?" Theology Today,
xxii (1965-1966), pp. 219-220.
^Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," The New Hermeneutic, p. 53•
Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Problem," The New Hermeneut1c, pp. 115ff*
Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith, p. 331»
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this fundamental hermeneutio problem. The efforts towards a
closer definition of it are still going on. I think the concept
can be meaningful and helpful if it brings out the fact that
existence is existence through word and in word.l
Robinson points out that it was Ernst Fuehs who first redefined theological
hermeneutics within the context of Heidegger's ontological investigation of
language. Robinson writes:
It was Ernst Fuchs who first translated the hermeneutical dis¬
cussion from the categories of inauthentic and authentic exis¬
tence derived from Being and Time into the later Heidegger's
analogous distinction between the everyday language of the p
subject-object dilemma and the uncorrupted language of being.
Ebeling defines theological hermeneutics as the doctrine of the Word
3
of God. This is not to suggest that he is falling back on the traditional
Orthodox distinction between hermeneutlca sacra and hermeneutica profana, a
distinction that was made possible by the coining of the concept, "hermeneutics,"
in the middle of the seventeenth century. Rather, he is speaking of theo¬
logical hermeneutics in the sense of a special hermeneutics in contradistinction
to general hermeneutics. It is this distinction of general and special that
replaced sacra and profana hermeneutica at the beginning of the Enlighten-
5
ment.
Ebeling defines hermeneutics this way: "Hermeneutics as the theory
„6
of understanding must therefore be the theory of words. Insofar as herme¬
neutics is the theory of understanding, its task will be to remove "hindrances"
which obscure the word. This task, in turn, will determine the scope of her-
^Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith, p. J51.
2
Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," The New Hermeneutic, p. 49.
^"Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith, p. 525.
4Ibid., p. 515n. 5Ibid., p. 514. 6Ibid., p. 519-
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meneutics. (l) It may be limited to philological and grammatical understanding
of the text. (2) It may include the general problem of historical under¬
standing. (3) It may be extended to an understanding of the reality that
encounters us in the present through the text. (4) Or, hermeneutics may be
an inquiry into the conditions under which understanding in general can take
place.1 As it has already been pointed out, Ebeling likewise shows that the
modern turn in the theory of hermeneutics is traced from Schleiermacher, through
Dilthey, to Heidegger. He shows that hermeneutics has become the essence of
2
philosophy, thus replacing the classical epistemological theory. Ebeling
writes:
Rather, the development from Schleiermacher via Dilthey to Heideg¬
ger shows that the idea of a theory of understanding is on the
move towards laying the foundation of the humanities, Indeed even
becomes the essence of philosophy, that hermeneutics now takes
the place of the classical epistemological theory, and indeed
that fundamental ontology appears as hermeneutics.5
Insofar as hermeneutics is the theory of words, what is significant
is the word-event in which understanding is achieved. Ebeling's concept of
4
word-event is intended to point out the linguisticality of reality. He
writes:
This much, however, can be said in general terms on the question
of what has to be the guiding light of hermeneutics: it must be
a word-event in the comprehensive sense that it embraces both
linguistic tradition and encounter with reality.5
IIbid.
^Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Grundztige einer
philosophischen Hermeneutik (TUbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, I960).
"''"Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word, and Faith, p. 317*
4
Supra, pp. 232f.
''"Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith, p. 322.
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This defining of the task of hermeneutics as removing those hindrances
which obscure the mediation of reality through language corresponds closely to
Heidegger's concept of language as the "house of Being," i.e., language lets
Being be. This is to say, understanding takes place through language, not
that language creates a new 'understanding. In this way, it can be seen that
language is performatory, not informative.
The primary phenomenon is the realm of understanding is not
understanding OP languagi^tH^r'ilanding THMJGH TSi^SSge.
The word is not really the object of understanding, and thus
the thing that poses the problem of understanding, the solution
of which requires exposition and therefore also hermeneutics
as the theory of understanding. Rather, the word is what
opens up and mediates understanding, i.e. brings something to
understanding.^
Ebeling further points out the performatory function of language when he
writes: "The basic structure of word is therefore not statement—that is an
abstract variety of the word-event—but apprisal, certainly not in the colour¬
less sense of information, but in the pregnant sense of participation and
„2
communication.
In this way, it can be seen that Ebeling and Fuchs have sought to
re-adjust Bultmann's program of demythologizing which holds that the New
Testament mythological language is a secondary objectification of authentic
existence. Both Ebeling and Fuchs stress the performatory function of language
in contrast to Bultmann's attempt to get behind the mythological language to
3
an understanding of authentic existence.
Since the function of hermeneutics is to allow reality to be understood
1Ibid., p. 318. 2Ibid., p. 326.
"'"Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith, p. 331 • Fuchs,
"The New Testament and Hermeneutical Problem," The New Hermeneutic, pp. 116-
119, 124-125.
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through language, Ebeling and Puchs believe that theological hermeneutios
can locate the significance of the historical Jesus. The historical Jesus
is seen to be the Word of God, for in his preaching he made God present.
Thus, by getting back to the preaching of the historical Jesus, one gets back
to authentic language—the language of faith.1 Jesus' word is called a gift
which was given to his hearers, and thus by clinging to his word the hearers
have a "model of faith" to take along with them. It was subsequent to his
crucifixion that Jesus himself became adorned with honorific titles. Thus,
the primitive church ultimately replaced Jesus' preaching with his person as
the "model of faith.Thus, to believe in Jesus is to believe in Jesus'
4 .
message of love. Furthermore, Jesus message, as the word of God, is sig¬
nificant, not because of its content. Rather, what is significant is that in
the phenomenon of language one speaks not so much to be understood, but he
speaks because he understands. Puchs writes: "At home one does not speak
so that people may understand, but because people understandILanguage
does not create anything new, i.e., it is not informative, but mediates under-
standing. Language "announces what it is time for." Thus, the significance
of Jesus' parables and his language is that his message announces that now
God has come forward in his concrete revelation. Fucbs writes:
For I can really love God from now on. I can rejoice in him,
since Jesus has made God present for me. And how has he done
that? Through his words, which now lie like Christmas presents
on the table. What we should put on—so to speak, what we
^uchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem," The New
Hermeneutic, p. 123.
2




should clothe ourselves with—are indeed Jesus' words themselves.
And clothed in them we should henceforth carry on our daily life.
It will have become a completely new lifeT^ '
This, then, is the theological relevance of the historical Jesus. It
is through his preaching that man encounters God. Puchs writes:
This is why I have in my own way renewed the question of the his¬
torical Jesus. Jesus himself had been God's word to which all
clung, for Jesus did not want to be or to be understood as any¬
thing other than God's word, which entered into his daily life
and began here its work. He was this word, for he let himself
be heard at precisely that place where God himself had begun
to speak. Jesus was God's word, if at that time the time for
this word had come! And that is what faith in Jesus believes,
by believing in the historical Jesus. This alone is the true
meaning of "Easter faith." Jesus and those who believe through
him belong forever together. For this reason they believe in
him by confessing him as God's word, indeed as God's "verb,"
God's "time-word.
Ultimately, the New Testament is seen as "a textbook in hermeneutlc.
It teaches the hermeneutic of faith—in brief, the language of faith—and it
encourages us to try out this language ourselves, so that we may become
familiar with—God."^
It can thus be seen that the ultimate task of theological hermeneutics
is to bring one to an understanding of the historical Jesus in terms of a
word-event (Ebeling), or language event (Fuchs).^ It is this "event" which
is the saving event, for what came to expression in Jesus was faith. Thus,
to have faith in Jesus means to re-experience Jesus' decision of faith.
E. Pannenberg: The Integration of History and Hermeneutics
Wolfhart Panneriberg seeks to resolve the hermeneutical problem in
terms of universal history. He sees that the historical distance between
'''Ibid., p. 130. 2Ibld., p. 136. ^Ibld., p. 141.
^Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," The New Hermeneutic, p. 57-
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text and interpreter cannot be bridged merely in a psychological interpre¬
tation of the author, whether it be Schleiermacher's "divinization," Dilthey's
reliving and reproducing the mental life of the author, or Bultmann's exis¬
tential exegesis.1 While these hermeneutical approaches intend to take
seriously the historicity of author and interpreter and the claim which the
text lays upon the hearer, they fail to grasp the comprehensive historical
situation. This is especially seen in Bultmann who, while underscoring the
significance of single historical phenomena and epochs of the past for the
present, eliminates the question of any meaning in history as a course of
2
events.
To be sure, the distance between the author and interpreter was felt
by these hermeneutical approaches. In this respect, the question which
directed their primary hermeneutical inquiry was—how can historically-con¬
ditioned events of the past become meaningfully relevant in the present?
However, what appears to be lacking in Bultmann, for example, is a corresponding
interest in the second aspect of the historical problem—what are the prob¬
abilities of historical knowledge insofar as faith is concerned? To be sure,
Bultmann's work in historical criticism has been as thorough as it lias been
radical. But can historical reflection be divorced from dogmatics in such a
manner that the historical distance to be bridged between text and interpreter
is the sole task of hermeneutics, while the historical authenticity of the
events which the text reports is only minimally important? Must not the
distance between text and events which are reported in the text be equally
^WoIfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," History
and Hermeneutic, p. 150.
^History and Eschatology, p. 121.
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relevant?
The chief merit of Panneriberg lies in his attempt to integrate his¬
torical reflection and dogmatics. It is his avowed purpose to show that the
hermeneutical problem can be resolved only within the context of universal
history. For him, there can be no bridging of the historical past and the
present in terms of a psychological or existential narrowing down of the
problem. Furthermore, the probabilities of historical knowledge have a sig¬
nificant bearing upon the reality of faith.
In sharp contrast to Bultmann who denies any meaning in history as a
course of events since he says one cannot know the end, Pannehberg constructs
a theology of universal history on the very basis that we can know the end
of history since it proleptically occurred in the resurrection of Jesus of
Nazareth. Thus, Panneriberg intends to take seriously the twofold problem of
hermeneutics and history for Christian faith—i.e., how can historically-
conditioned events of the past have absolute significance for the present,
and are the probabilities of historical knowledge sufficiently determined
so as to provide faith with a rational basis?
First, it can be said that Pannenberg proposes the convergence of
history and hermeneutics into a universal-historical perspective. Historical
study must not conceive its task in mere terms of going behind the texts to
ascertain bare facts. Rather, historical study in effect goes beyond the
actual texts when it goes behind them, for what lies behind the texts cannot
be understood as "an isolated datum, but reveals itself only within a universal
context of events and meaning, only in terms of a universal history, which
also embraces the era of the investigator."1 Thus, the task of the historian
history and Hermeneutic, p. 123. Cf. Basic Questions in Theology,
I, 150.
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is not restricted to the "dead remains of the past.""'' On the contrary, the
historical interrogation includes the historian's relationship to the subject
matter, for the "object is already viewed from the perspective of the present
time." This is not to embrace a historical relativism in which it would be
impossible to gain an objective knowledge of what really happened. To be
sure, events have their own immediate environment in which they can be seen,
but their true significance extends beyond this. "The more significant an
occurrence, a figure, is, the more inclusive the context of events will have
to be to which one has reference if one desires to do Justice to its true
significance, even in an approximate way.
On the other hand, if historical study restricts its interest solely
to what happened in the past, then it becomes a subsidiary science to herme-
4
neutics. To be sure, this going behind the texts to the actual course of
events to which the texts refer is the central task of historical study in
itself. But, it must not stop there. Rather, its interrogation must be
viewed from the standpoint of the present interrogator's era, if the true
significance of the past is to be given its due credit. This bridging of
past texts and the present era of the investigator is the central task of
hermeneutics. In fact, it was this bridging of the distance between the past
5
and present that originally gave rise to the need of historical study itself.
At any rate, Pannenberg points out that the distinction between the historical
investigation of going behind the texts and the constructing of hermeneutieal
bridges to the present can at best claim only tentative legitimacy, for both
history and hermeneutics form a single theme.
^History and Hermeneutic, p. 125. ^Ibid. "^Ibld., p. 124.
4lbid., p. 127. 5Ibid., p. 125. 6Ibid.
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That transmitted texts have a relevance that extends beyond their
immediate historical setting explains the relative independence of herme-
neutics from historical study."'" Such is the case for example with the Pauline
letters. Their significance is not exhausted in mere terms of historical
study; they have a present day relevance concerning man's condition before
God. Herodotus intended his history to be a memorial to the heroic deeds of
2
his age which in turn would be an example for all mankind. Panneriberg writes:
"Historiography itself never intends to describe a completed, past epoch
merely as past. That would not be worth the effort. Quite the contrary,
3
historiography is constantly guided by an interest in the present.
What Pannenberg calls for is not an either-or situation, but the
integration of history and hermeneutics into a universal-historical method.
Pannenberg writes:
Thus a certain competition is evidenced between the hermeneutical
and the universalgeschichtlich way of looking at things. Both
have to do with texts. Both reach from the text to the inter¬
preter's present, and both draw the interpreter into the inter¬
pretation of the text. However, the hermeneutical approach
apparently moves exclusively between the past text and the
present interpreter, whereas the universal-historical approach
first of all goes back behind the text, and considers the occasion
or the event which gave rise to the text in the context of its
universal-historical significance, a context which includes the
interpreter's own historical epoch. The universal-historical
method of approach therefore takes a detour, the detour of going
behind the text to the event which underlies it, the event to
which it points, in order that by means of this detour a bridge
may be built to the time contemporaneous with the interpreter
(or the historian).^
In thus proposing the merging of history and hermeneutics, Pannenberg
1Ibid., p. 127.
2
Ibid. Cf. The History of Herodotus, trans. George Rawlinson
(London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1924), I, 1.
^History and Hermeneutic, p. 127. ^Ibid., p. 124.
314
wants to overcome the anthropocentric interpretation particularly of
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Bultmann. Schleiermacher sought to reconstruct
texts from the thought processes of the author without sufficient emphasis
being placed upon the historical setting which is a necessary part of textual
interpretation."*" Dilthey limited history to what man had done, thus making
it possible to intuit the actual meaning of texts on the basis that what man
has created man can know. Pannenberg points out the theological weakness of
defining history solely in terms of what man has done in the past, "it is
simply not the case that the historian may concern himself only with the
intellectual and spiritual activity of man, and may turn everything else over
to physics."
Dilthey thus constructed a faulty hermeneutical bridge because he was
only interested in investigating the past in terms of its present possibilities
of human existence. But if this hermeneutical task is to be accomplished, then
it must go beyond "intuition" to an examination of not what man only did but
what happened to man as well.
Bultmann's emphasis upon the "claim" which the transmitted texts
make upon the investigator in principle overcomes his existentialist "pre-
understanding.To be sure, Bultmann's "preunderstanding" does not intend
to suggest that the text cannot speak anew. In this respect, he stresses
the claim which the text makes upon the hearer. However, he does limit the
"claim" of the biblical texts in terms of what it opens up as possibilities
of authentic existence. However, Pannenberg shows that the biblical texts
are not merely interested in human existence in such an abstract way.
Rather, they speak also of God, the world, and history. In this respect,
XIbid., p. 128. 2Ibid., p. 1J0. ^Ibid., p. 134.
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God mediates Himself to man not only through an existential encounter, but
through the world and history. Man cannot understand himself in isolation from
the whole of reality, but rather he seeks to coordinate his life in terms
of his whole environment. Pannehberg writes!
Is it not true that the question concerning the possibilities of
human existence Is always referred, for its clarification, to
the question concerning the world, concerning society, and beyond
both toward the question concerning God? Is it not true that man
cannot expect an answer to the question concerning himself without
a knowledge of the world, of society, of history and of God? In
that case, self-understanding cannot become thematic without
taking into account a previous understanding of the world, and, in
a certain sense, also a previous understanding of God. Man's
understanding of the world and of God is not only an expression
of his question concerning himselfj rather, it is only the
relationship to the world, to society, to God that mediates man
to himself. Only through the mediation of this relationship does
he gain his self-understanding.1
Pannenberg further shows that the "past cannot be deprived of its
past-ness" and then be re-interpreted as possibilities of present authentic
existence. Instead, the past "must be related to the present precisely as
what is past." This accords with what has been defined as truth—the self-
disclosure of the essence of what-is. In this respect, the texts must be
allowed to speak for themselves.
If a transmitted text, precisely In its past, and therefore non-
contemporary, form, can put a claim upon the interpreter, then
one can obviously not set a priori limits around this claim (for
example, through reflections on the spiritual and intellectual
situation of the present time), but rather, the interpreter
must expose himself entirely to the particularity of that which
is past. He must apprehend the past situation to which the
text is related in its differentiation from his own present, and
may relate that situation only in this differentiation to his
own present time.2
In thus pointing out the convergence of history and hermeneutics,
"^Ibid., pp. 132-133- Cf. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 3-
2 3""Pannenberg, History and Hermeneutic, p. 133- Ibid., p. 13^•
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Panneriberg makes use of Gadamer's expression, "the fusing of horizons," which
describes the meeting between the horizon of the past text and the present
horizon of the interpreter.1 But Gadamer speaks of the linguisticality of
reality and says that the mediation of the past text to the present is an
2
accomplishment of language. In this respect, Gadamer like Ebeling and Fuchs
devalues the assertive character of language in an attempt to preserve "the
"5
unspoken horizon" behind the text. However, Pannenberg argues that even
the unspoken meaning of events in the past must be made into statements and
cannot simply be comprehended in terms of a mere claim which the text makes
upon the hearer in the sense of an existenziell encounter of an "i" with a
"thou." This means that though the hermeneutical task is a linguistic pro¬
cess, the fact remains that the fusing of horizons (i.e., the past with
the present) is not an accomplishment of language alone. But rather, it is
mediated historically. This is to say, the fusing of horizons is the
accomplishment of a new understanding which in turn gives rise to a new
4
way of speaking. Thus, it is only through assertions, statements, and
content that the past is mediated to the present. It has already been
pointed out that truth is itself historical. This is not to eliminate the
objectivity of truth. Rather, it points out that general concepts of man
and the world are conceived of as timeless, while on the other hand the true
content of experience is characterized by its historicality.
"^Ibld., p. 137. Cf. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 9»
p
Supra, pp. 304ff.
^H. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 444, cited by Pannenberg,
History and Hermeneutic, pp. 142-143.
4 i
Pannenberg, History and Hermeneutic, p. 142.
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In thus broadening hermeneutics into a universal-historical per¬
spective, Pannenberg is not adopting the Hegelian total mediation of present-
day truth through history. Rather, on the basis of Jesus' eschatologieal
message, the proleptic character of his resurrection, and his Israelite-
Jewish background, Pannenberg projects the idea of universal history which
leaves the future open, acknowledges the limitation of finite knowledge and
at the same time attempts to provide a valid epistemological access to the
whole of reality."1"
Before further examining the Pannenbergian idea of universal history
as a constructive proposal to the problem which the rise of the modern
historical consciousness has posed for theology, a few clarifying statements
should be made. It should be borne in mind that no attempt is being made
2
to evaluate in a comprehensive sense his systematic theology. Nor is there
any intention of discussing in a direct manner the various doctrines of
Christian theology. For example, the christological problem concerning the
divine and human aspects of Jesus' life insofar as their soteriological and
revelatory significance is concerned is not here directly considered.
Thus, it can be said that this projection of a theology of universal
history is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of all aspects of
Christian doctrine. Nor is it intended to be a total narration of revelatory
3
events. Rather, it is a perspective which brings into focus the whole of
"Sibid., p. 151. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 174-181.
S'or a strictly exposition of Pannenberg's theology, cf. Duane Allen
Priebe, "History and Kerygma: A Study of the Concept of Revelation in Theology
of Wolfhart Pannenberg" (unpublished Doctor of theology thesis, School of
Theology at Claremont, I965)•
3 1
The word, "perspective," is meant here to be a rejection of Pannenberg s
idea of univeral history as an exclusive theological method. Cf. infra, pp. 374f.
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reality in which God reveals Himself (and thus, this is not to say that
revelation is an inference from history). In this respect, an emphasis upon
certain doctrinal truths is not meant to devalue the significance of others,
as though, for example, Jesus' crucifixion were insignificant in comparison
with his resurrection.1
One further clarifying statement perhaps should be made. It would
far exceed the scope and purpose of this work to carry on a direct dialogue
with those who have been engaged in critical debate with Panneriberg's idea
of universal history, especially since what is intended here is a critical
appropriation of certain of his presuppositions in an attempt to come to
terms with the problem of a dualistic epistemology. Thus, this thesis is
not a critical analysis of his whole theology. However, an appreciation
for the critical debate will be indirectly reflected in the discussion
that follows. Some of the more important points raised against Panneriberg's
idea of universal history, which shall be evaluated, include these; (l) Does
his emphasis upon the eschatologieal future devalue the significance of the
present moment? (2) Is an indirect self-revelation of God theologically
valid? In this respect, does he reduce Christian faith to the level of
a mere fides historica? (3) Can Jewish apocalypticism do duty for what
Pannenberg wants it to do? (4) Can the historical-critical method demonstrate
even with a high degree of probability the reality of God's self-revelation?
(5) Is it really possible to go behind the kerygma to the actual course of
events which underlie the kerygma? That is, can the gospels be used as
historical sources as well as testimonies of faith? (6) Does Pannenberg
render innocuous the ministry of the Holy Spirit, especially in regard to
n
Cf. Moltmann's misunderstanding of Pannenberg at this point (Theology
of Hope, p. 83).
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biblical inspiration and prophetic inspiration? (7) Can his Hegelian
emphasis upon the primordial unity of historical fact and meaning be onto-
logically defensible? That is, does his denial of a supernaturally-inspired
interpretation of historical facts have a biblical or philosophical motive?
Or, stated otherwise, do the facts of history really speak their own language
so that God's self-revelation in history is self-evident to anyone who is
properly informed of these events and their contexts. (8) Ultimately, is
Pannenberg's idea of universal history a theological importation without a
solid biblical foundation?
CHAPTER XIII
A THEOLOGY OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY
The relation of history to hermeneuties (which together form the
two aspects of the idea of revelation) poses this question of priority—
is language or history the primary locus of revelation? In Bultmann's
kerygmatic theology and Earth's theology of the Word of God, the primary
locus of revelation is centered in the word, thus putting revelation
outside the possibility of critical inquiry. Though Barth added objectifying
elements to his dogmatics, revelation itself did not come under the general
category of verifiable truth. Thus, revelation was seen as the self-authen¬
ticating Word of God. Ebeling and Fuchs modified Bultmann's "demythologizing"
into the understanding of the linguisticality of reality, i.e., language is
not a secondary objectification, but the reality itself coming to expression
in the language event. However, this language event is not an assertion that
can be objectively analyzed, but rather, it is a communication between persons
as an encounter, an "apprisal."
A. Revelation and the Probabilities of Historical Knowledge
In contrast to this neo-orthodox understanding of revelation as
encounter through word, Pannenberg radically redefines revelation in terms
of history as the comprehensive whole of reality. Here the emphasis is not
upon linguisticality, but upon the historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) of
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of all reality."'' This means that theological knowledge is historical knowledge.
What Pannenberg is asserting is that knowledge of revelation is not a super¬
natural knowledge as though revelatory events occurred in a supra-historical
2
ghetto. The knowledge (i.e., insight) which faith presupposes is a knowledge
of history which is accessible to human comprehension. To set the knowledge
of revelation over against natural knowledge "is in danger of distorting
„3
the historical revelation into a gnostic knowledge of secrets. Pannen¬
berg is thus projecting a theology of reason in which it is asserted that
God has made Himself known within the context of our natural processes of
thought. In thus emphasizing a theology of reason, Pannenberg eliminates
the category of a supernatural order of knowledge as opposed to a natural
order.^ In an exaggerated manner, his polemic is: "THE HISTORICAL REVELATION
IS OPEN TO ANYONE WHO HAS EYES TO SEE. Pannenberg further polemicizes a
strong methodically-objective approach in this way:
Nothing must mute the fact that all truth lies right before the eyes,
and that its appropriation is a natural consequence of the facts.
There is no need for any additional perfection of man as though
he could not focus on the "supernatural" truth with his normal
equipment for knowing. The event, which Paul witnessed, took place
totally within the realm of that which is humanly visible. In
particular, the Holy Spirit is not an additional condition without
which the event of Christ could not be known as revelation.6
'''Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 242.
o 3
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 198. Ibid., p. 135*
^Basic Questions in Theology, I, 13. ^Revelation as History, p. 135-
^Tbid., p. 136. It is this premise that God's revelation is self-
evident to historical reason that has Justly occasioned the criticism that in
effect Pannenberg does not sufficiently clarify "the transition from historical
fact to faith" (Helmut G. Garder and W. Taylor Stevenson, "The Continuity of
History and Faith in the Theology of WoIfhart Pannenberg: Toward an Erotics
of History," The Journal of Religion, LI, no. 1 ^January, 197151). Cf.
L. Steiger, "Revelation-History and Theological Reason: A Critique of the Theo¬
logy of Wolfhart Pannenberg," History and Hermeneutlc, trans. J. C. Weber, p. 88.
322
This means a knowledge of revelation is a knowledge of history, i.e.,
what factually happened in the space-time spectrum. What cannot be ascer¬
tained in the biblical traditions by means of the historical-critical method
cannot be true for Christian faith. This means what is theologically true
cannot be historically false.* But, it is also saying that only those
theological truths which can be sufficiently verified according to a critical
p
reconstruction of the biblical traditions are to be considered valid. In
this way, Pannenberg intends to overcome the trend in theology which locates
revelation in the moment of faith's experience rather than in "a reasoned
knowledge of what is transient and concrete.""' Thus, "Christian faith must
not be equated with a merely subjective conviction that would allegedly
4
compensate for the uncertainty of our historical knowledge about Jesus.
This would only make faith indistinguishable from superstition. Pannenberg
thus sees the task of the theologian to be one of critically assessing the
truth-claim of Christian faith.
For much too long a time faith has been misunderstood to be sub¬
jectivity's fortress into which Christianity could retreat from
the attacks of scientific knowledge. Such a retreat into pious
subjectivity can only lead to destroying any consciousness of
the truth of the Christian faith.5
This leads Pannenberg to says "Faith can breathe freely only when it can be
certain, even in the field of scientific research, that its foundation is
6
true. For example, the historical character of the resurrection of Jesus
*Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 92.
O
Jesus—God and Man, pp. 99, 109. Basic Questions in Theology, I,
38-39, 507~19S-199.
■* 4




(without which Pannenberg argues that there can be no Christology) cannot be
ruled out a priori. It cannot be deprived of its historical past-ness and then
be re-interpreted existentially. If there is any present significance to
the resurrection kerygma, then the kerygma must be taken seriously when it
reports an event that happened in the past. Thus, Panneriberg points out that
faith In Its claim to absolute certainty must reckon with the probabilities
of historical knowledge. In other words, there can be no absolute dualism
of the subjective certainty of truth and the objectivity of knowledge (i.e.,
insight). That is, one must not speak of the resurrection kerygma solely
in terms of its existential relevance without also a critical assessment of
its historical factuality, even as In philosophy Hegel has argued that one
cannot divorce appearance and reality as though what-appears Is relevant
while the question of its reality Is irrelevant. Such a dualism, Pannenberg
would argue, is not any less unacceptable to philosophy than a theological
dualism of faith and a historical knowledge of facts.
In arguing for the corporeality of Jesus' resurrection (which is
the central event in his theology of universal history), Pannenberg pursues
a closely reasoned argument which includes: (l) delineating the Old Testa¬
ment and Jewish eschatological expectation of the general resurrection of
the dead, (2) a historical-critical analysis of the resurrection traditions,
(3) a careful exegesis of the resurrection texts, (4) a philosophical re¬
flection on the possibility of Jesus' resurrection, and (3) anthropological
considerations concerning man's hope for life beyond death."*"
There are, however, two especially significant factors Pannenberg
considers in establishing the resurrection as a historical event. First,
"\jesus—God and Man, pp. 53-11^.
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there is the language of the Old Testament and the Jewish eschatological
expectation in which Jesus' resurrection was expressed. This prior expectation
of the general resurrection of the dead presupposes that the Jewish community
possessed a distinctive thought-pattern in which the resurrection as an
expression of an imperishable life was clearly distinguished from this
worldly-transitory experience of life. Thus, the encounters with the risen
Lord were expressed in already-existing thought-patterns, such as "resurrection
from the dead," "rising from sleep," etc. (Isa. 26:19; Dan. 12:2; I Thess.
4:13ff; I Cor. 11:30; 15:6, 20, 51). Thus, the historical occurrence of
Jesus' resurrection did not need to be interpreted for the first time, but
its interpretation was inherent in the event itself because the disciples
already had a prior conception of the resurrection from the dead. Thus, the
resurrection of Jesus is described not as a mere resuscitation of the dead to
a temporal life, but the transformation of an old body into a "spiritual body"
(I Cor. 15:35-56). This is to say, the early Christian community knew the
difference between "the intended reality and the mode in which it is
expressed in language."1 Without intending to negate the facticity of the
resurrection of Jesus, Pannenberg thus designates it as a "metaphor" insofar
as its linguistic expression is concerned. This means that the event happened
in space and time, though the language itself is analogical because it speaks
of a reality beyond man's present experience. Further, the term, "resurrection
of the dead," is an "absolute metaphor," for it is "the sole expression for a
2
definite subject matter, and is neither interchangeable with other images."
In addition to the Old Testament apocalypticism, Pannenberg delineates
the significance of Jewish apocalypticism in attempting to set forth an
1Ibid., p. 75. 2Ibid., p. 187.
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apologetic for showing how it was possible for the disciples to confess the
reality of the resurrection. He wants to show that this confession was not
an arbitrary or mythological interpretation, but a valid historical statement
based on what factually happened. Thus, the disciples were reporting what
they had seen and not confessing what they merely believed. This is to say,
in arguing for a theology of reason, Pannenberg intends to show that what
the disciples reported did not require a supernatural interpretation. Instead,
the resurrection event can be seen for what it factually was by anyone as a
natural (and not a supernatural) appropriation of the facts.
Whether or not Jewish apocalypticism can serve the apologetic
purpose Pannenberg wishes is debateable. In fact, the Pannenbergian group,
especially Rolf Rendtorff, Ulrich Wilkens, and Pannenberg in Revelation as
History, is criticized for its interpretation of Jewish apocalyptic theology
in establishing a theology of universal history. In appealing to Dietrich
RSssler, Gesetz und Geschichte (Neukirchen Kreis Moerss Verlag der
Buehhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, I960), 1 they argue that God's self
revelation took place in past decisive events, such as the Exodus and the
Conquest, but with the exilic and postexilie prophets, the idea of revelation
was shifted to a future perspective, and finally in Jewish apocalyptic
2
theology revelation was expected to take place at the end of history. Over
against this, it has been asserted that Jewish apocalypticism comes from
astrological determinism and ontological dualism, derived from Persia and
Babylon. It is further contended that the apocalypticists were not concerned
1Cf. Wilkens, Revelation as History, p. 62.
^Revelation as History, pp. 47-48, 59-66, 111-112, 128. Basic
Questions in Theology, I, 20-21.
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with history as the sphere of God's revelatory activity, but with the
eschaton when this present evil world would be done away with."1"
However, Panneriberg's appeal to Jewish apocalyptic theology in the
present context is to point out that the conception of the resurrection from
the dead was not immediately formulated with Jesus' own resurrection, but
that in fact there already had existed a prior conception of the resurrection.
Thus, Pannenberg's apologetic use of the prior conception of the resurrection
from the dead is to point out that the disciples knew how to express the
reality of Jesus' resurrection (though it was necessary to recast this prior
conception in the light of what actually happened), and thus they were not
resorting to mythological conceptions as such.
The second factor to be considered in establishing the resurrection
as a historical event (thus pointing out that the probabilities of historical
knowledge must be reckoned with in reference to the certainty of faith) is the
authenticity of the Pauline account of the appearances of the risen Lord to
certain members of the Christian community (I Cor. 15:1-11). In contrast to
the Gospels' accounts of the appearances of Jesus which Pannenberg (in his
highly rationalistic methodical approach to the study of Scripture) thinks
"have such a strongly legendary character that one can scarcely find a
historical kernel of their own in them," he finds strong historical evidence
"'"Cf. Robert North, "Pannenberg's Historicizing Exegesis," The
Heythrop Journal, II, no. 4, 377-400; H. D. Betz, "The Concept of Apocalyptic
in the Theology of the Pannenberg Group," Journal for Theology and the
Church, VI (1969), 192-207; William R. Murdock, "History and Revelation in
Jewish Apocalypticism," Interpretation, XXI (1967)* I67-I87. It should be
pointed out that Panneriberg has acknowledged that his idea of the Jewish
apocalyptic theology of history must be revised (Basic Questions in Theology,
I, xviii).
2
Jesus—C-od and Man, p. 89.
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of such appearances in Paul. Pannenberg writes:
In view of the age of the formulated traditions used by Paul
and of the proximity of Paul to the events, the assumption that
appearances of the resurrected Lord were really experienced by
a number of members of the primitive Christian community and not
perhaps freely invented in the course of later legendary development
has good historical foundation.*
It is in this context of apocalyptic tradition and the appearances
of Jesus as reported by Paxil that Pannenberg considers decisively significant
for ascertaining the resurrection as a historical event. However, the
question arises whether Pannenberg has in fact "proved" the resurrection
itself, or proved that Paul and those to whom he appeals as witnesses, whose
testimony could be checked by Paul's contemporaries, merely said that Jesus
was raised on the basis of their having remembered certain appearances of
the risen Lord. Whether or not the mere fact that it can be proved that
Paul said Jesus was raised from the dead constitutes a "historical demon¬
stration" of the resurrection itself is problematic. If one understands
history in Collingwood's sense, then Panneriberg's proof is not a historical
demonstration of the resurrection. For Collingwood, what is merely remembered
does not qualify as scientific history. Paul's statement of the resurrection
is based on the "memory" of those who witnessed the appearances of the risen
Lord, but there was no present concrete evidence that Paul could appeal to,
excepting of coxxrse the empty tomb which Paul does not ever mention.
Collingwood, whose epistemology of history Pannenberg in general
p
follows, defines scientific historical knowledge in terms of what can be
conclusively known comparable to the certainty that one can attain in mathe-
^Ibid., p. 91.
*T3asic Questions in Theology, I, 70-72, 78-80.
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matics. It leaves "nothing to caprice," and allows "no alternative con¬
clusion, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstration in mathe¬
matics."^ However, Collingwood does not define all reality as history.^
In this respect, a biography is not defined as historical knowledge insofar
as it relies on memory and not concrete evidence. To be sure, Collingwood
does not deny that a biography is genuine knowledge, but it is not historical
knowledge inasmuch as there is no immediate appeal to tangible evidence but
**
only an appeal to one's memory. Precisely what historical knowledge is for
Collingwood can be seen when he writes:
If I say 'I remember writing a letter to So-and-so last week', that
is a statement of memory, but it is not an historical statement.
But if I can add 'and my memory is not deceiving me; because
here is his reply', then I am basing a statement about the past
on evidence; I am talking history.^
Thus, scientific historical knowledge is imaginatively re-enacting the
past on the basis of what is currently given as concrete evidence.
On the other hand, whenever it is asserted that historical con¬
clusions represent degrees of probability, then Collingwood says that one
is resorting to scissor-and-paste history, which relies on memory and
15
authority of others. However, Collingwood affirms that we may accept as
true some things even though we cannot appeal to the grounds upon which they
are based. But this "information" is not scientific historical knowledge,
g
even though it may be said that such is real knowledge and not mere belief.
Thus, when Parmeriberg states that the resurrection of Jesus has
"good historical foundation" on the basis of those who saw the appearances of
^Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 262. ^Ibld., pp. 210, 302.
^Ibld., p. 304. 4Ibid., pp. 252-253. 5Ibid., pp. 257-263.
6Ibid., pp. 256-257.
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the risen Lord and that faith has its point of departure "on an event which
we can know historically only with probability,""1' then he is not providing a
scientific historical demonstration of the corporeality of the resurrection,
but rather he is only historically demonstrating that Paul and the early
Christian community "said" that Jesus was raised on the basis of their memory
of his having appeared to them. If this is to be called a historical demon¬
stration, then clearly in Collingwood's terms this is a scissor-and-paste
history, based on the memory and authority of those who reported the
appearances. It is because theology has to do with degrees of probabilities
in regard to history that causes the real rub for faith. This is why
Kierkegaard and subsequent neo-orthodox theology refused to put faith at the
mercy of historical research. For Kierkegaard, faith has its point of reference
in history, but Its sole condition is found in God Himself. That is, faith
is solely the work of God. Though Pannenberg clearly distinguishes between
the certainty of faith and the certainty of historical knowledge and shows
2
that they lie on different levels, nevertheless, his exclusively critical-
historical approach is at best problematic from an apologetic standpoint,
for the Scriptures are primarily kerygmatic in intention and only secondarily
can be appealed to as "historical sources," though this is not to reject in
principle Pannenberg's goal of historically vindicating the knowledge of
revelation which is logically prior to faith. Thus, insofar as Jesus'
resurrection is concerned, perhaps it would be more correct to say the
resurrection as a historical event can be shown to be genuine knowledge and
not mere belief, though it does not qualify as a historically verifiable
"scientific" knowledge merely from the standpoint of the Pauline kerygma.
"'"Theology as History, p. 273. 2Ibid.
530
According to Collingwood's episternology, Paul's re-enactment of the resur¬
rection event would have to elicit the support of concrete evidence (such
as the empty tomb) and not merely the memory of witnesses before it
could qualify as scientific knowledge.
To be sure, Pannenberg appeals to the tradition of the empty tomb
and sees in this tradition a valid historical account."*" Consequently,
in theory Pannenberg can assume that the resurrection event can be historically
demonstrated (even according to Collingwood's idea of "scientific" history)
inasmuch as there is not only the tradition of the appearances of the risen
Lord, but also the tradition of the empty tomb as well. This is to say,
"scientific" historical knowledge based on what is concrete evidence (and
not mere memory) can be claimed for the resurrection event itself, if in fact
the tradition of the empty tomb is authentic. But on the other hand, when
Pannehberg argues that (1) the Jewish apocalyptic expectation (which
provided the language for expressing what is meant by the resurrection) and
(2) the Pauline kerygma constitute in themselves a historical demonstration,
it is debateable. Only if the tradition of the empty tomb can be supported
(which Panneriberg argues in favor of) can the resurrection in theory be
called a "scientific" historical demonstration.
However, to restrict the term "historical knowledge" to Collingwood's
definition is more confusing than instructive for the Christian believer whose
faith has to do with historical events. Furthermore, the question arises
whether or not Collingwood's so-called "scientific" history is more a sub¬
jective assertion rather than an objective possibility. To be sure, history
1 P
Jesus—God and Man, pp. 99-106. Ibid., p. 98.
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should be "wholly a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and concrete."1
But is it really possible to assert that "scientific" history proves "its
point as conclusively as a demonstration in mathematics"? This is to say,
can historical knowledge ever advance beyond the concept of probability?
In contrast to Collingwood's epistemology and from a more "practical"
(rather than "scientific") perspective, the believer can speak of the resur¬
rection as a historical event on the basis of Jesus' appearance to the dis¬
ciples and can refer to this knowledge as historical knowledge inasmuch as
the appearance was an occurrence that happened in space and time. At the same
time it is to be acknowledged in accordance with Collingwood's epistemology
that there can be no "scientific" historical verifiability of the resurrection
(if indeed there be such history at all!) merely from the standpoint of the
Pauline kerygma, especially since Paul (I Cor. 15:1-11) only appeals to the
memory of those who witnessed the appearances of the resurrected Lord. One
might further suggest that in the light of what Paul says of the reality of
Jesus' resurrection that to disbelieve that Jesus was raised from the dead
reflects a particular Weltanschauung rather than what Paul's resurrection
kerygma actually affirms on the basis of eye-witness testimony, whose testi¬
mony could be checked.
Pannenberg's emphasis in this regard has been to point out that the
knowledge upon which faith has its point of departure is objective. It is
his quest for the objectivity of knowledge that so characteristically dif¬
ferentiates Pannenberg from the Kantian presupposition that reason can cognize
no valid theological content which rather must be referred to faith as a
subjective postulation. Pannenberg's ontology is in fact a clear rejection
1 2
Supra, p. 278. Supra, p. 328.
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of the Kantian dualistic definition of reality. In this respect, he cannot
accept a dualistic epistemology in which history is dichotomized into the
sacred and the profane. There are not two kinds of historical reality, for
God works in the ordinary world of profane history. Thus, he criticizes
Richard Rothe for making the distinction between the manifestation of God in
the external events of history and the inspiration of the biblical witnesses
whose interpretation is essential to a correct understanding of those reve¬
latory events. Likewise, he criticizes Paul Althaus for holding to the view
that the meaning of Jesus' history as revelation is only accessible to faith.
Pannenberg writes:
Such a splitting up of historical consciousness into a detection
of facts and an evaluation of them (or into history as known
and history as experienced) is intolerable to Christian faith,
not only because the message of the resurrection of Jesus and
of God's revelation in him necessarily becomes merely subjective
interpretation, but also because it is the reflection of an
outmoded and questionable historical method. It is based on
the futile aim of the positivist historians to ascertain bare
facts without meaning in history.^
Pannenberg insists upon the primordial unity of fact and meaning,
event and interpretation. Every event imposes its own meaning to each
inquirer. To be sure, not every event possesses equal clarity, but Its clar¬
ity will be disclosed in proportion to the knowledge of its "context of occur¬
rence and tradition in which it took place and through which it is connected
"X
with the present and its historical interest." Here it can be seen that
Pannenberg is not resorting to a simplistic epistemology in which the mind
passively receives reality. Rather, one must critically evaluate events in the
"^Theology as History, pp. 125-126.
p
Ibid., p. 126. Cf. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 8.
^Ibid., p. 127.
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light of their contexts.
This context of tradition extends from the present moment of each
particular inquirer into the past event. One must not simply inquire into the
past as though it were a dead past. The historian is no cemetery caretaker.'1'
This reciprocal relationship of past and present means that our present thought-
world is not to be sacrificed to a previous world view, but at the same time
our own world view is not to be considered inflexible or absolute. Pannenberg
is not embracing an absolute relativism of historical knowledge, but rather
he is pointing out that any one event has its inherent meaning only as it is
seen in the context of universal history. Obviously truth in any absolute
sense of the word cannot be rationally comprehended by finite man, but this
does not minimize the fact that the greater a knowledge of the traditio-
historical context of any event, the greater one's understanding of the event
will be.
Pannenberg is careful to guard against permitting one's own subjective
interpretation to be injected into an event of the past. Though an event
must be interpreted in the context of universal history, this does not mean
one can inject whatever interpretation he likes into the event, "if we are
to take these facts seriously, nothing out to be inserted so as to allow them
to be seen in a way different from what would naturally emerge."
That one does not see the events correctly does not mean that they
are beyond human reason to know. It could be that one does not have sufficient
historical data to see the meaning of an event. At any rate, insofar as the
meaning of the Christ event is concerned, that certain men do not see Jesus
^"Pannenberg, History and Hermeneutic, p. 125.
2
Revelation as History, p. 157*
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as the revelation of God does not indicate this unique event is above reason
to know, "if the problem is not thought of in this way, then the Christian
truth is made into a truth for the in-group, and the church becomes a gnostic
community."
It can be seen that Parmenberg distinguishes between faith and knowl¬
edge in a comparable way to the Reformers' distinction of notitia, assensus,
2
and fiducia. Faith is trust in Jesus and his message. It is this fiducial
faith that creates fellowship with God. But, this faith is not blind gullibility.
It is based on knowledge, i.e., insight (notitia plus assensus). Faith has
its frame of reference in historical events which can be sufficiently verified,
thus satisfying the demands of our critical rationality, while faith itself,
on the other hand, has its sole condition in the free grace of God. This
means faith is logically preceded by knowledge and thus presupposes its basis
is true. But the condition for faith is the work of God. To be sure, this
knowledge of faith's basis may not be psychologically antecedent to faith,
i.e., faith may not have a scientific knowledge of its basis, but it at least
must presuppose that this basis is true.
It would thus not be accurate in the strict sense of the word to say
that Pannenberg is trying to prove faith. Pannenberg is quite willing to
subsume knowledge under the category of faith in the Reformer's terminology.
Faith, in this respect, includes notitia, assensus, and fiducia. But even
3
here, notitia and assensus logically precede fiducia. Pannenberg further
points out the relationship of faith and knowledge when he writes: "One
cannot really know of God's revelation in Jesus Christ without believing.
"*Tbid. ^Basic Questions in Theology, II, JOff.
•^Ibid., p. 30.
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But faith does not take the place of knowledge."''" Thus, faith has its sole
condition in the work of God and is not the accomplishment of man, though at
the same time Pannenberg contends that the knowledge which faith presupposes
must be open to critical historical research. Thus, it is trust in Jesus
which creates fellowship with God and not theoretical knowledge.
He who believes in Jesus has salvation in Jesus whom he trusts,
without regard to the question how it stands with his historical
and theological knowledge of Jesus. The presupposition is, of
course, that fellowship with Jesus really mediates and assures
salvation. The research and knowledge of theology, or at least
of the theoretical disciplines of theology, deal with the truth
of this presupposition of faith. Such knowledge is thus not a
condition for participating in salvation, but rather it assures
faith about its basis. It thereby enables faith to resist the
gnawing doubt that it has no basis beyond itself and that it
merely satisfies a subjective need through fictions, and thus^
is only accomplishing self-redemption through self-deception.
This emphasis upon history as the locus of revelation which is open
to rational inquiry stands in radical contrast to all forms of dialectical
theology. Pannenberg readily admits that this exclusively historical approach
puts faith at the mercy of historical research. In this respect, one must
reckon with the possibility that the knowledge upon which faith is based could
be shown to be false in the light of future research. To be sure, Pannenberg
does not take this possibility to be a probability: "I see no occasion for
apprehension that such a position of research should emerge in the foreseeable
future. But in principle it cannot be excluded.
If ,
The protests and objections to Pannenberg s proposals are hardly
^Theology as History, p. 128. ^Theology as History, p. 269.
^Ibid., p. 274.
In this respect, Pannenberg complains of the many misrepresentations
of his position ("Postscript," Revelation as History, p. 187.) James Robinson
also says "that argumentation by gibe, innuendo, misunderstanding and inadequate
representation has characterized the debate, which makes it at times difficult
to sift out the points worthy of serious discussion" (Theology as History, p. 80.)
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surprising in the light of its radical divergence from the generally accepted
concept of revelation which is not open to critical, rational inquiry. However,
the question arises whether or not he has in fact articulated the central
concern of faith? Has he not shown that concrete historical events cannot be
treated as marginal or outdated aspects of the biblical witness? That such
questions should be answered affirmatively has already been suggested. We now
turn to a closer look at what Pannenberg means by universal history.
B. History as the Totality of all Reality
Reality as history necessarily implies the temporal development of
reality, in contrast to the Greek concept of the cosmos as the timeless and
unchanging reality. This means that all truth is historically mediated, and
thus it is incomplete. There can be no total mediation of truth through
history because the whole of reality as history is not yet known. This is
not suggesting a relativistic narrowing down of historical knowledge, but a
fundamental recognition of man's finiteness. In this respect, Pannenberg's
proposal for universal history does not succumb to Hegel's total mediation of
truth through history which is accomplished in the present moment."'' However,
Pannenberg does suggest a total mediation of truth through history which will
be ultimately accomplished in the eschaton, but which is known now only pro-
2
leptieally and provisionally. As we have seen, this total mediation of truth
which is accomplished in the eschaton is a direct self-revelation of God.
Until the eschaton, history mediates only indirectly the self-revelation of
God.
'''Pannenberg, History and Hermeneutic, pp. l46ff.
2Ibid., p. 151.
337
To see the present as being drawn toward a definable goal in the
future is not to overlook the irrational and diabolical characteristics of his¬
tory. It is not a naive optimism, but rather it affirms on the basis of what
God has done in Christ that ultimately the love of God will triumph. Even an
optimistic philosophy of history such as Hegel's does not ignore the evil and
the fragmentary nature of history. Hegel speaks of "history as the slaughter-
bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue
of individuals have been sacrificed.1,1 He further says: "But actually his¬
tory is not the soil of happiness. The periods of happiness are blank pages
2 3
in it."^ Despite this, Hegel asserts that history is governed by reason.
However, in contrast to Hegel, to affirm "that reality is history
hastening toward an End"^ does not mean that history is merely the external
exhibition of a logically fixed Idea, for this in effect would reduce history
to the nonessential insofar as anything really new occurring. World history
for Hegel "represents the phases in the development of the principle: whose
content is the consciousness of freedom."^ This is to say, history is the
manifestation of a logically fixed Idea (or Reason) which comes to its aware¬
ness in human consciousness, i.e., "world history is the exhibition of spirit
striving to attain knowledge of its own nature."^
In contrast to Hegel, history as it moves toward its goal in the
eschaton in fact undergoes further development which includes modifications
7
and transformations of present reality. Despite this contingency and incon-
clusiveness of history, to think in terms of the whole of reality is an
^Hegel, Reason in History, p. 27. ^Ibid., p. 33» ~^Ibid., p. 47.
^Theology as History, p. 133. ^Hegel, Reason in History, p. 70.
/T rj
Ibid., p. 23. Panneriberg, Theology as History, p. 260.
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inescapable fact of life, even though it is usually done unreflectively."*"
That it is the experience of man to organize his life in relation to
the whole of his world has been shown in terms of Kant's transcendental ego.
The self is the means of connecting all the appearances of phenomena into a
2
unity by means of the conceptions of the understanding. This means that it
is through our consciousness that we as a thinking self (as ego, the tran¬
scendental apperception) organize all of our experiences of phenomena into a
coherent whole. For Kant, this self-organizing activity of the transcendental
apperception relates only to what are the objects of our experiences and not
the subject of what we experience. This means the self is transcendental
and thus not an absolute self. This further means that the coherent structure
of phenomena produced by the transcendental ego is not absolute knowledge;
3
i.e., it is not knowledge of what really is, but merely what appears. It
is this "transcendental ego" that serves as Hegel's point of departure for
showing what he means by universal history. Hegel says that this definition
of the ego has an important characteristic—it shows that thought produces
1}.
unity, that thought organizes all the manifold things into one. Thought for
Hegel is reality (the Idea, Reason, God). This reality is a process of
becoming aware of itself in human consciousness, or in history. Or, to put
it otherwise, history is a process of reality becoming aware of itself in
human consciousness. Thus, a knowledge of history is a knowledge of God, i.e.,
God (reality, freedom, thought, etc.) comes to know himself in human subjec-
5 i
tivity.^ What Hegel is asserting is a metaphysical monism over'' against Kant s
12 "5
Ibid., p. 242. Prolegomena, pp. 65-66. Ibid., p. 82.
2l
History of Philosophy, III, 437-
^Hegel, Reason in History, pp. 23, 67.
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dualism. However, Hegel is building on to Kant's basic idea of the tran¬
scendental ego which organizes all the elements of human knowledge into one
consistent whole. Hegel turns Kant's transcendental ego into the "Notion,"
the "Truth of all modes of Consciousness," "Absolute knowledge. This
purely logical description (which Hegel derives from Kant's transcendental
logic) has its actual development In world history. "For world history is
the manifestation of the Divine, the absolute process of Spirit in its highest
forms. It is this development wherein it achieves its truth and the conscious-
ness of itself. Thus, in his Logic, the Notion is the "Spirit's knowledge
of its own pure essence,"^ whereas In world history this concrete development
of the Spirit's knowledge of itself takes place. Hence, just as it is the
nature of Kant's transcendental ego to organize all its thoughts of phenomena
into a single coherent whole, even so It is the nature of reason (the Idea,
thought) to effect a unity of all reality. Thus, in terms of his Philosophy
of History, the concrete actualization of God's essence (or, the Notion)
5
constitutes universal history. To be sure, Hegel believed his dialectical
method to be unsurpassable. Whether or not he believed that there would be
no further progress in philosophy itself is debatable.^ At any rate, he did
in principle overleap the boundary of finite existence by Indicating that
7
absolute knowledge could be mediated in the present In terms of world history.
On the other hand, Pannenberg does not assert that one can attain
absolute knowledge as though he would be able on the basis of present
xSupra, p. 82. 2Hegel, Reason in History, p. 70.
•^T'old., p. 67, cf. p. 69. ^Supra, P- 82.
^Hegel, Reason in History, p. 95. °Supra, P- 98.
7
Hegel, Reason in History, p. 95.
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experience to comprehend the whole of history. But, he does argue that the
whole of reality can be historically mediated provisionally and proleptieally
on the basis of God's activity in the world. Pannenberg writes:
But the Hegelian conception of history is in fact not the only
possible one, because the end of history can also be understood
as something which is itself only provisionally known, and in
consideration of this provisional nature of our knowledge of
the end of history, the horizon of the future could be held
open and the finitude of human experience preserved. Precisely
this understanding of history as a totality presented from the
perspective of an end provisionally and proleptically accessible,
is the understanding which is presently to be gleaned from the
history of Jesus in its relationship to the Israelite-Jewish
tradition.
Pannenberg acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel's insights con-
2
cerning the idea of a universal history, but Pannenberg locates the original
3
source, not in Hegel, but in the biblical tradition itself. In this respect,
^History and Hermeneutic, p. 151•
2
Ibid.; Revelation as History, pp. 4, 5* 19*
3
History and Hermeneutic, p. 151. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 12.
Pannenberg has been accused of forcing theology into an alien philosophical
mold (Cf. Martin Buss, "The Meaning of History," Theology as History, p. l4j5;
William R. Murdock, "History and Revelation in Jewish Apocalypticism,"
Interpretation, XXI, 1967* 187)* but is he not rather more fully explicating
in non-biblical terms (i.e., the idea of universal history) what is the authen¬
tic biblical distinction between the present revelation of God in Jesus as
Saviour and the future consummation of his revelation "when his glory (I.e.,
Jesus' divinity) shall be revealed" (I Peter 4:3). Cf. Baillie, p. 60.
Lothar Steiger thinks Pannenberg uncritically adopted Hegel's concept of uni¬
versal history without considering the problems which his epistemology raises
in regard to the self-mediation of thought (Lothar Steiger, "Revelation-
History and Theological Reason," History and Hermeneutic, p. 87). One may well
wish that Pannenberg had defined his theology of universal history in more
direct relation to Hegel (and in this respect this thesis has already pointed
out the relationship between Hegel's idea of world history and his episte¬
mology, as well as indicating its similarity to Pannenberg's theology). But
surely Panneriberg did not intend to present his theology of history as directly
dependent on Hegel, i.e., Pannenberg's idea of universal history was not a
mere sacred version of Hegel's universal history. Thus, to discredit Pannen¬
berg' s theology of universal history simply because he does not comprehensively
evaluate Hegel's thought is not justifiable, for Pannenberg intends to support
his position from Scripture, not from Hegel. Thus, if one is to dismiss
Pannenberg's proposal for a theology of universal history, he must do so
exegetically and not with reference to how adequately Pannenberg understood
Hegel.
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Hegel's philosophical terms are an adoption of the vocabulary of theism,
which in turn is transformed in its meaning to fit Hegel's monistic meta¬
physics."'' In this respect, we have already pointed out that Hegel was a
2
metaphysical monist, but not a monotheist. On the other hand, Pannenberg
derives his theology of universal history from five biblical themes: (l)
the prophetic vision of the universality of the God of Israel,^ (2) the Jewish
4 . . ,
apocalyptic expectation of the coming Kingdom of God, (3) Jesus claim to
5 6
authority," (4) Jesus' eschatological message of the imminent reign of God,
and (5) the self-confirmation of Jesus' unity with God through his resurrection
7
from the dead.
In asserting that it is history as the whole of reality (which culmi¬
nates at the end) that reveals the essence of God, Pannenberg is not intending
to suggest that the infinite is reduced to the finite or that God is identical
with the process of history itself. But neither is God to be thought of as
a timeless, static Being. Rather, He is creatively active in the process of
history. He is the power of the future who works in the present in order to
usher in his Kingdom. This is not to localize the infinite in the finite.
Neither is it to adopt "an exclusive immanence" (which is itself a contra-
g
diction in terms) as opposed to a transcendency. Pannenberg writes:
"*Hegel, Reason in History, p. 25. 2Supra, p. 242n.
3
Revelation as History, p. 133 £t passim; Basic Questions in Theology,
II, 113f.; Theology as History, pp. 118-125.
4
Revelation as History, p. 127; Jesus—God and Man, pp. 67, 74-75# 7°,
8i^
^Theology as History, pp. 101-117. ^Ibid.
'Ibid., pp. 125-131? Jesus—God and Man, pp. 53-114.
^Theology as History, pp. 251-252.
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History is not the field of a finitude which is enclosed within
itself, an "immanence" to which one could and indeed would have
to oppose a "transcendence." History is far rather the ongoing
collapse of the existing reality which is enclosed in its own
"immanence" (because centered on itself). The power of the
infinite is active and present in this collapse of the finite.
Thus, history is not merely the sum total of what man has done and
2
suffered, as Aristotle put it. Neither is history merely the creation of
man, as Vico and Dilthey asserted. What man is and has created are finite,
but history in this sense is not finite. "Rather, it accomplishes the crisis
of the finite throughout time. Hence man shows himself to be finite in his
history." Pannenberg further writes:
If one regards history only as the sum of the self-contained
finite, and understands it in this way as the total panorama of
human deeds and sufferings, then it really becomes incomprehensible
how it can be said of history that God is revealed in it.
However, Panneriberg points out that history is not itself self-explanatory
apart from the transcendent reality of God who chooses to make himself known
in history. If history were thought of as being "wholly other" from the
^Theology as History, pp. 251-252.
2Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric, edited and translated by Theodore
Buckley (London: George Bell and Sons, 1894), p. 424.
•^Theology as History, p. 252. ^Ibid.
"^Writing from the standpoint of a "secular Christianity," Ronald Gregor
Smith has pointed out in this regard the "malaise in the modern secularist
position" in that it tends to eliminate the element of faith in the transcen¬
dent reality of God. For Smith, it is this "faith which makes man's autono¬
mous responsible action possible" (The Doctrine of God, edited and prepared
for publication by K. Gregor Smith and A. D. Galloway /"London: Collins,
1970_7, p. 158). To be sure, Smith is not speaking of history in Pannehberg's
sense; but from a different perspective he is arguing, as Panneriberg does,
that what makes man's responsible action and meaningful experience possible in
history is the historicity of God, i.e., man knows God to be the source of our
own historicity because God himself"is involved in our history" (ibid., p. 166).
Thus, Smith speaks of God's history because He is involved in man's history.
Smith, in speaking of the history of God, does not mean to suggest that God
undergoes a change in His essence and thus he parts company with those forms
yv
reality of God, then there would be no purpose in speaking of God, if history
in this respect were complete and comprehensible without Him.
Only because the infinite reality, which as personal can be called
God, is present and active in the history of the finite, can one
speak of a revelation of God in history. For it is thereby con¬
cretely shown that the finite is not left to itself.
Thus, God reveals Himself indirectly in history and in Jesus of Nazareth
Joins Himself to the finite. But this is not saying that history reveals God
as an inference from history as though this would constitute a cosmological
proof for the existence of God corresponding to the Greek idea of a timeless
2
cosmos from which one infers the existence of one god. Rather, God is
"immediately perceptible to men" because He makes Himself known, and thus this
knowledge "is not first discovered upon reflection by means of an inference."^
C. An Eschatological Doctrine of Creation
The central theme in Pannenberg's entire systematic theology is his
eschatologically-oriented ontology. In this respect, he views historical
time and the comprehensive whole of reality (i.e., history) from an eschato-
4
logically-oriented perspective.
of process theology which adhere to Whitehead at this point (ibid., pp. 143-
161). Likewise, Pannenberg argues that time is implicit in the essence of
God, though God Himself does not change in His essence (infra, pp. 351ff •) •
^"Theology as History, p. 253«
p
Ibid., pp. 254-255. Cf. Jtirgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. JJff.
Hiroshi Obayashi, "Pannenberg and Troeltsch: History and Religion," Journal
of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVII (1970), 401-419.
•^Theology as History, p. 255.
4 .
This eschatological feature of Pannenberg s ontology is the over¬
whelming emphasis of all his writings so that it is not practical to provide
a comprehensive system of footnote references to all that he has to say on
this subject.
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What he has to say about an eschatological conception of ontology
has its exegetical basis in Jesus' message on the imminent Kingdom of God.
Panneriberg takes seriously the well-known tension that expresses itself in
Jesus' eschatological message, i.e., the tension between "the already" and
"the not-yet" aspects of the Kingdom of God. Pannenberg sees this tension
to mean that both future and present are "inextricably interwoven."^ God's
Kingdom is not merely some future cosmic event, while man simply waits and
endures for its arrival. Rather, the present is pregnant with meaning because
God, who is the power of the future, extends his rule into the present. This
means the present is the effect of the future. God as the power of the future
lias acted decisively in His Son whose message, life, and fate have eschato¬
logical significance for all mankind. This means Jesus' eschatology cannot
be narrowed down to a timeless eschatological "deed of God" in which the
2
possibilities of human existence would merely be unveiled. Rather, who
Jesus was and what happened to him is a proleptic unveiling of the future.
This also suggests that it is the "power of the future" which is so deci-
sively significant for the "present" instead of the mere "power of the past."
Thus, the imminent Kingdom of God as proclaimed in the eschatological
message of Jesus is "a key to the whole of Christian theology."^ This pre¬
supposition of the Kingdom of God for theological reflection holds in utter
seriousness the cosmic and historical implications of Jesus' eschatological
^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 53-
2Ibid., p. 52.
^Ibld., p. 64; Basic Questions in Theology, pp. 245 et passim.
4
Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 53-
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message. This to say, the eschatoiogical future must not be reduced to a
mere ethical attainment on the part of man as though he could bring about the
Kingdom of God on earth by means of his own initiative. "This future is
expected to come in a marvelous way from God himself; it is not simply the
development of human history or the achievement of God-fearing men," according
to the biblical witness.1 The uniqueness of Jesus' eschatoiogical message,
however, consisted not in his preaching concerning the coming of God's Kingdom
on earth, but rather that the presence of this coming Kingdom was now already
happening in his person, thus showing that the present is to be seen in the
light of the future and that he himself as God's Son is the pre-actualization
of the future.
This radical nature of Jesus' eschatoiogical message stands in sharp
contrast to the ethical interpretation of the liberal theology of the nine¬
teenth century. For Albert Schweitzer, Jesus' eschatoiogical preaching was
2
an offense to modern thought. For Bultmann and the early Barth, eschatology
I
was stripped of its temporal meaning. Bultmann still speaks of present
3
eschatoiogical existence to the exclusion of any concrete futurity. C. H.
Dodd believed, as well as Bultmann, that the future aspect of Jesus' message
4
was a dispensible remnant of Jewish thought. For Pannenberg, the eschato¬
iogical future of the Kingdom of God, in contrast to a mere eschatoiogical
present, is seen to be the "resounding motif of Jesus' message," and for this
5
reason cannot be summarily dismissed.
1Ibid., p. 52. *TPhe Quest for the Historical Jesus, p. 397*
3
Supra, pp. 229f.
^History and the Gospel (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1938), p. 62.
theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 53-
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This brings us to Pannenberg's idea of an eschatological doctrine of
creation."'' This suggests that the present derives its significance and power
from the future, which has always been active in the past. This reversal of
the time sequence in which the future has priority over the past is a fun¬
damental implication of Jesus' eschatological message, i.e., the coming
Kingdom of God.
To speak of the Kingdom of God is to speak of the rule of God.
To speak of the rule of God is to speak of the being of God, since His mile
cannot be thought of apart from His existence. To speak of the being of God
in connection with the rule of God is to speak of the power of God, for it is
2
through the power of His being that He rules.' And, since Jesus' eschato¬
logical message proclaimed both the "already" and the "not-yet" of the
Kingdom of God, it can be said "in a restricted but important sense, God
does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's
being is still in the process of coming to be. In this way, Panneriberg
points out that it is in the eschaton that God's rule shall be universally
established at which time it can be said that the goal of history will be
attained, thus showing that the end of history will be one with the essence
''"Ibid., pp. 60, 70. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 237•
theology and the Kingdom of God, pp. 55f •
^Tbid., p. 56. Cf. Basic Questions in Theology, II, 242. Obayashi
obscures this ontological implication of Jesus' eschatological message and
resurrection when he suggests that Pannenberg's emphasis upon the future is
derived from his ontological and cosmological presuppositions (Hiroshi
Obayashi, "Pannenberg and Troeltsch: History and Religion," Journal of
the American Academy of Religion, XXXVII /~1970_Z» 405# 413). Quite the
contrary, it could be argued that Pannenberg's emphasis upon the ontological
priority of the future has its basis in Jesus' eschatological message and
not in any ontological presupposition per se.
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of God. The meaning of this "not-yet" of God's existence will be further
enunciated in connection with the idea of eternity.
The ontologieal implication of Jesus' eschatological message suggests
a reversal in the traditional time sequence. Creation does not stand at
the opposite pole of eschatology within the time spectrum. Rather, theology
should speak of a "creative eschaton,thereby showing that the temporal
beginnings of the history of the world eventuate from the future and that God
as the power of the future is creatively directing the course of history toward
the ultimate inauguration of His Kingdom. This means creation should not
be seen from the perspective of a mere primordial beginning.
The notion of the Kingdom of God evokes a vision of the unity
of each being and the unity of the whole world as flowing from
the future. Par from creation being at one end of the time
spectrum and eschatology at the other, creation and eschatology
are partners in the formation of reality. The future decides
the specific meaning, the essence, of everything by revealing
what it really was and is. At present a being is "something," a
unity in itself, only by anticipation of its unifying future.
The future interprets the present and the past; all other in¬
terpretations are helpful only to the degree that they anticipate
the future.2
Thus, an eschatological doctrine of creation calls for the rearranging
of the traditional time sequence, so that the past and present are seen to be
the effect of the future. This does not eliminate the contingency of events.
On the contrary, contingency (freedom) is a necessary presupposition for the
existence of a personal God who is the power of the future. Without the
concept of freedom there can be no concept of person as such. Thus, the
contingency of events suggests the reality of a personal God who brings into
3
existence what is uniquely new.
^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 6j. Cf. Jesus—God and Man, pp.
39if. """"
^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 60. ^Ibid., pp. 58ff»
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Also, an esehatological ontology points to the constancy (pre¬
destination) of events. Both contingency and constancy are essential
elements. Reality is not one blind chaotic process, but neither is it a
mechanically operated cause-effect. What is significant is that despite the
contingency of the world there is unity, for God as the power of the future
guarantees the unity of all events through His sovereignty while at the
same time allows for contingency in His freedom. Thus, the decisive feature
of Jesus' eschatological message is that the present eventuates from the
future, i.e., the present is being drawn toward a definable goal in which
all reality shall come under the rule of God. Pannenberg writes:
Jesus' message of the Kingdom of God implies that the unity of
the world is to be expected from its future. Therefore the
unity of all things should not be understood in terms of an eternal
cosmos but as something to be achieved by a process of recon¬
ciling previous schisms and contradictions. Reconciliation is
a constitutive aspect of creation.
Here it can be clearly seen that Pannenberg does not divorce nature and
history. He is not willing to restrict the theologian's concern to man
and then simply turn everything else over to natural science. Rather, he
2
shows that creation itself is in need of the reconciling activity of God.
In this respect, the theologian must reject the idea of natural causality
in the sense that natural or historical processes are mechanically necessi¬
tated. It is this presupposition of natural science that Whitehead labels
"5
"anti-rationalistic," "a naive faith," and "scientific materialism."
-4heology and the Kingdom of God, p. 60.
2
Indeed the biblical witness includes "nature" as well as man to be
fallen under the curse of sin (Genesis 3'17; Romans 8:19-23). Cf. Cullmann,
Salvation in History, p. 146.
^Supra, pp. 271f. Whitehead's ontological consideration demands the
existence of God as the Principle of Concretion in order to account for the
"togetherness of all actual occasions." be sure, this idea of is a
While the scientific laws of natural science have their validity
in the sense that they are descriptive of the processes of nature, they are
not to be thought of as "deterministic models of reality,""'' or as Leibniz
has put it, they are not necessary laws of pure reason, but contingent
2
truths of fact. These laws of nature point to the unity of the world which
has its basis in the sovereignty of God, thereby showing that natural pro¬
cesses are contingent upon the freedom of God. This means the law of cau¬
sality must be seen in the light of the biblical doctrine of creation and
eschatology if the eschatological message of Jesus concerning the Kingdom of
God is to be taken seriously. This further means that the concept of his¬
torical relativity does not rule out a priori the possibility of something
absolutely unique occurring in history.
The eschatological conception of time (i.e., that the present which
is now past eventuates from the future) overcomes the existentialist narrowing
down of time as it is seen in the early Heidegger's Being and Time. In this
work, Heidegger spoke of the order of time as originating from the future,
through the past, and on to the present. For Heidegger, the future refers to
what are the existential possibilities of human existence. The past refers
to his facticity, i.e., his "thrownness" into the world. The present refers
to his "fallenness," i.e., his not having appropriated his future possibili¬
ties. Time is thus understood existentially and ecstatically. I.e., to states
of mind. This means man exists, not in time, but as time (temporality).
metaphysical principle which attempts to explain the "separative," "prehensive,
and "modal" cliaracters of space-time and thus is not here introduced for
religious purposes (Science and the Modern World, pp. 93* 9^» 250).




Though Heidegger rightly seeks to correct the one-sided mechanical view of
time, i.e., time as merely the moving sequence of "nows," on the other hand.
Christian theology has the responsibility of showing that the possibilities
of human existence are not exhausted in Heidegger's terms of an existentialist-
eschatological narrowing down of the future whereby the future is deprived
of its concrete reality and re-interpreted in terms of a "state of mind."
Stated succinctly, eschatological existence is a present reality because God
as the power of the future has acted decisively in the past in His Son who
unfolded and made possible in his life, death, and resurrection the present
possibilities of human existence and further unfolded what are the eschato¬
logical future possibilities of human existence through his resurrection
from the dead.
In this respect, Pannenberg has attempted to show that the present
meaning and possibilities of human existence eventuate from a concrete
future, a future which is identical with the Kingdom of God; but it is a
future that has already proleptically arrived in the present which may be
thought of as a "permanent present" insofar as this future impinges upon
the present."1" This means that those who are rightly related to Jesus
Christ and his message already share in the future, the eschaton.
To speak of the eschatological future of the Kingdom of God is not
to eliminate the reality of God's presence and male in the present. Present
eschatological existence is available to man because the eschatological future
has proleptically occurred in Jesus of Nazareth whose redemptive life
effected man's reconciliation with God. Or, to put it otherwise, salvation
is available to man today because the future of God's Kingdom in which God
^Theology and the Kingdom of God, pp. 1'42-142.
351
reigns supremely and universally has been unveiled in Jesus' eschatological
message and person, and those who accept his message of forgiveness also
accept him, for it is through his cross and resurrection that Jesus' person
and message are seen to be interrelated. Thus, those who believe in Jesus
already participate in the coming Kingdom of God."''
To speak of the coming Kingdom of God is not to degrade the past,
for God as the power of the future miles the past as well as the present.
This means to speak of God as the power of the future is to speak; of His
eternity. To be sure, eternity is not a timeless reality. It is not the
unchanging, primordial, and eternal present of Platonic philosophy. Neither
is God "the concept of a timeless ground of being in the depths of reality,
2
in the background of the realm of being." Rather, time is implicit in the
3
very essence of God. This means that only in the actualization of the
future, i.e., in the eschaton when God's Kingdom shall become a concrete and
universal reality, will history be one with the essence of God. Only then will
God's self-revelation be direct, for both his will and purpose will be communi¬
cated in an unbroken and direct manner. In philosophical terms, this means
subject and object will be identical, that what-is will be fully revealed in
what-appears, that the one who communicates and what is communicated will be
identical.
In contrast to Whitehead who posits the idea of a development in God
because of his involvement in time, Pannenberg sees the futurity of God's
^Theology as History, pp. 116-117. Jesus—God and Kan, pp. 245-
280.
^Basic Questions in Theology, II, 244.
^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 62.
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Kingdom to mean that what the present truth is will be decided from the
standpoint of the future. But, this does not mean that God undergoes a
development in His essence. Rather, when the goal of history has been
accomplished, it will be seen that what is true then was true throughout the
movement of time. Pannenberg writes:
It is true that, from the view point of our finite present, the
future is not yet decided. Therefore, the movement of time
contributes to deciding what the definite truth is going to be,
also with regard to the essence of God. But—and here is the
difference from Whitehead—what turns out to be true in the future
will then be evident as having been true all along. This
applies to God as well as to every finite reality. God was pre¬
sent in every past moment as the one who he is in his futurity.
He was in the past the same one whom he will manifest himself
to be in the future. What distinguishes the present argument
from Whitehead's philosophy is the ontological priority of the
future as this priority is evident in the idea of God as the one
who is coming."'"
Pannenberg is not suggesting that God merely relates Himself to
finite man as the power of the future, but that God is in himself the power
2
of the future. This means God is pure freedom. However, without the
concept of the future there can be no concept of freedom or person. In
this respect, only if man has a future does he have freedom, for openness
to the future is a fundamental feature of freedom and individuality. This
means man is free to the extent that he can transcend himself and thus
transform and go beyond the present. In contrast to man, God is pure freedom
because there is no future beyond Him. This idea of the personality and freedom
of God is distinguished from Paul Tillich who says that God is not a being or
3
a person but Being itself, the Ground of Being. However, Pannenberg points
out that unless God is thought of to some extent as an independent Being with
"'"Ibid., pp. 62-63. 2Ibid., p. 63.
3
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 235-
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personality, the concept of God is meaningless.1 Panneriberg shows that God
is the power of Being because He is the power of the future and thus pure
freedom. "Being is itself to be thought of from the side of the future,
instead of as the abstract, most universal something in the background of
2
all beings." Since God (as Being) is the power of the future, this
suggests His eternity. Panneriberg writes:
Because there is no future beyond God, his having been the future
of his past creatures has not, for him, passed away. He remains
the future of the whole of the past and keeps present to himself
his having been the finite future of every finite present which
has now become past. Thus he keeps his past creatures in the
present of his future.3
1Basic_ Questions in Theology, II, 236.
2
Ibid., p. 246. From a different perspective, Ronald Gregor Smith
also calls attention to the inadequacy of Tillich's category of Being in
speaking of the reality of God. Smith argues for a more dynamic view of
God's reality in which the emphasis falls upon the coming of God to man in
terms of historical experience (The Doctrine of God, pp. 78-IO9). For
example, instead of the words spoken to Moses at the burning bush, "i am
that I am" (Ex. 3* 13-15), suggesting the idea of Being as a fundamental
category for speaking of God, Smith seeks to show that what is involved in
the giving of this name to Moses is that God will show Himself to His people
as He so chooses in His freedom. Smith cites von Rad in support of this
interpretation of Ex. 3:13-15 as the dynamic coming of God to man in
historical experience: "The whole narrative context leads right away to the
expectation that Jahweh intends to import something—but this is not what
he is, but what he will show himself to be to Israel" (Gerhard von Rad,
Old Testament Theology ^"Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962_7, I, 180, cited
by Smith, The Doctrine of God, p. 95). Likewise, Panneriberg wants to speak
of God in such dynamic terms, but Panneriberg defines the Being of God
(ontology) in terms of His unbounded future (eschatology)} i.e., God's Being
is to be determined by what His eschatological future will show Him to be.
In this respect, ontology and eschatology are not separated as they are in
Michalson who says: "New Testament faith is eschatological and not
ontological" (Worldly Theology, p. 105, cited by Smith, The Doctrine of God,
p. 108).
•^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 63.
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In this respect, Pannenberg calls for a revision of the Greek idea of
eternity (as the eternal present). Since God exists as the final future, then
the idea of eternity may be defined as "the totally comprehensive present."'''
In this way, the concept of eternity includes the element of change and
time.
From man's finite perspective it can be said that "the eschaton
2
is eternity in the fullest sense." Eternity refers to the existence
(or Being) of God. And since in the eschaton it is the essence of God to
exist, the past, present, and future are merged into one. This means the
eschaton is the arrival of the Kingdom of God. To be sure, God's existence
has been from eternity and He has always remained the same because in His
pure freedom He exists as the final future. But for finite man, God's essence
does not yet fully exist. It Is only in the eschaton that God's essence
will be directly seen to exist.
By emphasizing the futurity of the Kingdom of God which will
disclose the essence of God, it should be reiterated that this is not
devaluing the present. Nor is it adopting any form of theological agnosticism.
To be sure, man's knowledge of God's revelation can be ascertained histori¬
cally as it is reported in the biblical tradition, and thus his relationship
to God through Jesus of Nazareth is no pious self-delusion. But, man's
knowledge (insight) of God's self-revelation is only indirect and partial,
which can only be direct and complete in the eschaton. On the other hand,
man's experience of God through faith (fiducia) in Jesus is direct and
immediate, for fellowship with Jesus "really mediates and assures salvation."
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 64.
■^Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 269-
355
"He who believes in Jesus has salvation in Jesus whom he trusts, without regard
to the question how it stands with his historical and theological knowledge
of Jesus," though of course one must at least presuppose the message of
Jesus is true."'" The distinction between God's direct and indirect self-
Ibid. Obayashi has overlooked Pannenberg's basic contention that
faith is trust in Jesus and that this fiducial faith cannot be equated with
theoretical knowledge (cf. Hiroshi Obayashi, "Future and Responsibility: A
Critique of Pannenberg's Eschatology," Studies in Religion Sciences Re-
ligieuses, I, no. 3 /Winter, 1971 7# 191-203. To say that Panneriberg re¬
duces faith to the level of a mere~""cognitive substitute" (ibid., p. 196)
is not to do justice to his position. Further, Pannenberg clearly distinguishes
between the certainty of faith and the certainty of historical knowledge,
thereby showing that faith in Jesus assures and mediates salvation while
historical knowledge is characterized by degrees of probability (cf. Pannen¬
berg, Theology as History, p. 273)• Thus, faith and historical knowledge
lie on two different levels, but they are not antithetical. Neither is it
accurate merely to say that for Pannenberg faith is a "cognitive substitute.
It is a trust in the realm of cognition, one that consists In the suspended
state of affairs between prolepsis and the eschaton. It is a kind of trust
in which man hopes that his knowledge, based on the prolepsis, will be
justified rather than disappointed at the end" (Obayashi, Studies in Re¬
ligion, p. 196). This interpretation of Pannehberg's view of faith
which completely ignores his emphasis upon man's existential participation
in present salvation is at best a one-sided representation. For example,
to say that Pannenberg "fails to ascribe any function to faith" (ibid.,
p. 198) is not an accurate assessment of Pannenberg's position. When
Obayashi says that faith "must include the decision to believe" and that
faith is self-commitment (ibid., p. 199)» then he is not saying anything
different from Pannenberg. On the other hand, Pannenberg would argue that
for one to believe without a "factual ground for believing" (ibid.) is
pious self-delusion. However, it is not fair to say that "the eschatological
ontology of Panneriberg tends to dismiss faith in this sense of total
commitment" (ibid., p. 199). Rather, it would be accurate to say that
Pannenberg will not accept a divorce between reason and faith. Further, it
is a caricature of his position to say that for Pannenberg man's "essence
horrifyingly awaits him at the end imposing itself upon his existence as
what he should have made of himself" (ibid., p. 198). Quite the contrary,
Pannenberg believes that man can have salvation now because he has fellow¬
ship with Jesus Christ. But, this present participation in salvation is
possible because of the self-revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth. To
be sure, for Pannenberg God as the power of the future Is bringing history
toward its end when the believer will participate in the eschaton and enjoy
the naked presence of God. Strictly speaking, fiducial faith, for Pannenberg,
has its point of departure in past events (i.e., the Christ event) and this
faith is also oriented toward the future. However, faith in Jesus has a
definite function for Pannenberg, for it is faith (not theoretical knowledge)
that mediates present salvation. Cf. Thomas D. Parker, "Faith and History,
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revelation (or stated otherwise, the distinction between the "already" and
"not yet" of the Kingdom of C-od) can be further illustrated in the philo¬
sophical distinction of appearance and reality.
The unity and difference between appearance and reality has already
been suggested in the chapter on "the ontology of history." There it was
pointed out that appearance is the fundamental feature of reality. What
appears is what is, though at the same time it must be said that what is
is not exhausted in what appears. Reality appears in more than one event,
and yet reality is more than its appearances. This does not suggest that
appearance is mere semblance. Rather, what is really appears. Pannenberg
writes: "Connected with the possibility of manifold appearance of one and
the same eidos is the fact that it exhausts itself in none of its appearances.
There always remain other ways in which 'the same' eidos could appear."1
Insofar as the Kingdom of God is concerned, it has already appeared
in the ministry of Jesus. In his person, the coming Kingdom of God has al-
A Review of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man," McCormick Quarterly,
XII, no. 1 (November, 1°68), especially pp. 72-73 where Parker defends
Pannenberg against his critics at this point. Parker here shows that
Pannenberg "indicates his awareness of the personal, existential dimensions
of faith. He agrees with his critics that faith is a personal commitment
made in response to the Kerygma." However, Obayashi (despite his misinter¬
pretation of Pannenberg) does rightly emphasize that if the external evidences
of Christian faith extended beyond the realm of more or less degrees of
probability to the realm of absolute certainty then faith could easily
degenerate into mere fides historica. John Wesley also long ago made this
point in his controvery with the English deists. He wrote: "I have some¬
times been almost inclined to believe that the wisdom of God has, in most
later ages, permitted the external evidence of Christianity to be more or
less clogged and encumbered for this very end, that men (of reflection
especially) might not altogether rest there, but be constrained to look into
themselves also and attend to the light shining In their hearts" (Wesley,
"A Plain Account of Genuine Christianity," John Wesley. A Library of
Protestant Thought, edited by Albert C. Outler / New York: Oxford University
Press, 196b_7, p. 192).
theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 132.
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ready commenced in the world, though at the same time the present appearance
of the reality of the Kingdom of God does not exhaust its futurity. This
is to say, the reality of the Kingdom of God has already made its appearance,
even though this appearance is to be differentiated from its reality. Only
in the eschaton will the reality of the Kingdom of God be identical with
its appearance.
This distinction between the present appearance and the future
reality of the Kingdom of God corresponds to the distinction between God as
Father and Jesus as Son. That the Kingdom of God has appeared means that
the reign of God was begun on earth in the person of Jesus. This means
"that God himself had uniquely and definitely appeared in Jesus without the
difference between Jesus and God himself being thereby dissolved.""'' Thus,
the arrival of the future reality of the Kingdom of God in the present means
that God joined Himself to the finite by making His appearance in Jesus,
though without restricting the reality of Himself to His appearance in
Jesus. Pannenberg writes: "The distinctive characteristic of the message
of Jesus is that the future of the rule of God is not separated from the
present as still outstanding, but that precisely as the future it becomes
the power that determines the present and thus comes to appearance in the
2
present."" Stated philosophically, this means appearance is the partial
3
arrival of the future.
"'"Ibid., p. 13&. ^Theology as History, p. 267n.
leology and the Kingdom of God, pp. 127-14-3. Obayashi thinks that
Parmenberg's emphasis upon the eschatological future "minimizes the signifi¬
cance of the present." Cf. Hiroshi Obayashi, "Pannenberg and Troeltsch:
History and Religion," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVIII
(1970)» 4-1J. It is difficult to understand why such a judgment should be
made against his idea of the eschatological future. Pannenberg certainly
intends to show that the present is decisive because God as the power of the
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It is this combined unity and difference in appearance and reality
that places the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation at variance with the
ancient oriental religions in which any certain form of the deity's
appearance was inconsequential because its appearance constituted
no essential unity with the god. Because of this separation of appearance
and reality, the mythical god could "appear" in as many forms as it wished,
for its appearance was nonessential to its being. Likewise, in Platonic
philosophy appearance was nonessential to true being. Such is not the case
with the idea of the Incarnation. The appearance of Cod in Jesus of
Nazareth means his essential unity with God, thus suggesting that appearance
and essential presence coincide. This inseparable Interaction between
appearance and reality insofar as the doctrine of the Incarnation is concerned
is cogently described by Pannenberg.
In the ministry of Jesus, on the contrary, the God of Israel,
the future of his Reign, comes definitively to appearance once.
He manifested himself In this single event conclusively and
for all time, and just for this reason only once. This is how
the later ecclesiastical doctrine of the incarnation expressed
the matter, over against all Hellenistic notions of an epiphany.
The finality of Jesus' ministry is based on its eschatological
character, on the fact that through it the ultimate future
of God's Reign becomes determinative of the present and there-
future has already acted in the past, thereby giving meaning to the present.
For example, Pannenberg says that the eschatological future "has already
become decisive for the present since the appearance of Jesus. In virtue
of Jesus' appearance and destiny it has become possible to live one's
present existence in its specific, concrete constellation as it appears
in the light of God's future and thus in his ultimate truth" ("The Question
of God," Interpretation, XXI /July, I967Z, 515)• Perhaps it could be argued
that Pannenberg does not actually say enough about the "present" in his
writings (cf. Helmut G. Harder and W. Taylor Stevenson, "The Continuity of
History and Faith in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Toward an Erotics
of History," The Journal of Religion, LXI, no. 1 /"January, 1971_7» 51-5^)•
But to say his theology of the eschatological future "minimizes the signifi¬
cance of the present" is not convincing.
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fore becomes present. Appearance and essential presence are here
one. Is not this character of the appearance of God in Jesus—
as opposed to the different religio-historical background of the
Platonic-Parmenidean relation between appearance and true
being—also relevant for considering the problem of appearance
in general?^
Thus, the significance of the appearance of God in Jesus is that this
appearance is an enduring present appearance because it is the essential
presence of the unlimited future. Theologically stated, the reality of God
as the unbounded future has appeared in Jesus of Nazareth, and this appearance
is a permanent and enduring present because it is the appearance of the
ultimate reality of the future (i.e., God). Pannenberg writes:
The confession of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ affirms,
in this sense, that in him the future of God has become present
among us, and not only a transitory present (in an event which
in the meantime has become past once more for us), but an
enduring present—through the spirit of Jesus—because it is a
present that has an unbounded future.2
The obvious implication of such an "enduring present" is that in Jesus of
Nazareth we have the finality of God's revelation so long as history is still
hastening toward the eschaton. This is to say, that if the reality of God
has appeared in Jesus, then he is the anticipation of the ultimate future
which is God. And, if the appearance of Jesus is the arrival of what is the
ultimate future, then no other event can surpass the Christ event without
involving itself in a logical contradiction. To be sure, God continues to
work In history, but He does not reveal Himself in any fundamentally new manner,
i.e., if the appearance of Jesus is really the arrival of God as the power of
3
the future.
^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 135-
^Theology as History, p. 267n.
Jesus—God and Man, pp. 128ff.
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Finally, it can be said that Pannenberg's eschatological doctrine of
creation is not a "mobile teleological concept of totality."1 Rather, history
is being drawn toward the eschaton, not inherently, but by God Himself. This
means the directional character of history (i.e., history hastening toward
its consummation in the eschaton) is not understood in terns of Aristotle's
telos. It has no "teleologically-stamped idea of development." Pannenberg
defines historical continuity as being "continually created backward by the
restrospective attachment of the new to the earlier." Pannenberg's criticism
of Aristotle's doctrine of motion underscores this difference. He writes:
The futurism of this Aristotelian analysis of movement is
neutralized, however, by two notions. The first is the notion
of self-movement, already conceived of by the later Plato.
According to this doctrine the entelechy is not the anticipation
of the not yet attained goal, but is the already present (vor-
handen) germ, out of which the goal unfolds itself. This
inner teleology, which reverses the relation of present and future,
has robbed evolutionary thought until our day of the possibility
of seeing what is new in each event as something really new.
Even more decisive for Aristotle himself is the notion expressed
in his Metaphysics that the goal of the movement, in order to be
able to cause the movement, must already be somewhere. But if
the movement brings forth nothing except what is already actual
somewhere else, then nothing new can arise. Also, for Aristotle
the realm of forms is timeless, i.e., unlimited presence. Thus,
in Aristotle the Eleatic understanding of being prevailed once
again.^
4
D. History as the History-of-the-transmission-of-traditions
5
As it has already been shown, Pannenberg points out that the funda-
1Pannenberg says that Gehard Sauter (Zukunft und Verheissung
/ 1965_7, p. 266) wrongly draws this conclusion (Theology as History, p. 260n.).
^Ibid., p. 26ln. ^Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 139 •
Vames Robinson's translation of Traditionsgeschichte as "history
of the transmission of traditions" will be used throughout this section.
Cf. Theology as History, p. ix.
Supra, pp. 254ff.
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mental biblical meaning of the Word of God is not the direct self-revelation
of God, i.e., the direct self-disclosure of God's essence. He writes: "if
we do not wish to lose the specifically biblical content, then we must first
of all orient the dogmatic concept of the Word of God to the words of God
connected with the history of Israel and primitive Christianity—words that
have various functions and specific content." Pannenberg thus intends to
restore the declarative function of the word. This means that the Word of
God tells us something in the way of content that is not identical with the
essence of God. In this respect, the Word of God relates to revelation, but
is not in itself revelation. Rather, the word is "the concrete execution of
the history of revelation." To speak of the Word of God as a direct divine
self-revelation is a gnostic understanding of the word, not a biblical one.
Rather, the proof of the deity of God takes on the character of an "indirect
"X
self-revelation as a reflex of his activity In history. Thus, we have
returned to what has been suggested would be Panneriberg's adaptation of
Professor Mclntyre's concept of revelation—A(x) reveals B(y) to C(Historical
Reason).
If history is the sphere of God's revelation, then what significance
is the word? The answer is found in the ontological structure of historical
reality itself. History includes both natural events and meanings (words).
It is not made up of a positivistic idea of brute facts. Rather, history
4
speaks its own language within the context of its tradition. This means
"'"Revelation as History, pp. 11-12.
2Ibid., p. 152. ^Ibid., p. 13
^Ibid., p. 137. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 85- Lothar Staiger
has exaggerated Panneriberg's subordination of "word" to "event" when he says:
"Pannenberg does not have any concept of the word-character of revelation
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understanding is likewise a part of history, but understanding itself follows
as a natural consequence of seeing events in their traditio-historical con¬
text. However, it is only in the context of the whole of reality that the
true essence of any one event can be ascertained. Thus, when the word ascribes
to any event its essence, i.e., its meaning, then this can only be provisional
because the whole of reality in its historical development is not yet final.
Only God as the power of the future has such omniscience.
What Pannenberg thus proposes as a solution to the epistemological
question whether revelation is effected through word or event is a deeper
understanding of history as "history-of-the-transmission-of-traditions."
He differentiates his systematic concept of history as the history-of-the-
transmission-of-traditions from what is the formal method of exegetical and
form-critical research , which inquires from the given literary unity to
the original written traditions and then back to the oral traditions. Such
an exegetical or form-critical approach is not necessarily concerned with
the question of the factuality of the events reported in the traditions, but
with Pannenberg the question of the factuality of the events and their meaning
is of paramount importance. He thus broadens this method into a systematic
structure designed to include "the whole implied behavior of the participating
individuals ... in the investigation." This further means that "the
because he understands revelation to be the ordering of the data into the
overall conception of a plan of salvation" ("Revelation-History and Theological
Reason: A Critique of the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg," History and
Hermeneutic, p. 101). To be sure, Panneriberg does not ascribe any independent
authority to words as revelation, but words are ontologically tied up with
events, so that the kerygmatic proclamation is an essential part of God's
revelation in Jesus Christ (Revelation as History, p. 15*0.
"*3asic Questions in Theology, I, 93-
^Theology as History, p. 257n.
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systematic concept does not begin with the final stage of a text in order
to inquire back about the derivation of the material that has been fashioned
into it. Rather it begins at the points of origin reached through such
historical research and inquires into an open future of transformations,
mixtures, or ramifications of traditions.1,1
Thus, the underlying presupposition of this concept is that the di¬
vinity of God is not comprehended in any one event, but is indirectly revealed
in the course of the divine events reported in the traditions and ultimately
it is only at the end that God will be directly revealed. Thus, the divine
events which reach back into the earliest traditions of Israel's beginnings are
continuously absorbed, transformed, or rejected by subsequent traditions. This
means any particular divine event is not isolated in itself, but reaches beyond
itself whenever it is expressed in words, which serve as vehicles to carry
the meanings of the event to others for whom the word has general relevance
in that it affirms something about God. This historical experience which
"finds its precipitation in language" is then absorbed by others, and it
sheds light on their own historical experiences as well as these subsequent
experiences reflect new light on the previous historical experience. In this
respect, Pannenberg writes; "The natural events that are involved in the
history of a people have no meaning apart from the connection with the traditions
and expectations in which men live."
This historical continuum thus presupposes "the relationship . . .
between historical experience and language" which "makes it comprehensible
ti4
that history takes place as history of the transmission of traditions.
IP •*.
Ibid. Ibid., p. 256. ""Revelation as History, p. 152.
4
Theology as History, p. 256.
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Pannenberg further describes it this way:
It is a consequence of the language-character of historical
experience that human history always accomplishes itself as
history of the transmission of traditions, in dialogue with
the heritage of a past which is either adopted as one's own
or else rejected, and in anticipation of a future which is ^
more than the future of the particular individual concerned.
Tradition which is passed on is thus not an uncritical appropriation
of the past. It is not the blind acceptance of what has been handed down.
Rather, the history-of-the-transmission-of-traditions involves critical
re-assessment, modifications, re-interpretations, and an occasional extraction
2
of those parts no longer relevant or credible. Pannenberg sees this under¬
standing of the history-of-the-transmission-of-traditions to be at work in
the biblical traditions. For example, though the prophetic word announced
the future acts of God, the fulfillment did not always coincide exactly with
what had been promised. Rather, the events at times themselves reflected a
3
new understanding back upon the promises themselves. It thus follows that
revelation as history is the totality of speech and events. In this respect,
Panneriberg disallows a dualistic epistemology in which Historie and Geschichte,
oiiter history and inner history, are divorced. Pannenberg in this way is
pointing out that the concept of the Word of God must be linked to a complex
of events, if it is to be revelation. The Bible is thus re-defined in terms
of a history-of-the-transmission-of-traditions instead of an authoritative
book of revealed oracles.
Pannenberg points out that there are three principal meanings of the
"Word of God" in Scripture.^ First, there is the Word of God as promise.
^"Ibid. ^Theology as History, p. 258.
^Ibid., p. 120. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 88-95.
4
Revelation as History, pp. 152-155*
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However, the prophetic word is not established as proof of God's divinity
until its fulfillment in history iias come about (I Kings 22:28j Deut. 18:
9-22; Jer. 28:6-9). Second there is the Word of God as forthtelling. As
such, the function of the word is to proclaim God's Law and commandments.
Third, the Word of God is designated as the apostolic kerygma in the New
Testament. Panneriberg writes:
By far the preponderant meaning of the designation "Word of God"
in the New Testament is the word of the apostolic proclamation.
The message of the apostles is called the Word of God, because
it is decisively set in motion (I Thess. 2:13) through the
appearances of Jesus (Gal. 1:12, 15f.). This is not because of
human effort, but because of God himself. This is really more
properly understood as a report of the event in which God is
revealed, as the report of the fate of Jesus. This can be seen
in the genitive constructions like Word of the cross, Word of
redemption, as well as in the parallel usage Word of God and
gospel. The appropriate response to this event of the
eschatological self-vindication of God is that of "reporting,"
and this can be so proclaimed in every language, culture, and
situation as the decisive act of God's salvation. In this
connection, an objective and detached chronological description
of this event would not measure up to what is involved in
"reporting." Thus, the apostolic word in the sense of report
is also essentially proclamation.
Thus, the kerygmatic proclamation of God's revelation in Jesus Christ
is an essential element, for without this "universal notification" of God's
act in Jesus, revelation would not be effected. Equally important is the
realization that the kerygma does not "add" something to this revelation,
2
but rather the kerygma is to be seen in the light of its content. This
means the kerygma as the Word of God has revelatory significance only to the
extent that it points to Jesus. This further means the word has no autonomous
status. The significance of the word lies in what it declares.
1Ibid., p. 154.
p
Ibid., pp. 15^-155. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 85.
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Pannenberg thus rejects the idea of a Christology which takes its
starting point either in contemporary Christian experience or the mere
kerygma of the primitive church. The validation of Christian faith is to be
decided on the basis of its content, not the mere proclamation of the kerygma.
The content of faith relates to what Jesus was and then secondarily to what
he is today for the believer. This means for Pannenberg that it is exclu¬
sively the historical method of critically reconstructing the events of Jesus'
life upon which Christology must depend. Panneriberg writes: "Only in trust
in the reliability of the report of Jesus' resurrection and exaltation are
we able to turn in prayer to the one who is exalted and now lives, and thus
to associate with him in the present."''" The emphasis is on "reliability."
Pannenberg argues that theology can only show the truth claim of Christian
faith as it goes behind the kerygma to the events themselves. In thus stressing
the declarative character of language, he points out the tension that exists
between the kerygma and its content. This tension was worked out by Baur in
terms of a "Tendenzkritik," which means one must ferret out the actual history
behind the texts if an accurate picture is to be had. The texts thus exhibit
various tendencies which indicate that what they express is not identical
with the events to which they refer. This means the texts point away from
2
themselves to other events. In this respect, Pannehberg describes the
kerygma as "report" rather than a mere "witness." He insists that the New
Testament must be taken as a 'historical source' and not only as a 'preaching
"'"Jesus—God and Man, p. 28.
2
History and Hermeneuticr,. pp. 125ff. Cf. Peter C. Hodgson, The
Formation of Historical Theology (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1966), pp. 196ff. Cf.F. C. Baur, Kritische Untersuchungen {iber die
kanonischen Evangelien (Tubingen: L. F. Fues, 18^7).
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text'.1 In this respect, Panneriberg rejects K&iler's identification of the
kerygmatic presentation of Jesus Christ and the historical Jesus, though
Pannenberg does insist upon their continuity. While Kfihler argued that the
real Jesus is the whole biblical Christ, Pannenberg denies that Jesus can be
simply equated with the apostle's keiygmatic presentation. For KRhler,
the canons of modern historiography cannot do Justice to the New Testament.
At most, historical-critical study can ascertain only a "historical minimum"
which may be used to persuade the "unbeliever" to give the kerygma an honest
hearing. On the other hand, if the New Testament is to be judged exclusively
on the basis of the historical-critical method, then the gospels are utterly
unreliable. However, if historical study assumes a more moderate role of
providing the working material for dogmatics whose task is to make "an
inventory of our assets, then it can point out that the activity of Jesus
is to be seen from the perspective of his resurrection in the light of the
Old Testament background, and that this then throws light on the historical
activity of Jesus' earthly life as well.^ Similarly, Cullmann has pointed
out that the apostolic kerygma refers back to the historical Jesus first of
all through his resurrection, then to the actual kerygma of Jesus himself,
5
and then re-interprets this in the light of the Old Testament kerygma.
Pannenberg is in only partial agreement here. He cannot accept the view
that the pre-Easter Jesus is to be seen in the light of his divine-human
"*■
Jesus—God and Man, p. 25.
2 3
Ibid., p. 23. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 8I-87. Supra, p. 191.
^K&hler, The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical
Christ, p. 86.
^Salvation in History, pp. 104, 110, 111.
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person. To be sure, Jesus appeared as a man with a sense of divine mission,
but he did not appear as the God-man. Only on the basis of his resurrection
can one affirm his divinity. Thus, the passion narratives are not historical,
but mythological (in the bad sense of the word). He writes:
In retrospect from the perspective of the resurrection, it is
true that Jesus in his person was one with God also in his life
before Easter. However, when Jesus' pre-Easter life is conceived
as having been already divine-human in a direct sense, our con¬
ception of Jesus falls back into the mythological realm.-'-
Pannenberg also finds himself in disagreement with Paul Althaus, who
asserts the resurrection is "historically perceptible," but not "historically
2demonstrable." What Pannenberg is arguing is that only what can be histor-
3
ically demonstrated can be a valid theological statement. In this respect,
his Christology begins "from below," not "from above." This means he does
not pursue an incarnational Christology, but begins with the man Jesus himself.
Only in this way does he arrive at an understanding of Jesus' unity with the
Father. Thus, Pannenberg concludes that Jesus' divinity cannot be decided
4
upon the basis of his earthly activity, but upon his resurrection.
Since the only means of ascertaining the revelation of God in Jesus
of Nazareth is through the historical method (i.e., the historian must
investigate what the facts are behind the kerygma), Pannenberg cannot sus-
cribe to any form of an authoritative "Word of God" theology which would
have the effect of merely suppressing critical rationality and compelling
belief. In this sense, he denies to revelation the status of something
1 2
Jesus—God and Man, p. 224. Ibid., p. 109.
^Basic Questions in Theology, I, 198-199-
4
Jesus—God and Man, pp. 33-37-
^Ibid., p. 99; Basic Questions in Theology, I, 139» 160, 195-198-
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received supernaturally. Until the Enlightenment, the Bible had been more
or less identified as the Word of God, which was conceived as supernaturally
inspired. In neo-Orthodoxy, revelation was no longer identified with the
Bible, but with the Word of God as kerygmatic proclamation (Bultmann) or as
Jesus Christ who is the source of the preached and the written word (Barth).
Pannenberg says this shift from the orthodox concept of revelation nevertheless
left intact the idea of authoritarianism. "But for men who live in the sphere
in which the Enlightenment lias become effective, authoritarian claims are no
longer acceptable." Pannenberg in this way is seeking to point out the in¬
adequacy of all authoritarian theologies which in essence would exempt the
truth-claim of Christian faith from critical rationality. He thus says: "it
was for this reason that I finally turned away from the 'theology of the Word
of God' in its different present-day forms.
To be sure, Pannenberg admits that authoritarianism is a character¬
istic feature of both the Old and New Testaments, that the prophets conceived
of their message as the authoritative Word of God and that the apostles
(especially Paul) identified their message as the authoritative Word of God.
Such authoritarianism is characteristic of episcopal and papal claims, as
well as the Reformers' sola scriptura. However, Pannenberg sees in the
^Theology as History, p. 226. ^Ibid.
3
Ibid., p. 227. It is not altogether justifiable for Pannenberg to
charge that Barth's theology of the Word of God is merely subscribing to
an uncritical acceptance of authority. Barth (as well as Bultmann) is just
as concerned with the truth-claim of Christian faith as Pannenberg is.
Instead of suggesting that Barth equates faith with blind gullibility, it
would be more accurate to say that Barth locates the validation of Christian
faith in God's authentication of His Word in Holy Scripture (i.e., testi¬
monium Splritus Sancti internum), whereas Pannenberg thinks the historical-
critical method is entirely adequate for such purposes.
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Enlightenment's demand for individual freedom over against all forms of
authority the mature result of Christian faith itself.Pannenberg thus
wants to separate the authentic (in the sense of being verifiable) biblical
experiences of God from the authoritarian claims of the Bible itself. In
this respect, Pannenberg speaks of the dissolution of the Protestant Scripture
principle. What is normative for valid theological statements is not the
biblical texts themselves, but the historically verifiable events which the
2
texts report.
Thus, what Pannenberg calls for is a "depositivization" of the "pre-
modern Christian tradition. This depositivization would render useless
the idea of demythologizing, especially in the light of the fact that Pan¬
nenberg thinks demythologizing in Bultmann did not completely abandon the
4
outmoded authoritarianism of the church tradition. Thus, his basic dis¬
agreement with the theology of the Word of God is its suppression of rational
inquiry into revelation: "The question concerning the revelation of God, as
it has been reformulated on the basis of the Enlightenment, is not seeking
for some authoritarian court which suppresses critical questioning and
individual judgment, but for a manifestation of divine reality which meets the
I ItS
test of man s matured understanding as such.
He thus says that "thinking which has appropriated the questions of
the Enlightenment can no longer be content with asserted authorities." Rather,
1Ibid., pp. 227-228.
O /
Pannenberg, "La signification de l'^schatologie pour la comprehension
de l'apostolicit! et de la catholicit! de I'Eglise," Istina, XII (1969)*
Cf. Basic Questions in Theology, I, 4, 6, 7* 12; Theology as History, p. 228.
•^Theology as History, p. 228. ^Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 229.
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modern man "must ask about the adequacy of the claims of authority." Otherwise,
if authoritative claims compel belief then faith will "deteriorate into the
'work' of an illusory redemption of oneself." This would mean that "the be¬
liever who thinks that he can give the answer to the trial of gnawing doubt
through the act of faith itself is already on the road to such a self-deceptive
works-righteousness."^" In thus rejecting any authoritarian feature insofar as
the idea of revelation is concerned, Pannenberg is trying to guard theology
2
against the charge of illusion in Peuerbach's or Freud's sense.
Pannenberg, however, makes it quite clear that he is not intending to
lessen the ministry of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer. In reply
to John Cobb's criticism that Pannenberg draws "attention away from the question
of God's immediate dealings with individuals,"^ Panneriberg says: "Far be it
from me to contest the immediacy of contingent divine activity in individuals.
Cobb's criticism is prompted by Panneriberg's insistence that a direct self-
r
manifestation (not a direct self-revelation) of God, i.e., God directly
manifests himself to someone in the form of a verbal communication, is not
truly revelation for us, except as it can be "confirmed" to be true on the
basis of its traditio-historical context. This is to say, a direct self-
manifestation of God which takes the form of "prophetic inspiration" does not
have "an autonomous status as revelation," so far as it relates to our
1Tbid., p. 270. 2Ibid., p. 239-
•^Cobb, "Past, Present, and Future," Theology as History, p. 209.
Theology as History, p. 238.
k i
A direct self-revelation would be the full disclosure of God s essence,
whereas a direct self-manifestation involves only the appearance of God with¬
out any reference to a disclosure of his essence. Cf. Revelation as History,
P" 9"
6
Theology as History, p. 238.
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critical consciousness today.
In effect, it would thus certainly appear, despite his denial, that
Pannenberg has minimized the prophetic word which is so characteristic of the
Old Testament. He clearly rejects any "isolated supernatural inspiration"
even if it should be the Old Testament prophets. Only as the prophetic word
conveys what has happened in the past and from this announces provisionally
what will happen in the future does it have any theological validity today.
Thus, Pannenberg clearly suggests that he will not allow for the validity of
any divinely-inspired communication to the prophets, for words are solely the
vehicles which convey the meaning of divine historical acts. Thus, words in
themselves are not to be seen as revelation.
To be sure, Pannenberg correctly points out that a direct experience
of God as well as all consciousness "is itself mediated through the previous
history of individuals within their environment, as well as through their
relation to the future toward which their anxieties and hopes are directed."'''
And of course, his emphasis upon the inseparable relationship of historical
experience and language is intended to be directed against the Barthian
theology of the Word of God which says quite plainly that revelation is not
concerned directly with the question of historical understanding. But, if
the Barthian theology placed one-sided emphasis upon the "word" as the medium
of revelation, it is clear that Pannenberg has one-sidedly emphasized his¬
torical events as the medium of revelation.
Farther, if Pannenberg so strongly insists that the revelatory events
are open for anyone who has eyes to see and that the interpretation of these
events is self-evident to historical reason, why is there no general consensus
1Ibid.
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of opinion concerning the revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth? Pannenberg's
answer is found in Paul's statement that "the god of this world has blinded
the minds of the unbelievers" (II Cor. 4:4)."'' If this is so, then historical
reason can hardly qualify as the sole means of ascertaining the proper inter¬
pretation of revelatory events. Instead, one must rely also upon the Holy
Spirit "who will guide you into all the truth" (John 16:13). This is not to
introduce the Holy Spirit as a "stop-gap" for ignorance, but a fundamental
biblical recognition that man's powers of reason also come under the curse of
the Fall.
This related question must also be put to Pannenberg. If he does
not discount the direct influence of the Holy Spirit upon the believer, why
must it be asserted that only through the historical method can God's revelation
2
in history be established? To be sure, revelation must show itself to man's
critical rationality as being valid. But if God's Spirit is really operative
in the life of the believer, then cannot "contemporary Christian experience"
be a decisive factor? If God really acted in the past events to make himself
known, can he not likewise confirm his past activity in our "contemporary
Christian experience"? Is this not the significance of the Reformers'
teaching concerning the testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum, that one is
brought to fiducial faith through the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, who
likewise guarantees the certainty of what is the basis of faith? John Calvin
put it this way:
But I answer, that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to
reason. For as God alone can properly bear witness to his own
words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts
^Revelation as History, p. 136
2
Jesus—God and Man, pp. 99# 109-
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of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the
Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke by the mouth
of the prophets, must penetrate our hearts, in order to con¬
vince us that they faithfully delivered the message with which
they were divinely intrusted.
However, Pannenberg will not subscribe to the doctrine of Scriptural
inspiration. Rather, for him "history is the most comprehensive horizon of
2
Christian theology." To be sure, the idea of universal history can be
supported from the "given" of the biblical witness. But, to say that it is
"the most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology" is affirming more than
the biblical witness permits. In this respect, it is highly problematic to
make the idea of universal history the single overarching principle of Christian
theology, for the witness of Holy Scripture is too varied to be subsumed under
3
a single concept. This is to say, any one all-embracing principle that is
substituted for the Reformers' sola scriptura principle must be judged arbi¬
trary and one-sided. Thus, not universal history, but Holy Scripture itself
in its manifold witness^ is "the most comprehensive horizon of Christian
"^Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1879), I, 72.
2
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, I, 15•
5Cf. Karl Gerhard Steck's criticism of the Heilsgeschichte theology
in this regard ("Die Idee der Heilsgeschichte," Theologische Studien, LVT
/ 1959_7, 10ff.). Cf. James Barr, "Revelation tErough history in the Old
Testament and in modern theology," Interpretation, XVTI (1963)# 193-205*
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To be sure, Pannenberg recognizes the manifold witness of Scripture,
but he thinks that the idea of the unity of Scripture is dissolved. Thus,
following K&semann (Essays on New Testament Themes, pp. 48-62), Pannenberg
speaks of a canon within the Canon. In this respect, the "material norm"
within the Canon is the Christ event which lies behind the kerygma and which
can be ascertained by the historical-critical method (Basic Questions in
Theology, I, 194-196). It Is this presupposition that the unity of Scripture
is dissolved, as well as his attempt to go "behind" the kerygmatic presen¬
tation of Jesus as the Saviour in order to ascertain the real historical
Jesus (as though the gospels intended to be primarily "reports" rather than
'witnesses,") that is highly problematic. Insofar as the unity of Scripture
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theology." This is not to suggest that one can dispense with all presup¬
positions in his study of the Bible, or that one can simply read off the
meaning of the biblical content as though the Bible consisted of a book of
systematically-formulated oracles. In this respect. Professor Mclntyre has
shown, in special reference to the method of Christology, that theological
method is "a complex of several distinct methods, including such methods
as the literary-critical, the dogmatic, the historical, the sociological and
2
geographical, the liturgical, and the ethical. What is thus being argued
here against Panneriberg is that while there is no single theological method,
nevertheless, Holy Scripture (and not universal history) is "the most compre¬
hensive horizon of Christian theology."
This further question must be put to Pannenberg. Does he not in
effect allow for at least the partial legitimation of the knowledge of reve¬
lation through the testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum when he says that
one can have fellowship with Jesus without regard to his theological and
historical knowledge? If one can say, thus, that the Holy Spirit imparts
the inward certainty of the truth of revelation, is not Pannenberg's heavy
reliance upon the historical method a one-sided neglect of the cognitive
aspect of faith? To be sure, Pannenberg deserves the merit of pointing out
so cogently that the biblical texts must be treated as historical sources
if faith is not to be made suspect. He has thus impressively shown in his
is concerned, KHhler has (it seems to me) rightly argued for the theological
perfection of the Bible (i.e., perfectio respectu finis). Insofar as the
possibility of getting back behind the kerygma Is concerned, one can also
argue with KMhler that the biblical, historic Christ is not an importation
of the early Church, but rather the early Church confessed Jesus as the
risen Christ because "Christ himself is the originator of the biblical pic¬
ture of the Christ" (Supra, p. 195)•
^The Shape of Christology, p. 38. 2lbid., pp. 30-52.
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book, Jesus—God and Man, that the believer's subjective certainty of God's
revelation can be seen to be objectively true. But in thus stressing the
exclusively historical method for getting at the actual course of revelatory
events, has he not depreciated the theological intention of the biblical
texts? This devaluation of the theological intention of the biblical texts is
especially seen in his negative judgment concerning the passion narratives,
as well as his rejection of the identification of the divine-human Jesus with
the historical Jesus. To be sure, Pannenberg's desire for the rational
purity of faith accounts for this devaluation, and thus the theological in¬
tention of the gospel writers looks too much like a subjective and arbitrary
projection into the actual course of events of Jesus' life. Is this presup¬
position valid? Are the theological interpretations of the gospel evangelists
arbitrary and mythological?
Since Pannenberg has broadened the historical method to a universal-
historical method (i.e., he integrates the historical and hermeneutical
methods into one universal-historical method thereby showing that historical
facts speak their own language in the context of their own traditions which
also embraces the era of the investigator), is this not an excellent way of
showing how the disciples were able to see the historical Jesus for what he
really was. That is, is not Pannenberg's universal-historical method an
apt way of showing that Jesus as the divine-human person can be properly
seen only from the perspective of his resurrection? Cullmann, who also
speaks of the chains of traditions through which revelatory events are to
be seen so that subsequent events cast light back upon previous events, or
vice versa, points out that the real picture of Jesus could not be had until
after the resurrection of Jesus. The reason why the resurrection kerygma
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is so essential to a proper Christology is because the significance of Jesus'
life did not come into full view until after the resurrection. This does not
mean that the disciples placed a different interpretation on the life of Jesus
than Jesus had himself, but rather it means that the disciples stood in a
different relationship to Jesus after the resurrection. Cullmann puts it this
ways
The recent debate about the 'historical Jesus' often suffers from
failing to take into account that not only the events but also
their salvation-historical interpretation—in the proclamation of
Jesus—were given with the historical Jesus, and that the disciples
were not announcing this interpretation for the first time after
his death. Instead, after Jesus' death his interpretation was
newly discovered by the disciples simultaneously with the new
Interpretation which they then shared in for the first time. For
this reason the Johannine concept of the recollection effected
through the Spirit is a particularly apt expression for this
state of affairs.1
Thus, if one follows Pannenberg's emphasis upon the chain of events,
which is the bearer of revelation, then one can appreciate the historical
character of the gospel "reports" on the very basis that the historical Jesus
is the whole biblical Christ. That is, the picture of Jesus which emerges in
the gospels is reflected from a "higher perspective" than what can be gained
from a positivistic historiography. To be sure, Pannenberg is not at all
pursuing such a positivistic historiography. He likewise points out the
ontological significance of Jesus' resurrection for his divinity, but at the
same time he fails to appreciate the historical significance of the gospels
whenever they interpret the events of Jesus' life from the perspective of
his divine-human person. Such an interpretation for Pannenberg is mythological,
despite his insight that subsequent events illuminate previous events, and
in this case Cullmann has rightly pointed out that the events of Jesus' life
^Salvation in History, p. 104.
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could only be properly interpreted from the perspective of the resurrection.
If one rules out a priori the doctrine of Scriptural inspiration, it
is difficult to see how one could speak of relevatory events exclusively in
terms of a "depositivization," so that the final judgment in any matter con¬
cerning historical events of the past must be decided by the historical
method. Oscar Cullmann has shown that much that is reported as events in
the Bible does not fall under the category of being historically verifiable.
However, at the same time they are so intertwined with historically control¬
lable events that it is impossible at times to differentiate the controllable
from the uncontrollable elements. In this respect, Cullmann chooses to speak
of events, such as, the creation, fall of Adam, the second coming of Jesus,
etc., as "historicized myths," i.e., events which are divine events though
real events which do not come under what is historically controllable. This
is to say, these occurrences which are historically uncontrollable events
nevertheless "really happen" and "must not be conceived as metaphysical and
nontemporal," but rather they are "included in the temporal process.""'"
The distinction that Cullmann is making between "history" and "myth"
corresponds to the traditional distinction between what is naturally and what
is supernaturally known. Though Cullmann clearly defines what he means by
myth (e.g., myth is a divine, temporal event which cannot be historically
ascertained), perhaps the distinction between the natural and supernatural
would be terminologically less confusing, even though it may be apologetically
more unsuitable. At any rate, for one who is not to dismiss the idea of
inspiration so summarily in favor of a strictly historical-critical approach
(as in the case of Pannenberg), it must be said that it is doubtful that
1Ibid., p. 143.
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one can sustain the reality of revelation exclusively in terms of what can be
historically demonstrated. To be sure, that events play such a prominent
role insofar as revelation is concerned makes historical-critical research
necessary. Cullmann rightly points this out:
Just as eyewitnessing is a fundamental accompaniment to a witness
of faith for ^he apostle, and one cannot be thought of without
the other ( brtL&reircr&y/ John 20.8), in the same
way, research on the narrated events with any available means
precedes faith in the interpretation of the events for the exegete.^
Further, Cullmann points out that what does fall under the category
of being historically controllable indirectly confirms those parts, such as
the creation, the eschaton, etc., which are not under historical control.
Especially the witness of the prophets and the apostles is a key to faith in
that they stand in close proximity to revelatory events. This leads Cullmann
to say: "it must be noted that the apostles' eyewitness is more important
than that of all the other biblical witnesses because it relates to the
decisive events / i.e., the Christ event_7 and in this way indirectly guar-
2
antees the revelations of all the previous witnesses."
What Cullmann is distinguishing here between the historically control¬
lable and the historically uncontrollable elements of the biblical witness
is illustrated in regard to the factual event of Jesus' resurrection. It
is "not itself accessible to historical control," though it "is linked with
facts at least theoretically provable within the historical framework—the
"5
resurrection appearances and the empty tomb. Thus, on the basis of the
apostles' testimony, one can affirm the bodily resurrection of Jesus from
the dead, while acknowledging such an affirmation is not subject to a direct
historical demonstration, though nevertheless it is a valid historical
1Ibid., p. 73. 2Ibid., p. 296. ^Ibid., p. 143.
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statement.
What is being argued here is that the knowledge upon which faith has
its point of departure does not altogether qualify as historically controllable
knowledge. But, this is not to bring in the Holy Spirit as a stop-gap for
ignorance, but is a fundamental recognition of the cognitive aspect of faith,
i.e., the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. Though faith has its frame
of reference in historical events, these events do not necessarily qualify
as being historically demonstrated. Though they may be "historically percep¬
tible," nevertheless it is the witness of the prophets and the apostles that
creates faith and not what can be merely demonstrated historically. Thus,
faith also relates to the credibility of the witnesses of divine revelation,
who themselves stand in a relationship to the witness of their predecessors,
which culminates in the final witness of the apostles to Jesus Christ. This
chain of witnesses to divine revelation which culminates in the witness of the
apostles is the basis for Cullmann's statement that their witness "indirectly
guarantees the revelations of all the previous witnesses.1,1 Cullmann further
points this out:
Faith is therefore also a faith in the witnesses, or rather in
their function in salvation history. Faith intrudes upon us as
we hear the witness, although we see the human weakness and im¬
perfection of the witnesses themselves. We cannot be eyewitnesses
any more. But to be witnesses ourselves we must believe in their
witness. This looks like dead 'faith in authority'. But the
biblical witnesses, the prophets and apostles, are so closely
bound up with the salvation history revealed to them that their
witness as such can become an object of a true and living faith
in their mission the basis of which lies in the mission of the
bearer of revelation, Christ. We have seen that the biblical
witnesses too believe in the witness of their predecessors, so
that the new facts and their interpretation are connected with
the salvation history of the past. We find ourselves in this




Finally, though Pannenberg seeks to show that Christian faith is not
merely submitting to "asserted authorities" and thus he substitutes the idea
of the inspiration of Holy Scripture with the idea of the history-of-the-
transmission-of-traditions, it is questionable whether or not such a strictly
rational approach to the truth of revelation will be convincing to non-
believing "historians," especially since the Scriptures are primarily keryg-
matic in intention and are only, though in an important sense, secondarily
historical sources. Furthermore, since theology cannot move beyond the concept
of historical probability, it is not likely to be convincing to non-believers
to say that the revelation of God can be ascertained through a mere critical
reconstruction of historical events unless at the same time one can speak of
the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. But, Pannenberg will not allow
for this distinction. He says that "the word itself brings the Spirit with
2
it," but the Spirit is "not a special condition for knowledge" of revelation.
If in fact the word itself is Spirit-filled as such, why is it that Pannenberg
says that only the historical-critical method can "verify" the truth-content
of faith? If the kerygma is "Spirit-filled" as such, why cannot the Spirit
authenticate its own message? To be sure, this is not to reject his proposal
for a historical revelation, but it is a rejection of his one-sided emphasis
upon what the historical method can do. In place of this, why not hold to
both Pannenberg's use of the historical method and the Reformers' teaching
concerning the testimonium Spirltus Sancti internum? Thus, if Bultmann's
one-sided existential exegesis of the New Testament is not acceptable, neither
is Pannenberg's exclusive historical-critical exegesis.
"L 2
Salvation in History, p. 323- Revelation as History, p. 196.
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What, then, is the validation of Christian faith? A critical recon¬
struction of history provides faith with a knowledge of its basis and helps
to remove its "gnawing doubt that it has no basis beyond itself."1 Rational
arguments may demonstrate that Christian faith deals more realistically with
2
human nature than all other options. But, in the final analysis, the vali¬
dation of Christian faith comes about through the internal confirmation of
the Holy Spirit. This means that one's experience with the risen Christ
reveals itself in "love, Joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness,
faith, meekness, temperance" (Galatians 5:22-23)- Otherwise, if faith is not
a way of knowing, then K&hler's question is all the more pertinent: "How
can Jesus Christ be the authentic object of the faith of all Christians if
the questions what and who he really was can be established only by ingenious
investigation and if it is solely the scholarship of our time which proves
itself equal to this task?"^
4
D. Universal History and the Problem of Historical Relativity
As it has already been pointed out, the central problem which histor¬
ical relativity poses for Christian faith is this—how can events which are
historically conditioned have absolute and universal significance for all
mankind? Troeltsch puts it this way:
It is difficult to bring out a single point of history within
1Supra, p. 335
^Tlils is one of the main thrusts of Reinhold Niebuhr in his Nature
and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 196k).
^K&hler, p. 102.
4
Cf. Laurence W. Wood, A Study of David Friedrich Strauss on the
Problem of Faith and History," (unpublished Master's thesis, Christian
Theological Seminary, 1969), PP. 88-98.
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this long time, and specifically to think of a direct middle
point of our individual religious history as the exclusive
center of all mankind. This looks much too severe to absolutize
our accidental individual surroundings.^
David Strauss says: "it /"the Idea_/ is not wont to lavish all its fulness
on one exemplar, and be niggardly towards all others—to express itself
O
perfectly in that one individual; and imperfectly in all the rest." We have
cited many attempts to cope with this problem of "particularity." For example,
Bultmann seeks to overcome historical relativity by leaving it undisturbed
insofar as faith is concerned. He writes:
The only way to preserve the unworldly, transcendental character
of the divine activity is to regard it not as an interference
in worldly happenings, but something accomplished in them in
such a way that the closed weft of history as it presents itself
to objective observation is left undisturbed.^
But does historical relativity mean that events are all governed by
a natural cause-and-effect relationship which leaves out God's creative
activity? In this respect, historical relativity, i.e., the historical con¬
ditioning of all truth, is to be seen from the perspective of an eschatological
doctrine of creation, i.e., the present is to be judged not simply in the
light of the past, but from the future which draws the present which is now
past toward its ultimate goal in the eschaton.
How does this eschatological doctrine of creation resolve the problem
of a single point of time in history as possessing universal and absolute
meaning for all mankind? That is, the crucial philosophical problem thus is
whether or not there can be such an absolutely unique event. Is it possible
^Supra, pp. 2-3.
^The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, p. 780.
^Kerygma and Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, p. 197*
j>8b
for the Christ event to be the mid-point of all history? Certainly if the
historical claim of Christian faith is true, then the Christ event would
have absolute meaning for all mankind since it would be the center point of
universal history. But since this would be to "absolutize our accidental
individual surroundings," Troeltsch would argue that it was not very probable.
However, Troeltsch points out that the development of the whole
universe was "absolutely unique" and that it becomes comprehensible only
when we "referthe existence of the actual to the arbitrary fiat of Deity.
There is no other explanation of the world as a whole."1 But if this is true,
why is it incredible to argue that the Christ event itself is absolutely
unique—at least from a philosophical perspective? That is, if the resur¬
rection which Christian faith interprets to be the vindication of Jesus'
claim to divine authority was really witnessed by his followers, would they
have had any other choice than to "refer the existence of the actual to the
arbitrary flat of Deity?"
Thus, it seems that the burden of proof lies as heavily on one who
does not accept the possibility of an absolutely unique occurrence happening
within the historic process. To doubt the possibility of an absolutely
unique occurrence is like doubting the reality of the universe inasmuch as
Troeltsch has shown that the universe defined in terms of its entire devel¬
opment is an absolutely unique event. Thus, a critical reconstruction of
history should be the criterion for evaluating the possibility of the absolute
uniqueness of Christ rather than philosophical arguments. This is why
Pannenberg has said; "The judgment about whether an event, however unfamiliar,
'''Ernst Troeltsch, "Contingency," Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, ed. James Hastings, IV, 88.
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has happened or not is in the final analysis a matter for the historian and
cannot be prejudged by the knowledge of natural science.""1"
Though philosophically we may admit the possibility of such an unre¬
peatable occurrence, would it still not be arrogant to absolutize our own
accidental sphere of history to say it happened only this one time? Further,
is it not a selfish claim to be the chosen people of God, as it is claimed in
the history of Israel?
It is only natural to think that all people have an equal opportunity
in their quest for God. It would be less embarassing for theologians to
admit that Christianity only stands as the sublimest of religions. Reihhold
Niebuhr writes:
It is a scandal for all rationalistic interpretations of history
that the idea of a universal history should have emerged from
the core of a particular historical event, whether that event
be the covenant of God with Israel, or, as the New Testament
conceives it, the "second covenant," instituted by the coming
of Christ.^
It is this "scandal of particularity" that Christian faith cannot
compromise. While there is no point in trying to deny any validity to other
religions, it must be admitted that the biblical view of revelation speaks of
God revealing Himself in a special way to certain individuals within the con¬
text of world history. Admittedly, this view of biblical revelation is
highly selective. It is one man who fathers a nation. One man leads the
Israelites out of slavery. Only a few prophets are selected to be God's
messengers to the people. Only one king rules over the people at a time.
Ultimately, one woman gives birth to Jesus of Nazareth, whose life, death,
^"Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, p. 98.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 19^9)* P. 105«
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and resurrection have eschatological meaning for all mankind.
This process of selection seems to be highly unfair and arbitrary,
or to put it in Strauss' terms, "niggardly.1,1 Yet, this is a basic principle
of nature. Why is it that all men are not born with the same mental capa¬
bilities? Why is it that some are born with physical defects and others are
born normal? Why is it that the length of life is not the same for all? Why
is it that all men are not born with equal economio and educational opportu¬
nities? Why is it that man only of all the living species is rational? Why
is it that some men are chosen to govern others instead of every man governing
2
himself without any outside political interference?
To insist that certain individuals cannot be divinely chosen for the
sake of others is to confuse the basic understanding of all nature. It is
a characteristic of nature to be highly selective and arbitrary. This
favoritism from the standpoint of nature is amoral, though its evil aspects
are the results of man's sin (Romans 8:19-23). But, in regard to the biblical
faith, God's favoritism is of a different kind. To insist that the biblical
idea of selectivity is "niggardly" is to confuse the intention of God's
revelation, for God is no respector of persons (Acts 10:34). Since all men
have sinned, all come under the judgment of God. There is no man who knows
God apart from God making himself known to man. All men stand on equal
footing before God. Consequently, God's favoritism to certain individuals
carries with it moral implications. Each individual is chosen, not merely
for the sake of his own personal destiny, but for the destiny of all mankind.
1Supra, p. 383.
P




Abraham's call is to be the founder of the nation through which
all the nations will bless themselves. Moses is called to be
the liberator of an enslaved people. The great prophets are
all called to be God's messengers to the people and politicians
of their time. The apostles are called by Jesus to be his
messengers to the nations. The calling of the individual is
not simply for the acceptance of his own personal destiny; it
is for the fulfilment of his role in God's plan for the sal¬
vation of mankind. It is a calling to responsible partici¬
pation in the events which are the key to world history.
Ultimately, it was Jesus of Nazareth who was selected to be the one
particular person whose purpose was to reconcile the world to God. Paul
writes: "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (II Corin¬
thians 5*19)• This reconciliation brought about a new situation altogether
in the world since the time that sin entered the world and man's relationship
to God was broken. This reconciliation further brought about a disclosure
of meaning in history which otherwise could never have been known. Men
everywhere can now have fellowship with God through an encounter with the
risen Christ. Paul speaks of man's existential participation in salvation
this way: "For there is no distinction between Jew and Greek; the same Lord
is Lord of all and bestows his riches upon all who call upon him. For every¬
one who calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved" (Romans 10:12-13).
Thus, it can be said that history has been the progressive unfolding of God's
will in the world to all mankind, which was proleptically fulfilled In Jesus
of Nazareth in that he was the pre-actualization of the goal of history, i.e.,
the coming Kingdom of God has provisionally already arrived in the person of
Jesus Christ and is to be fully consummated In the eschaton.
In this way, it can be said that revelation is not to be defined in
^Lesslie Newbigin, Honest Religion for Secular Man (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1966), p.
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terms of Geschichte in contrast to Historic, or faith in contrast to knowledge,
or the moment of faith's decision in contrast to a knowledge of historical
facts, or "mere word" in contrast to "mere fact." Rather, God's self-
revelation is to be seen in terms of history as an indirect self-disclosure
of His essence which is to be consummated in the eschaton at which time God's
direct self-revelation will be effected. Here, then, is the proposal of a
theology of universal history as a possible option for resolving the problems
of a dualistic religious epistemology.
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